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IMPERIALISM IN THE ANCIENT WORLD

EDITED BY

P. D. A. GARNSEY AND C. R. WHITTAKER

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THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH SEMINAR
IN ANCIENT HISTORY

Edited by

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PREFACE

This is the second volume arising from the Cambridge Seminar in Ancient History directed by Professor Moses Finley. We take this opportunity to express our appreciation for the active assistance and encouragement he has given us as editors and scholars.

This volume reflects the aim of the architect of the Seminar to approach the subject of imperialism on a broad front. Unlike its predecessor, *Studies in Roman Property* (1976), it ranges over a wide expanse of history and covers a number of different societies, from New Kingdom Egypt to Rome under the Principate. Despite the inevitable gaps and unevenness of coverage, all important aspects of imperialism are given detailed and systematic attention in one or more studies. There is sufficient overlap of subject matter and interests to invite comparative assessment. Uniformity of viewpoint has not been sought after, nor has it been attained. In this, the volume reflects the present state of the debate on imperialism in the ancient world.

We wish to thank R. Van Dam for his valuable help in editorial matters.

July 1977

C.R.W.
P.G.

1: INTRODUCTION

P.D.A.Garnsey and C.R.Whittaker

The first and major problem in discussing imperialism is one of definition.[1] 'Imperialism' has become a term of abuse, implying unjust or oppressive rule or control of one people by another. These pejorative connotations are central to the meaning of the word as it has been interpreted by numerous historians of antiquity, with the result that it has been all but eliminated from their accounts of interstate relations. In the case of the Delian League, where it was not at all obvious that the dominant state ruled benignly or in the interests of its subjects, scholars have fallen back on the assertion that Athenian-allied relations were 'hegemonial' in character rather than 'imperialistic' in the first decades of the existence of the League (if not through the entire inter-war period); meanwhile Thucydides' characterization of the Athenian empire as a tyranny has been attributed by some to the historian's political prejudices, which led him to overlook the popularity of Athens among the lower classes of the empire.

The requirement that an imperialist power must have imperialist aims and motives has further narrowed the concept of imperialism and limited its applicability. In this case discussion has centred on the growth of Roman power; the debate has its origin, not in the strictures of a critic, a Roman Thucydides, but in the viewpoint of an enthusiastic admirer, Polybius. Polybius asserted, indeed took it for granted, that Rome aimed at empire.[2] Modern scholars influenced by anti-imperialist currents of thought were bound to challenge this assumption. In 1920, Maurice Holleaux demolished an extreme version of the Polybian theory, according to which Rome was an aggressive and Machiavellian power advancing systematically and deliberately towards the goal of world dominion. His thesis, put simply, is that the Romans did not want an empire and did not look for one. War and empire were imposed on them from outside, by chance factors beyond their control. Thus, for example, Holleaux concluded his discussion of the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War in this way:

'In 200, as thirty years earlier, it was simply an accident that drew the Romans out of Italy and set events in motion. It was by accident and through an error of judgement that the senators committed themselves to this course.'[3]

The concept of accident has found its way into English historical writing. Cary wrote of the First Punic War: 'Both parties may be acquitted of using the affair of Messana as a pretext for a predetermined war. The collision which brought on the First Punic war was wholly accidental.' Badian in discussing Rome's Illyrian policy came to this conclusion: 'It was the accident (if we may call it such) of the failure of Rome's attempt to live at peace with other great powers, that led to the need to subdue them and thus to the establishment of the Roman Empire as we know it.' A recently published book by Errington begins with the startling sentence: 'Rome's rise to power was one of the most important accidents in European history.'[4]

The doctrine of 'accidental imperialism' rests on an improper use of the word 'accident', as a reading of Aristotle's discussion of chance in *Physics* ch. 4ff. makes clear.[5] In the first place, it would be difficult to concede that a state which made a whole series of territorial conquests or political gains was acting without having foreseen possible consequences. If the Romans consistently failed to coexist with their rivals, the proper inference seems to be that their wars were inevitable not accidental. The broader the perspective we adopt on Roman foreign policy, the less appropriate the language of accident becomes - Polybius, it will be recalled, began with the Gallic invasion of the early fourth century and the steady conquest of Italy that followed. Secondly, if the Romans, as we are told, were forced to expand their area of control, then the proper notion to introduce, following Aristotle's discussions in both the *Physics* and the *Ethics*, is that of a reluctant not an accidental action or set of actions.

An amended version of the thesis might run as follows: Rome's chief aim in expanding its frontiers was self-defence; the empire grew only under the stimulus of threats and provocation from outside; Rome was not involved in empire-building for its own sake. Here it is tacitly admitted that expansion was in some sense an end, and its accomplishment therefore neither accidental nor unforeseen. But the initiative for warlike action lay with other powers, and the

Romans are therefore freed from the opprobrium which is attached to aggressors. We have thus slid into the thesis of 'defensive imperialism'. This popular thesis, which draws its strength from the apparent inconsistency of Roman foreign policy, the slowness with which their rulers acted (or reacted), and their reluctance to annex, has yet to be subjected to systematic and searching criticism.

The most recent proponent of the view that imperialism is to be associated with a palpable intent is Veyne.[6] In an article asking whether there was such a thing as Roman imperialism Veyne argues that what is important is not so much dependence and superiority as 'a sense of dependence', 'a sense of superiority'. Imperialism, as distinct from an empire, does not exist unless one acquires a taste for unsought conquest. Desiring only the freedom to behave as she wished, Rome was the victim of circumstances, being forced into a series of pragmatic decisions, the consequences of which she never considered. In this jungle, where dog eats dog and every neighbour is either subordinate or a threatening enemy, war was a normal part of life in which the aristocracy took part for the public good without asking why. To be sure, there were ambitious individuals anxious for their measure of glory, but their personal behaviour must (by this argument) be separated from the collective intention of the state and the oligarchy.

The studies in this volume illustrate the problems of conceptualization that are discussed above. On the one hand are those papers which employ a restricted definition of imperialism and empire. Griffith describes the Second Athenian Confederacy as 'no *arche*, but a genuine and respectable hegemony', and argues that the 'mentality of *arche*' can be detected with certainty only in Athens' relations with allies who were not members of the Confederacy. Briscoe declares it 'wrong to see Macedon as an imperial power consciously seeking to extend its control in Greece', and draws a parallel between Macedonian and Roman behaviour, which was 'purely defensive'. In arguing for the lack of rational choices open to the Hellenistic rulers, he comes close to a modern view of imperialism as being a natural consequence of international power relations, which are necessarily unstable. Andrewes' question-mark over Spartan imperialism hinges on the difficulty he finds in distinguishing between the ambitions of individuals and the policy of the state.

On the other hand are those papers which seek to define imperialism purely in terms of the exercise of power. However difficult the abstraction, commonsense tells us that we are dealing with a reality, the relationship of ruler to subject, which can be evaluated with reference to some set of criteria. Finley suggests six ways in which power might be exercised by one state or community over another - restriction of freedom, political interference, compulsory service, tribute, confiscation of land or emigration, and other forms of economic exploitation or subordination. Whittaker and Kemp have followed this suggested typology with minor variations when discussing Carthaginian and Egyptian imperialism.

The reader must make his or her own choice as to how this debate is to be conducted or resolved. Motives, real or assumed, are of interest. The problem is, how are they to be ascertained? It may be significant that Kemp, who is dealing with the heavily stylized and formulaic sources of the Egyptian New Kingdom, and Whittaker, who has to rely on the largely hostile Greek sources for Carthaginian history, are the most ready to adopt Finley's view that motives are irrelevant to definitions of imperialism. Neither in the events of Egyptian nor of Carthaginian imperialism can they confidently detect the immediately pragmatic rationale of action.

Conquerors can hardly be expected to explain their motives as a deliberate attempt to increase their *Machtbereich*. The British in India did not admit to a doctrine of imperialism. Louis Faidherbe, architect of French imperial expansion in West Africa, declared: 'Our motives are pure and noble, our cause just.' Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany was supposedly 'profoundly penetrated by the ideal of peace'. So although we may feel in retrospect that actions ought to relate to a declared philosophy of conduct, in practice the information available usually consists of either the pragmatic rationale of the frontiersmen, the men on the spot, for whom the action itself is sufficient without a clear policy, or ritual justifications and pretexts: claims of honour at stake, security at risk, necessary war measures and the '*mission civilisatrice*'.[7] Athenian tribute was necessary to protect the allies from Persia; freedom and autonomy were the gifts which every imperial power wished to confer on willing or unwilling subjects. Brunt's study of Roman concepts of empire in the age of Cicero shows how important it is to differentiate between explanations

of the genesis of empire ('the true driving forces' behind imperialism), the ideology which keeps it going, and the reality.

As for the conquered, their point of view (or more correctly, points of view) is usually inaccessible to us, or at least until such time as the empire itself has produced its own beneficial ideology among those subjects who have cooperated.

Motives can be understood only with reference to a background of the structure and institutions of society. This is the lesson of Andrewes' study, which shows that the Spartans were not so much imperialists who arrived too late (as Veyne suggests), as half-imperialist; their actions abroad laid bare the basic contradictions of a society which produced a militarist ethos with no military mission to complement it. New methods of warfare abroad were necessarily evolved in the Peloponnesian War, but new political relations never developed internally. A structuralist approach is prominent in Finley's unromantic assessment of the economic benefits and burdens of Athenian imperialism, which he finds was designed to serve the interests of the Athenian democratic state. By contrast, the rational interests of the commercially-minded Carthaginian oligarchy lay in avoiding confrontation but increasing control. This volume lacks a structuralist study of the Roman republic along the lines proposed by W.V.Harris in a recent article.[8] Such a study might stress the ever-increasing need for warfare in the acquisition of personal riches, glory and clients among a competitive political elite, which was bound to produce an empire. Brunt refers briefly to the militarism of the traditions of old Rome, such as the ancient prayer of the censors for the aggrandizement of Rome, or the soothsayers' habit of predicting that a war that was imminent would advance the boundaries of the empire. Such practices in his view undermine the argument for defensive imperialism. When all such justifications have been swept away, it is *laus imperii*, the doctrine of power, which remains. And this is simply the ancient belief, expressed by Thucydides and implicit in the works of Polybius, that it is natural for the stronger to dominate the weaker.

Roman writers under the Principate produced no new thoughts on the subject of imperial rule. Such 'advances' as were made in the philosophy of empire were the work of the Greek intelligentsia. This class, which in the fluid and dangerous period of the late republic, according to Crawford, exploited the Greek intellectual pretensions

of leading Romans in order to win protection and other concessions for the Greek communities, two centuries later, as Nutton shows, produced the ideology of participation and turned *imperium populi Romani* into *imperium orbis terrarum*. Aelius Aristides, Plutarch, and the other Greek intellectuals who became vocal supporters of the empire were representative of the class of provincials which benefited most from Roman rule, the local aristocracy. On the one hand, the new phase of imperialism ushered in by the Principate of Augustus was characterized by a more rational exploitation of the subjects of Rome; on the other, the Roman imperial system that Augustus and his successors created brought real material benefits for subjects as well as rulers. There is no paradox here, for the benefits and burdens of empire were unevenly distributed. In order to reap the fruits of power the Romans were forced to utilize their provincial clients and thus to share power with them. As Garnsey shows, the real effect of empire was to increase social differentiation.

Resistance within the empire was not to be expected, and did not come, from the *évolué*, who despite his provincialism was committed to the values of the empire, and was prepared, even anxious, to participate in the exercise of power and the economic exploitation of the mass of provincials. There were Rabbinic protests - although Jewish attitudes were not uniformly hostile, according to de Lange - and some dissentient Christian voices. But the spirit of rebellion was by and large the preserve of the poor and the fringe members of Roman provincial society. Their resistance was the least likely to be effective.

2: IMPERIALISM AND EMPIRE IN NEW KINGDOM EGYPT (c. 1575-1087B.C.)

B.J.Kemp (Faculty of Oriental Studies, Cambridge)

The treatment of a period of ancient Egyptian history under a heading which belongs very much to the modern world requires something of a defensive introduction. The charge is easily made that simply by using the words 'imperialism' and 'empire' a host of complex and debatable issues are prejudged and cast into a misleading and inappropriate mould. Certainly the ancient Egyptians themselves seem to have known of no words which can be translated as 'imperialism' or 'empire', but neither, for that matter, did they have words for 'government', 'administration' and 'history', nor even, despite its pervasiveness in Egyptian civilization, was there a word 'religion'. This is something that can be encountered across the whole range of subjects on which the Egyptians wrote. Thus, they possessed a technical vocabulary for solving mathematical problems, but no word which can be translated 'mathematics'. They acted without seeing the need to abstract and refer separately to the activity as an independent phenomenon. The verbal and mental sequence in Egypt was not from the particular to the abstract, it was to metaphor and religious symbolism. Yet, conversely, whilst we may judge the Egyptian vocabulary to have been weak in just those areas that we rate most highly, it is also true that our own vocabulary and range of concepts is inadequate for coping with the heart of the Egyptian intellect for which we can offer only the sadly degraded term 'religion'. It is not just a matter of difficulties in translation; there is a major intellectual disjunction between us and the ancient Egyptians. Yet, with a large bureaucratically-run country and having important interests in neighbouring lands, they also faced some of the same practical problems that more recent societies have faced. Their solutions, though justified in religious terms, seem firmly rooted in political reality. It is in our assessment of politically real behaviour that the answer is to be found as to whether they acted in a manner analogous to states of later periods who have conceived of 'empire' with a greater degree of abstraction and clarity.

From the New Kingdom, a considerable body of inscriptions and scenes has survived related to the theme of conquest and subjection of the outside world to the rule of the king of Egypt. Some of them, in alluding to specific instances of triumph, are termed 'historical' by modern scholars, but from their language, and very often from their context within a temple, one can judge them to be more truly theological documents and sources for our understanding of divine kingship. Within them the divine king is depicted fulfilling a specific role with historical actuality entirely subordinated to a predetermined format. Presented as a form of cultic drama the conquest theme is one element in the broader and fundamental role of divine kingship: that of reducing chaos to order.[1] Sometimes one finds scenes of the king's subjection of foreign humanity paired with hunting scenes where a chaotic animal world is subdued, and certainly in later periods the symbolic connection between the two was explicitly formulated in scenes of the king snaring birds in a clapnet which illustrated the text, or 'book', called 'The subduing of the nobility', which was evidently intended to assist the king's supremacy over his enemies.[2]

It is a mistake, too, to explain the endless repetition of victory as just propaganda. Little of it would have been visible to the people as a whole, being often well within the body of the temple, or at least screened off by the great temple-enclosure walls. It represents rather a constant restatement of theological formulae, particularized for each king. It is also likely that the great scenes of victory and the listing of conquered places which frequently occur on temple walls, particularly on the towers of pylon entrances, were regarded as magically efficacious in protecting Egypt from foreign hostility. This interpretation can be supported by reference to a ritual of humiliation in which the names of the king's 'enemies' were written upon little statuettes of bound captives which were then burnt or buried, or on pottery vessels subsequently smashed. This ritual is known from as late as the Graeco-Roman period, and many actual statuettes bearing long lists of foreign places and princes have survived from the earlier period of the Middle Kingdom (when they are referred to as 'Execration Texts').[3] The lists on the temple walls of the New Kingdom, and around the statue bases of kings, were probably intended, by their attitudes of

permanent subjugation, to achieve the same end, having shared in the 'Opening of the Mouth' ritual which animated temple walls and statues alike.[4]

These formal scenes and texts contain elements of a fairly consistent and coherent view of Egypt's position in the world, or more correctly, of the king's position, for at times the Egyptian people, including the army itself, are presented as being on a level little different from that of the foreign nations. These statements can be abstracted and put together to make up a single account. It is important, however, to realize that Egyptian religious texts in general are not constructed as logical treatises intended to explain or to persuade, but consist instead of series of concise statements whose logical connections may not be made explicit. Hence, any modern account which seeks a logical presentation is bound to be quite alien to the spirit of the texts themselves.

In the theology of the New Kingdom the single most important element was still the sun (Ra), whose manifestations were many, but most importantly the Theban god Amen, whose almost total absorption into solar theology was marked by the common divine designation Amen-Ra. Akhenaten's religious reform was evidently an attempt to separate the sun cult from extraneous elements, particularly that of Amen, and to emphasize its true nature by constant reference to the sun's disk (Aten). The theme that the sun god was the creator and sustainer of all life, both animal and human, throughout the universe was made the subject of hymns, some of great poetic beauty.[5] Some passages briefly include the foreign lands and peoples within the scope of the sun god's power,[6] but more generally Egyptian theologians seem to have displayed little interest in the details of the creation of the physical world. Nevertheless, a simple, unelaborated claim that the sun-god of Egypt, and occasionally other gods as well, was the creator and sustainer of the whole universe was not infrequently stated or implied in contexts involving the king in his role of foreign conqueror. Of more particular interest to the gods were those lands which yielded products for themselves and for their temples. These places were sometimes referred to as 'god's land'. The Lebanon where grew the cedar trees for the great temple flagstaffs and barges was one; Sinai of the turquoise mines was another; so also was the greywacke quarries of the inhospitable Wadi Hammamat (*KRI* VI 11.4,

VI 13.11). But most important was Punt, a term for some coastal area somewhere between Eritrea and northern Somaliland which the Egyptians regularly visited by voyages from ports on the Red Sea coast.[7] Here, through trade probably at a coastal entrepot, incense was obtained.

Considerable prominence was given in the New Kingdom to detailed expositions in temples by texts and pictures of the king's conception and birth from a union between his mother and Amen-Ra, who had assumed the form of the reigning king.[8] Being made in the divine image the land was described as becoming at his accession as perfect and harmonious as it had been 'in the time of Ra', on the 'First Moment' immediately after creation had taken place (e.g. *Urk* IV 2119-20), and as the son of the gods he inherits all that they have made, 'that which the sun's disk encircles',[9] in order to administer it on their behalf (e.g. *Urk* IV 368.13-14, 1327.1-3). This could include a claim to universal rule abroad. Thus Amenhetep III says of Amen: 'He has handed over to me the princes of the southlands, the southerners and the northerners as well, every one made equal to the other, and their silver, their gold, their cattle, all the precious stones of their lands in millions, hundreds of thousands, tens of thousands, and thousands. I shall act for him who begat me with a steadfast purpose, just as he appointed me to be "Ra of the Nine Bows".'[10] The 'Nine Bows' is a common collective expression for the nations of mankind, including the Egyptian people, and here the king's equivalence to the sun god is expressed by simply calling him 'Ra'.

Sometimes this transfer is represented as a contract in which the king provides for the gods, building temples and ensuring a plentiful supply of offerings, and the gods in their turn are then obliged to grant universal power, as well as health and good fortune (e.g. *Urk* IV 563.4-5, 817.2-5, 864.5, 1754.4-7, 2043.6-9). But the transfer should not be understood as something which took place at one point in real time. It belongs to a mythopoetic dimension outside time, and describes rather an ever-active relationship. And whilst the king is most commonly the heir to certain gods of outstanding power and importance, principally Amen-Ra, the inheritance myth could also be invoked to describe his relationship to lesser divinities as well, an aspect of the interchangeability of Egyptian deities. In the little temple at Semna in Nubia, for example, the king's inheritance stems from Dedwen, a probably Nubian god long before brought into the

Egyptian pantheon, to whom this temple happens to be partially dedicated (*Urk* IV 199.13-15). At the great temple of Amen at Karnak both Dedwen and Sebek, a crocodile god, hand over to the king the rule of foreign lands (*Urk* IV 774.13-15, 574.8-9).

Although the theme of the king replacing chaos with order was very occasionally given an Egyptian setting,[11] normally Egypt was depicted as accepting a new rule with joy. The foreign lands, however, were regarded as much closer to the primeval chaos and possessed of a naturally rebellious disposition, so that force was necessary before the king's claims might be accepted, though eventually they too would come to rejoice in his rule. Military campaigns thus appear as part of the duties which the gods pass on to the king. Scenes which illustrate Rameses III's defeat of Libyans, for example, commence with Amen symbolically handing him a sword, whilst Thoth, god of writing, says: 'Thy father Amen sends thee forth to destroy the Nine Bows' (*KRI* V 10.9-10 = *HRR* 4). Elsewhere kings receive the sword which commissioned conquest from Ra-Horus of the Horizon, Ptah, Atum and Seth.[12] One text, of the reign of Tuthmosis IV, suggests, too, that the king may have consulted an oracle of Amen before setting out on a Nubian campaign (*Urk* IV 1545.14-1546.3). The final act was the king's presentation of his conquests to the gods, most often to Amen.

Implicit in this relationship between king and gods was a simple theory of causation: piety brought blessings, and victory was one of them. The converse - impiety bringing failure and defeat - is found in a formal context only once in the New Kingdom. Akhenaten's attempts to destroy the existence of Amen in favour of the wholly non-anthropomorphic solar cult of the Aten were afterwards thought to have had this effect: 'The land was in distress. The gods, they had turned their backs on this land. If expeditions were sent to Palestine to enlarge the boundaries of Egypt, they met with no success' (*Urk* IV 2027.11-14).

In view of the divine assent to campaigns, texts describing them tend to be very sparing in providing strictly historical explanations. One common introductory cliché which provides a setting rather than a cause describes a report brought to the king in his palace outlining the mustering of specific enemies, and their hostile intentions and initial actions. Immediately the king prepares for battle and the campaign commences. In other cases the purpose is said to be simply

'to enlarge the boundaries of Egypt', a ritual phrase which was applied to actions well within the regular sphere of Egyptian activity, or just for the king to 'give vent to his desires throughout the foreign lands' (*Urk* IV 9.8-9). It is interesting to note that the machinations of the enemy are normally a purely human affair, springing from perversity and wickedness. In one instance defeated Libyan invaders claim to have been deliberately made the playthings of 'the gods', but these can only have been Egyptian (*KRI* V 64.2-3 = *HRR* 82). In another text, unfortunately fragmentary, the king charges his officials with the responsibility of guarding the boundaries of foreign countries, 'according to the design of the fathers of your fathers', a collective term apparently for the principal Egyptian gods, who are thus seen as the source of order abroad.[13] There is never a recognition of an alien superhuman power. The Egyptians were, of course, aware that other gods were worshipped in foreign lands, at least in western Asia. But when encountered during the New Kingdom they were increasingly regarded as peripheral members of the Egyptian pantheon. Sometimes in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties they were seen as forms of the Egyptian god Seth who represented, amongst other things, all that was strange and disturbing in foreign lands,[14] and who was given great prominence at this time, though partly for local historical reasons. Thus the Egyptian version of the treaty between Rameses II and the Hittite king Hattusilis concludes with the names of divine witnesses, and the Hittite gods appear in such guises as 'Seth of Hatti', and 'Seth of the town of Zippalanda', substituting for forms of the Hittite storm-god Teshub.[15] It is also Seth who in one text appears as the fickle god of the Libyans: 'The Libyans have been burnt up in a single year. Seth has turned his back on their chief. Their settlements have been destroyed at his utterance' (*KRI* IV 15.9-11 = *ANET* 377). Seth is one of the gods who hands the sword of conquest to the king, and in the later New Kingdom the king's might is often compared both to Seth and to the Palestinian god Baal. This recognition of foreign, or at least western Asiatic, gods would seem to have been the ultimate logic of claims to universal sovereignty made for Egyptian gods, and presumably deprived Egypt's foes of sources of divine assistance, at least in Egyptian eyes.

This theology of conquest which not only justified, but, because of the magic latent within words and pictures, also helped to bring

about the king's universal rule, was illustrated with a characteristically vivid and powerful iconography.[16] Some themes - the king smiting bound captives with a mace, or in the form of a sphinx trampling on contorted figures - were of great antiquity. But the technological innovation of the chariot in the New Kingdom added a further important artistic element. Although most familiar to us from temple walls, the themes of conquest and dominance over enemies were employed in the decoration of palaces,[17] on state barges,[18] and in the designs on pieces of jewellery and small trinkets such as scarabs.[19] This would have accorded well with the growing fashion for militarism in the New Kingdom.

Alongside the theme of conquest, it is not uncommon to find inscriptions which represent universal Egyptian rule as an already accomplished fact: 'Heaven and all the foreign lands whom god has created serve her [Queen Hatshepsut] in totality' (*Urk* IV 341.15). The hyperbole is extravagant to the point of including lands beyond the likely reach of Egyptian power: 'Commands are sent to an unknown land, and they do everything that she commanded';[20] 'Giving praise to the good god, doing obeisance before the son of Amen, by the princes of all foreign lands who are so distant as to know not Egypt' (*Urk* IV 1866.16-18). This figure of speech is found stretched to cover even countries with which the Egyptians were actually familiar. So Queen Hatshepsut's expedition to Punt, a place regularly visited by Egyptians, becomes a marvellous discovery, with the astonished princes of Punt expressing incredulity at the Egyptian discovery, yet admitting that they live by the breath which the king of Egypt provides.[21] The detailed lists of subject places which regularly accompany scenes of the victorious king likewise were influenced by this attitude.[22] Although some of the earliest of the preserved lists from the New Kingdom, of the reign of Tuthmosis III, seem to reflect fairly faithfully the state of Egyptian power abroad, the universalist ideal begins to make itself felt from the reigns of Tuthmosis IV and Amenhetep III, so that into these lists there enter the names of places and of great kingdoms from the limits of the Egyptians' geographical knowledge: Babylon, Assyria, Mitanni, Hatti, and, from the reign of Horemheb, Arzawa on the west coast of Anatolia. Crete was included as well, and one of the more recently discovered lists from the reign of Amenhetep III contains what appears to be a

list of towns in Crete and the Aegean, including Knossos, Amnisos, Mycenae and its port of Nauplia, and just possibly Troy as well.[23]

In this type of context the only relationship which could be appropriate between Egypt and other countries was that of overlord and vassal. Diplomatic gifts from foreign rulers beyond Egypt's empire, material received in trade, as well as levies exacted from places that were actually subject, all is depicted and referred to in the same way, as if tribute. The word that is frequently translated 'tribute' more strictly means 'produce' or 'revenues', but the individual contexts frequently are such that 'tribute' conveys better what was intended.[24] In the reign of Amenhetep II the diplomatic preliminaries between Egypt and her principal enemy at the time, the kingdom of Mitanni, which were eventually to lead to a marriage alliance were recorded in one formal text: 'The princes of Mitanni came to him, their *tribute* on their backs, to beg peace from His Majesty, seeking his sweet breath of life. A famous occasion, quite unheard of in all the days of men and gods - this country which Egypt knew not making supplication to the good god' (*Urk* IV 1326.1-12). Very similar terms were employed to record the marriage between Rameses II and a Hittite princess which took place thirteen years after the signing of a peace treaty in which, being a real diplomatic document, both kings appear as equals, and 'brothers'. In the Marriage Stele the king of Hatti is given the words: 'Our land is desolated, our lord Seth is angry with us, and the skies do not give us water... Let us despoil ourselves of all our possessions, with my eldest daughter at the head of them, and let us carry gifts of fealty to the good god, so that he may give us peace and we may live' (*KRI* II 246.7-247.3 = *BAR* III §§415-24).

Texts of this type, and the scenes they sometimes accompany, belong to an idealized, or ritualized, counterpart of the real world, a dimension similar to that in which other aspects of Egyptian religion were presumed to operate. The king as a mortal man fought and negotiated in a real political world, but the true significance of his actions at the level of 'intellectual' interpretation emerged only after translation into this cosmic dimension. In this process the record of actual events was edited to bring out just how the immutable forces and roles had been present on a particular occasion. The two most revealing cases of editing of this nature are the Battle

of Megiddo text of Tuthmosis III,[25] and the texts and scenes recounting Rameses II's battle with the Hittites at Kadesh.[26] The former was composed by creating a narrative framework from the concise and factual entries in the daily scribal journals, and grafting on to this lengthier passages in a more varied literary style which depict the roles of the main participants, and in particular the king's sole responsibility for successful strategy and ultimate victory. The role of the Egyptian army is essentially to act as a foil to the king's superiority, and to receive the blame for not having followed up the king's instant routing of the enemy. In the Battle of Kadesh record there is a curious and presumably unintended contrast between the pictorial record, an extraordinarily imaginative composition which hints at the strategic weakness of the Egyptian tactics, and the literary record which was written in a uniform heroic style, where victory is the responsibility solely of the king, assisted by Amen who is reminded in a speech of his contractual obligations to Rameses as a pious king. Even more than in the Megiddo text the Egyptian army has a wholly inglorious role, and in the end is depicted as being scarcely more worthy than the enemy. These texts are about divine kingship, not about national greatness.

This material poses large and difficult questions. The historian may well be left with the feeling that if it were possible to discover the full history of international relations at this period in some other way, the surviving sources would turn out to be of interest only in illustrating the tenuous relationship which they had to historical reality. Then one is entitled to ask: did the king and his advisers ever really speak in this way? To what extent was belief in this mythohistorical world spread through government circles? Obviously it provided a good source of metaphors, and the satisfaction of the justified cause.[27] But there is enough documentation to show that in the Near East the Egyptians were participating in a form of international relations which was conducted very much at a truly political level. Apart from a great deal of background material from western Asia, not involving Egypt but going back to earlier periods,[28] there are two groups of sources for Egypt's direct involvement. The later group concerns the single most important aspect of international relations in the ancient Near East: the treaty.[29] Many were between a dominant state and less powerful ones who thereby

became vassals under various obligations, but in this case the treaty, between Rameses II of Egypt and the Hittite king Hattusilis after a long period of hostilities (including the Battle of Kadesh), was between two great powers.[30] In the text, known from both Egyptian and Hittite versions, both kings appear as equals and 'brothers'. It was said to be binding on successors, it declared a pact of mutual non-aggression and aid in the event of one party being attacked from without or within, arranged for extradition of refugees, and assistance in the case of a disputed succession. Nothing was said about boundaries and spheres of influence, presumably because these things were evident from treaties which each side had with individual Syrian princes. An impressive list of deities were invoked as witnesses, many from the Hittite contribution being translated into forms of Seth, but also adding Amen and Ra at the end. The contradiction inherent in having a peace treaty guaranteed by gods who at the same time supported the king's conquering role appears also in the striking fact that the Egyptian version has survived only because it was inscribed in at least two temples, an interesting break in the logic of temple texts, although, as noted above, the subsequent Marriage Stele is in the old stereotyped formula. The new cordiality between the two countries was affirmed at a more personal level by letters of friendly, though restrained, greetings sent to the Hittite king and to his wife, Padu-Hepa, by Rameses II, his wife Nefertari, his mother, Queen Tuya, the then crown prince, Seth(Amen)-her-khepshef, and by the vizier Paser.[31] These letters were accompanied by presents of gold and cloth.

The earlier source group is the cache of tablets from Akhenaten's capital, el-Amarna, written in cuneiform script employing a dialect form of Akkadian.[32] Amongst the texts are a few intended to help Egyptians learn Akkadian, and vice versa. The bulk of the tablets are letters from western Asiatic courts, and copies of letters sent in return. In political terms the letters fall into two main groups which immediately delimit the real sphere of Egyptian power abroad. One is correspondence between Egypt and other states of great power status where the mutual mode of address is 'brother'. These are the states of Babylonia, Assyria, Mitanni, Hatti, and Alashiya (Cyprus).[33] The content is mainly personal, but might include a political element, as with the King of Alashiya's advice

not to align with the kings of Hatti and Babylon (EA 35). With the letters went exchanges of presents, a practice taken very seriously and about which kings were most sensitive in balancing what they gave against what they received. The second group concerns the city-states of Palestine and Syria: their princes and their resident Egyptian officials. They address Pharaoh as 'my lord'. Those closer to Egypt had little prospect of an improved alternative, but the Syrian princes were in a position to make choices of major importance for themselves. Their aims have been summarized as: preservation of their own local autonomy, extension of their own rule over neighbours, maintenance towards the Egyptians of a show of loyalty to secure men and money, and either opposition or submission to the Hittite king according to circumstances.[34] Their letters tend to have the form of a long introductory protestation of absolute loyalty couched in obsequious language: 'This is the message of a slave to his master after he had heard what the kind messenger of the king [said] to his servant upon arriving here, and [felt] the sweet fragrance that came out of the mouth of Your Majesty towards his servant'; thus Abi-milki of Tyre (EA 147). In such cases the direct political message tends to be reserved for a brief final sentence or two, although some writers, notably Rib-addi of Byblos, could sustain loquacious pleas for support for much of their letters. A constant element is denunciation of a neighbouring prince on grounds of disloyalty to the king of Egypt. Since the accusations at times extended to the murder of one prince by another (e.g. EA 89, also 73, 75, 81, 140), these were not necessarily to be dismissed as inventions.

The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this material is that, although no trace has survived of anything like an objective comment on an international situation, Egypt's foreign relations were politically based, required careful interpretation and judgement, and involved discussion of situations in terms of human motives. For this one may assume that the Egyptians were well equipped. In the first place they tended to write letters to their superiors in a not dissimilar exaggerated style.[35] Secondly, the giving of legal judgements in Egypt (something which was not confined to a class of professional judges but was probably a basic attribute of holding a significant office), although it might well involve reference back

to documentary archives, was essentially a matter of resolving conflicting testimonies and assessing human behaviour. The inspecting committees of the Abbott Papyrus set up to make on-the-spot checks on accusations of tomb-robbery in the Theban necropolis are a clear example of rational independent assessment.[36]

Against the view that decisions were rationally based one might cite the ample evidence that oracles played a significant role in New Kingdom society.[37] The evidence ranges from minor decisions in the lives of common people to the ratification of state decisions by the oracle of Amen at Karnak. One is entitled to ask if this practice had a part in foreign policy and military decisions, although apart from a single case, mentioned above, where a king implies that he sought divine advice before starting a campaign, there is no real evidence. But in any case, the nature of Egyptian oracles seems to have been normally very simple, involving an affirmative/negative reaction to a question. The formulation of questions would presumably have entailed rational prior discussion, and a negative reaction would have involved either a retiming or a reformulation. One might wonder if perhaps oracular guidance was sought when a major decision proved difficult, the response by the god reflecting a decision which had 'emerged' from a subtle interplay of inspiration and consultation on the part of the priests involved. Nevertheless, the records of major court enquiries - the tomb-robbery trials of the later Ramesside period and the harim conspiracy of the reign of Rameses III[38] - give no indication that oracles were involved in reaching decisions; nor in the formal records of the battles of Megiddo and Kadesh do the kings involved seem to have sought divine guidance when faced with major tactical decisions. Indeed, the Kadesh sources imply that the king made a wrong decision through accepting false information from captured enemy agents.

Through their massive repetition one can perhaps too readily come to accept the formal texts and scenes of the king as universal conqueror as an early form of a theory or doctrine of imperialism. But if one considers carefully the likely reasons why the Egyptians embarked on conquest at the beginning of the New Kingdom, and the fact that by having done so, further activity in western Asia, at least, became circumscribed by a political situation which required rational treatment, it is hard to see in what way the formal texts

could have guided decisions, which is presumably one important criterion for a theory of imperialism. Nor does Egyptian behaviour in western Asia bear any distinctive stamp which marks it out from that of other major states. In Nubia the results of conquest were in fact more distinctive, mainly through the massive temple building programme. But even here, whilst a definite positive policy must be presumed, it is not something which can be read from the formal texts. Thus, in searching for a form of imperialism in New Kingdom Egypt it is necessary to look beyond the formal texts on kingship, and to consider both the patterns of Egyptian activity abroad, and certain features of Egyptian society itself.

For the present, two very basic interests in conquest and control can be pointed out. One was the economic return. From the south this involved not only trade goods encountered closer to their sources and therefore diminished less by customs dues levied by a succession of native kingdoms, but also gold and copper and possibly other things as well from direct exploitation of the land,[39] although gold was presumably the most important. In western Asia the return was more in the nature of booty: the capture of spoil during campaigns, and the levying of taxes in those areas where a degree of control could be exercised. Some of the Amarna letters refer to caravans, some originating from beyond the areas of Egyptian control and evidently vulnerable to robbery (EA 7, 29, 52, 226, 255, 264, 295, 316), but how important overland trade was (and some of these caravans may have been carrying tribute or diplomatic gifts) compared to maritime trade with places such as Byblos and Ugarit is impossible to know, as is, therefore, its influence in determining policy. Booty and tribute and its presentation to the temples was a constant theme of the formal texts, and one which, in the detailed enumerations, brought out the bureaucratic side of the Egyptian character. But this is not to say that it was a prime consideration in making decisions rather than just a desirable by-product of policies formulated from rather different considerations. Economic exploitation as a prime motive in imperialism has been doubted in the history of more recent colonial empires,[40] and one might well conclude from a review of all the evidence that in New Kingdom Egypt other considerations had equal and probably greater value.

Later manifestations of imperialism also prompt one to ask the

question: was there an aristocratic pursuit of 'glory' in the New Kingdom? Although no personal commentaries on the politics of the age have survived - almost certainly none was made - there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to suggest the existence in New Kingdom society of a group or class of high social standing for whom militarism and the military arts were things to be pursued for their own sake. The prestige of militarism was enhanced by its ready association with kingship, in which in ways far more diverse than in previous periods the king as conqueror and mighty man was celebrated.[41] Its symbol was the chariot, a striking innovation for Egypt in the New Kingdom. This group must have been a creation of the policies of conquest, but increasingly must have come to play a major part in perpetuating it. There is ample documentation for the increasing political role of men with military backgrounds, culminating in the eventual transfer of the throne to an army general, Horemheb, and his succession by a military family who founded the Nineteenth Dynasty.[42]

If glory and booty had been the main stimuli for the Egyptian effort abroad, then the search for rational explanations would be curtailed. The Nubian evidence in particular suggests otherwise, but it is also worth noting that militarism was evidently not characteristic of educated Egyptian society as a whole. The army and the empire in the end depended on the civil administration, from whose ranks also came politically powerful individuals. At school, through the texts which served as models for copying, young scribes were taught a disdain for all professions other than their own. This extended to military careers, and scorn was poured on the soldier and on the chariot officer and on service abroad.[43] These texts evince no positive side other than selfishness - being a scribe 'saves you from toil, it protects you from all manner of work'[44] - but simply in preferring power through orderly administration to glory through action and adventure people who had accepted this ethos must have been a source of counter-arguments to those of the military. At a very general level it might be said that Nubia was an administrative creation, whilst western Asia provided the main scope for military shows, though even here, as the Amarna letters imply, identifying the enemy was itself a task for home-based officials.

THE EGYPTIAN EMPIRE IN NUBIA[45]

Nubia is the southward continuation of the Nile valley, beyond the ancient frontier at the First Cataract. Below the Third Cataract the agricultural potential of the valley must have been relatively small compared to most of Egypt, and there must be a degree of doubt as to whether the fertile Dongola Reach to the south, above the Third Cataract, was much exploited by a settled crop growing population.[46] During the earlier Middle Kingdom the Egyptians had held Lower Nubia by a series of great fortified towns and a group of frontier fortresses all of which seem to have been culturally isolated from the surrounding population who continued with a material culture which still bore marked resemblances to that of late prehistoric Egypt. Upper Nubia had remained independent, but, perhaps from the wealth that trade with Egypt brought, a coalition of kingdoms with a striking material culture of their own, now named after the most important one at Kerma, grew up.[47] During the two centuries or so of internal governmental weakness which resulted in a withdrawal of rule from Nubia and a partitioning of Egypt between an Upper Egyptian state ruled from Thebes (the Seventeenth Dynasty) and a northern kingdom under the rule of Palestinian kings (the Hyksos), a Kingdom of Kush, based on Kerma, emerged as a significant state whose power extended into Lower Nubia. Towards the end of its existence it is known to have been in diplomatic contact with the Hyksos kingdom, and was recognized by the Thebans as a threatening presence beyond Elephantine.

The New Kingdom was initially the result of an expansion of the Theban kingdom of the Seventeenth Dynasty, northwards against the Hyksos, a move which eventually reunified the country, and southwards against the king of Kush. An important group of inscriptions provides an account of the beginning of the most important phase, and does so in terms of an aggressive initiative of the king for reasons of political honour.[48] From a point of terminology, for which other examples can be found,[49] it would appear that it was felt that Nubia, or at least the more northerly part, was a sort of quasi-extension of Egypt at more than a purely geographical level, and it would doubtless have been well known that at an earlier period Lower Nubia had been held by the Egyptians through their forts and fortified towns. There is no mention of a long-term economic gain - trade-goods and

gold - from Nubia, although the booty theme appears in the sections on the attack on the Hyksos which is the major interest of the preserved parts of these texts. The power of the king of Kush, with his fortified court at Kerma, may well have been known to the Thebans, not least from Egyptians who are known to have spent periods in his service, and since power readily provokes notions of great and plunderable wealth, there may be no need to look further than the motives provided by the immediate political setting and the promise of glory and booty.

The conquest of Nubia was effected relatively rapidly. By year 3 of Kamose (c. 1555 B.C.), last king of the Seventeenth Dynasty, most of Lower Nubia was already in Egyptian hands,[50] and within fifty years, in the reign of Tuthmosis I, the kingdom of Kush in Upper Nubia had been destroyed, and an Egyptian expedition had penetrated as far as Kurgus, above the Fourth Cataract.[51] In Lower Nubia, the old Middle Kingdom towns and forts, suitably refurbished, formed the basis of the new Egyptian occupation, and it is possible that new fortresses were built, the evidence being as yet confined to a hill fort in Lower Nubia, Gebel Sahaba, and to a rock-cut ditch beneath the later temple town of Sesebi in Upper Nubia,[52] and a statement in a formal inscription which refers to 'fortresses' built by Tuthmosis I 'to repress the rebellious lands of the Nubian people' (*Urk* IV 138.16-139.1). Formal records of campaigns in Nubia continue into the reign of Merenptah,[53] and where specific places and events are referred to some historical basis can be accepted, but even then the scale or significance may have been magnified. Certainly the archaeological record does not suggest serious opposition to Egyptian rule. Such disturbances as there were probably arose either as attacks by eastern desert nomads on Egyptian mining expeditions and perhaps on caravans, or in Upper Nubia as attacks on officials by Nubians not resident in the temple towns.[54] In contrast to the scenes of warfare in western Asia where the object of attack in the battle reliefs of the later New Kingdom is frequently a fortified town on a hill, the only Nubian scene where there is any indication of a setting depicts Nubians fleeing to a village set amidst trees.[55]

The conquest of Nubia began in a particular political context. By a century later, say the reign of Tuthmosis III, Egypt had become a major power in the Near East; Nubia could no longer have appeared

as a serious threat, and trade and mineral exploitation were things which were dependent upon security in relatively remote desert areas where a permanent Egyptian presence was hardly feasible. Thus the pursuit in the period between the reigns of Tuthmosis III and Rameses II (about two centuries) of an essentially civil policy requiring considerable effort and expenditure should be seen as a development within a relatively stable and established situation and not as a direct consequence of whatever might have been in the minds of Kamose and his immediate successors. The most enduring sign of the new direction in Egyptian policy was the large number of stone temples which appeared not only in the old fortified towns inherited from the Middle Kingdom, but also on many sites, new as far as the Egyptians were concerned, in both Upper and Lower Nubia. Some of them were of considerable size, the most splendid having almost certainly been the great temple of Amenhetep III at Soleb.

With a few exceptions in remote desert localities,[56] Egyptian temples were not isolated structures. Although our knowledge of towns in ancient Egypt is still disappointingly slight, enough is known to suggest that normally a temple was the focal point, at physical, symbolic, and spiritual levels, of an urban community. In Nubia, evidence from a number of sites offers a fairly consistent setting for the stone temples. It took the form of a rectangular area enclosed by a mud-brick girdle wall with external towers along the wall faces and at the corners, but normally without a ditch. Despite the application to such places of the term 'fortress',[57] the lack of a ditch and of extra protection at the gates suggests that serious attacks were not expected, and it is as well to remember that in Egypt temple enclosure walls were in some cases given a fortified aspect largely for symbolic reasons.[58] Within the Nubian enclosures, however, were not only the temples and their ancillary buildings, but also areas of houses, including a residence for the civil governor. Extra-mural settlement is also known to have existed, but its extent has never been fully investigated at any one site. An important point to note is the size of the storeroom block in the most completely revealed example at Sesebi (fig.1). Because these towns were for the most part constructed of mud-brick their survival has often not matched that of their temples. But in view of what has been learned from a selection of sites, together with what we know of the



FIG. 1 THE TEMPLE TOWN OF SESEBI



FIG. 2. OUTLINES OF SIX NUBIAN TEMPLE TOWNS

role of temples generally in New Kingdom society, it seems reasonable to assume that wherever a stone temple stood on flattish ground not far from the river it was built to be the centre of a brick town. During the long reign of Rameses II temple building and embellishment reached obsessive proportions in Egypt, and this extended to Nubia as well, particularly in the creation of a group of rock-cut temples in Lower Nubia, of which Abu Simbel is the most famous. Although the normal programme of temple town building continued as well (e.g. Aksha and Amara West), these rock temples, being out of all proportion to the size of the local communities, are a gross extension of an aspect common to all temples: that whatever their local role might be, they were also manifestations of royal power. Here, this aspect was treated independently of the local context. This is evident at Wadi es-Sebua (fig.4), where the mud-brick enclosure around the front can have accommodated only the priestly group, the local community having apparently lived in a small unwalled village down by the river bank (see p.42 below). It is not enough to say that these rock

temples were built to overawe the local inhabitants; this had happened generations before.

In fig.3 the distribution of New Kingdom temple towns has been plotted. In Lower Nubia some of them were based on the old Middle Kingdom fortified towns, but these have not been separately distinguished on the map since, by the mid-New Kingdom, this had become a circumstantial aspect of their history. I have assumed that wherever a stone temple stood on suitable ground it was part of a town, even when no part of the brickwork has survived or been reported. Rameses II's rock temples are, however, separately indicated, as are those old frontier forts of the Middle Kingdom which, despite having lost their strategic significance, were still given a small temple and where finds indicate that a community of sorts still lived there. In Lower Nubia the distribution should evidently be regarded as close to saturation point, since the spacing of the sites is similar to that obtaining in the more southerly part of Upper Egypt, whose agricultural potential may not have been much more. A map of likely temple town sites in this area is included as an inset. Upstream from Lower Nubia there lies a rocky and inhospitable region known as the Batn el-Hager, 'Belly of the Rock', which detailed archaeological survey has shown to have lacked a significant settled population in ancient times, except for a gold-working site or two.[59] But beyond roughly the Dal Cataract, the valley begins to open up a little more and significant areas of flat ground and river bank appear. The sequence of temple towns follows this resumption of limited fertility closely, until it is again broken by the Third Cataract zone. By contrast, between Kerma and the Fourth Cataract the Nile flows across a vast flat plain of sandstone, and the Dongola Reach, as this stretch is called, has broad and continuous alluvial banks watered by the Nile floods, as well as some shallow basins (the largest being at Kerma, Argo and Letti), although unless their drainage and irrigation is improved with canals and banks their yield is said to be poor, and in a year of low Nile negligible. Thus their value in ancient times is uncertain, but even so, this 300 kilometre stretch is the most fertile region south, probably, of Gebel Silsila in Egypt. Consequently the absence of evidence for temple towns in this area south of Kawa is a matter that calls for some comment.[60]

There are three points to be made here. In the first place, the



FIG. 3. NUBIA IN THE NEW KINGDOM

siting of a temple town at Gebel Barkal has great significance, quite apart from showing in its isolation how secure the Egyptian presence in Nubia was. For, from a communications point of view, the Nile above here becomes a virtual cul-de-sac. The long series of rapids which make up the Fourth Cataract are the most difficult and hazardous of all. When ascending them, the wind is found to blow in the same direction as the current for all but a couple of months of the year. Boats may be laboriously towed, and in the last century it was reported that parties of about ten boats took between thirty-five and forty days to make the passage as far as Abu Hamed, near Kurgus.[61] By contrast, the Bayuda Desert on the left bank offers a number of easy routes with watering places, affording a short-cut across the whole of this great north-eastward bend of the river. Anciently it is attested that the journey could be accomplished in six or seven days.[62] Emerging from the Bayuda Desert one has reached the edges of the Sudanese heartland. Although the river remains an important source of life, beyond it stretches a great plain which receives just sufficient rainfall to support large areas of parched and seasonal grassland mixed with acacia trees. Here, in turn, developed the civilization of Meroe, the Christian kingdom of Alwa, and the Muslim kingdom of the Fung. In ancient times it was also probably the beginning of the wild game lands whose products, in the form of ivory, panther skins, giraffe tails, ostrich feathers, even live animals such as monkeys, hunting-dogs and giraffes, found a ready market in Egypt. Gebel Barkal (Napata) looks well chosen as a centre where the Egyptians could trade with peoples from across the Bayuda Desert. Being on the right bank, the river served as a protection from the south, and a land route, the Sikket el-Meheila, linked it almost directly with the temple town of Kawa. It was also within easy reach of the Wadi Melh, an old caravan route leading south-westwards into Kordofan and Darfur. The existence should also be noted of a likely alternative desert caravan route which, either leaving Egypt in the region of Daraw, or leaving Lower Nubia at Korosko/Wadi es-Sebua, regains the Nile at Abu Hamed, near which, at Kurgus, on the east bank, there is a group of Egyptian graffiti from the New Kingdom.[63] There is no evidence for an Egyptian town, but a local market might be postulated to explain the graffiti (equivalent to the market town of Berber of more recent times[64]); an alternative is that, lured by

reports of wealth or by the possibility of a direct land route to Punt, these graffiti mark the passage of Egyptian armies.

The second point on the distribution of temple towns is that they may be following the existing pattern of political power. Although our knowledge of the archaeological record of the Dongola Reach is still disappointingly slight, the principal area of the Kerma culture would seem to be just this stretch of river between Kawa and Amara.[65] This would readily be explained if the wealth and eventual power of this area, in the form of the kingdom of Kush, was derived from the use of the same overland trade route in those earlier times when the Egyptian frontier was further north at the Second Cataract. This leads to the third point. When, after a cultural hiatus of some three centuries following the end of the Egyptian New Kingdom control of Nubia, the kingdom of Meroe suddenly emerges from obscurity and for a while, as the Twenty-fifth Dynasty, ruled Egypt as well as Nubia and an area of uncertain extent to the south, four sites were given particular prominence in Nubia as centres for the cult of Amen and for the rites of coronation: Gebel Barkal (Napata), Sanam, Kawa and Argo.[66] Although Sanam appears to have been a new foundation (opposite Napata), the other three sites belong to the same distribution pattern as the temple towns of the New Kingdom. Furthermore, the two earliest of the Meroitic royal cemeteries were in the vicinity of Gebel Barkal: Nuri and el-Kurru. At the latter site an earlier phase extends back into the period between the end of the New Kingdom and the beginning of the Twenty-fifth Dynasty, and probably contained the burial of ancestral native rulers of this area. Important Meroitic cemeteries have also been found at Soleb and Sedinga. This continuity of importance in these two separated areas - the Amara-Kawa stretch, and the Napata region - carries with it the implication that one should seek to locate here the most important of the Nubian kingdoms or regions which occur in Egyptian lists of captured or defeated enemies. Amongst these, Kary can in fact be localized in the Napata region,[67] and Irem (and the possibly adjacent Gwerses and Tiurek) in the Kawa-Amara area.[68]

With the temple towns went a full administration on Egyptian lines.[69] As in Egypt, most officials were either representatives of the king and departments of the central government, particularly those concerned with various forms of wealth, with a viceroy of Kush

at the head corresponding to the vizier in Egypt; or they were officers of the local temple, not merely in a hierarchy of priests, but including 'scribes' and 'stewards' and suchlike, and more minor figures, such as a 'cultivator for the divine offerings (i.e. temple income)',[70] or a 'herdsman of the cattle of Horus, Lord of Miam',[71] who also exemplify the fact that temples were normally owners of agricultural resources, although a title like 'official in charge of the cattle of all the gods of Wawat (Lower Nubia)' also implies that ultimately temples came under some central accounting system.[72] Two other groups of officials should also be noted: military officers, and 'mayors' of the temple towns.[73] This last office, although it possessed little by way of its own officialdom, was the basic local government office in Egypt, and one of its responsibilities was the delivery of local taxes, paid in kind as well as in gold, to the vizier, presumably those levied on private land.[74]

The agricultural land of Nubia seems to have been apportioned according to the fragmented pattern of landholding characteristic of Egypt. The evidence is not very abundant, but is nevertheless fairly specific. In the reign of Rameses VI a deputy to the viceroy called Pennut made a pious donation of land for the benefit of a cult of a statue of the king in the temple of Aniba (Miam).[75] The donation consisted of five plots of land varying between about 1⅓ and 5⅓ acres, in no case adjoining one another, and mostly narrow strips running back from the Nile to the desert. They were bordered by fields belonging to Pharaoh, to the office held by Pennut and in one case apparently rented to the crown, to a herdsman called Bahu, and to other existing statue cults: one of a former deputy, one of the king administered by the chief priest at Aniba, and another to a cult of the dead queen Nefertari, wife of Rameses II. A remarkable, and possibly exceptional, case of a major temple in Egypt having wide-ranging possessions in Nubia is provided by the Nauri Decree of Seti I, intended to protect the temple possessions and the transfer of revenues back to Egypt from the interference or misappropriation of officials.[76] The siting at Nauri implies that in part the possessions were in the more southerly region. One clause concerned with the protection of the 'staff' of the temple in Kush, the name of the more southerly part of Nubia (Upper Nubia), gives a vivid idea of the diversity of temple holdings and involvement in local

activities, for listed are: 'guardians of fields, inspectors, bee-keepers, cultivators, vintners, gardeners, crews of transport boats, hunters (?), stoneworkers (?), foreign traders, transport troops for the gold miners, carpenters', and another clause adds fishers and fowlers. An alternative method of endowing temples and their communities, by tax rather than ownership, appears in a decree of Tuthmosis III which re-establishes the 'offerings', or income, of the little temple at Semna, perhaps too remote to be able to look after its own lands. Most of it was in the form of corn from Lower Nubia, to be provided by an annual tax collected by the 'mayors and district officials of the Elephantine part of the "Head of the South"' (another term for Nubia),[77] the same officials who were, in Egypt, responsible for delivering taxes to the vizier. Finally, there is a record of a grant of land to a chief priest at Buhen in the reign of Tuthmosis IV (*Urk* IV 1637.11-14).

There are two important implications of this. One is that the Egyptians were attempting to introduce agriculture in a far more systematic way than is likely to have existed before, probably not an easy task in view of the height of the river banks which requires the lifting of water, unless the area happens to be an abandoned river channel and therefore lower. Agriculture and a complex system of land tenure must have transformed Nubian society at the lower end, since the need was now for peasant agriculturalists. Secondly, doubts must be raised as to the reality of a significant Nubian 'tribute', as depicted in formal scenes and texts. The products of trade and of the mines may well have flowed straight to Egypt. But the logic of the temple town/mayor system is that they passed on to the central government (represented by the viceroy of Kush) only something equivalent to the taxes which similar places in Egypt remitted to the vizier. The Egyptian economy contained a large redistributive element based on the king, but at least by the later New Kingdom (and probably a lot earlier) both the evidence from texts and the simple fact of the size of their storage facilities strongly suggest that temples carried out at a local level a large share of the total redistributive operation in the country, perhaps leaving the army and the various palaces as the principal responsibility of the king. For the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty some figures are available for cattle, an apparently highly-priced commodity in Egypt.[78] The

Rekhmira tax list indicates that taxes rendered to the vizier's office on a mainly town basis in the southernmost, i.e. poorest part of Egypt, between Elephantine and Thebes, amounted to a figure almost certainly well short of 100 head of cattle.[79] The annals of Tuthmosis III give as the revenues (*bꜣkt*) of Lower Nubia the figures 92, 104; 94, 89, and 114 head of cattle for five almost consecutive years,[80] figures that compare closely with the Upper Egyptian taxes. For Upper Nubia the figures, at 343, 419, 275, and 296, are much larger, and perhaps imply that the fertile areas of the Dongola Reach were given over more to herding than to settled agriculture.

The evidence from Egypt shows that temple involvement in land holding was an extremely complex business. Over long periods of time the temples built up holdings as a result of royal donations, usually, it would seem, in the form of numerous widely-scattered plots. A practice, going back to the pyramid age and still apparently followed, allowed for part of the income from a particular temple holding to be diverted to become the income of another temple. A good part of the lands seems to have been farmed on a rented or sharecropping basis. A significant feature of the New Kingdom was the number of statues of kings whose cult was supported by an income, partly or largely derived from land owned by them. This land was donated either by kings (a very ancient practice), or by private individuals, Pennut, quoted above, being an example in Nubia.[81] In either case the responsibility for administration could be granted to private individuals, the donors themselves where the land had been a private bequest, who then became the statues' priests and thereby received a regular income. These arrangements could be hereditary, the attraction for private donors being perhaps a reduction in taxes and greater security against seizure. There are grounds for thinking that this was one way in which veteran soldiers, including foreigners, were rewarded. This practice was a partial replacement of an older one where the statue supported by such a pious foundation was of the donor himself, and formed part of his tomb. The complex and sometimes interlocking patterns of temple and statue cult income, not all on the same basis, made an overall accounting system necessary, of which one classic example, the Wilbour Papyrus, has survived from the reign of Rameses V.[82] Since temples were, at a symbolic as well as at a practical level, a part

of the 'state', the king being the other part, temple revenues from Nubia could perhaps also be regarded as 'tribute', although we do not have sufficient information to know if this was ever actually done.

The above discussion should go a long way towards defining the character of New Kingdom imperialism in Nubia. One can say that the system provided a ready means of exploiting Nubia to the full, but exploiting should evidently not be taken to mean a massive transfer of wealth and produce to Egypt. The logic of the system was that much of the revenue was consumed in this locally controlled manner of redistribution through the temple. Even the building of the temples themselves represented a loss to the Egyptian state of administratively and technically skilled persons and the means of payment to large building crews, all of which could have been used in Egypt. The benefit to the Egyptians must have been of a much more intangible character, namely the extension of the very area of the state, though whether piety can be distinguished from power as a motive is hard to know. Nevertheless, the idea - even the word 'vision' may not be inappropriate - was a persistent one, to judge from the period of time over which new temple towns were founded or rebuilt, and, if one is prepared to allow for the existence in ancient Egyptian society of different views as to the nature of preferred activity abroad, a product of the 'scribal' mentality rather than the military one.

This is also an appropriate moment to consider the applicability of the term 'colonization'. Since the basic form of Egyptian society differed significantly from Roman society, a point by point comparison between the temple towns and the *coloniae* is not particularly helpful. However, if the comparison is made at the level of the relationship to the parent society, then a parallel can be seen to emerge. The *coloniae*, remarked Aulus Gellius,[83] 'have the appearance of miniatures, and are reproductions of Rome herself'. Of the temple towns in Nubia, with regard to their basic physical shape and their administration, one could phrase a similar statement, although no individual Egyptian city seems to have possessed quite the symbolic role which Rome had. But reproductions of the New Kingdom city idea they certainly were. They were also the centres of a policy on land, and land is, in Finley's words, 'the element round which to construct a typology of colonies'.[84] The Egyptian policy in riverine Nubia

involved not merely annexation, but evidently a more intensive exploitation of its agricultural potential through the introduction of personal responsibility for farming strictly defined and legally based plots of land. Insofar as one can construct a useful definition of the word 'colony', the New Kingdom temple towns would seem to fit.

The one element of uncertainty is the extent to which the population of Nubia was increased by immigration from Egypt. The uncertainty arises from the rapid and, around the temple towns, wholesale adoption of Egyptian culture by the local population, to the extent that the composition of the population seems at present unascertainable. Imperial policies have occasionally embraced significant transfers of population, and this has been raised in connection with New Kingdom Egypt, though also strongly criticized. However, letters found in 1969 at Kamid el-Loz in Syria do hint at some definite policy towards population. Addressed to two local rulers under Egyptian overlordship, they are concerned with the transfer of a class of captives (*ʿprw*) to Nubian towns whose inhabitants the king had removed.[85] As is so often the case, wide implications from isolated sources are incapable of being verified further. The question remains, therefore, somewhat academic. We have no evidence for a legally defined 'citizenship' in ancient Egypt. The implication of this is that just by adopting Egyptian culture and making himself presentable enough to enter Egyptian officialdom, a Nubian acquired a place in Egyptian society equivalent to possession of citizenship, and with opportunities for property-owning and promotion within the system. Thus the effect of Egyptian policies in Nubia was to increase, perhaps quite considerably, the numbers of people who, by culture and opportunity, were, in effect and in those respects which mattered most at the time, Egyptian. Whether this was ever consciously intended is hard to say. During the Second Intermediate Period, when Nubia was independent, a taste for Egyptian culture and the means to satisfy it are evident in some Lower Nubian cemeteries, and in any case, by the time that the temple town programme got under way the process of Egyptianization was largely complete.[86] Egyptian culture must have had a considerable glamour in the eyes of Nubians, and, through the land reorganization process, few riverine communities can have escaped regular contact with Egyptian society. It is not hard to understand how, in an age innocent of the esoteric

delights of 'folk culture', many of the local products, such as the decorated hand-made pottery and mother-of-pearl trinkets, did not survive the flood of cheap mass-produced Egyptian wares: the plain but practical pottery made to fit in with Egyptian practices and habits, and the rather gaudy jewellery of glazed frit (Egyptian faience) which seems to have held a place in ancient Egypt equivalent to plastic in our own culture. Furthermore, once conquest was complete, Nubians may have become anxious to display how they now belonged to the ruling power.

The evidence which makes Egyptianization into an important issue is not simply the ubiquitous replacement of one culture by another. From an upper stratum of society there is striking evidence pertaining to two groups of Nubian princes. One group were princes of Teh-khet, a region apparently between Buhen and Faras.[87] Within it, at Debeira East, was a rock-cut family tomb of entirely Egyptian type, decorated with wall paintings in Egyptian style, though with some details depicting local agriculture. It belonged principally to a 'prince of Teh-khet' namely Djehuty-hetep, a common Egyptian name. Across the river was the tomb of another of these princes with the Egyptian name of Amenemhat, who was apparently Djehuty-hetep's younger brother. This tomb had a small brick pyramid built above the rock-cut chambers, a fashionable touch only just at this time becoming popular at Thebes itself. The pottery and other grave goods were also Egyptian. Both men seem to have lived in the first part of the Eighteenth Dynasty. A number of typically Egyptian statues and stelae can also be ascribed to this family. It is only the genealogy of these princes where non-Egyptian names occur, the fact that Djehuty-hetep himself occasionally used a second and non-Egyptian name, and their use of the title *wr*, 'prince', which the Egyptians normally applied to foreign dignitaries, which tell us that we are here dealing with a prominent Nubian family who had adopted Egyptian culture. One member of the family must have migrated to the frontier town of Elephantine, where his tomb has been discovered. The office of prince of Teh-khet is known to have lasted at least to the reign of Rameses II.

Interestingly, Djehuty-hetep's father, Ruiu, had two namesakes at Aniba who both illustrate the same process.[88] One, whose title is not fully preserved, was married to a woman with a probably

Nubian name, Iret-nebia, but their son's name, although not fully preserved, was clearly Egyptian: '...nefer'. The other Ruiu, conceivably the same man, held the office of 'deputy to the viceroy', the highest office for Lower Nubia. He was buried in a family tomb at Aniba with an elaborate mud-brick chapel of Egyptian type, his name inscribed on the stone door jambs. The burials had been rich and wholly Egyptian, and included two statues and ushabti-figures bearing his name. A further case at Aniba of a man with a probably Nubian name holding high office is the mayor of Miam (Aniba), Pahul, buried in a tomb with a fine Egyptian-type heart scarab and some imported pottery, a Syrian red lustrous spindle-bottle and an imitation Late Minoan alabastron.

The second group of princes also used the term Miam to refer to their territory, but evidently it could apply to a stretch of the Nile valley at least as far as Toshka, as well as to the Egyptian town of Aniba. For a long time a prince of Miam called Heka-nefer was known from a wall painting in the Theban tomb of the Viceroy of Kush, Huy, who held office in the reign of Tutankhamen. In a scene where princes of Lower Nubia, painted alternately black and brown, are presented to the king by Huy, one of them is labelled 'Prince of Miam, Heka-nefer', and is dressed in a richly exotic native costume. But in this there may be more than a touch of the artistic conventions for southerners. In 1961 his tomb was identified as one of three rock tombs at Toshka East, some twenty-five kilometres away from Aniba.[89] In its plan it closely resembles contemporary tombs at Thebes, particularly that of the Viceroy Huy himself. Around the entrance were carved prayers to Egyptian gods and representations of Heka-nefer in Egyptian costume. Inside were traces of wall painting in Egyptian style. The objects which remained in the badly plundered burial chamber indicated interments of Egyptian type, with ushabti-figures, and a fragment of a stone pectoral inscribed on the back with Chapter 30 of the Book of the Dead. The contrast with the depiction of Heka-nefer in Huy's tomb could scarcely be more complete. Inscriptions from the site also preserve more of his titles, including one which suggests that he had served whilst a youth as a page at the Egyptian court, exemplifying a common Egyptian policy of giving an Egyptian court education to the children of foreign princes.[90]

No inscriptions have survived to identify the owners of the other two closely similar tombs adjoining Heka-nefer's, but in the vicinity was found a graffito commemorating another prince of Miam with the Egyptian name of Ra-hetep. It would seem very plausible to regard Toshka East as the site of a cemetery of native princes allowed to retain their elite status, but who, to the extent of siting their tombs at least, kept themselves separate from the Egyptian temple town at Aniba. Similarly in the case of Teh-khet, Debeira lay between the Egyptian towns of Buhen and Faras.

A further area where the extent of Egyptian penetration into Nubian society can be seen is religion. In the temples built by the Egyptians in Nubia the gods who were present in statues and to whom offerings were made were entirely the product of Egyptian theology. This suggests that, in contrast to the Egyptian reaction in Palestine, Egyptian theologians were unable to identify any well-defined local deities whom they could recognize as fringe members of the Egyptian pantheon. Nor have the indigenous inhabitants of the pre-New Kingdom phases left any traces of shrines, unless some of the groups of rock carvings of cattle and other subjects served as foci for devotion. The Egyptian gods in Nubia can be divided into three groups:

(i) traditional Egyptian deities. These appear quite unaltered, or with some specific Nubian epithet, such as 'Amen-Ra, pre-eminent in Nubia', 'Amen-Ra residing in the "island" of Miam (Aniba)', 'Maat-Ra, lord of Nubia', 'Ra, lord of the eastern bank', 'Isis the great, lady of Nubia', or 'Amen-Ra, lord of the thrones of the two lands (a term for Karnak, Thebes), residing in the holy mountain of Napata, the great god, lord of heaven'.[91] Of understandably common occurrence was the father-wife-daughter triad of Khnum, Anukis, and Satis of Elephantine and the First Cataract;

(ii) 'the Horus gods of Nubia'.[92] For reasons largely lost in obscurity both Horus and the goddess Hathor were, from early times, regarded by the Egyptians as the typical manifestations of accessible and beneficent divinity in foreign lands. Sometimes they reflect an Egyptian view of a local deity, such as Hathor, Lady of Byblos, who masks the local goddess Baalath Gebal. But in most cases, and probably exclusively in Nubia, they are likely to have been Egyptian creations, in which particular localities were assigned to their

patronage. Such immanence is very clear from the case of Hathor, Lady of Nekhent, who, in the Middle Kingdom, was the patron goddess of the normally uninhabited diorite quarries in the desert west of Toshka.[93] Most important were the Horus gods: 'Lord of Baki', 'Lord of Miam', and 'Lord of Buhen', representing the three principal areas of Lower Nubia with their centres at Kubban, Aniba, and Buhen. Of lesser importance were 'Horus, Lord of Meha', 'Hathor, Lady of Ibshek', and 'Hathor, Lady of Iken'.[94] Curiously, these localities are all in Lower Nubia, which might suggest that this particular form of theological 'research' was primarily a Middle Kingdom phenomenon, when the Egyptians lived in fortified enclaves and Lower Nubia must have seemed still an alien land; and that the import of more purely Egyptian deities was found in the New Kingdom to be more appropriate to the changed Egyptian position;

(iii) Egyptian kings. This again was an extension of a very Egyptian practice, going back at least as far as the later Old Kingdom in Egypt, but possibly given more prominence now in Nubia. The cults of statues of Tuthmosis III 'residing in Teh-khet',[95] and at el-Lessiya temple,[96] of Amenhetep III 'Lord of Nubia' at Soleb, of Tutankhamen at Faras, and of Rameses II at various temples, including all of his rock-cut ones,[97] all seem to have commenced during the particular king's lifetime. Cults of Rameses VI and probably of Queen Nefertari are attested at Aniba by the donation text of Pennut mentioned above. Amenhetep I as 'Amenhetep of Kary',[98] apparently the area of Napata, was presumably a posthumous cult, and in a number of localities a cult of Senusret III, the great conqueror of the Twelfth Dynasty, was celebrated.

A particularly eloquent witness to the depth of penetration by Egyptian religion into Nubian society is provided by a shrine, a mere ledge in a rock face at Gebel Agg, not far from Heka-nefer's tomb at Toshka East.[99] A narrow bench had been cut at the back, presumably for offerings, and above it was carved a scene on the overhanging rock face. It portrayed a group of people, almost certainly a Nubian family, two of them herdsmen, who bring offerings to three gods: Horus, Lord of Miam, the long-dead conqueror of their country from a previous age, Senusret III, and Reshep, 'great god, lord of heaven', a Palestinian deity given a niche in the Egyptian pantheon, although his exotic origin was doubtless unknown to this particular group of

worshippers. Below the scene is carved a short prayer for a number of Egyptian officials who had 'visited Nubia', one of them a stonecutter and perhaps the man who had carved the scene above, although the responsibility for this, perhaps more of a financial kind, was claimed by one of the sons of the family. Some of the pottery found in front was apparently in the traditions of the pre-New Kingdom culture, suggesting that this was a well-established place of offerings. One might also wonder if at other localities this type of rock shrine characterized the sites chosen by the Egyptians for rock temples. Outside the walls of Sesebi in Upper Nubia a small single-chambered shrine had been erected, around which skeletons of snakes had been buried in pottery vessels. Unfortunately no inscriptions survived to show whether the cult was a local one, or of the Egyptian cobra goddess of the harvest, Renenutet, honoured in at least three Nubian localities.[100]

The Egyptian system established in Nubia had, perhaps not surprisingly, a powerful demographic impact. During the Eighteenth Dynasty, the number of sites, mostly cemeteries, declined dramatically in Lower Nubia until, by the beginning of the Nineteenth Dynasty, it becomes virtually impossible to isolate significant groups of graves outside the cemeteries attached to the temple towns. This has been taken to show an equivalent absolute decline in population: 'During the fifteenth century B.C. there occurred a general exodus of what remained of the indigenous population, until in the later Eighteenth Dynasty the only Nubians who remained in the region were those who had been absorbed into the Egyptian colonies. These colonies themselves rapidly declined in size and importance, and practically ceased to function after the Eighteenth Dynasty. Small numbers of Egyptians remained on frontier duty for another two centuries, building monuments to proclaim the glory and sovereignty of their pharaoh over a deserted land.'[101] Explanations have been sought in natural ecological reverse,[102] and in the effects of too energetic an exploitation. One might note that the names of the last three kings of the New Kingdom, Rameses IX, X, and XI have been found at widely separated temple towns in Nubia, and more significantly the Pennut donation text referred to above provides indisputable evidence that in one part of Lower Nubia the Egyptian agricultural system was still operating in the reign of Rameses VI, implying

the existence of peasants, even if they did not leave much in the way of archaeological traces behind them. But for a better understanding of the archaeological evidence two general points must be made. The first is that, probably by about the beginning of the first millennium, thus subsequent to the New Kingdom, the practice of burying quantities of household goods in tombs in Egypt had largely ceased, and had been replaced, though probably not so universally, by the inclusion of amulets and other purely religious objects. The first part of this process - decline in the burial of household goods - had almost certainly begun in the late New Kingdom, producing in Egypt an effect which bears some resemblance to that visible in Lower Nubia. It can be demonstrated in the relatively well-surveyed Qau area of Middle Egypt,[103] and at the important palace site at Medinet el-Ghurab, whose cemetery seems to display the same decline in the numbers of burials that can be ascribed to the later New Kingdom.[104] The second point is that in the larger New Kingdom cemeteries in Nubia, the Egyptian type of family vault was adopted, served by a single chapel, sometimes quite elaborate.[105] These have been terribly robbed being very vulnerable, but in addition to containing several burial chambers, it is clear that each chamber might contain several bodies,[106] so that the numbers of tombs in one of these cemeteries give one no idea at all of the numbers of burials involved, nor how they might have been distributed in time. Since the comparison that is being made is with the older indigenous cemeteries where burials were made singly and marked clearly with a stone tumulus, there is a real danger of being misled by a simple tomb count.

To illustrate this demographic aspect I have chosen one fairly well surveyed area of Lower Nubia, fig.4. The stretch of Nile valley upstream and downstream of Wadi es-Sebua seems anciently to have been one of the less prosperous parts of Lower Nubia, although Burckhardt in 1813 reported that he found it 'the best cultivated part of the country which I met with, between Assouan and Derr',[107] as well as the home of merchants who used a long overland desert route to trade with the Sudan, at Berber. The principal area of cultivable alluvium was at es-Sebua itself, on the left bank, and extended to a maximum width of about one hundred metres, which has probably been reduced since ancient times by heavy sand drifting.



FIG. 4. WADI ES-SEBUA IN LOWER NUBIA

During the Middle Kingdom a population bearing C-group culture was distributed as a scatter of small communities on both sides of the river, and with an obvious concentration in the vicinity of es-Sebua itself. They can be recognized both from little groups of stone huts and from stone tumulus cemeteries. Many contained only a few graves, and although part of the evidence is available only in preliminary reports, altogether no more than about one hundred graves may be present. Almost opposite the site of the New Kingdom temples a much more substantial C-group village was discovered in 1965, comprising about forty stone houses. On the river side it used the low cliff edge for protection, but on the landward side it was fortified with a thick stone wall containing loopholes, with spur walls to protect the main gate, though all on a miniature scale. In the preliminary publication the finds have been dated to the Second Intermediate Period, which would make it one of a small number of fortified settlements which grew up at this period.[108] If this date is substantiated, it would suggest strongly that the nucleation of population which is so evident in the New Kingdom had already begun shortly before this time, and for local defensive reasons.

In the New Kingdom, both this village and any other outlying settlements were abandoned. Except for some sherds claimed to be of the New Kingdom found in isolation on the right bank, settlement seems to have been confined to the left bank where the cultivable land was widest. In the reign of Amenhetep III, thus about a century and a half after conquest, a small mud-brick temple was built here, dedicated principally to Amen-ra, but a more popular form was honoured on some private stelae under the name 'Amen lord of the roads'. One had been dedicated by 'the chief priest and mayor, Pia', from the reign of Rameses II, presumably the head of the community at this time.[109] In the reign of Rameses II this temple was restored, and on a fresh site the rock temple was built, using western desert nomads captured for the purpose as labour.[110] Both temples stood back from the river at the beginning of the slope up to the desert. No trace was found here of a New Kingdom town or village, but in the report of a 1906-7 survey it was remarked that the 'mounds which mark the site of the ancient town are to be seen at the river's edge in front of the temple, the surface pottery being mainly late'.[111] No attempt was made to excavate it, and it subsequently fell victim

to the raised level of water in the reservoir created by the successive damming of the Nile at Aswan. Consequently, a New Kingdom horizon must remain a matter of conjecture, but this situation also illustrates the particular vulnerability of one class of settlement, that lying on the river bank. The cemetery record, likewise fragmentary, also suggests that the community was divided into two: a handful of people living around the temple, the officials, who were apparently buried in a small cemetery with rock tombs near the temple; and the inhabitants of a small village down by the river who continued to use an old C-group cemetery about a kilometre upstream, which was used again in Meroitic and modern times, a fact which suggests, despite gaps in the archaeological record, a degree of continuity in the local population. It had been plundered, and deeply buried beneath drift sand so that full excavation was not possible. In one campaign of excavation forty-one graves were ascribed to the New Kingdom, all shallow oblong pits for one burial and all extremely poor, even when unplundered. Indeed, half of them contained no objects at all, and most of the remainder only a single pot. It is thus not really possible to see how these burials were distributed in time.

The conclusions to be drawn from Wadi es-Sebua are that the size of the New Kingdom temples, especially the rock temples, is no guide to the size of the population, even at the outset of the New Kingdom; and that with such a modest population the archaeological record becomes highly vulnerable and makes quantitative assessment difficult. Wadi es-Sebua may not be typical of all 'country' areas, away from the main towns, and it should be noted that no assessment is yet possible at all for Upper Nubia. But when other evidence, such as the Pennut donation text which concerns an area not all that distant from Wadi es-Sebua, is considered as well it should be concluded that whilst the later New Kingdom was not a period of particular prosperity for Lower Nubia, and may have seen an agricultural population with very little material wealth at all existing beside small groups of officials, it is not justified to invoke almost total depopulation.

THE EGYPTIAN EMPIRE IN WESTERN ASIA[112]

From the point of view of the history of imperialism, the western Asiatic side of the Egyptian empire is of less interest than Nubia,

in that it was merely a variation on the common theme of vassalage and tribute. As in Nubia, the initial conquests were rapid, in succession to the expulsion of the Palestinian Hyksos dynasty, reaching the Euphrates in the reign of Tuthmosis I (c. 1500 B.C.). Some fifty years later, this same limit marked the peak of Tuthmosis III's successes. At this distance the Egyptians were close to the frontiers of major states - Mitanni across the Euphrates, and by the late Eighteenth Dynasty the Hittites in Anatolia - and evidently did not possess the overwhelming military strength to defeat rival great powers and occupy their territories, as the Assyrians and later the Persians were able to. Since the same was true, *vis-à-vis* Egypt, for these other two powers, the history of this period is essentially one of military struggle for the domination of Syria, not only for whatever economic gain might accrue (this being something that the texts say little about), but more for the power or sense of power brought by military success and diplomatic coercion in a region which was, by the standards of the age, an advanced one. The limits of effective Egyptian control seem normally to have stretched no further north than, say, a line between Ugarit (or a point to the south) and Kadesh, although this should not be understood as a frontier, but a zone beyond which Egyptian power to dictate the course of events and collect tribute was greater or lesser, according to circumstances. Only with the treaty between Rameses II and the Hittites (c. 1270 B.C.) does a degree of relative stability seem to have appeared, and was effective probably because it represented a mutual recognition of the limitations of power, and although it contains no geographical definitions, it must have been based on this dividing zone which had gradually emerged and which left most of Syria within the Hittite empire. Behind this treaty lay some three centuries of Egyptian military effort since the beginning of the Eighteenth Dynasty, of garrisoning punctuated by major campaigns. The basic lack of territorial advance over this period may have mattered less compared to the satisfaction of the New Kingdom military urge, since the well-equipped armies of western Asia must have seemed a more fitting challenge than Nubian raiders or rebels. The increase in power brought by success was marked by diplomatic courtesies from far afield, from the courts of great kings. Nubia could offer nothing like this.

Syria and Palestine had been the scene of a relatively sophisticated urban society for as far back as the initial emergence of the Egyptian state at the end of the fourth millennium, and indeed beyond. This has been emphasized recently by the discovery at Tell Mardikh (the ancient Ebla) of about 15,000 tablets dating to the twenty-fourth or twenty-third century, part of the contents of which are said to deal with international diplomatic exchange.[113] It says something about the character of the early Egyptian state that, apart from forays and perhaps some attempt at control in that part of Palestine closest to Egypt, it was not until the New Kingdom that a serious attempt was made to establish hegemony in Palestine and Syria. Little is actually known in Palestine of political organization for the earlier periods, but the archaeological record shows every sign of an inherent city-state pattern. This reached a peak of wealth and development during the latter part of the Middle Bronze II period, and probably produced the Hyksos dynasty in Egypt. The material culture of Middle Bronze II Palestine was for a while transported to the eastern Nile delta.[114] Although there is no really unambiguous written evidence, the general historical situation raises the serious likelihood that the overlordship of the Hyksos kings extended over at least the southern part of Palestine as well, whither they retired in the face of the successful Theban revolt which led to the establishment of the Eighteenth Dynasty. The importance of considering this is that, if true, the early Eighteenth-Dynasty kings may have found themselves heirs to an existing vassal system which required only a limited display of military determination to take over.

Egyptian hieroglyphic sources say remarkably little about imperial organization. But considerable incidental detail emerges from the Amarna letters, augmented to a small extent by finds of similar tablets on other western Asiatic sites (e.g. Ta'anach, Gezer, Tell el-Hesi, and Kamid el-Loz).[115] The careful sifting of allusions in letters written by and to people well acquainted with the background, to which certain Egyptian hieroglyphic references can be added, has produced the following rather hazy picture.[116] The city-states continued to retain their kings or princes (more than one term was used to differentiate status) once they had sworn an oath of allegiance to Pharaoh, a formal ceremony to which the Egyptians gave



FIG. 5 TENTATIVE POLITICAL MAP OF PALESTINE AND SYRIA IN THE 14TH CENTURY B.C.

great symbolic importance. Some of their children might be sent to the Egyptian court to be brought up in Egyptian ways, and from them the successor might have to be chosen. Loyalty and a flow of tribute was maintained by Egyptian-appointed commissioners who frequently, though not always, possessed Egyptian names. The powers of these commissioners were evidently wide, and extended to protecting the local prince from his own people and quelling disturbances in the cities, and to settling local disputes between city-states by a court of arbitration consisting of a group of them. Where Egyptian supremacy was an established fact, the commissioner was a figure who could help support a ruling house in the local political intrigues which could reach serious proportions, and his character was of obvious concern to the individual prince. One Amarna letter (EA 106) from Rib-adda of Byblos, in requesting a new commissioner for Simyra, asks for a particular Egyptian fan-bearer by name, for 'I have heard from others that he is a wise man and everyone loves him'. It is possible to interpret the evidence of the Amarna letters to point to the existence of a division of the whole area under Egyptian hegemony into three provinces (though there appears to be no ancient term for such): Amurru (taking its name from the dominant city-state), a northerly coastal province; Upe, stretching inland over Syria; and Canaan, comprising much of Palestine. Each contained a city in which the senior Egyptian representative had a more permanent residence, respectively Simyra, Kumidi and Gaza. Garrisons, which could be quite small, were stationed at some places. At Jerusalem, the local prince Abdu-heba faced a revolt of a garrison of Nubian mercenaries, poorly supplied, who broke into his house and, so he claimed, tried to kill him (EA 287). It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the conditions of Hittite vassalage, the city-states were evidently not required to assist the Egyptians militarily.[117] The Egyptian government was kept in touch by envoys, chariotry personnel carrying clay-tablet letters to and from Pharaoh and his chief ministers on the one hand, and the various princes and Egyptian commissioners on the other.

Naturally, an important feature was the assessment of tribute, paid in kind and probably on an annual basis (cf. *Urk* IV 1442.3-7), carried out by Egyptian officials. The possibility that this implies at least a limited Egyptian bureaucratic presence in addition to the

commissioner is increased by the discovery at two sites (Tell el-Duweir[118] and Tell esh-Sharia[119]) of a small number of Ramesside hieratic texts, probably preliminary book-keeping jottings. The former group is concerned with 'wheat' and 'harvest tax'; of the latter group one is concerned with taxes coming to the 'house', though whether this refers to the local sanctuary or to the local Egyptian residence is not yet apparent. If the Egyptians were running a full tax assessment system, a much greater degree of organization and staffing is implied than is visible from other sources.

Basic to the character of this empire was the Egyptian acceptance of a well-established way of life. Politically, it was a classic city-state situation with some, particularly in Syria, the centres of confederacies with their own vassals. Typically, the urban centre stood on a mound of accumulated strata from earlier periods, surrounded at the top by a massive towered perimeter wall with strongly fortified gateways, and possessing some form of keep or strong point. In size the cities varied considerably, sometimes reaching proportions which, for the ancient world, were fairly large. Within they presented a tightly-packed congested appearance, crossed by only narrow crooked streets. House units are often not easy to isolate, and there has been little serious analysis of the articulation of town plans. At some sites palaces have been found, likewise varying greatly in size: 400 square metres at Ta'anach; some two and a half acres at Ugarit, a city of very considerable wealth. Public buildings separate from the palace are difficult to isolate. Particularly important for the contrast with Egypt are their temples, relatively modest constructions without their own precincts.[120] For Syria, some further written evidence exists for social and economic structure.[121] It was not an ethnically homogeneous society. As a result of southward migrations in the preceding period, a significant new element was now to be found in the ancient Near East. Their language was Hurrian, their ultimate homeland may have been Armenia, and amongst them was an aristocratic class called *maryannu*, bearing Indo-Aryan names, who formed a ruling element in Syria and parts of Palestine, though not exclusively so. They were particularly associated with chariotry, and indeed must have provided the model for the military aristocrats of New Kingdom Egypt, as well as an enemy whose defeat or

capture was prestigious. The term *maryannu*, however, was not only hereditary, but could also be conferred on a man as a mark of honour. The kingdom of Mitanni was itself a Hurrian confederate state across the Euphrates.

These city-states were ruled by hereditary kings who in some cases still attempted to maintain an aura of divinity, and who fulfilled a wide range of administrative and judicial functions, although their power was to a degree circumscribed by a council of 'city lords'. Census records provide a good sign of a bureaucratic control of society, in which people were classed, taxed and rendered liable to service. This last demand, in particular, is probably a sign that the existing system was in essence no less onerous for the majority of the people than anything the Egyptians might have introduced, although the extent or frequency of the burdens might have been increased by Egyptian demands for revenue. Members of the aristocracy could be granted lands and villages in perpetuity in return for payment of certain taxes and the rendering of certain obligations to the king. Slavery existed, but not apparently on a particularly large scale. Farming, trade and industry (e.g. purple dye from murex shellfish) were pursued, and made some places, such as Ugarit, very rich. Quite apart from the great practical problems, the Egyptians' general weakness in abstract thinking must have rendered very unlikely any attempt at reorganizing the law, government, or society of this region following some great master plan or set of elegant concepts. Since this was a society which the Egyptians could not alter but only hope to keep favourably disposed towards them, it is possible that, outside the special conditions created by rebellions and campaigns, they acted with some regard for established exchange procedures. Thus Pharaoh might seek to acquire weaving slave-girls 'in whom there is no blemish' not by peremptory demand, but by sending an official to one of the local princes (in this case Milkili of Gezer) with a consignment of precious things to exchange for them (*ANET* 487). This debit side to the imperial balance sheet is, as in Nubia, impossible to quantify.

Nor does the question of colonization or town-building arise in this area. Some towns or districts are known to have been made into Egyptian royal domains (e.g. Gaza and Kumidi), others of the temple of Amen at Thebes,[122] but there is no indication that this went

further than placing an existing town or area somewhat more firmly within the Egyptian grasp, no indication that anywhere a significant building programme was undertaken. Even in the important copper mining desert region around Timna in the Wadi Arabah the local cult set up by the Egyptians, a form of Hathor, was served by only a rudimentary rough stone sanctuary, in contrast to the great temples of Lower Nubia which must likewise, in some cases, have served insignificant communities.[123]

In assessing the impact of Egyptian imperialism in western Asia in cultural terms, allowance must be made for the fact that this was an age of great international exchange in technology, religious ideas and artistic motifs in which Egypt was only one party, although the distinctiveness of Egyptian art makes its influence more readily apparent. Furthermore, these exchanges of ideas, material objects and persons went beyond the bounds of empires. As examples revealed by texts but of a type not normally documented by archaeology one might cite the Mitanni loan to Amenhetep III of a statue of the healing goddess Ishtar of Nineveh (EA 23), and the requests by the prince of Ugarit for an Egyptian doctor to be sent (EA 49), and by the Hittite king to Rameses II for medical assistance for his ageing sister.[124] The artistic eclecticism of the age is well exemplified by the Megiddo ivories,[125] and survived into the very different political world of the early first millennium in the carved ivories of Phoenicia and North Syria, where it is possible to discern still Egyptian, Hurrian, Hittite and Mycenaean motifs.[126] Small objects of value from Egypt - faience, stone and glass vessels, scarabs and bronze objects - are found in relatively limited quantities on Syro-Palestinian sites, although the general record does include 'pockets' of Egyptian or Egyptianizing material, the background to which is not always easy to understand. The Fosse Temple at Tell el-Duweir, for example,[127] which was evidently not the main city shrine since it lay outside the city limits at that time, included a strong Egyptian element among the large quantity of votive objects, despite the lack of Egyptian inscriptions referring to the deity there (unlike the temple at Beth-Shan, see below). The question as to whether the devotees numbered Egyptians amongst them, or whether objects of value suitable for pious temple gifts would inevitably often have been Egyptian imports or imitations, is as yet unanswerable.

Identifiable Egyptian pottery, the most distinctive being the blue-painted vessels developed during the later Eighteenth Dynasty, is generally rare. This is in marked contrast to the quantities of pottery imported from elsewhere or imitated locally which could, in tomb groups, reach fifty per cent.[128] This included Mycenaean pottery, but even more so Cypriote, which became a dominant feature of the Palestinian pottery repertoire. Its range is noticeably wider than that found in Egypt, where Cypriote pottery imports seem the result of a more specialized trade, and presumably is a sign that local trading patterns in Syro-Palestine continued under Egyptian overlordship. It is a common comment that trade in Egypt, particularly with the outside world, was a royal monopoly, in contrast to other parts of the ancient Near East, but the evidence on which this is based is not very satisfactory. One reference, in a scribal school exercise in which the writer is made to describe the luxurious and successful life of his teacher, contains the intriguing statement: 'Your ship has returned from Syria laden with all manner of good things.'[129] Although one can scarcely base a case for private merchant ventures in Egypt on a single isolated reference, it should at least serve as a warning against making too sweeping a generalization on this topic.

During the Second Intermediate Period, as noted above, Palestinian material culture was to be found in the eastern Nile delta, but with the coming of the New Kingdom this influence seems largely to have died away. Apart from a line of forts or way stations along the north Sinai coastal road leading to Palestine (one recently located at Bir el-Abd),[130] the cultural division between Palestine and Egypt was a sharp one in the New Kingdom, as can readily be seen by comparing the excavation reports of east delta sites such as Tell el-Yahudiya[131] with that of Tell el-Ajjul,[132] one of the closest large Palestinian Late Bronze Age sites to Egypt, and possibly the city of Sharuhen whither the Hyksos king retired when expelled from Egypt.[133] On many sites in Palestine (even Tell el-Ajjul) the purely archaeological record would not of itself incline one to the view that an Egyptian empire existed at all.

However, one particular facet of culture does deserve to be singled out for further consideration. The temples on Late Bronze Age sites display little in the way of architectural grandeur. Their

basic forms, of one or more modest chambers, were still rooted in a long tradition reaching back to the Early Bronze Age, and were also widespread beyond Palestine and Syria. The contrast with Egypt was not just in forms and monumentality, but also in the absence of important identifiable ancillary structures, particularly a temple precinct and capacious warehouses. There are some indications, however, that they were given a significant role in the Egyptian imperial presence. It might indeed be thought that in this area at least the Egyptians were better placed for introducing changes, but even here they seem to have accepted basic cult practices and divine identities, some Syro-Palestinian deities acquiring a limited recognition in Egypt (Reshep at the Gebel Agg shrine in far-distant Nubia was referred to above).[134] The most revealing site in this respect is Beth-Shan (Tell el-Hosn), a town set on a mound lying to the west of the Jordan valley.[135] During the period equivalent to the New Kingdom the edge of the mound was fortified with a towered wall, and behind it, at one period (level VII of the thirteenth century) a small fortified keep was built, of the sort that appears in Egyptian artistic representations of western Asiatic towns, and at another (level VI, about the reign of Rameses II) a house was constructed for the Egyptian army commander employing inscribed stone doorframes of the type found in houses in Egypt. The site of the temple was close by, and over a period between the mid-thirteenth and the tenth centuries it had been successively rebuilt. For much of this time it was a relatively modest building of mud-brick, of locally inspired layout but employing certain Egyptian design elements, such as stone papyrus capitals. The inscribed stones belong to two groups, representing two very different levels of patronage. One consists of stelae dedicated to local deities: Anat, possibly Astarte, and 'Mekal of Beth-Shan', this last god depicted in Egyptian style though with Asiatic headdress and features, and dedicated by a builder named Amenemope and his son Paraemheb. There is no obvious trace at this personal level of Egyptian deities. The other group, which very surprisingly had been re-erected in front of a yet later temple belonging to the period following the end of the New Kingdom, when it is generally assumed that the Egyptian empire had ceased to exist, consisted of formal, 'official' stelae of kings Seti I and Rameses II, depicting only Egyptian gods, and containing either military epithets or

accounts of local campaigns, just as if they had belonged to a purely Egyptian temple.

Along with the reused stelae was found a life-size statue of Rameses III. This may not have been the only royal statue on a Palestinian site, for another from an unknown provenance in Palestine is in the British Museum,[136] and a battle text of Rameses II may refer to a statue of his in Tunip.[137] Royal statues, particularly in the Ramesside period, imply statue cults with supporting foundations, and may suggest, for the later New Kingdom at least, an attempt at creating a psychological focus for Egyptian rule, in the shape of a ruler cult. Evidence for other Egyptian cults is slight.[138] The most specific is a reference to a 'mansion' built by Rameses III at Gaza to contain a statue of Amen to whom the people of Palestine would bring tribute (P Harris I 9.1-3). The term 'mansion' may well have referred to something fairly modest,[139] and Gaza itself was too closely linked to Egypt for this statement to signify a policy more widely adopted. The unusually close relationship between Egypt and Byblos during the Middle Kingdom had left a legacy in the form of a local Hathor cult, and this continued to receive Egyptian patronage during the New Kingdom.[140] Another Hathor cult, at Timna, see above, belongs to an extension of Egyptian desert mining activities. From the major role played by temples in the society of New Kingdom Egypt and Nubia one might have expected a greater effort at establishing Egyptian cults, especially of Amen and of the king, or perhaps of Seth even, in the western Asiatic provinces. One should not overestimate the size of Late Bronze Age archaeological exposures on Palestinian town sites, and it should be pointed out that statues or other cult objects of Canaanite deities are equally lacking. The Beth-Shan temples themselves contained nothing in their architectural remains to suggest that a large royal Egyptian statue had been present, nor does P Harris I (a summary of Rameses III's achievements) refer to it. One should perhaps not, therefore, be too ready to deny that this basic aspect of the Egyptians' ordering of society was scarcely represented in this part of their empire.

As with Nubia, it has been claimed that under Egyptian hegemony there was a general decline in prosperity in Palestine (though not in Syria) during the later New Kingdom, corresponding to the later phases of the Late Bronze Age and the beginnings of the Iron Age. It

has been further claimed that this was the direct result of maladministration and rapacious taxation.[141] A literal acceptance of the Amarna letters, with their desperate pleas and grievances might indeed create the impression of a system degenerating in disorder. But at the same time, the self-interest of those who wrote is hard to discount, as hard as the seriousness of their complaints is always to accept at face value. Although in tone they are a valuable corrective to the bombast of official texts, they are likely to be, in their way, almost as tendentious.[142] The archaeological record is far more complex than in Nubia, and still a lot more fragmentary. As excavation proceeds - it has now reached the stage of second expeditions to some of the original key sites and to inevitable reinterpretations of basic findings - a bewildering variety of local histories is emerging, punctuated by destruction levels for which attempts at correlation with known Egyptian campaigns sometimes seem forced and somewhat arbitrary. In general, the period equivalent to the establishment of the New Kingdom empire seems to have witnessed the decline, even abandonment, of some places in Palestine (such as Bethel, Jericho, Tell el-Duweir, Shechem, Tell Beir Mirsim and Tell el-Fara'ah), and at others a period of destruction followed shortly afterwards by rebuilding (e.g. Beth-Shemesh and Tell el-Ajjul). Destruction temporarily overtook Megiddo and Ta'anach somewhat later. But by the later Eighteenth Dynasty it would seem that almost every town for which there is evidence in the Middle Bronze Age was once more occupied, and some, such as Tell Abu Hawam, had been newly founded. Significant new buildings might be constructed (e.g. the Late Bronze II palace at Tell Aphek[143]). But for the later New Kingdom, any growth that was in Palestinian society seems to have stopped. Individual places (Beth-Shan is a striking case, and one might cite places in the plain of Accho[144]) survived to the end of the New Kingdom without apparently suffering a serious destruction, but a great many more were wrecked in about the reign of Rameses III.

It is thus evident that the Egyptian empire did not usher in a golden age of peace and prosperity in western Asia. The fate of city-states evidently depended a great deal on local circumstances so that generalization is now extremely difficult. Some clearly went through periods when survival itself was uncertain. Whether or not the added taxation for Egypt depressed local economies, the

really serious weakness of the empire in this part of the world was almost certainly that the Egyptians were just not strong enough militarily themselves to impose their rule absolutely. They evidently had no real supremacy over the armies of Mitanni or of the Hittites, and could only with difficulty prevent local rebellion or inter-city warfare.

The texts of the period also expose a further threat to order which one imagines the armies of the day were even less able to cope with: a disruptive element outside the recognized power structure of the region. The better-documented group were referred to by the terms SA.GAZ or *hapiru*, and occur in cuneiform documents both from the preceding period and from a wide area of the Near East, as well as in the Amarna letters.[145] They may not be ethnic terms, and in the Amarna letters could be used as pejoratives in referring to one's enemies generally. The people they describe appear as donkey drivers, smugglers, migratory farmers and slaves. Occasionally they turn up as independent raiders, but more frequently as mercenaries employed by one city-state against another. Their origin remains obscure, though one might guess at a mixture of people drawn in from the deserts, refugees from wars, and simply criminals. Some were captured on Egyptian campaigns, and appear in Egyptian texts as *'prw*, working on winepresses and in quarries. A further group whose niche in society may for a time have been similar were called by the Egyptians the Shasu, although with them a homeland in Transjordan and a more specific origin amongst organized pastoral nomadic tribes seems substantiated.[146] They too were encountered by the Egyptians on campaigns in Palestine, were captured alongside the *'prw*, and, by the late New Kingdom, were serving as mercenaries in the Egyptian armies. In the battle reliefs of Seti I, the Shasu are defeated just over the borders of Egypt in north Sinai. It is impossible to measure how seriously this undercurrent in society affected the prosperity and well-being of urbanized life in Palestine, and difficult as yet to discover at what point this element took on the character of the more direct assault which was to lead to the establishment of the kingdom of Israel, although it is noteworthy that from the reigns of Rameses II and Merenptah, alongside general terms for unruly elements, more specific names appear: Israel, Moab and Edom.[147]

In the thirteenth century these disruptive elements were

augmented by migrants or refugees from western Anatolia and perhaps the Aegean, termed the Sea Peoples by the Egyptians. By the end of this century they had destroyed both Hatti and Ugarit, and some went on to settle on the coastal plain of Palestine, as the Philistines.[148] The peace treaty between Egypt and Hatti in the reign of Rameses II may not therefore have had much effect in improving security within the areas of Egyptian control. The Egyptians took through taxation or tribute, but could not provide the peace and security needed to maintain or enlarge the economic base.

The first part of this paper made the point that, as a contribution to the history of imperialism, New Kingdom Egypt should not really be studied primarily on the basis of the formal texts of conquest, which reflect a philosophy of glorified pillage. It is necessary from other, often less explicit sources - both written and archaeological - to seek the rationale behind Egyptian foreign activity of this time. Furthermore, an imperial balance sheet would almost certainly show a significant debit side.[149] Whatever specific motives may be discerned, however, empires are ultimately about power and the sense of power, and belong to a stage of internal political development. In Nubia, the exercise of power was in extending the Egyptian way of life and administration, and the form it took involved investment in the creation of a particular type of colony, whose form points to certain emphases in the character of Egyptian society at that time. In the long term it was not successful in that, when eventually the administrative impetus was withdrawn at the end of the New Kingdom, the life of the temple towns seems to have faded away. But some recognition, at least, should be given to the positive side of this early attempt to extend what, to the Egyptians themselves, was a civilized way of life.

In western Asia there was no scope for anything like this. A strong indigenous culture and a relatively sophisticated society would doubtless have swamped any Egyptian colonies had they been set up, and this must presumably have been appreciated at the time. The contrast with Nubia can in a rough way be compared to the contrast in numbers of colonies in the eastern and western parts of the Roman empire. But here the sense of power for the Egyptians came partly from trying to match the well-equipped and presumably

well-trained armies of western Asia, and perhaps even more so, from participating as a major power in the well-established prestige forum of international relations. Satisfaction came from the exchanges of presents, compliments and envoys with other great powers whose respect had been won, and from the oaths of loyalty of vassals, and the many other ways in which vassals expressed their inferior status.

From its establishment to the end of the reign of Rameses II, the empire was a going concern for something like two and a half centuries. The lack of prosperity in Nubia in the subsequent century, the failure in Palestine to maintain order and security, and the similar lack of growth: these are things which cannot be entirely explained by saying that the Egyptians exacted too much, or were too punitive in their treatment of subject territories. Rameses II was the last major New Kingdom builder in Egypt outside Thebes, and the period following his reign was also evidently one of stagnation and of many changes in the character of society which are as yet barely understood. Decline embraced Nubia, Palestine and Egypt.

3: CARTHAGINIAN IMPERIALISM IN THE FIFTH AND FOURTH CENTURIES

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INTRODUCTION[1]

Phoenician colonization of the western Mediterranean from the eighth century B.C. was never a coordinated movement under the direction of a single mother country or state. If therefore Tyre, who was most prominent of the Phoenician colonizers, exercised no direct control over the Phoenician diaspora, neither did Carthage, the new Tyre in the West, inherit any hegemonial role. Carthage began as merely one of a number of colonies, founded almost certainly after Gades and Utica but, like other western Phoenicians, in response to pressures at home and in quest of land on which to settle in the West. Tradition, which is probably correct, gave to Carthage only one distinctive feature from the rest - a restricted territory. From the start Carthage was bound by a compact with her Libyan neighbours to remain confined to a narrow neck of land, the Megara, and checked from expanding into her natural hinterland of Cape Bon (e.g. Justin 18.5.14; Livy 34.62.12).

For a long period this was the condition which pertained. As the colony grew in size she was compelled to seek beyond her confines for food and for land for her surplus population. Already in the mid-seventh century B.C. archaeology has revealed that she established a trading presence on the corn-rich Syrtic coast of Africa. And according to Diodorus (5.16), she sent out her own first colony to Ibiza in 654 B.C.

In the next century, even though Carthage broke out of her narrow territory into the *peraia* of Cape Bon, native Libyans still resented and resisted Carthaginian expansion inland. Meanwhile social and political norms had become established over a period of two hundred years. The result was that Carthage, more than her sister colonies, looked towards the sea for her livelihood. The Carthaginian aristocracy discovered profit and prestige from long distance trade - principally in corn and precious metal - as well as from the land they held in Carthage itself. Shipping and

overseas interests, long familiar to Phoenician grandees, because they too had suffered restricted access to their Lebanese homeland, became an inherited tradition and a way of life among the nobility of Carthage. In the Mediterranean Carthage was a force to be reckoned with by the Greeks and Etruscans.

The aim of this paper is to examine how far Carthage's overseas interests and the actions she took to maintain them can be categorized as 'imperial' from the late sixth century, when she first took a hand in Sicily, until the fourth century when Agathocles invaded Africa. By the latter date Carthage had expanded into a territory beyond Cape Bon and, although there were never the same social barriers as in Greece or Rome against participation in trade, the aristocracy had begun to return to the land. As landowners their values changed, so that in the third century a new attitude to empire and territorial expansion developed just as Rome appeared in Southern Italy.

What I shall argue is that up to the third century imperialism by most criteria cannot, as is generally believed, be proved by the evidence or argued on *a priori* grounds. Only in one or possibly two respects can imperial control be detected: one is emigration under what might be considered privileged conditions to states who owed obligations to Carthage, although it is difficult to prove that these colonial settlements maintained formal political bonds with Carthage; the other is in the control of ports of trade. But that control must be carefully understood. It was not through colonization nor through territorial annexation but - as far as one can judge - through grants of privileged treaty status in foreign ports, not unlike what later came to be called 'Capitulations'. The third century, however, was a different story of land empires and annexation and one that will not be told here. The concern in this paper is the period when Carthage, like Venice before the fifteenth century, still remained 'bride of the sea'.

THE TRADITION AND LANGUAGE OF IMPERIALISM

The 'imperialism' of Carthage is more or less taken for granted by both ancient and modern writers.[2] As early as the sixth century, according to Justin (19.1.1, 18.7.19), the great dynast Mago, following the campaigns of the mysterious 'Malchus', laid the

foundations of the *imperium Poenorum*; and this process was supposedly carried on by the Magonid house in the fifth century, particularly in Sardinia and Sicily. Diodorus Siculus, too, writing of the archaic period of Sicily, speaks of Carthaginian 'hegemony of the Phoenicians' (4.23.3, 10.18.6, 12.26.3) and the whole ideological presentation of the Battle of Himera, as first reported by Herodotus, was based on the presumption that Carthage in the fifth century intended the enslavement of the Sicilian Greeks - just as Persia had intended to enslave the mainland Greeks (e.g. Hdt. 7.158 and 166).

There is therefore a powerful and early historiographic tradition of Carthaginian imperialism which derives its strength from the supposed ambition of Punic barbarians to dominate the civilized Greeks. A Platonic epistle of the mid-fourth century specifically warned of the dangers of Sicily being transformed into a Phoenician or Opician 'empire' (*dynasteia kai kratos*, *Ep.* 8.353e). Even if the hostility and chauvinism stemmed more from Greek aggressiveness and their fierce inter-city rivalries in Sicily than from any clearly revealed Carthaginian design,[3] in the end there were no pro-Carthaginian historians whose work survives, nothing to redress the balance. And these distortions continued. Under the Romans there is a spate of horror stories illustrating the supposed Punic lust for power which justified the initiative of her enemies. One thinks of Roman claims of attacks by Carthaginians upon their shipping to justify their annexation of Sardinia, which even Rome's best propagandist, Polybius, found impossible to defend (3.28.1-2). Strabo's story of how Carthaginians used to drown all strangers attempting to sail to Sardinia or Gibraltar is another tale from the same book (17.1.19).

The problem then resolves itself into two strands. First, how much of the historiographic tradition of a Carthaginian empire, including the semantics of imperialism, must be saved? And secondly, assuming there is something to preserve, how can ancient views of Carthaginian imperialism be conceptualized?

It is plainly impossible to reject a Carthaginian 'empire' out of hand. The weight of Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Diodorus and Polybius is more than we can resist. If Thucydides, through the mouth of Alcibiades, could speak of a Carthaginian *arche* (6.90.2) and through Hermocrates could declare Carthage 'more powerful than

any other people of her day' (6.34.2), contemporary readers must surely have imagined some resemblance, however remote, to the Athenian empire of the time. The question is, What?

The same question attaches itself to that other favourite word of ancient authors, *epikrateia*. The term was first employed in relation to Carthaginian power in Sicily by Plato (*Ep.* 7.349c) and subsequently adopted by Aristotle to describe Carthaginian control over some miraculous source of oil (*de mirac. ausc.* 841a; cf. 837a). It then became the word regularly used by secondary sources, such as Diodorus and Plutarch, as the technical term for Carthaginian presence in Sicily in the fourth century B.C. Since it is unclear what these varied authors meant by the term - whether vaguely 'influence' (as in Xen. *Hiero* 6.13) or more generally 'power' (as Polyb. 2.39.7) - it cannot be simply assumed they intended the sense of an imperial province of the later, Roman sort, for which the normal Greek word was *eparchia*.

On the other hand, Diodorus at least would appear to convey something rather more formal by *epikrateia* than the word *hegemonia* by which he regularly and deliberately characterized the much less coherent Carthaginian relations in Sicily in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. (e.g. 10.18.6, 12.26.3). Diodorus, or his source, had presumably come to the conclusion that Carthage by the fourth century had become in some sense a counterweight and similar to the expansionist power of Syracuse under Dionysius I and his successors, who are said to have 'used fear of Carthage to be masters of the other cities without risk' (Diod. 13.112.1-2; cf. 13.91.1). But Diodorus is far from unambiguous about his terms. In Sardinia he says that Carthage had from a very early date 'possessed' (*krateo* is his word) the island (5.15.3-5; cf. Strabo 5.2.7), yet in a subsequent passage, in which he probably derived his information from the historian Timaeus, he calls this Carthaginian control in the fourth century no more than *hegemonia* (15.24.2).

Finally we come to Polybius, whose major concern was the anatomy of Roman imperialism in the second century B.C. Polybius had no hesitation in employing terms like *eparchia* of Carthaginian territorial relations in Sicily (e.g. 1.15.10, 1.17.5) and *eparchousi* to translate an archaic Latin verb that described Carthage's control of Sicily under the terms of the treaty of 509 B.C.

(3.22.10, 3.24.12). In Roman parlance the terms ought to correspond to *provincia* and some such word as *imperare*, meaning 'to rule over' or 'control'. So on the face of it this appears to mean a good deal more than simply alliances or hegemony. But the oddity is that the terms are conspicuously not employed in the treaty to define Carthage's relations with either Sardinia or Libya which were, if any, 'ruled over' by Carthage. To say that the whole of Sicily was some sort of direct Carthaginian province as early as 509 B.C. was in any case preposterous, as Polybius himself realized when he explained that the clause must refer only 'to as much of Sicily as falls under Carthaginian control' (3.23.5). But that was not what the treaty itself said, and we must either accept that Carthage really ruled over all Sicily or the terms do not mean rule at all. Since the treaty which Polybius saw was in archaic Latin, we can only speculate about what Latin words Polybius saw which led him to his Greek translation. But this and the treaty of 348 B.C., which Polybius also recorded, were drawn up long before Rome herself did control *provinciae* in a territorial sense. Could it be therefore that the term *provincia* did actually appear in the treaty but only in the original latin sense of 'sphere of influence',[4] which Polybius wrongly assumed to mean what it did in his own day? Perhaps all the treaties were really saying was that Rome would recognize certain regions over which Carthage had influence.

If the language of the ancient writers is ambiguous or unclear, we must now ask how far the evidence of historical events will support the reality of a Carthaginian empire - the reality, that is, in terms of domination, control or manipulation of one previously autonomous agency by another by whatever mechanism, whether political, moral or economic. Since this control need not be to the disadvantage of the weaker party, all question of the willingness of the subject and the popularity of the imperial power, even if it could be measured, is an irrelevancy. For this judgement I shall examine Carthaginian power under the following headings, any one of which, if present, must be regarded as a mark of imperialism: direct territorial conquest and annexation, a system of provincial administration, the levying of tribute, a method of exploiting land, unequal alliances and, lastly, trade monopolies and controls.

CONQUEST AND ANNEXATION

Most explicit of all the ancient evidence is the contrast and implied parallel between Carthage and the imperial ambitions of the Sicilian tyrants culminating in the open rivalry between Dionysius I of Syracuse and Carthaginian interests in the fourth century B.C. There is no doubting Carthaginian intervention in Sicily over a long period from at least the later sixth century B.C. and it was in this context that Thucydides described Carthage as a force to be reckoned with. Whether or not Malchus in the sixth century was the name of a historical person, or a title, or even a corruption of the name Mago (since his name appears in one manuscript as 'Mazeus'), and whatever his intentions in Sicily,[5] in the end it is impossible to show that Carthage was either the only resistance or even the main Phoenician resistance to the early encroachment and attacks mounted by Greek cities and adventurers. Presumably all Phoenician colonies in Sicily had an interest in the supply of silver and in the ports of trade in Sicily; certainly all had armies of their own, even if Carthage was among the more powerful. Their call to Carthage for aid probably derived from a straightforward need for manpower, since the Phoenician colonies in Sicily were not only smaller than their Greek counterparts at the time of their foundation but did not increase significantly in size from the continuous flow of immigrants that was characteristic of cities like Syracuse. But why should the effort to resist be thought primarily Carthaginian? In both the Pentathlus episode at the beginning of the sixth century and in the Dorieus episode at the end the evidence is less than unanimous as to whether Carthage even participated, and there is perhaps a natural tendency among Greek authors to think of all Phoenicians as Carthaginians.[6]

There were of course Carthaginians resident in Sicily by the beginning of the fifth century B.C. and their close ties with some of the Phoenician and Greek colonies are discussed later. But this does not make an empire. It is not too difficult to see how the rise of the turbulent Deinomenids in the early fifth century and the arrival of Greek refugees in eastern Sicily might upset some of the trade agreements and in particular the safety and accessibility of ports such as Syracuse or those on the Straits of Messina (e.g. Hdt. 6.17; see below, p.84). So it is not surprising that *emporia*

figure as one important issue in this period (Hdt. 7.158). The Magonids, whose political power in Carthage was dominant, were also enmeshed into Sicilian and Syracusan politics (Hdt. 7.166-7) and were naturally interested parties in these developments.

But having said all that, we must recognize once again that Carthaginian merchants were not likely to have been the only or even necessarily the main defenders of port of trade rights and reciprocity agreements in Sicily. At Himera in 480 B.C. Herodotus pointedly speaks of other allied forces, with Phoenicians as well as Libyans ranged against Syracuse, even though their leader was Hamilcar, the Magonid king (7.165). Carthage, that is, played a role of one among many of the Phoenician colonists and seems to have been present at Himera largely through the mediation of the Greek tyrants Terillus of Himera and Anaxilas of Rhegium, who must surely have supplied some of the funds. It is typical of the historiographic tradition that the huge quantity of silver and gold taken after Himera should be said to have been taken from the defeated Carthaginians in spite of the known wealth and probable access to silver of Selinus, Motya and others of the allies.[7]

After this it is the supposed cataclysmic size of the disaster of Himera which has frequently been adduced as the event which reduced Carthage to economic impotence and isolation for the rest of the fifth century, thereby checking the imperial designs of the Magonids. But, as it turns out, the propositions upon which the hypothesis was based have been eroded. Politically the Magonids were not immediately discredited and economically it is unbelievable that Carthage suffered economic isolation while other Phoenician cities such as Motya or even Kerkouane on Cape Bon flourished.[8] Yet it is worth reminding ourselves that the existence of the theory of recession was in order to explain the objective fact of the lack of aggressive action or opportunism by Carthage in Sicily during the rest of the fifth century - including her failure to take advantage of the Athenian invasion of Sicily in 415 B.C. If now by contrast we regard Magonid policy in Sicily as one not of territorial imperialism but of alliance and the preservation of independence for those cities who offered them rights of access and protection for their trade, then Himera, for all its losses, was not an unmitigated disaster. For it was in fact a warning to Acragas and Syracuse and it

preserved Carthaginian trade and alliances in Sicily. In spite of the barrage of Greek propaganda, it now becomes intelligible why Hamilcar, the dead general, was honoured in every Phoenician city (Hdt. 7.167); the proof of his success was nearly seventy years of uninterrupted freedom, peace and prosperity in Sicily. The fame of Carthage's supply of gold and silver by 415 B.C. is matched by the wealth of Motya in 397 (Thuc. 6.34.2; Diod. 14.53.3). But neither Carthage nor the Phoenician cities needed territorial empires to achieve this. What they needed was peace.

The real puzzle is why Carthage should have abandoned this beneficial quiescence in Sicily at the end of the fifth century for a more active policy which served her rational interests less well. The theory of Magonid revenge for Himera (Diod. 13.43.6) loses its force if what was said earlier was correct. The theory in any case finds little support in the narrative of 410-409 B.C. Renewed Carthaginian intervention, for instance, came at the request of Segesta and it was an Elymian general who commanded the first battle (Diod. 13.43.4, 13.44.4). Every effort was made to avoid rousing Syracuse (Diod. 13.43.6, 13.54.5) and in 406 Carthage made an offer of an alliance and neutrality to Acragas in spite of earlier Greek hostility (Diod. 13.85.2). On the Greek side, the attacks upon Panormus and Motya in 408 by Hermocrates were not supported by Syracuse in spite of Hermocrates' efforts to legitimize his position. Thus far there was little to show a radical departure from earlier Carthaginian policy and nothing to explain the massive display of force in 406 - certainly nothing to justify Diodorus' words that Carthaginians were 'eager to be overlords of the island' (13.80.1). No doubt there was a degree of war hysteria in Carthage and an impetus produced by the events themselves into which Carthage was sucked, where it is easy to understand Magonid interests in revenge, among other things, pressing for intervention. And no doubt there was the inducement of the massive booty which Carthage did in fact gain by the virtual annihilation of Himera, Acragas and other Greek settlements. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the real reason behind Carthage's greater involvement in Sicily in this century was more directly a response to the truly dominating position of Syracuse, which began with Hermocrates and Dionysius I, than the result of some radical reappraisal of Carthaginian interests.

It may be therefore that Diodorus and his sources were right to select a different word, *epikrateia*, to describe this new Carthaginian presence in Sicily. It was a more formal acknowledgement of Carthage's role as protector of Phoenician interests. Several agreements and treaties, beginning with that of 405 B.C., recognized a territorial region, eventually marked off by the River Halycus, of Carthaginian paramountcy (Diod. 13.144, 14.96.4, etc.), and this corresponds to the Carthaginian 'sphere' of Sicily within which Romans were offered the same facilities as Carthaginians by the treaty of 348 B.C. (Polyb. 3.24.12). This is important because it shows that Carthage could now in some respects speak for the communities of western Sicily. But does it go further than the system of alliances in the fifth century? Although Diodorus talks of cities 'drawn up under Carthage' (15.15.1), the actual relationship was in fact still determined by bilateral agreements. Halicyae, Solus, Segesta, Panormus, Entella and others, including native Sicani, were all called 'allied cities' (*symmachousai poleis*) in 397 (14.48.4) and this term continued to be applied to the cities in the *epikrateia* (e.g. 13.62.5, 14.55.7, 14.85.4). The description in itself need not, of course, mean any more real independence for Phoenician and Elymian cities than Athenian 'allies' possessed in the Delian League. To some extent that impression is borne out when we read that Segesta 'put herself into the hands' of Carthage in 410 in return for her aid (Diod. 13.43.3-4). But the parallel with Athens ceases when we read that Carthage in 345/4 had to 'court' her allied cities in Sicily for their support (Diod. 16.67.1).[9]

It is furthermore quite wrong to regard the military resistance to Syracuse as conducted solely by Carthaginian armies. No doubt again Carthage's repeated expeditions created a confusion between 'Phoenician' and 'Carthaginian' which could be exploited. In 396 B.C., for instance, the fleet is described by Diodorus in alternative sentences as Carthaginian or Phoenician (16.60). But in fact the massive fleet on that occasion could not conceivably have been all Carthaginian, if the figures provided by Ephorus and Timaeus are anywhere near correct (Diod. 14.54.5 and 59.7 - one thousand ships, or perhaps half that number). In 409 B.C. Hermocrates' attack on the western Phoenician cities encountered local armies who

were manifestly not Carthaginian (Diod. 13.63.4), and it was presumably these forces which turned up alongside the Carthaginians at Cremisus in 338 (Diod. 16.79.6-80.1). As before, money would certainly have been provided for military pay by all the Phoenician cities, who struck silver coin.

The strangest of all features of Carthaginian behaviour in Sicily in the fourth century is explained by this ambivalent relationship. In spite of the undoubtedly increased military activity of expedition and counter expedition from Carthage and Syracuse, Carthaginian aggression time and again faltered just at the critical moment of success. In 405 B.C. Dionysius I was even politically embarrassed by Hamilcar's failure to pursue him and his offer of alliance at the very gates of Syracuse (Diod. 13.112.2 and 114.1-3). In 397 the Carthaginian force was totally unprepared to assist Motya and ended by simply running away (Diod. 14.48.1 and 50.4). Diodorus himself is astonished at Himilco's withdrawal from Syracuse in 396 and his explanation is a devastating plague (14.70.4). In 383 (or perhaps 374), after defeating Dionysius I at Cronion, Carthage tamely agreed to more or less the *status quo ante* (Diod. 15.17.5). In 344, after failing to dissuade Timoleon's force from entering Sicily, the Carthaginians 'unaccountably' withdrew from Syracuse (Diod. 16.69.5). To those Greeks who proclaimed the chronic, imperial machinations of Carthage the explanation had to lie in barbarian cowardice (e.g. Diod. 16.79.2) or plagues and Pyrrhic victories. The chain of mishaps is decidedly suspicious.

Sardinia too was a region colonized by early Phoenicians where also Carthage intervened. There is no difficulty in finding an historical context for Carthage's proprietary interest. The Phoceans, with more than a penchant for piracy, colonized Alalia and possibly Olbia too in about 565 B.C., thereby provoking the retaliation of Carthage and Etruscan Caere about 535 (Hdt. 1.166-7). It makes sense to connect this event with the presence of 'Malchus' whom tradition brings to Sardinia after his Sicilian escapades (Justin 18.7).[10] And after him there was Magonid activity on the island in the early fifth century (Justin 19.1.6).

Archaeologists have been quick to detect confirmations of these episodes from the signs of destruction at inland Phoenician forts and their subsequent restoration.[11] But the precise dates

of the various phases offer by no means conclusive support, since the archaic period is deemed to end in the sixth century B.C. but the so-called 'Punic' phase does not start till the fourth century.[12] That is one difficulty. The other is whether this Punic evidence really does amount to what Moscati says was 'without doubt' a permanent Carthaginian occupation from the fifth century onwards.[13] All it really proves is that there was a close similarity between Carthaginian culture and that of many Phoenicians in Sardinia. But that would not be surprising if close trade and exchanges, including colonization, existed and need not imply a loss of autonomy by the Phoenician cities. As we have already seen, Diodorus, where he deals with better documented periods than the archaic, uses a term, *hegemonia*, which in the Sicilian context seems to mean no more than assistance and alliances with other Phoenicians. The considerable and early independent development of archaic Phoenician foundations like S. Antiocco, Tharros and Cagliari, whose exploitation of the agriculture and minerals of the hinterland have been demonstrated by the excavations at Monte Sirai, make one wonder about the extent to which Carthage could have actually controlled them or closed their ports.[14]

Then again in the early fourth century Dionysius I probably provoked the Carthaginians into sending some sort of help to protect Sardinian Phoenicians by his activity in the Tuscan Sea, an attack on Pyrgi in Etruria in 384 B.C. and an attempt to set up a base in Corsica (Strabo 5.2.8). The details are obscure but it may have been these events which were connected with a rebellion of Sardinian natives that forced Carthage to 'win back' the island (Diod. 15.24.2).[15] The circumstances explain the proprietary interest of Carthage, particularly if she relied on Sardinian corn. But it should perhaps be seen on a political level too, akin to the Carthaginian action to restore Hipponium on the Bruttian coast after it had been wiped out by Dionysius (Diod. 15.24.1); that is, measures specifically provoked by Dionysius and an attempt to neutralize his aggressiveness. It need not however (as we can be sure of in the case of Hipponium) mean Carthaginian occupation.[16]

In Spain the Carthaginian flag was never as prominent as in Sardinia. Once one accepts that Gades and other Phoenician colonies from the start had an independent life of their own and were not

simply part of a great web of Tyrian commerce that fell into Carthage's lap when Tyre declined, the scrappy literary and archaeological evidence for the classical period does not amount to very much.[17] There were pressures on Gades and the far-western Phoenicians from the sixth century onwards, which were to some extent linked with the maritime activities of the Phoceans. Obscure records have survived of Phocean or Massiliote clashes with both Gaditain and Carthaginian ships (Justin 43.5.2; Paus. 10.8.6, 10. 18.7; Thuc. 1.13.6; cf. Strabo 4.1.5), as well as the mysterious disappearance of Greek Meinake (Strabo 3.4.2) and an otherwise unknown battle of Artemisium.[18]

But Carthaginian activity and interest in the West at the same time as her other ventures in Sardinia and Sicily are not at issue. The point is, does this amount to an imperial take-over of the Phoenician colonies? The closest we come to that notion is in an undatable passage from Justin, which reads that Gades, being under pressure from her neighbours, was assisted by her kinsmen, the Carthaginians, who then added a part of this 'province' to their 'empire' - *partem provinciae imperio suo adiecerunt* (44.5.3; cf. Macrob. *Sat.* 1.20.12).[19] Certainly there is reason to suppose that the sixth century was not an easy period for Phoenicians in Spain. The last dated evidence from the sites of Toscanos and Trayamar on the Malaga coast, for instance, fall in this century and thereafter they were abandoned. There are also distinct breaks on the west African coast between the archaic Phoenician pottery, generally thought to emanate from Gades, and the later 'Punic' pottery, which may not date before the later fifth century. All that suggests the ending of Gades as an independent trading city.[20]

On the other hand, it is extraordinarily difficult to authenticate actual Carthaginian occupation. The long-distance ships in the mid-fourth century which made the west African run were based on Gades not Carthage, according to Ps. Scylax (*GGM* I. p.94 (112)), and they are named as Phoenician not Carthaginian. That may mean nothing. But Gades did preserve its quasi-independent status right down to the last days of the Barca Spanish empire (*socius et amicus* - Livy 28.37.1). If the evidence from west Africa is anything to go by, the conclusion of the most recent and thorough study of the region is that 'Morocco knew the Carthaginians but it

never belonged to them'.[21] Polybius' vague statement about the submission of much of Spain to Carthage by 265 B.C. (1.10.5) is completely contradicted by the fairly precise information given by Diodorus concerning the new conquests of Hamilcar Barca 'as far as the pillars of Hercules, Gadeira (Gades) and the ocean' just before the Second Punic War (25.10.1-4). That means either Spain was lost and won back in thirty years without a single comment from any source or that the nature of the relations with Spain and the western territories before the Barcas was of a much looser kind than is commonly admitted. Let it be conceded however that the information is so meagre that it could be interpreted in many different ways. But in general the evidence of actual conquest and annexation throughout the western Phoenician orbit is at best ambiguous and in many regions unlikely in the earlier classical period, at least, even if there was perhaps some change in the fourth century. That will be examined later.

PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

In spite of the historiographic tradition which saw in Carthage a Persia of the West, the sources have produced no satrapy system, no governors of satellite territories like those of the Persian empire - or none, at least, before the third century B.C., which will be discussed later, when for very specific reasons a change took place in Carthage's political economy. Throughout the archaic and classical periods to the fourth century B.C. there is not a single reference to any known Carthaginian structure of imperial administration. About the closest we can get to an imperial bureaucracy in the literary sources are the various kings and generals fighting short-term wars abroad - like Mago, who was 'spending time' in Sicily in 393 B.C. (Diod. 14.90.2). It is significant that in the entire chapter assigned by Gsell to 'Administration de l'Empire de Carthage' he could find only one reference which looks anything like an imperial official before the third century B.C. This is an inscription from Tharros in Sardinia (*CIS* I 154) which records a scribe, whom Gsell believed to be similar to the *grammateis* or market officials who appear in the first Carthaginian treaty with Rome (Polyb. 3.22.8). Similar they may have been but there is absolutely nothing to prove this man was either Carthaginian or in Carthaginian employ and the

chances against him being so seem quite high.[22] Even in the third century, outside Africa and the Barca empire in Spain, the only Carthaginian official that can be found is a military officer, a boetharch, in Sardinia; but that was after the First Punic War (Polyb. 1.79.2).

TRIBUTE

The nearest we get to imperial tribute and the first of such references, as far as I know, is after the sack and total destruction of Selinus in 409 B.C. (Diod. 13.59.3). Those Selinuntians who had not taken part in the siege were permitted to work the land on payment of *phoros* to Carthage. The second reference is in the treaty between Carthage and Syracuse in 405 B.C. which stipulated that Gela and Camarina must pay for their defeat a *phoros* which was in explicit contrast to the status of the Phoenician colonies, the Elymians and the Sicani (Diod. 13.114.1). The position of Selinus, Acragas and Himera, who also figure in the terms, is ambiguous as the wording stands and they might also be thought to be listed as tribute payers, although it seems easier to regard them as being recognized in this agreement as Carthaginian allies, which was reaffirmed later. The third and final reference comes in an imaginary speech by a Syracusan called Theodorus, who claims in 396 B.C. that, if victorious over Dionysius I, Carthage would impose upon them a 'fixed tribute' (*phoros horismenos*) (Diod. 14.65.2). In all the references the *phoros* seems to apply only to defeated enemies, not to allies and, unless it can be shown to be a permanent imposition, looks more like a war indemnity than regular tribute. That is very much the implication of Theodorus' speech. Perhaps the tribute was permanent for Selinus, Acragas and Himera, but, if so, this is not stated when they were redefined by treaty in 314 B.C. as somehow 'drawn up under Carthage' (Diod. 19.71.7). The subordination of Camarina and Gela cannot be documented beyond 397 and had ended by 383 B.C. (Diod. 14.47.5, 15.17.5). Further speculation about the existence of a full scale, imperial tribute, a pre-Roman tithe system and so on, is simply unsupported by the evidence.[23]

As far as Sardinia and Spain are concerned, the evidence of tribute is even less. It may be that Sardinian corn came to Carthage under some sort of tributary system. But we only hear about

this source of supply when Carthage was faced with revolts by the Libyans of the interior.[24] So the record is irregular and, for all we know, the corn could have been paid for. In Spain, however much interest the Phoenicians and Carthaginians may have taken in mining the silver, we know nothing of any tribute paid in this medium to Carthage.

Tribute requires some sort of organization for collection and coercion; it may also produce a tendency towards a single coinage system, as in the Athenian empire. Yet, as we have already seen, there is no hint of an imperial civil service, inspectors and the like. Garrisons however are often thought to have existed. The standard example quoted is that of Heraclea Minoa, on the borders of the territory defined as the Carthaginian *epikrateia* in the fourth century. It was a city which Diodorus says 'was subject to' (*hypekouen*) Carthage in 357/6 (14.9.4). That looks clear enough. But in spite of mention of a 'prefect' or magistrate (*epistates* or *archon*) in the sources, there is nothing about a garrison of troops; and in the one case where we know of the officer he was not a Carthaginian but a Greek (Diod. 16.9.4; Plut. *Dion* 25). Certainly Heraclea was, like some other towns, used in the fourth and third centuries as a centre for mustering Carthaginian armies (as when Pyrrhus attacked, for instance, Diod. 22.10.2).[25]

Can we conclude from this a permanent network of imperial garrisons? In 409 B.C. Carthage retired from Sicily leaving behind some troops, but specifically for the needs of her 'allies', not to control her subjects (Diod. 13.62.6). In 404 B.C. too Campanian troops (in origin, presumably, mercenaries) were left at some unnamed place 'as a guard' (Diod. 14.8.5). But they promptly joined Dionysius I and, to judge by other Campanians settled at Entella, they were neither satellites nor a garrison but allies (Diod. 14.61.5, 14.67.3). A Carthaginian garrison in 278/6 at Enna - if the textual emendation is correct - was there explicitly at the wish of the inhabitants to protect themselves against the tyrant Phintias and they remained there until such time as the people voluntarily turned to Pyrrhus (Diod. 22.10.1). Thus the evidence of coercive control comes down to a garrison town without troops and troops who are not in garrison towns. Vague allusions to troops in Sicily cannot, in view of the contingents supplied by

the Phoenician colonies, simply be assumed to mean garrisons of Carthaginian contingents (e.g. Diod. 15.17.2 - Lilybaeum in 368; 19.106.5 - in 311; both of which are quoted by Gsell[26]).

There did develop in the fourth century, or more precisely after 410 B.C., several coinage series in Sicily with the Phoenician legend *s.y.s.* whose provenance from cities such as Motya, Solus, Panormus and even Segesta suggests a cultural and perhaps some political unity. The question is whether this political and geographical solidarity among Phoenician cities adds up to an imperial province controlled by Carthage.[27] The so-called 'Carthage' types and the *s.y.s.* types were presumably struck for the military campaigns of this decade when there was indeed a united front in western Sicily against Dionysius. That does not prove a Carthaginian dictat existed. Indeed there is good reason to believe that the *s.y.s.* coins belonged only to Panormus, while die links are common among Greek cities with no more than friendly relations. The several sources of the coins and the linking of the dies between various Phoenician cities might indicate exactly the opposite - that Carthage was only one among many allies. The coins were certainly never an instrument and probably not even a symptom of imperialism.

Under this heading therefore there are some signs of Carthage's growing concern in Sicily and perhaps even a willingness to contemplate the formal subjection of perennially troublesome enemies within what they regarded as their sphere of influence. But it is hazardous to go beyond that to postulate a regular system of garrisons, tribute and officials, who exacted money, men and obedience from friends and enemies alike.

LAND EXPLOITATION

It follows that, if there was no actual territorial conquest, land could be acquired by Carthaginians only by private purchase under some arrangement like *enktesis* or through colonization of some sort. But unless the colony can be shown to have preserved real ties with Carthage which the mother city could exploit to her own advantage then the foundation of colonies in itself is no more imperialistic than the movements from Greece had been in the archaic period.

Evidence of Carthaginian colonization is not hard to come by, directed to all the territories where Carthage was active. In

Sicily, for instance, Diodorus describes Motya in the early fourth century as an *apoikos* of Carthage, and, although he is strictly wrong, he may be referring to reinforcements of colonists sent from Carthage (Diod. 47.4; Paus. 5.25.5).[28] After the destruction of Himera colonists were sent from Carthage to found the new city of Thermae in 407 B.C. (Diod. 13.79.8), although many Greeks from old Himera and elsewhere, including Agathocles' father, were included in the venture (Cic. II *Verr.* 2.35.86; Diod. 19.1.2). In Sardinia too we have a number of references to Carthaginian colonists, although some are quite certainly incorrect and confuse early western Phoenicians with Carthaginians (e.g. Paus. 10.17.9, attributing the foundation of Caralis and Sulcis to Carthage). We need not take Cicero at his word that all Sardi were in origin disgraced Punico-Libyan half-breeds (*pro Scauro* 42) to believe there is something behind the notion that here too some Carthaginians came to settle and reinforce the old Phoenician foundations.[29] In Spain it is significant that, apart from the references to innumerable Carthaginian *emporia*,[30] there is only one case of a colony - *apoikia* - cited in any author before the Roman period, when the distinction between Phoenician and Carthaginian seems to have been lost. The single colony is one mentioned by the fourth-century historian Ephorus of 'Libyphoenicians from Carthage, forming a colony' (Ps. Scymnus, *GGM* I, p.203; cf. Avienus, *Or.marit.* 421).

The term 'Libyphoenician' does however go right to the heart of the problem. It does not matter here what the ethnic mixture of these people was, since we are only concerned with their relations to Carthage. And for that we have Diodorus' statement that 'they share rights of intermarriage (*epigamia*) with Carthaginians' (20.55.4). If that were true of Libyphoenicians and if Libyphoenicians could be shown to have been scattered all over the Mediterranean littoral, it would go a long way to establishing the case for colonies formally tied to Carthage - much as the Latins were tied to Rome, said Mommsen[31] - and would support Weber's contention that all western Phoenician colonies assisted Carthage in 'the forceful monopolization of trade'.[32] There is a fair number of references to Libyphoenicians or the analogous Blastophoenices (Spain) and Sardolibes (Sardinia), of which the earliest is probably that describing the foundations on the west African coast in

the periplous of Hanno (*GGM* I, p.1). But there are two points to observe: one, that by far the majority of references are late and seem to have had a geographic limitation to those who lived east of Cape Bougaroun in Algeria; the other is that Diodorus expressly limits his remarks about *epigamia* to 'the four categories who have divided Libya' - and by 'Libya' he almost certainly meant the eastern Maghreb. So the remarkable 'interwoven kinship' that he mentioned could have been something which grew up in the third century and the product of the African empire of Carthage, about which there is more to say later. But there is slender support in these Libyphoenician examples for a tight network of satellite 'Latin'-type cities scattered over the western Mediterranean.

If we now come back to the examples of *apoikiai*, is there any reason why we should believe they had more than sentimental links with Carthage? These might in some cases lead to bilateral alliances and even dependency, but not *qua* colony and not more than, say, in the case of the old Phoenician colonies or Elymian Segesta.

There are two curious passages in Aristotle's *Politics* which deal with Carthaginian colonization (1273b19, 1320b5). The first concerns the use of colonization as a social manipulator to prevent discontent against the oligarchy and the second deals with the provision of working capital to colonists 'whom they constantly send out to the surrounding territory'. This last phrase strongly suggests that Aristotle had in mind the African hinterland, although there is nothing to preclude overseas territories. It requires some stretch of the imagination, however, to perceive in this passage a system of rotating native commissioners, as Gsell believed (following Mommsen).[33] If it does refer to the overseas colonies noted earlier and if it means the Phoenician cities of Sicily, Sardinia and Spain were prepared 'constantly' to accept Carthaginian peasants and poor in return for the aid Carthage offered them against their neighbours, then here indeed is an instrument of imperialism which Carthage exploited to the advantage of her own political economy.

ALLIANCES

What has just been said raises the question of the *quid pro quo* of Carthaginian alliances. There is no denying the presence of

Carthaginian forces nor their concern to keep the ports open - nor even their leadership from time to time in Sicily, Sardinia and Spain. The ancient evidence is unassailable on this point. To Greeks who viewed all Phoenicians in one light the question of whether Carthage herself was always involved perhaps seemed academic. But in the early stages and before the fourth century, at any rate, there is not enough to talk of an empire nor even, as Merante does, of 'domination'.[34] Diodorus deliberately spoke of *hegemonia* up to that date and there is nothing which happened which could not be explained in terms of a loose system of alliances and reciprocal treaties.

One aspect of the early alliances is a feature familiar enough in the study of Greek history, the exchanges of hospitality (*xenia*) and formal ties of friendship and marriage contracted between aristocratic families of different great houses across state barriers.[35] The Carthaginian dynast Mago, who was active in Sicily around the turn of the sixth century B.C., had married a Syracusan wife and his sons were heavily involved with other powerful families in Himera and Rhegium, who were themselves similarly bound by marriage ties (Hdt. 7.165). These were the men who emerged as tyrants in their cities and who stimulated Carthaginian intervention at Himera in 480 B.C.

These quasi-kinship relations continued throughout Carthage's involvement in Sicily. They are the sort of thing which is portrayed in the exchanges of *tesserae* recorded in Plautus' *Poenulus* (e.g. 955-60) and they lasted long after the growth of central state agreements. They characterize and underline the fact that Carthaginian foreign policy was conducted not so much in the abstract political atmosphere of state government but through the very personal interests and ambitions of its leading figures. There were numbers of wealthy Carthaginian merchants resident in the various ports of trade in Sicily (and we must presume elsewhere) and it is not surprising to find them on familiar terms with the tyrants' courts. In a dialogue of Heraclides of Pontus, for instance, there is a reference to 'a certain Magos' who claimed to have circumnavigated Libya and who is portrayed in discussion with Gelo, tyrant of Syracuse (Strabo 2.3.4). It would be pleasant if this Mago (as I take his name to be) were

a member of the great house, but he represents a typical enough example.[36] Carthaginian interests in alliances for security and the benefits that accrued do not have to be explained in imperialist terms of crude annexation and booty. For the elite were often personally and directly involved in the success of the trade (see below p.87). As we saw earlier, the rational interest of these men was generally conditions of peace.

The Carthaginian dilemma was on the one hand to maintain the peace that produced economically profitable relations with many towns such as Acragas and Syracuse, which housed resident Carthaginian and Phoenician merchants (Diod. 13.81.5, 13.84.3, 14.46.1-2), and on the other to keep alive the alliances and treaty ports in Sicily upon which her merchants ultimately depended. A series of ambitious Greek adventurers, Hermocrates, Dionysius, Timoleon, Agathocles, Pyrrhus and finally Hiero, continually threatened to destroy the delicate balance of Carthaginian foreign policy and to lay bare its contradictions. In particular the total destruction of Motya and the expulsion of all Phoenician merchants from Syracuse and her allied cities in 389 B.C. by Dionysius I (Diod. 14.53 and 46.1-2) - the latter an action which, as far as I can tell, is unique in Sicilian history - hammered home the lesson that, if Carthage wished to maintain her interests in Sicily, a more active foreign policy of intrigue and interventionism was necessary in the fourth century.

It is this dilemma which accounts for the increase in political rivalries in home politics at Carthage during this century: the fall of the Magonid general, Himilco and his suicide in 396 (Diod. 14.76. 3-4); the rise of Hanno the Great and the disappearance of the last known Magonid in the early 370s, at about the same time as a terrible Libyan invasion and internecine fighting in the city (Diod. 15.24.2-3); the treachery of Hanno's rival Suniatus (Eshmunyaton?) in warning Dionysius I of an impending expedition (Justin 20.5.4; cf. Diod. 15.73 - 368 B.C.). All these were manifestations of a struggle for a fundamentally unattainable goal. Even the fall of Hanno the Great at some unspecified date after an attempted *coup d'état* (Justin 21.4; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1272b and 1307a) is probably linked to Sicily, since we hear of a certain Hanno in 345 who was replaced for his failure as a general (Diod. 16.67.2; Plut. *Timol.*

19). But in 338, after the fearful defeat at the Cremisus, it was Hanno's son, Gisco, who was recalled from exile (Diod. 16.81.3, Plut. *Timol.* 30.3).

This does not mean there were clear-cut imperialist and non-imperialist parties in these rivalries, nor even a clash between African and Sicilian interests, although both these causes have sometimes been suggested.[37] The political struggles now, as always, were as much the product of personal rivalries and family intrigues as of fundamentally opposed policies. Gisco's return to favour after Cremisus was due to both the failure of his predecessors and the personal advocacy of his Sicilian friends, Mamercus of Catania and Hiketas of Leontini (Plut. *Timol.* 30.2); the latter was certainly a friend of Hanno, though Hanno was also known for his African achievements (Diod. 16.67.1-2). In all the intrigues for power there is never reported a hint of either withdrawal from Sicily or of total conquest (in spite of vague Greek propaganda); only of 'keeping a hand in Sicilian affairs' (Diod. 14.95.1). The problem of how to balance the twin themes of this policy was irreducible and led to constant fluctuation in one or other direction.

The truth is that the territorial ambitions of Carthage in the fourth century seem to be not much greater than before in Sicily. But there was a greater sense of insecurity in face of the now dominant power of Syracuse. The development of central, state institutions in both Syracuse and Carthage led to a shift in balance in interstate relations from the personal bonds of friendship between the great houses to the more impersonal, collective interests of the ruling elite, although never the elimination of the former. Both tendencies created a greater need for formal definitions of alliances and intercity relations, of spheres of influence and boundaries. That would explain why men looked at Carthage's 'province' in a different way, and why Carthage's allies became more dependent upon her aid and leadership, but it did not in itself change the structure of the Carthaginian alliances into a centrally organized empire of provinces and officials. To some extent this is quibbling with words, since the greater dependence of the allies made it less and less likely or possible that they should withdraw. And that was a form of imperialism.

TRADE MONOPOLIES AND CONTROLS

Recent studies of the western Phoenicians in the archaic period, based upon the distribution of trade goods, now stress the polycentric character of archaic trading in the Mediterranean and the absence of any centralized and exclusive trade empire directed by Tyre or Carthage.[38] We are nevertheless confronted by the awkward fact that there are innumerable references in the sources to Carthaginian *emporia* or trading ports, particularly in Libya and Spain, of which the most prolific are perhaps those of the fourth-century Greek geographer whose *periplous* was attributed to Scylax.[39] We have the literary and archaeological evidence of trade down the *kolpos emporikos* (Strabo 17.3.2) as far as Mogador, if not further, which is reinforced by the celebrated voyages of Hanno and Himilco making their way past the Straits of Gibraltar.[40] And above all we have the treaties between Carthage and Rome: according to the first treaty of 509 B.C. the Carthaginians seem to be claiming control of ports of trade in both eastern Libya and Sardinia, which in the second treaty of 348 becomes a prohibition on all trading and settlement in those regions (Polyb. 3.22.9, 3.24.11). These provisions Polybius interpreted to mean that Carthage in some way regarded Sardinia and eastern Libya as their own or 'private'. The second treaty added a provision about Spain by defining a point, Mastia Tarseion, beyond which trade should not be conducted by Rome (3.24.4).

It has become accepted almost without question from all this that during the course of the fifth and fourth centuries Carthage increasingly exercised a trade blockade in the western Mediterranean. Stories of drowning of strangers or voluntary scuttling of ships to prevent the discovery of trade routes add to the impression (Strabo 3.5.11, 17.1.19). And yet questions arise. At the end of the fifth century, for instance, a Spartan fleet of merchantmen *en route* from Cyrene to Tunisia encountered no Carthaginian blockade and even put in at the Carthaginian *emporion* at Neapolis on the southern side of Cape Bon in supposedly forbidden territory (Thuc. 7.50). The condottiero, Ophelas, who marched from Cyrene to Carthage in the late fourth century, is probably the man who wrote a *periplous* of Libya (Strabo 17.3.1), which could have had more than academic interest for him. Herodotus seems to have received information about natives in the Libyan *emporia* district and about the gold

trade of the far west (4.191 and 196). If all this information came from Carthaginian sources, which is by no means certain, it at least shows that it was not censored. So much so, that Gsell, unlike some of his successors, was forced to argue that Polybius' wording about the embargo on Libya in the 509 treaty must have meant Libya *west* of Carthage, even though Carthaginian special interest in the Algerian coast is inexplicable and unsupported in this or later centuries.[41]

In Spain, in spite of the treaty, there was no uniform trade embargo on foreigners either. Apart from Euthymenes of Massilia who sailed down the Atlantic coast of Africa at some unspecified date (*FHG* IV 408), the Massiliote explorer Pytheas claimed to have travelled to Britain some time in the late fourth or third century and he was not molested at Gades (Strabo 2.4.1-2). The Alexandrian admiral Timosthenes in the 280s had good information about the western Mediterranean, including the site of Gibraltar/Algeciras, for which significantly he gave a Greek name (Strabo 3.4.7).[42] And in Sardinia, where the approaches were supposedly completely banned, presumably for fear of native revolts, Eratosthenes actually says it was only 'strangers' (*xenoi*) who were so treated (Strabo 11.1.19) and he made his comment in the context of the ports of trade in Egypt, where we know access was certainly carefully controlled but never totally excluded (Hdt. 2.179). The presence of Massiliotes in Tharros at a date which could fall within the period under discussion (*IG* XIV 609-10) rather suggests that the same was true in Sardinia.

There is no need here to underline Carthage's continuous and predominant role in long-distance trade. In this respect Carthage, because of her restricted access to a rural territorium (Justin 18.5.14), differed from many of the other western Phoenician colonies in her early history, and this was doubtless the reason why she developed into the leading Phoenician naval state during the archaic period. It also explains why Carthage from an early date found it necessary to dispose of her surplus population by subcolonization and to seek food supplies outside her territory from districts such as eastern Libya and Sardinia. In Spain of course the attraction was silver and in west Africa gold. But nowhere in the archaic period or later is there anything to indicate this trade was conducted in a commercially open and competitive market

responsive to price wars, supply and demand or diminishing marginal utility.[43] No one, said Xenophon, has got so much silver that he does not wish for more (*Poroi* 4.7). It follows that the Phoenician Spanish trade in silver was not undercut or dislocated by grants of port or trade facilities to Phoceans or other Greeks by the local rulers (e.g. Hdt. 1.163, 4.152). What did upset Carthage was piracy (Hdt. 1.166, 6.17; Arist. *Rhet.* 1.12.18), and this in turn provoked general hostility to the foundation of alien colonies within the limited range of raiding penteconters.[44] That had been the reaction of the men of Chios when Phoceans tried to settle on the adjacent Oenussae islands (Hdt. 1.165), and it was the same principle which provoked Carthaginian opposition to Dorieus' attempt to colonize the African *emporia* coast or the Phocean colonization of Alalia in Sardinia.

In other words, none of these were examples of simple market competition. Trade under these conditions is basically a political activity between communities, like war, and conducted at the same level of management.[45] Guarantees of peace and friendship are more important than haggling for prices, which undermines security. Complete strangers are automatically suspect, since their purpose must be aggressive and their influence on peaceful natives disruptive. Even friendly traders are stereotyped as potential cheats, spies and pirates (e.g. Hdt. 1.1, 1.153), whose access to markets must be strictly supervised. Elaborate care was therefore taken to defuse potential conflicts, either by silent trade - for which we have the celebrated Carthaginian example in Herodotus (4.196) - or by agreed rights to ports of the sort granted by king Arganthonius to some Greeks at Tartessus (Hdt. 1.163).

It is the ports of trade, the *emporia*, which Polanyi first suggested should be regarded as the principal instrument of the Carthaginian political economy and (we may add *ex hypothesi*) of whatever degree of imperial control they may have exercised. The notion has been taken up by others, but with two important qualifications:[46] first, that the distinction between *emporia* and other urban centres is blurred, particularly in Sicily; and secondly, that the neutrality of ports of trade as a means of separating incompatible systems, which Polanyi emphasized, should not exclude the possibility of a more discriminatory, political use of ports

in favour of friends and allies.

Carthaginian *emporia* must be regarded as falling into two categories. One type was in those regions where Carthaginian traders themselves operated under the licence of foreign powers, even though they often settled more or less permanently in the port. This was clearly true, for instance, of those many Carthaginian and Phoenician traders in Syracuse (Diod. 14.46.1), or in Acragas with its hundreds of 'resident aliens' in the fifth century (Diod. 13.81.4-5, 13.84.3 - the figures are surely exaggerated). The same was presumably the case with the Punic ghettos of *portum Punicum* and Pyrgi in the Etruscan ports of Caere and Tarquinia. It must also account for some of the many so-called 'Carthaginian' *emporia* listed by Greek geographers in Spain and Africa. They were not necessarily any more Carthaginian than the port where Homer's Phoenician merchants lived for a year (*Od.* 15.416ff.); nor, to judge by what we know of Arganthonius, were they limited to Carthaginian merchants. The independent Phoenician colonies of Spain, Sardinia and Sicily would not in principle have behaved any differently from Greeks or Iberians in their relations with Carthaginian merchants, although in practice a common culture and language must have created favourable conditions for trade agreements.

The second category of *emporia* consists of those under Carthaginian control, the most important of which was obviously Carthage itself. This was state administered trade, conducted in the presence of state officials (*kerykes* and *grammateis*), of the kind we have recorded in the Rome treaty of 509 B.C. in Libya and Sardinia (Polyb. 3.22.3). The presence of a Greek community in Carthage is attested on many occasions (e.g. Diod. 14.77.4-5 in 396 B.C.) and it was assuredly paralleled by an Etruscan settlement.[47] Nor was Carthage the only site known in Libya. Neapolis (Thuc. 7.50) and later Kerkina (Livy 33.48.3) were all very much Carthaginian.

It was presumably in Carthage's interest to determine the rights of access to ports of trade herself rather than to rely on the possession of such rights as were granted by other powers. Direct administration of the *emporion* was not only profitable for *vectigalia maritima* which went into the pockets of the *principes* of Carthage (Livy 33.46.8-47.1) but, as Xenophon's Simonides advised Hiero of Syracuse, it brought political prestige to the ruler (Xen. *Hiero* 4.7, 9.9). This means that user-rights in ports of trade were regarded as

instruments of diplomacy and power as much as special economic advantages. According to an emotional speech given by Herodotus to Gelo of Syracuse in the early fifth century, Gelo had once asked the mainland Greeks for help against Carthage, 'To free the *emporia* from which you had great advantage and profit ... But for all you did they would still be in barbarian hands' (Hdt. 7.158). Whatever the historicity of the speech, the notion was feasible in Herodotus' day.[48]

But what control? And how was it operated? In the second category of *emporia* it was exercised by the presence of Carthaginian officials, payment of tolls to Carthage and perhaps territorial occupation by Carthage - the sort of thing that seems to have pertained in Leptis Magna in the second century B.C. But that kind of evidence is lacking for anywhere else among the dozens of *emporia* outside Africa, with the possible exception of Sardinia. The silence is here surely significant. The only other possibility is Carthaginian control by treaty and indirect pressure; perhaps also Carthaginian control of the semi-autonomous enclaves established in the ports. This would be rather like the right to appoint the wardens of the port granted by Egypt to select states at Naucratis (Hdt. 2.178), or the control of the segregated *karum* by Assyrian traders in the middle of a foreign Anatolian kingdom in the second millennium B.C.[49] In the Middle Ages and later such concessions were called 'Capitulations' and are recorded from at least the ninth century, when Harun-al-Rashid granted special commercial facilities to the Frankish subjects of Charlemagne.[50] They were in effect treaties which granted to a state extra-territorial jurisdiction over its nationals within the boundaries of a foreign port, and were based on the principle that the sovereignty of a state could extend to its overseas subjects but not to the port territory. It was thereby a convenience to both parties - to the home state by providing a measure of law and order among wealthy and often powerful merchants in the port, and to the foreigners in that they were protected in their transactions and usually given some reduction of port duties. The result was the formation of virtually a foreign enclave in the midst of an alien land, sometimes, although not necessarily, to the restriction of the host's sovereignty.

How far the Assyrian *karum* or the Capitulations were precisely

paralleled in Carthage's extra-territorial relations is almost impossible to say with the limited information available. But the examples prove that territorial sovereignty was not a precondition of control of port operations. Nor were these conditions necessarily exploitative of the host country - what today we might call neo-colonialist - since in this kind of trade prices were fixed by non-commercial mechanisms. But politically such user-control was of immense value in the conduct of foreign affairs. In return for Carthaginian aid against mounting Greek or native pressures, the various Phoenician cities must have agreed to permit Carthage to dictate the terms under which the ports of trade extended its rights to users, but they did not necessarily forfeit their independence.

This political instrument of determining the approaches to the ports of trade (*epibathrai* is Polybius' word, 3.24.14) is always assumed to mean a policy of *mare clausum*, trade monopolies and closed markets, based on theories of formal economics. But in conditions of administered trade the logic is perverse. The Carthaginians were concerned not to limit the number of traders who came to their ports but to increase them. Strangers, unidentifiable penteconters of warlike appearance were potential enemies, raiders and kidnappers. It is significant that Polybius automatically interpreted the treaty of 509 to refer to Roman war ships (3.23.2).[51] They caused local shipping to suffer and the population was abducted as slaves (e.g. Plaut. *Poen.* 66). Adjacent ports of trade or colonial foundations were likewise threatening, apart from drawing off potential allies. The success of treaty trade depended upon the ability to offer protection and guaranteed prices. The aim was to direct shipping to suitable sites, to assist the trader with facilities for storage and judicial authorities to enforce contracts, to keep the foreigner under surveillance rather than encourage him to smuggle at unauthorized sites.[52] The 'running in' of ships (*katagein* is the Greek word) seems to have been a fairly common practice for compulsory sales both in this period and later.[53] The essential prerequisite for the port of trade was peace (Xen. *Poroi* 5.2), and this was what motivated Carthage in Spain, Sardinia and Sicily.

TOWARDS A MODEL FOR CARTHAGINIAN IMPERIALISM

In Carthage, as in all pre-industrial and relatively undifferentiated societies of a precapitalist era, the economy was 'submerged in social relationships' and this characteristic predominated over such principles of formal economics as the theory of indifference, diminishing returns and economic maximization.[54] That means to say that, even if they had had the skill to calculate the strictly financial value of marginal production and exchange, the Carthaginians would not have had the will to create this as the overriding principle, to the exclusion of social and political gains. Perhaps that is true enough of any society, but in Carthage as in all face-to-face communities, economic rationality was modified by social prescription to a far greater extent than in modern industrial societies where social and economic spheres are largely segregated.

Price in other words was less important than goodwill or prestige, and external trade was merely a tool towards this end. Commerce, insofar as it is an appropriate term at all, was directed towards the socially necessary objectives of Carthaginian society, which had as much to do with moral obligations and status as with private money-making. This does not mean that economic rationality disappeared and played no part in determining Carthaginian behaviour overseas. Economic maximization is merely a tautology for saying that each man does the best he can in the circumstances. But it is the circumstances that matter. We are not dealing with prelogical mentalities but with priorities.[55]

In consideration of Carthaginian imperialism this means that, while we must not rule out the possibility of economically exploitative domination through territorial conquest or tied trade, socially oriented actions also provided opportunities for manipulation and self advantage that do not fit into a term like 'commercial empire'.

If the Carthaginian economy was thus embedded in the social and political fabric of the state, there was no clear dichotomy between the public and private sector. Personal bonds of *xenia* and *philia* predominated in such actions of foreign policy as Magonid support for Himera against Syracuse or in response to the kinship call for help from Gades.[56] Phoenician merchants of

antiquity were princes and their traffickers 'the honourable of the earth' (Isaiah 23.8) - unlike those of Greece and Rome. Whatever the precise relationship between kings and the ruling 'order' at various periods, Aristotle and Polybius make it clear that wealth, largesse and conspicuous spending rather than birth were essential for control of political power (Arist. *Pol.* 1272b-1273a; Polyb. 6.56.4).[57] Since agrarian wealth and land were in short supply until at least the fourth century B.C., it follows that Carthaginian grandees derived their status and riches both from land and from trade and foreign adventures. King Hanno's voyage to the west African coast in search of gold (as we believe) was just such an example of state-cum-private enterprise and perhaps one more example of the interchangeable political and trading role by the ubiquitous Magonid family.

According to Cicero's biased view, commercial greed destroyed Carthage's will to fight (*de rep.* 2.4.7), which more or less corresponded to Aristotle's judgement that riches in Carthage were more honoured than merit (*Pol.* 1273a). In other words, prestige action lay more in trade than conquest and this, not surprisingly, baffled Cicero's agrarian sense of values. This does not mean that military prowess was wholly despised. If we can believe Justin, Mago, the founder of the dynasty, won great renown for *bellica gloria* (18.7.19) and the crack troops of the 'Sacred Band' in 339 B.C. were a political elite 'distinguished for bravery and reputation as well as property' (Diod. 16.80.4). But war in general, as we saw in Sicily, endangered the very basis of the economic and political welfare of the oligarchy, which was achieved through the careful nurture of administered trade in foreign ports and the extension of such facilities to their allies by private and state agreements.

And this brings us once again to the Rome-Carthage treaties, which are in many ways the best documents for understanding Carthaginian imperialism. The treaties, as many have seen, must be set in the context of the *symbola* and state agreements concluded by Carthage with several Etruscan cities (Arist. *Pol.* 1280a36). They were therefore agreements arising out of friendship not truces dictated from hostility. In matters of exchange and business the parties became 'like citizens of one city', says Aristotle.

Strangers were in this fashion made like kinsmen so that they could be incorporated as trading partners through a political and social act outside the realm of pure market economics, and not restricted to commerce.[58] The important point is that *symbola*, which were similar to other types of exchange of rights, rights of sanctuary or alien residence which can be documented in Phoenician or Levantine trading history far back into the archaic period, were designed to assist traders and strangers, not to keep them out.[59] Such state agreements were closely related to and developed out of exchanges of *xenia*.

What this paper has sought to suggest is that such agreements of reciprocity, which began as deals between equal partners, could move into conditions of unequal domination for political as much as commercial reasons. The tone of the Pyrgi gold inscriptions, dating from near the time of the first Roman treaty, is deferential to Carthage.[60] The treaties with Rome defined political spheres of influence where Carthage could, as it were, speak for others. And that redounded to Carthage's prestige. But Rome in 509, while speaking for the Latin cities, could hardly claim to control them at that date. No more could Carthage claim that Tyre was Carthaginian territory in 348, although she was included in the agreement (Polyb. 3.24).[61] So why should Utica or Mastia Tarseion in Spain have been any different in the same treaty? What had happened was that these cities under pressure of events were prepared to permit Carthage to define their foreign relations by jointly underwriting the protection of allied shipping in selected ports of trade. That was the attraction of the alliance and the nature of the Carthaginian empire.

A CHANGE IN CARTHAGINIAN IMPERIALISM

Carthaginian attitudes towards trade and overseas commitments were changing in the fourth century. This may have underlain their unwillingness to allow Romans to approach Libya and Sardinia, although they did not necessarily demand the same conditions from all their allies. It coincided with a change in the political economy of Carthage and the expansion of Carthage beyond the *chora* of Cape Bon. By the time of Agathocles' invasion in 310 B.C. Carthage controlled a territory some forty miles deep that extended

westwards as far as Hippo Acra (Bizerta) and eastwards to Hadrumetum and Thapsus. This implies a growth of landed property ownership, control of labour and new relations of production, which were bound to alter the social and economic priorities as well as affecting the ideology of the ruling estate. It is at this time in the fourth century, for instance, that we hear of Hanno and his support from 20,000 'slaves', who must be labourers on the land (Justin 21.4.6). We have evidence of rich estates owned by the nobility (Diod. 20.8.4), which probably included the exploitation of the corn lands to the south-west and olive culture to the south-east.[62] The introduction of the *Ceres* cult into Africa (Diod. 14.77.5) and the export of corn in 306 B.C. (Diod. 20.79.5) are signals of the new economy. However scathing Cicero may have been about the relative absence of a purely land-owning class in Carthage, the large olive estates owned by the Barca family near Thapsus (Livy 33.48.1; Pliny *NH* 17.93) demonstrate the change.

The logic of this change, however small in the fourth century, was growing inequality among the population of the territory as the minority gained control of the means of production. That produced greater unrest among those who were increasingly exploited and therefore greater danger that foreign invasions might spark off native rebellion - just as Agathocles and Regulus calculated. The benefits of reciprocity agreements and foreign exchanges were outweighed by the disturbances caused by foreign contacts. The vulnerability of Africa led to a greater dependence on Sardinia for emergency imports and therefore the need to limit approaches even by allies. Sicily became less a field for enterprise than a security risk from her contiguity. Agathocles, it was said, at the time of his death in 289 B.C. was planning to control Carthaginian routes by holding strategic points in Africa with a large war fleet (Diod. 21.16.1).

By the end of the fourth century the stage was set for the new Carthaginian imperialism of the third century, which is not studied here. Basically it aimed to neutralize Sicily and produce equilibrium through chaos. It was only the Romans who claimed to perceive in this an aggressive intent, in order to excuse their own actions.[63] The complete loss of Spain and its silver supply made Carthage more than ever reliant upon Sardinia and Libya. So it was that in the

third century the first extensive penetration deep into Africa took place followed by the full panoply of a provincial system, including governors, taxes and district organization of the territory.[64] This was the work of Hanno and Hamilcar Barca, further stimulated by the crippling blow to Carthaginian trade by the loss of Sicily and Sardinia in the First Punic War. Hamilcar then carried the empire westwards along the Metagonian coast and into Spain. The empire was described in the Macedonian treaty of 215 B.C. as 'those who are subjects of Carthage, who live under the same laws' (Polyb. 7.9.5). Polybius used the word *hyparchoi* for subjects, not the *eparchia* he had described before. The verbal shift is small but the real change great.

4: SPARTAN IMPERIALISM?

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The query in my title indicates a doubt about the reality of Spartan imperialism, as distinct from the ambitions of individual Spartans and their followers. Lysander tried to create something that we can fairly call an empire; twenty years earlier we have the foundation of Herakleia Trachinia, and we must at least consider whether the thinking behind that grandiose project could be called imperialistic; earlier still the regent Pausanias after the Persian War harboured ambitions which might have tended the same way. Both these men ended badly, and the colony too failed. The question is both about the nature of the ambitions and about the opposition to them: to some extent it was personal, but I conclude that there were general factors in the Spartan system which inhibited imperialism.

I *PAUSANIAS AND THE HEGEMONY*

It would be possible to extend the enquiry backwards and include King Kleomenes I, an active king, and a good case can be made for regarding him as an expansionist eager to increase Sparta's power and his own. I doubt if this would be profitable: the evidence is in effect all from Herodotus, mainly hostile to him, and the narrative is fragmented in such a way that it is hard to be sure how his various activities hang together, and harder still to be sure about his own and his opponents' motives.[1]

The position is different with his nephew Pausanias, regent for many years for his cousin King Pleistarchos, son of Leonidas. As the youthful victor of Plataia in 479,[2] and the leader of the fleet which went to Cyprus and Byzantium in 478, he had an assured prestige and opportunities for action beyond those available to Kleomenes. We see him through the eyes of two good witnesses, who took different views of the last phase of his life but use similar phrases about his alleged aims: Herodotus (5.32) knew, but doubted, the story that he was betrothed to a Persian princess, ἔρωτα σχὼν τῆς Ἑλλάδος τύραννος γενέσθαι; Thucydides cites a letter in which

he proposed to marry Xerxes' daughter, and does not doubt his motive (1.128.3), ἐφιέμενος τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἀρχῆς. Before we can go further this has to be sorted out.

At 5.32 Herodotus had occasion to mention Darius' cousin Megabates, and noted that it was to this man's daughter that Pausanias, 'if indeed the story be true, at a later time was betrothed, longing to become tyrant of Greece'. The doubt relates directly to the betrothal, but as the sentence runs it must also cover the tyrannical ambition, and it is significant that Herodotus thought it right both to mention the story and to express his doubt. At 8.3.2 the Athenians, in the interests of unity, nobly abandon their claim to command at sea; but only for the moment, 'as they showed, for when they had repulsed the Persian and the fight was about his own land, they used the excuse of Pausanias' hybris to take the hegemony from the Spartans'. Herodotus does not deny the hybris, but he thought that it was not in itself grave enough to cause the allies' switch from Sparta to Athens.[3] When Pausanias makes his substantive entry into the narrative, Herodotus praises his victory at Plataia, 'the fairest of all that we know' (9.64.1), and follows this with a string of favourable anecdotes about his conduct after the battle (9.76, 78-9, 82); at most there is a hint of corruptibility in Pausanias' reaction to Persian luxury (82.2), and his arbitrary execution of the Theban Medisers (88) is disquieting, but no real shadow is allowed to mar the glory.[4]

Thucydides had no occasion to dilate on Plataia and starts with the expedition of 478. Pausanias' violence is mere fact, not anyone's pretext, and it is the reason why the allies turned to Athens (1.95.1); when he was recalled and tried, it is a surprise that he was acquitted of Medism (1.95.5). Thereafter, in the excursus 1.128-34, his Medism and his ambition to rule Greece under the king is assumed throughout. We are given the text of his letter to Xerxes (ὡς ὕστερον ἀνηυρέθη, which has naturally excited suspicion) and of Xerxes' reply (128.6-7, 129.3): the only problem at that time, as Thucydides sees it, was to obtain certain proof of his guilt.

Thucydides' version has encountered severe criticism, some of it justified and some less so.[5] There is no need to rehearse the whole controversy here. The critics have enough of a case, and

the letters are not very palatable; it is hard to feel much enthusiasm for the novelette about Pausanias' eventual detection. The different situations of the two witnesses are important. Long before he began his famous enquiries, Herodotus heard enough discussion among his elders about the transfer of the hegemony and about Pausanias' role; above all he heard these things outside Athens, which makes it more difficult to disregard his judgement of the limited extent to which he could endorse the developed story. Thucydides, a full generation younger, was an Athenian who grew up when the empire was fully developed; and when Athens and Sparta took joint action against Themistokles, before Thucydides was born, Pausanias' Medism and Themistokles' involvement had been accepted officially as fact at Athens. We may regret that nothing stirred his powerful and critical mind to question these agreed fables, but only his more extreme worshippers need feel offended.

One factual detail shows that Pausanias did indeed have some dealings with the Persians: his agent Gongylos the Eretrian received from the king some Aiolic cities which his sons held in the 390s (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.6; cf. *Anab.* 7.8.8), presumably for service actually rendered.[6] The extent of Pausanias' commitment has been variously estimated,[7] but Herodotus' doubts incline me to minimize it: we need imagine no more than some form of reinsurance, such as Themistokles was alleged to have practised (Hdt. 8.109.5), or the English who after 1688 maintained contact with the exiled Stuart court, just in case.

His reaction to the loss of the hegemony is more important for our purposes. Driven out of Byzantium by the Athenians, he seems to have been left undisturbed at Kolonai for some time.[8] Thucydides' certainty about his Medism does not tell us exactly what he was doing at Kolonai, or why the Spartans sent for him when they did. The terms of the summons (131.1) and his imprisonment by the ephors (131.2) suggest that his enemies at home were at this time dominant and confident of a conviction; but then he was released, and when he 'offered himself for trial' no one took up the challenge. Thucydides did not infer, as we might, that the evidence proved inadequate or that Pausanias was found to have more political support in the city than had been expected; instead he remarks on the difficulty of attacking a Spartan in the regent's position

(132.1, 5) and turns to other grounds Pausanias had given for suspicion, the inscription on the dedication at Delphi[9] and the rest. It was the Spartan way, he comments, not to hurry into irreversible steps against a Spartiate without sure proof.

The Spartans could indeed be cautious, but this did not stop them putting their kings on trial;[10] and according to Thucydides himself Pausanias offered to undergo one. If public feeling had been strongly hostile to him, accusers would have come forward and evidence would have been found, so the implication of Thucydides' account is that Pausanias had enough support to make it risky for his enemies to proceed. But if so, what did his friends support? Not, presumably, a plan to make him tyrant or satrap under the Persians: the likely issue is the one indicated by Diodoros, who at 11.50 reports a debate between the young and the majority who wished to recover the hegemony from Athens by force, and a prudent elder who dissuaded them. Diodorus has this under 475/4, but his introductory phrase joins easily on to the end of his account of the transfer of the hegemony at 11.47.3, and the moment for decision was when the allies rejected Dorkis, sent out to succeed Pausanias: Sparta must either take action at once or acquiesce in Athens' initiative, as Thucydides says she did at 1.95.7, not contradicting Diodoros but putting the matter in a very different light. That was a victory for the opposition, and Pausanias' second voyage to Byzantium was a rebellious refusal to accept this. There is an uncertain hint in Thucydides that he said he was going out to take action against a Greek enemy;[11] the Athenians showed what they thought by expelling him forcibly from Byzantium, in my belief after no long interval.[12] The proceedings in Sparta after his second recall were an inquest on all this. It was no longer feasible to contest the transfer of hegemony, but there was an opportunity to strike down Pausanias and his supporters. We might understand better if we knew the exact date and how this fits in with other events in Sparta and the Peloponnese. The opposition won again, but it was not a complete or happy victory (Thuc. 1.134.4), and time must have been needed to establish the version which Thucydides accepted without question.

A design to retain or recover the leadership of the Greek war against Persia is not in itself, or not simply, imperialistic. It

is not indeed very clear what Pausanias and the Greek leaders were trying to create in 478, more particularly what they expected to become of Cyprus after their campaign there;[13] if Sparta had kept the leadership she would have had to impose some measure of organization generally. Lotze (1970) argues forcibly against assuming that the contemporary question was about the political domination of Greece; whatever the personal ambitions of Pausanias, the general Spartan reaction should be seen in terms of the prestige of leadership. This is in the main convincing, though it leaves Sparta's acquiescence in the Athenian takeover not quite transparent, and the anodyne mildness of Thucydides' Spartans at 1.95.7 can hardly be the whole story. Diodoros does not help with the motive: his Hetoimaridas (11.50.6) argues that naval hegemony would not be good for Sparta (μὴ συμφέρειν), which has an Isokratean ring, reminiscent of feelings expressed at Athens in the 350s but not suitable here. But it is not hard to imagine, with Lotze, that the landowners of Sparta preferred their established mode of life and were reluctant to undertake the effort that would be needed if Pausanias' lead were to be followed; and after the event it might seem palatable enough to sacrifice a degree of prestige and to leave the laborious job to Athens. Things were different at the end of the century, when Sparta had experience of war overseas and had developed new mechanisms for conducting it.

II *HERAKLEIA TRACHINIA*

Thucydides distinguishes the two alliances at the outbreak of war by saying (1.19) that the Spartans did not subject their allies to tribute, only took care (θεραπεύοντες) that they should be ruled by oligarchies sympathetic to herself. 'Care' might run to armed intervention, as at Sikyon in 418 (5.81.2; cf. 82.1 for Achaia), at a time of Spartan recovery after a period of depression; and no doubt at all times less obtrusive pressures might be exercised. Nevertheless, power by land required armed forces larger than Sparta could supply from her own citizen body, so that her allies retained their arms and got a measure of independence from that. The Peloponnesian League held real conferences at which Sparta might be outvoted, and the boast that the cities she led were autonomous had some substance.[14] At the start of the war Sparta

proclaimed the liberation of Greece, and if some Spartans entertained larger ambitions, the declaration hampered open imperialism. When war was resumed in 413 Thucydides allows the expression of thoughts about hegemony (6.92.5, 8.2.4), but not about empire, and the theme of liberation still shows its effects (8.46.3, 43.3).

The Archidamian War did however see the establishment of the Spartan colony at Herakleia Trachinia (Thuc. 3.92-3; Diod. 12.59.3-5) in 426, a venture which shows that policies which had nothing to do with liberation might be adopted by the Spartan state. I have argued elsewhere (Andrewes (1971), 217-26) that expansion by land to the north was a continuing strand in Spartan policy, that Thucydides perhaps overstresses the freelance position of Brasidas in his expedition to the north, and that the Olynthian War was not an isolated aberration. Of all this the foundation of Herakleia is the most striking symptom, worth further discussion.

The mere size of the colony is portentous. Diodoros' ten thousand is a naturally suspect number, and his breakdown into 4,000 Peloponnesians and over 6,000 others does not much improve its credibility; but Thucydides guarantees a large scale when he speaks of πάνυ πολλούς at the start, due to confidence in the stability of a Spartan foundation. There is no classical parallel for a colony of these dimensions on Greek soil, supposed to be friendly: the 4,000 Athenian cleruchs of Hdt. 5.77.2 on the land of the Hippobotai were not sent to Chalkis out of piety or friendship. We must not of course write off the element of piety for Herakleia, the connexion of Herakles with Trachis and the simultaneous appeal from Doris, but protection from the Oitaioi in this style was likely to prove more of a burden than a boon to the recipients, and there is evidence that it was resented;[15] and the Spartans finished by expelling the remaining Trachinians.[16]

For a second motive Thucydides gives its use in the war against Athens: a fleet could be prepared against Euboia, with a short crossing. We are then told that they began to build νεώρια,[17] and that the Athenians were at first greatly alarmed by this aspect of the foundation. It remains a little mysterious. They cannot have hoped to evade Athenian control of the sea and bring in a fleet of any size, but it may have been intended to build ships locally, and hope to find enough adequate seamen among the colonists, or import them

specially. In any case it would seem more economical to assemble the force required somewhere along this coast and ferry it across in some more surreptitious way; the Athenians, even if in general alerted, could not keep continuous watch on the whole coastline. Even if Spartan caution rejected that kind of risk, the naval preparations still seem somewhat overblown. Third, and most briefly stated, the place would be useful for the passage to the north,[18] and in 424 Brasidas stopped here to organize his transit of Thessaly (Thuc. 4.78.1); but again, a large-scale colony forty stades west of Thermopylai was not the most economic way of securing the defile.

Two further matters call for consideration. The first is Agis' expedition north from Dekeleia in winter 413/12 (Thuc. 8.3.1). His action against the Oitaioi is explained in terms of 'old enmity', i.e. the oppression of Trachis and Doris which in 426 had excused Sparta's intervention; it was another matter when he turned to 'the Achaioi Phthiotai and the other subjects of the Thessalians in these parts', over Thessalian protest, exacting money and hostages, depositing the latter in Corinth, and attempting to bring these tribes into the Spartan alliance. This is markedly more aggressive than anything that was done or threatened in 426, and the suggestion of imperialism is much stronger. Later, after the reorganization of Herakleia in 399 or 400 (see n.16), we find a Spartan garrison in Pharsalos (Diod. 14.82.6), presumably drawn in the first instance from their nearest base; and in 395 the army which followed Lysander to Haliartos included contingents from the tribes of the Malian Gulf (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.6).

Secondly, the action of Eurylochos in autumn 426, very soon after the foundation of Herakleia, when he gathered an army at Delphi to attack Naupaktos, and it included 500 hoplites from the new colony (Thuc. 3.100.2-101.1). It is not clear how many of them can have got home (3.109.2-3, 111), and the blow to Herakleia was probably severe; but the employment of these men may be one indication of the purposes which the colony was intended to serve. Lysander's army in 395 (above) also included Herakleots.

These items add up to a serious indication that some Spartans entertained plans to subject certain areas of central and northern Greece to a control tighter than that which they exercised over

their Peloponnesian allies. In terms of manpower this was imperialism on the cheap, calling only for governors and some staff from Sparta; and recruitment to Sparta's later long-distance expeditions shows that the Peloponnese could spare the colonists. These plans cannot have been wholly secret, but the key measure, the despatch of the colony to Herakleia, could be wrapped up as a response to the appeal of Trachis and Doris, so we need not suppose that the average Spartan at the start willed such action as Agis took in 413/12. I would stress again (cf. Andrewes (1971), 225) that our knowledge of Spartan involvement in the north depends on curious chances, and it is certain that there is much that we do not know; but the important fact remains that the colony failed, and failed repeatedly. In winter 420/19 it suffered a defeat at the hands of the local tribes and some Thessalians, and in the spring the Boiotians took it over (Thuc. 5.51-52.1). By the time of Agis' action in 413/12 Spartan control must have been restored, though Thucydides says nothing of Herakleia here (8.3.1); but in winter 409/8, if the chronology of this scrappy entry in Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.18 can be trusted, Herakleia was again defeated with heavy losses, this time by the Oitaioi and by the treachery of the Achaioi (presumably the Phthiotai whom Agis had recently tried to incorporate into the Spartan system). In 399 or 400 (see n.16) Herippidas intervened in a stasis, expelled the Trachinians and reorganized the colony, but after the battle at Haliartos in 395 the Boiotians and Argives took the place over, sent the Peloponnesian colonists away, and restored the Trachinians (Diod. 14.82.6-7). The later history of the city does not concern us.

Thucydides blamed the failure on the hostility of the colony's neighbours, and on the arrogance and incompetence of its governors (3.93.2, 5.51.2-52.1); and both charges are credible. The establishment of this outsize Spartan outpost was an affront only to be endured by those whom it affected if it was forcibly and efficiently maintained. The failure of the governors echoes a theme familiar in criticism of Sparta (e.g. Thuc. 1.77.6), and it is probably also a sign of uncertainty in Sparta's commitment to the enterprise. If, as I think, there was a continuing group of Spartans who favoured expansion by land to the north, the whole record shows that they were not continuously in control, and so could not ensure the appointment of governors in full sympathy with the project; and

governors of a different way of thinking were unlikely to make it work. The project needed more whole-hearted backing than it got.

III *LYSANDER AND AFTER*

In the course of the Archidamian War Sparta evolved methods for dealing with war in distant theatres for which the regular levy was not suited. Eurylochos in 426 foreshadows, and Brasidas and his subordinate officers in 424-422 fully exemplify, the practice of sending detached officers on special missions, and then or later the term *harmost* was applied to them.[19] Among his troops Brasidas had 700 helots (Thuc. 4.80.5), liberated on their return (5.34.1); and it must be soon after 424 that Sparta instituted the standing force of *neodamodeis*, helots liberated in advance for hoplite service.[20] The rest of Brasidas' force was made up of Peloponnesians who volunteered for pay. The record of Sparta's campaigns in the 390s shows that there was an ample supply of both types of soldier. This again was a system which made no large demand on citizen manpower, calling only for an adequate number of zealous and efficient commanders. Before the end of the Ionian War it had been expanded and developed, and it was ready to Lysander's hand for his attempt to set up an extensive Spartan empire.

It is not in doubt that Lysander proposed to retain for Sparta all of Athens' Aegean empire, and the mechanisms are too well known to need long exposition here. It is irritating that we cannot document a dekarchy in any state but Samos (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.7), but general statements about them occur in contexts (e.g. *Hell.* 3.4.2, 7) such that we cannot write them off as exaggerations of a few instances; if a harmost was installed in Byzantium (*Hell.* 2.2.2) as well as Samos, that shows the range of Lysander's plan. The finance of the operation is referred to explicitly only by Diodorus (14.10.2), to the tune of more than a thousand talents exacted from the defeated;[21] a clause in the Athenian settlement of 403 (*Ath.Pol.* 39.2) shows that payment was actually demanded, and for some time after the abolition of Lysander's dekarchies a fleet and an army overseas had to be paid for. The concentration of our sources on Athens prevents us from discovering much more about the way in which Lysander's dispensation affected other states.

It is hardly surprising that the attempt was made: the question

is rather why Lysander failed. His policy for Athens was wrecked by the intervention of King Pausanias in summer 403, and his defeat was sealed by the acquittal of Pausanias at his subsequent trial, though the voting is said to have been close (Paus. 3.5.2); and roughly at this time the dekarchies were abolished and the cities were given their 'ancestral constitutions' (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2).[22] The alliance still hung together for some years, and Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.1.5) comments on the continuing readiness of East Greek cities to comply with Spartan orders; but it was no longer in the same sense an empire, and when Lysander in 396 tried to recover his commanding influence among the East Greek cities (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2 credits him with an intention to re-establish the dekarchies), he was foiled by Agesilaos.

This was certainly in large part a matter of the internal politics of Sparta, which we should understand more fully if we disposed of minor sources for Sparta comparable with those we have for the political life of Athens. But Xenophon and Plutarch make it clear enough that Lysander was not only ambitious for Sparta, but also energetic and ruthless in building up his personal power: the narrative leaves no doubt that he was effectively in charge, even when he was no longer in formal command of the fleet. That was bound to cause trouble, and we need not doubt Xenophon when he gives jealousy as the motive of Pausanias when he persuaded three of the ephors to send him with a force to Athens (*Hell.* 2.4.29), to interfere with an operation which Lysander seems to have been carrying out with complete efficiency. The question is how widespread this feeling was, and the mere fact that Pausanias was brought to trial on his return shows that Lysander's position inside Sparta was still strong, whether or not we have been given the voting figures correctly. One would like to know more of the arguments by which Pausanias persuaded a majority of the ephors.[23]

But there is also the moral question, or if that is thought an unsuitable formulation, the question how much the policies and methods of Lysander offended ordinary men brought up under the strict Spartan code. Critics of Sparta have castigated the immorality and hypocrisy of her public policy, at least from the time of Thucydides' Athenian speakers at Melos (5.105.4), but even for them the Spartans show conspicuous virtue in their private dealings with

one another; it would be very peculiar if the average patriotic Spartan did not genuinely believe in the pre-eminent virtue of his city, and the opponents of Lysander surely made use of moral argument against his treachery and cruelty. One can only take the instances as they happen to be presented. Kallikratidas, done down by Lysander and his partisans (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.4, 10), makes a noble if slightly confused impression as Xenophon pictures him. The touching scene described in Lys. 18.10-12 is a little spurious, for Pausanias had surely made up his mind about Lysander's Athenian policy before he left Sparta, but there is no difficulty in believing that he used the situation of Nikeratos' and Eukrates' children as an example to show his troops how wrong it was to support the Thirty. The ephors who ordered the suppression of the dekarchies no doubt congratulated themselves on the righting of a manifest wrong. The basic fact is that the able and forceful Lysander, for whatever reason, could not persuade his countrymen to follow him for long.

What follows is pale in comparison. Agesilaos, relying less on force and fraud and more on his diplomatic ability and on the charm which enslaved Xenophon, built up his own position and made the most he could of Sparta's continuing predominance, imposing his will most effectively in the execution of the King's Peace. But it was noted that his prevailing passion was the advancement of his own friends in the cities (Isoc. 5.87), a source of weakness as well as of strength, which led him into actions which even Xenophon could not quite excuse (*Hell.* 5.3.16; cf. *Ages.* 2.21): this was something less than a system of empire. The defeat at Leuktra, provoked in a sense by Agesilaos' intractable enmity to Thebes, put an end to it all.

IV *CONCLUSION*

In all three instances we detect a lack of the whole-hearted will to empire. Comparison with Athens shows how this is rooted in the social and political system of Sparta. At Athens the empire brought tangible benefit to all classes: we hear most of the material gains of the poor and of their greed for pay, but that imbalance is due to the fact that they did not write the literature which has come down to us, and there is no doubt that the upper classes too

exploited the empire for material advantage. A recent study[24] examines the acquisition of land in the territory of allied cities by individual Athenians of this class; and they gained too because the tribute of empire saved them over a long period from contributions which they must otherwise have made from their own pockets to the expenses of the state. There is no good evidence of anti-imperialist feeling in the Athenian upper class,[25] least of all any sign that they resisted the exaction of tribute or its increase.

The benefits of a Spartan empire would be spread less widely, and might be less widely attractive to the governing class. Expansion meant for a substantial minority of helots the chance of being freed for military service, and there were no doubt increased opportunities for individual *perioikoi* (e.g. Thuc. 8.6.4, 22.1): but they did not determine Spartan policy. Notoriously, a section of the aristocracy proved eager for foreign service, not only for the hope of wealth but because they relished their standing in the cities and the 'flattery' of the inhabitants, a total change from the traditional discipline of Spartan life: see Xenophon's outburst, *Lac.Pol.* 14, most of which seems more applicable to the beginning of the century than to the time of the pamphlet's composition. These were the men of energy and initiative, like Derkyllidas whose fondness for service abroad is noted by Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.3.2): Ephoros (*FGH* 70 F 71) thought him devious and not a typical Spartan. They provoked some outcry against the corrupting influence of the wealth that now poured in to Sparta and, however ineffective in the long run, this may be taken as genuine protest in defence of a way of life that had satisfied many previous generations. Their estates, their hunting, a modicum of conventional warfare with their neighbours, and the high standing that their military reputation gave them, were enough for a good life; to reach out further meant a sustained effort in an unfamiliar field, and it seems that there were not enough who were ready to break out of the traditional pattern. That is the justification for setting a question-mark against Spartan imperialism.

5: THE FIFTH-CENTURY ATHENIAN EMPIRE: A BALANCE-SHEET[1]

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I

'Every doctrine of imperialism devised by men is a consequence of their second thoughts. But empires are not built by men troubled by second thoughts.'[2]

I start with that aphoristic formulation, the truth of which has been demonstrated in the study of modern imperialisms, as an antidote to the familiar practice of *beginning* a discussion of the Athenian empire with aims and motives and quickly sliding over to attitudes and even theory, thereby implying that the men who created and extended the empire also began with a defined imperialist programme and theories of imperialism. An outstanding current example of the procedure I have in mind is the attempt to date a number of Athenian laws and decrees (or to support a proposed date) by what may be called their imperialist tone. If they are 'harsh', it is argued, they smack of Cleon and should be dated in the 420s B.C., and not in the time of the more 'moderate' Periclean leadership, the 440s or 430s.[3] Insofar as the argument is not circular, it implies the existence of an identifiable programme of imperialism, or rather of both successive and conflicting programmes, and that requires demonstration, not assumption.

A second source of confusion is the unavoidable ambiguity of the word 'empire'. Stemming from the Latin *imperium*, 'empire' becomes entangled with the word 'emperor', and much of the extensive discussion throughout the Middle Ages and on into modern times ends in a tautological cul-de-sac: an empire is the territory ruled by an emperor.[4] Everyone knows that there are, and have been in the past, important empires not ruled by an emperor, and I see no purpose in playing word-games in order to get round that harmless linguistic anomaly. To suggest, for example, that we should abandon 'empire' as a category in Greek history and speak only of 'hegemony' does not seem to me helpful or useful.[5] It would have been small consolation to the Melians, as the Athenian

soldiers and sailors fell upon them, to be informed that they were about to become the victims of a hegemonial, not an imperial, measure.

That is not to question the legitimacy of efforts to differentiate among empires. All broad classificatory terms - 'state' is the obvious analogy - embrace a wide spectrum of individual instances. The Persian, Athenian and Roman empires differed among themselves in important ways, as do modern empires. It then becomes necessary, as with all classifications, to establish the canons for inclusion or exclusion. Those who play with 'hegemony' seem to me to give excessive weight to purely formal considerations, which, if adopted rigorously, would fragment the category 'empire' so much as to render it empty and useless. Common sense is right in this instance: there have been throughout history structures that belong within a single class on substantive grounds, namely, the exercise of authority (or power or control) by one state over one or more other states (or communities or peoples) for an extended period of time. That is admittedly imprecise, but large-scale human institutions can never be classified by other than imprecise canons: again I cite 'state' as an analogy.

A notable example of the formalistic approach is the concern of some historians to define and date the point at which a voluntary association of states was converted into an Athenian empire. The year 454 is a favourite date, because, it is generally believed, the 'league treasury' was then transferred from Delos to Athens.[6] At most, such an action was a symbol, a brutal statement of the reality, but not the reality itself. The word 'voluntary' is not even a good symbol, leading historians into remarkable verbal contortions. 'It seems possible to go farther and to state that though coercion of members apparently was regarded as legitimate - and probably even compulsion against states that did not wish to join - the reduction even of revolting members to the status of subjects was contrary to the constitution.'[7] Matters are not improved by a sprinkling of 'Weberian' terminology: 'indirekte Herrschaftsmittel bestehen darin, dass sie auf ein Interesse des Beherrschten am Beherrschtwerden bauen bzw. dieses hervorrufen'.[8]

Thucydides, with his incomparable eye for reality, did not

confuse it with the symbols and the slogans. 'First', he writes in opening his narrative of the Pentakontaetia (1.98.1), 'they (the Athenians) besieged Eion on the Strymon River', still in Persian hands, and then the island of Skyros in the north Aegean. Their populations were enslaved *and their territories were colonized by Athenian settlers*. Next Athens compelled Carystus on Euboea to join the league; clearly the 'voluntary' principle had had a very short run. Soon Naxos tried to withdraw from the league (the precise date is uncertain), only to be besieged and crushed by Athens. Naxos 'was the first allied city to be enslaved against established usage', comments Thucydides (1.98.4), employing his favourite metaphor for Athenian interference with the autonomy of the subject-cities in the empire.

Of course the Athenian empire underwent significant changes in the more than half a century of its existence. So has every other empire of similar (or longer) duration in history. To establish and explain the changes is a valid historical concern, but I find it a misconceived enterprise to seek one point along a continuous line which permits us to say that there was no empire before and that there was an empire thereafter. Carystus refused to join the alliance and was forced in; Naxos sought to leave and was forcibly prevented. And they were only the first of many city-states in that position, subject to the authority of another state which acted to advance its own interests, political and material.

I do not dispute that the 'Delian league' (a modern name for which there is no ancient authority) was welcome when it was created in 478 B.C., both because of the popularity of the vengeance appeal and, fundamentally, because of the need to clear the Aegean Sea of Persian naval forces. The Persians had twice invaded Greece unsuccessfully, and no one in 478 could have had the slightest confidence that the Great King would accept the defeats passively and would not return in a third attempt. Control of the Aegean was the most obvious protective measure, and Athens successfully won the leadership of such an undertaking. An Athenian, Aristides, was given the task of fixing the amount of money or the number of ships equipped and manned which each member-state would provide for the combined league fleet. The Athenians supplied the league treasurers (*Hellenotamiai*) and the military-naval command. Within a dozen

years (the exact number depends on the date of the battle of Eurymedon, which no scholar dates later than 466 B.C.), the league's formal objective was achieved. The Persian fleet of 200 triremes, most of them Phoenician, was captured and destroyed in a great land-and-sea battle at the mouth of the Eurymedon River in southern Asia Minor. Yet the 'league' remained in existence without a moment's faltering and its membership grew, willingly or by compulsion as the case may have been in each instance, exactly as before Eurymedon.

The chief executant of Athenian policy in those years and the commander-in-chief at Eurymedon was Cimon. He had been personally in charge at Eion, and again in 465 B.C., shortly after Eurymedon, when Thasos, the largest and wealthiest island in the north Aegean, tried to withdraw from the alliance. After a siege lasting more than two years, Thasos capitulated and was condemned to surrender her fleet (henceforth paying tribute in money), to dismantle her walls, to pay Athens a large indemnity, and to surrender the ports and the mines she possessed on the mainland. And Cimon, of course, far from being a 'radical democrat' or 'demagogue' like Pericles, let alone Cleon, represented the traditional, oligarchically inclined, landowning aristocracy of Athens. Had he lived longer, he no doubt would have opposed many of the policies adopted by both Pericles and Cleon with respect to the empire. However, his opposition would not have been on moral grounds. There is no difference in 'harshness' between the treatment of the people of Eion and Skyros in Cimon's day and Cleon's proposal nearly half a century later to massacre the people of Mytilene. Our sources, in fact, do not reveal a single Athenian who opposed the empire as such, not even Thucydides son of Melesias or his kinsman and namesake, the historian.[9]

Certainly neither Athens nor her allies anticipated *all* the consequences of the first step of association in 478, in particular what would happen if a member-state chose to 'secede'. Nor can anyone today know what decision-making individuals in Athens hoped or desired. What, for instance, were the long-range aspirations of Themistocles and Aristides for Athens and Athenian power? The Delian league was the first of a number of major instances in classical Greek history of the deployment of Panhellenism, with or

without the name, 'to justify the hegemony and mastery of one *polis* over other states by proposing a common aim, war against the barbarians'.[10] Hope and aspirations do not imply a defined programme, but their presence in Athens in 478 is demonstrated by the rapidity with which Athens not only acquired the decision-making power for the league but also was prepared, in manpower, ships and psychology, to exert force in the strictest sense, to impose her decisions and to punish recalcitrants.

This is not to underestimate the Panhellenic appeal, any more than the real fear of further Persian invasions. The pull of ideology is never to be underestimated, nor is it easy to untangle ideology and reality. In a conflict, how does one measure the respective importance of the two elements in determining the decision of a weaker state? A prudent state could 'voluntarily' save itself from the frightful consequences of resistance and 'involuntary' subjection, but some did not. An early British juridical distinction between ceded and conquered territories was soon abandoned precisely because the two overlapped much of the time.[11] Lacking, as we do, the data from the Athenian empire with which to attempt such refined distinctions, we may still examine that empire operationally, that is, analyse as best we can, and as concretely, the observed behaviour patterns, and assess the gains and the losses of both the imperial state and the subject states.[12]

For that purpose, a crude typology of the various ways in which one state *may* exercise its power over others for its own benefit will suffice:

(1) restriction on freedom of action in inter-state relations;

(2) political, administrative and/or judicial interference in local affairs;

(3) compulsory military and/or naval service;

(4) the payment of 'tribute' in some form, whether in the narrow sense of a regular lump sum or as a land tax or in some other way;

(5) confiscation of land, with or without subsequent emigration of settlers from the imperial state;

(6) other forms of economic subordination or exploitation, ranging from control of the seas and Navigation Acts to compulsory delivery of goods at prices below the prevailing market price and

the like.

The present essay will focus on the economics of imperial power. I do not imply by that concentration that the politics of the Athenian empire do not merit analysis or that economics and politics were separable, autonomous aspects of the story. However, I have nothing new to contribute on the foreign-policy aspect, except perhaps to ask: Why was Athens concerned to convert other Greek *poleis* into dependent agents in inter-state relations, and, in particular, what material benefits did Athens obtain (whether deliberately envisaged or not) from her success in the endeavour? Interference in internal affairs is less well understood, largely because of the inadequacy of the evidence, and again I shall restrict myself to those measures which either had or may possibly have had an immediate economic impact.

Because of the paucity and one-sidedness of the sources, no narrative is possible, and that means no adequate consideration of development and change. If what follows therefore has a static appearance, that is not because I hold the improbable view that the relations between Athens and her subjects were fundamentally unchanged from 478 to 404 but because I know of no way to document significant change, and no other way to avoid falling into the harshness-of-Cleon trap I have already discussed. We have the impression, for example, that over the years Athens interfered with increasing frequency and toughness in the internal affairs of some or all of the subjects: certain criminal cases had to be tried in Athens before Athenian juries, the right to coin money was taken away for a period, and there were other measures. What little we know about these actions rests almost entirely on epigraphical finds, and although it is usually possible to offer a plausible reason for the introduction of a particular measure at the time of a particular inscription, there has been too much unhappy experience with the crumbling of such logic upon the discovery of a new inscription. Besides, the dates of some of the most critical measures, such as the coinage decree, remain the subject of open controversy.

We know, too, that the Athenians developed a considerable administrative machinery for the empire, 700 officials, says Aristotle (*Const. of Ath.* 24.3), about as many as the number for internal

affairs. Apart from suspicion about the duplication of the figure 700, there is no valid reason to question his accuracy. 'We do not know enough to say that 700 is an impossible figure'[13] is needlessly sceptical. And again the sources let us down: the evidence for the administration is almost entirely epigraphical; it does not take us back earlier than the Erythrae decree (*IG* I^2 10), probably of the mid-450s; it allows barely a glimpse into the division of functions.[14] Nothing can be deduced from silence here: there are virtually no Athenian inscriptions (other than dedications) before the mid-fifth century, and even the tribute drops from sight between the original assessment by Aristides and 454. We may safely assume, I believe, that administrative officials (both military and civilian, in so far as that distinction has any meaning in this context) other than the *Hellenotamiai* began to appear at least as soon as there was resistance to membership, that their numbers increased and so did their duties and powers as the years went on. No long-range or systematic Athenian planning is implied in that assumption. What is indisputable is the existence and scale of this administration in the end, not only very large by Greek standards but also, as has apparently not been noticed, relatively larger than the formal administration in the provinces of the Roman empire.

II

In any study of the Athenian empire, two of the categories in my typology - military-naval service and tribute - must be considered together, because they were manipulated together by Athens for most of the history of the empire. When the league was founded, the member-states were divided into those which contributed cash and those which contributed ships together with their crews. As time went on, the latter group was whittled down until only two members remained, Chios and Lesbos, although others are recorded as having contributed a few ships to a campaign on a few later occasions, as did Corcyra, an ally outside the league. We have no list of the original muster of ship-contributing states nor any statement of the principles on which the states were assigned to one category or the other.[15] In a general way it is obvious that ships would have been required of the larger maritime states with proper harbour facilities, not of inland states or of very small ones. Honour

would have also played its part. In 478, at any rate, Chios or Lesbos would not lightly have surrendered their warships and everything that their possession implied; a few decades later, they pathetically clung to their continued ship-contribution as a symbol of 'autonomy' in contrast to the tribute-paying mass of subject states.[16]

However, if the surviving ancient texts fail us on the situation at the foundation of the league, Thucydides is explicit enough about the reason for the change in the pattern: 'reluctance to go on campaign led most of them, in order to avoid serving abroad, to have assessments made in money corresponding to the expense of producing ships' (1.99.3). 'To avoid serving abroad' cannot be taken at face value: these states had not in the past built, equipped and manned warships merely in order to repel attackers, and there are enough instances of their willingness to 'serve abroad'. Now, however, they were serving an alien, imperial state on its terms and at its command. Hence the reluctance, which first showed itself in a refusal to meet the required contributions (Thuc. 1.99.1), and after the high price of refusal had several times been revealed, turned into the most abject surrender, the conversion of the 'league' fleet into an Athenian fleet in the narrowest sense, part of it consisting of ships confiscated from the subjects (Thuc. 1.19) and another part paid for out of their annual tribute. Thucydides openly condemns the subjects for thus reducing themselves to impotence. But I suggest that the difference in naval power between 478 and, say, 440 was basically only a quantitative one. Athenian control of the combined fleet was near enough complete at the beginning to justify H.D.Meyer's judgement that the league was 'from the moment of its creation an Athenian instrument of compulsion (*Zwangsinstrument*)'.[17]

Some of the purposes for which the instrument was employed will be considered later. Here I want to examine the financial implications, without resorting to the arithmetical guessing-games that litter the scholarly literature. The few figures in the surviving sources are too skimpy, too unreliable, and often too contradictory to underpin the mathematics, and the epigraphical data add to the confusion rather than help to clear it. I shall therefore restrict myself to a few considerations *exempli gratia*, none

of which is undermined by a large margin of error.

First, however, it is necessary to get rid of two fetishes. One is a single numeral: 'The original tribute assessment totalled 460 talents' (Thuc. 1.96.2). It requires a powerful will to believe to accept that figure as credible, and a mystical faith to bring contributions in ships within the total.[18] The expenditure of ingenuity in the attempt to reconcile 460 with other amounts scattered among the sources could be indulged as a harmless pastime were it not that they divert attention from the realities of the situation. The objective was a fleet, not coin, yet scholars debate whether Aristides began his survey with a target of 460 talents or merely ended his work with a bit of meaningless addition, producing the meaningless total of 460. Can it be seriously suggested that in the early fifth century B.C. anyone would have begun the difficult task of assembling a coalition fleet by setting a target in cash, not in ships? And what is the point to a tribute total without a ship total, of which there is not a trace in the sources?

A major difficulty in the attempts at reconciliation is created by the totals of payments, normally under 400 talents, that appear (or are conjectured) on the 'Athenian tribute lists', a group of inscriptions which collectively are my second fetish.[19] Their discovery and study have of course been the greatest modern boon to our knowledge of the Athenian empire, but it has become necessary to insist that the 'tribute lists' are not a synonym for the empire, and that they do not represent the whole of the monetary inflow into Athens from the empire. I believe that the only figure of money income from the empire which can be defended, both substantively and contextually, is the one Thucydides (2.13.3) attributes to Pericles at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War - 600 talents. The tribute was the largest component, but from the viewpoint of Athens it was fiscally irrelevant whether the cash arrived as tribute, as indemnities or as income from confiscated mines.[20] But even if my faith in 600 talents should prove to be ill-founded, my analysis of the financial implications of the empire would not suffer in the least.

The figure of 600 talents certainly did not include the 'cash value' of ship-contributions, by then restricted to Lesbos and

Chios. For the earlier period of the empire, however, it is essential to obtain some notion of the relative burden of the two types of contribution.[21] Unfortunately, the cost of building and equipping a warship is unknown; the widely quoted figure of between one and two talents in the mid-fifth century is a guess, but it will serve our purposes. The normal life of a trireme was twenty-plus years, against which must be offset damage or loss in storms, shipwreck and battles, all varying greatly from year to year and incalculable. Then there was much the largest cost item, the pay for the crews, 200 in round numbers on each trireme, 170 of them rowers. That ranged from one third or one half a drachma early in the fifth century to one drachma a day at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, or one talent per ship per month at the higher rate. Again there are too many uncontrollable variables - the number of ships on regular patrol duty, on guard duty or on tribute-collecting assignment, the number and duration of campaigns year by year and the number of participating warships, the number of days devoted annually to training, essential for the rowers in triremes,[22] the share of 'allied' ships in the total activity of the league in all these respects.

We must therefore attempt a comparative assessment without precise figures, and one fairly late instance will serve as a point of departure. In the spring of 428 B.C. ten triremes from the Lesbian *polis* of Mytilene arrived in the Piraeus 'according to the alliance' (Thuc. 3.3.4). The ten triremes, Blackman writes, were 'a small squadron for routine service; more could of course be called for if necessary for a particular campaign'.[23] Yet this small squadron cost Mytilene five talents a month in pay, at the half-drachma rate, in addition to the costs of construction, maintenance, repair and equipment. The fragmentary 'tribute lists' for the years 431-428 show such annual tribute payments, in round numbers, as 10-15 talents from Abdera, 10 from Lampsacus, 15 or 16 from Byzantium, 9 from Cyzicus - all in the higher range of recorded contributions, not exceeded by more than half a dozen or so states. The comparison with the cost of ships' crews therefore suggests that, once the Persian fleet was shattered at Eurymedon, the move by the subject-states to shift from ships to tribute was motivated not only by patriotism and love of freedom but

also by public finance. For the maritime states, tribute often meant a reduced financial burden, in some years a substantial reduction. One comparative figure may help assess the burden: the average annual outlay on the Parthenon, a very expensive temple, was 30-2 talents,[24] equal to the highest recorded tribute, a sum which the crews of twelve triremes would have earned in pay (at the lower rate) in one five-month sailing season (and there were times when warships remained at sea outside the 'normal' season).

Two offsetting considerations are commonly introduced into the calculation, as in the following statement by Blackman: '... but the pay was mainly if not entirely going to their own citizens. A long season probably meant active campaigning rather than routine patrols, and this gave greater hope of booty to offset expenditure.' They 'may well have expected to cover their costs as a result; this was probably the case in the early years, at least until after Eurymedon and perhaps until the early 450's.'[25] The 'social welfare' consideration may be dismissed out of hand: it is not a fifth-century conception, especially not among the oligarchies which still controlled some of the larger maritime states: besides, many of 'their own citizens' quickly found employment as rowers in the Athenian navy. As for booty, which everyone no doubt hoped for, so long as they had to campaign and fight, there is little evidence in the ancient sources about any campaign during the relevant period except for Eurymedon. The silence of the sources is not a compelling argument on one side, but it seems to me impermissible on the other side to fill out that silence with 'may well have expected to cover their costs'. As for Eurymedon, it is a flight of the wildest imagination to think that the Delian league gambled its combined fleet, with their men, and the independence of Greece on a major naval battle chiefly, or even significantly, for the booty they would collect if they won.[26]

Large-scale naval (and military) engagements were both expensive and unpredictable, to the participants if not to later historians, even those with heavy advantages on one side. It required something like a full year, from about April 440 to about April 439, for Athens to subdue Samos.[27] The island was then still a ship-contributor and was able to muster 70 warships, 50 of them in fighting condition, and posed the further threat, real

or imaginary, of support from a 'Persian' fleet. Athens sent several large flotillas, perhaps totalling more than 150 (a portion of which was diverted against the 'Persian' threat) and a military force with siege equipment; she also summoned Chios and Lesbos to make their contributions, 25 triremes together in the first year, 30 in the second. There were victories on both sides, and then an eight-month siege forced Samos to surrender. There was considerable loss of life and material (including triremes). The financial cost to Athens may have been 1,200 talents (though that figure is reached by too many textual emendations for comfort). The victor's terms included a heavy indemnity, paid to Athens, and the surrender of the Samian fleet, marking her permanent disappearance from the roster of ship-contributors. We have no details of the Lesbian-Chian involvement, but each month would have cost them 12-15 talents in pay alone, and they received not a penny for their pains, either in indemnity or in booty.

Triremes were purpose-built warships fit for no other use. There was no interchangeability with merchant ships or fishing vessels, nor was there any other professional employment for tens of thousands of rowers.[28] Hence, as states lost genuine freedom to make war, there was little point, and great expense, in constructing, maintaining and manning a squadron. So they sought relief by inviting Athens to transfer them to the tribute-paying category, a request that could not have been *imposed* on an *unwilling* Athens. That Athens did agree indicates that she could afford the fiscal loss as the price for a fully Athenian navy, with all that it meant in power and self-satisfaction. She could afford it because the state's finances were in a healthy condition, thanks to the imperial revenues, direct and indirect. We are unable to do the sums, just as we cannot properly calculate how Athens managed to put aside so much of her public revenues as a reserve fund, reaching 9,700 talents at one moment (Thuc. 2.13.3). That is a pity, but it does not alter the reality.

III

Tribute, in its narrow sense, is of course only one way that an imperial state drains funds from subject states for its treasury. It is probably neither the most common nor the most important, as

compared, in particular, with a tithe or a monetary tax on the land of the subjects. Of the latter there is no trace in the Athenian empire, and indeed there is only one recorded instance of state exploitation of confiscated property, that of the gold and silver mines on the mainland taken from Thasos after her unsuccessful revolt.[29] These mines continued to be worked by individuals, as they had been before - most famously by Thucydides (4.105.1), presumably as an inheritance from his Thracian ancestors - but the Athenian state took its share of the profits, as from the mines of Laurium at home.

It was in the area of private enrichment, not public, that land played a major role in the Athenian empire. The number of Athenian citizens, usually from the poorer strata, who were given either allotments of confiscated land or, at least in Lesbos after the unsuccessful revolt there in 428, a substantial, uniform (and therefore arbitrary) 'rent', roughly equivalent to a hoplite's pay for a full year, on holdings retained and worked by the islanders, may have totalled 10,000 in the course of the imperial period.[30] The most naked kind of imperial exploitation therefore directly benefited perhaps eight to ten per cent of the Athenian citizen body.[31] Some confiscations were in places from which the defeated population had been totally expelled, but many were in areas in which the local people remained as a recognized community, and there the settler pattern that has dominated so much of the history of later imperialism was evident,[32] though rather in embryo because the settlements were short-lived.

Colonies and cleruchies are not the whole story, though most accounts of the empire rest with them, 'too preoccupied in studying the misdeeds of Athenian imperialism through official institutions and collective decisions' to give due weight to 'the action of individuals who played their part in the general concert'.[33] Individual Athenians, most of them from the upper end of the social and economic spectrum, acquired landed property in subject territories where there were neither colonies nor cleruchies. The evidence is scarce, but one piece is remarkable enough for a closer look. In the surviving fragments of the very detailed record, inscribed on stone, of the sale by public auction of the property confiscated from men convicted of participation

in the double sacrilege of 415 B.C., the profanation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the herms, there are included a few landed estates outside Attica, in Oropus on the Boeotian border, on Euboea and Thasos, and at Abydos on the Hellespont and Ophryneion in the Troad.[34] One group of holdings, dispersed in at least three regions of Euboea, belonged to one man, Oionias. It went for 81⅓ talents,[35] a sum to be compared with the largest (composite) landed holding recorded for Attica itself, that of the banker Pasion at his death in 370/69 B.C., which, we are told, was worth twenty talents (Ps.Dem. 46.13).[36]

It must be emphasized that men like Oionias were not from the classes who were assigned land in colonies and cleruchies, and that the properties sold up following their conviction (or flight) were not within 'cleruchic' blocks.[37] They had acquired their holdings by 'private enterprise', though we have no idea how that was achieved. Throughout the Greek world in this period, land ownership was restricted to citizens, unless a *polis* by a sovereign act granted special permission to a non-citizen, which it appears to have done rarely and then only for notable services to the state. It is wildly improbable that Alcibiades and his friends had each individually been granted this privilege by Oropus, Euboea, Thasos, Abydos and Ophryneion in gratitude for their benefactions. It is equally improbable that only men caught up in the escapades of 415 were in this privileged group. Were it not for the chance find of a batch of fragmentary inscriptions, we should have known nothing about the whole operation beyond four or five off-hand general remarks in the literary sources, yet Oionias, otherwise unknown, turns out to be one of the richest Athenians of any period in its history. Nor, finally, have we any idea of the number of properties abroad held by the men sold up: only some twenty of the known fifty victims have been identified in the surviving epigraphical fragments, and by no means all of their possessions are listed in the texts we have.

As I have already said, we do not know how these acquisitions were brought about. Were they obtained 'legally' or 'illegally'? Only the Athenian answer is clear: the Athenian state accepted the legitimacy of the title and sold the estates as the property of the condemned men. That the Athenian empire was the operative

element seems certain to me: I need not repeat what I have already said about the ambiguity of the concept of 'voluntary action', and we are here concerned with men who had influence and power inside Athens, men to be courted by subjects. It is even more certain that there was great resentment in the empire over this breach of the principle of citizen monopoly of the land, hence the Athenian concession in the decree founding the so-called second Athenian league in 378/7 B.C., that neither the Athenian state nor any of its citizens will be permitted 'to acquire either a house or land in the territories of the allies, whether by purchase or by foreclosure or by any other means whatsoever' (*IG* II^2 43.35-41). No one would have requested and been granted the inclusion of such a blunt prohibition unless there were strong feelings on the subject, which are reflected in the excessive formulation and which can have resulted only from the bitter experience of the 'first Athenian league'.[38]

IV

The moment we turn to the sixth category of my typology, 'other forms of economic exploitation or subordination', we are immediately plunged into the contentious field of Greek 'trade and politics'. On that I have stated and argued my views at length elsewhere.[39] My chief concern at present is with the consequences of Athenian imperial power in assisting individual Athenians to derive direct economic advantage other than through employment in the navy and related industries or through the acquisition of land in subject territories. Indirect gains were inevitable: power always attracts profits, as in the much vaunted plenitude and variety of commodities available in Athens, from which shippers, artisans and peddlers made gains. Many of the latter were not Athenians, however, and Hellenistic Rhodians were in the same advantageous position without the same political power behind them. Nevertheless, that such gains were a by-product of the Athenian empire is indisputable, though the magnitude of the gain cannot be measured and its place, if any, in Athenian policy cannot be deduced simply from its existence. *Handelspolitik* is not a synonym for *Machtpolitik*, no matter how often historians make the slide.

The problem can be stated in this way. Control of the Aegean was for Athens an instrument of power. How was that instrument employed to achieve ends beyond collection of tribute, land settlement, interference in internal political arrangements, suppression of petty wars and the more or less complete elimination of piracy? More precisely, was it in fact employed for any ends other than those I have just listed, and, in particular, for commercial ends?

Given the nature of the ancient economy, two of the most important and most profitable forms of modern colonial exploitation were ruled out, namely, cheap labour and cheap raw materials; in more technical language, the employment, by compulsion if necessary, of colonial labour at wages well below the market wage at home, and the acquisition, again by compulsion if necessary, of basic raw materials at prices substantially below the market prices at home. A third form of exploitation, which was available and which loomed so large in republican Rome, seems to have been absent in the Athenian empire. I refer to the lending of money to subject cities and states at high rates of interest, usually in order to provide the latter with the cash required by them for their tax (or tribute) payments to the imperial state. The possibilities of *Handelspolitik* are therefore narrowed to competitive commercial advantages sought by non-economic means, that is to say, by the exercise of power without manipulating prices and wages.

The evidence is notoriously slight, almost to the point of non-existence. In the second chapter of the *Constitution of the Athenians*, Pseudo-Xenophon hammers the point, repeated in blunt words in the next century by Isocrates (8.36), that imperial Athens 'did not permit others to sail the sea unless they were willing to pay the tribute'. These two writers are so notoriously tendentious that any of their generalizations is suspect, but not *ipso facto* false. Not so easily dismissed is the provision in the Athenian decree of 426 B.C. allowing Methone on the Thermaic Gulf to import a fixed amount (lost) of grain annually from Byzantium, upon registering with Athenian officials there called *Hellespontophylakes* (Hellespont Commissioners). Similar permission was given in the same period to Aphytis (near Potidaea). Only two texts, but they go some way towards documenting Pseudo-Xenophon and Isocrates. The inscriptions do not say that Methone and Aphytis could not

sail the sea without paying tribute; they say both less and more: both cities were guaranteed the right to 'sail freely' but neither could purchase Black Sea grain without Athenian permission.[40]

The presence of the *Hellespontophylakes* implies that all other cities were, or could be, similarly controlled. Whether or not the *Hellespontophylakes* represented 'a system of strict organisation'[41] cannot be determined but they deserve more attention than they customarily receive. Potentially, with the backing of the Athenian navy, they could deny any and every Greek city access to the Black Sea, and therefore access to the main seaborne route not only for grain, but also for slaves, hides and other important products. When were they installed? The temptation to label them a 'wartime measure' must be resisted. Not only does it introduce the argument from silence, about which I have already said enough, but it ignores the fact that very few years since 478 were not 'wartime' years.[42]

I do not suggest that the *Hellespontophylakes* were introduced early in the history of the empire. They were, after all, only the capstone of the structure, an organization designed to bring about a closed sea. What I do suggest is that such an aim was the automatic consequence of naval power, within the Greek *polis* system, and that steps in that direction would have been taken by the Athenians when and as they were able, and found it advantageous, to do so.[43] Short of going to war, there was no more useful instrument for punishing enemies, rewarding friends, and persuading 'neutrals' to become 'friends'.[44] And if employment of the instrument meant going to war, *tant pis*. The revolt of Thasos, Thucydides writes (1.100.2), arose from a quarrel 'about the *emporia* on the Thracian coast and about the mines the Thasians exploited'. That was as early as 465 B.C., and, though we do not know the issue dividing Athens and Thasos over the *emporia*, it can scarcely be unrelated to the 'closed sea' ambitions of the imperial state, which then simply took over the *emporia* after Thasos was defeated. Of course Athens did not yet have the ability to close the sea which she was to have later, but it is surely wrong to say that the aim itself was *unthinkable* in the 60s and 50s.[45] That is to commit the hegemony-into-empire error once again.

The question, in sum, is not when or whether the 'closed sea' was thinkable but when and how Athens was able to close the sea to suit herself. And why. As we shall see in a moment, Athenian purposes did not require total control, even if that were within their reach. The Corinthian warning, in 432, that inland states would soon learn what maritime states already knew, that Athens was able to prevent them from bringing their produce to the sea and from buying what they required in turn (Thuc. 1.120.2), is meaningful but must be understood correctly in practical terms. So is the 'Megarian decree'. Not even the most monumental special pleading has succeeded in diluting the plain words, repeated three times by Thucydides (1.67.4, 1.139, 1.144.2), that a decree, moved by Pericles in 432, among other provisions excluded the Megarians 'from the harbours of the Athenian empire'. All the elaborate arguments about the impossibility of blockade by triremes and about the ease of 'sanction-busting', founded in fact though they are, are irrelevant.[46] The Athenians claimed the right to exclude the Megarians from all harbours, and they could have enforced that claim *had they wished*. The long story that began with Eion and Skyros was known to every state which had a harbour, and there were Athenian officials (as well as *proxenoi* and other Athenian friends) in every important harbour-town.

That Athens did not wish to *destroy* Megara is patent, and significant. What she wished, and accomplished, was to *hurt* Megara and at the same time to declare openly and forcefully that she was prepared to employ the 'closed sea' ruthlessly as an instrument of power. The coinage decree, whenever one dates it, was precisely the same kind of declaration.[47] Both were expressions of *Machtpolitik* - but not, in the normal sense of that term, of *Handelspolitik*. At this point, we must introduce into the discussion the distinction first formulated clearly in the field of Greek history by Hasebroek, the distinction between 'commercial interests' and 'import interests' (specifically food, shipbuilding materials, metals).[48] Athens could not survive as a great power, or indeed as any kind of large autonomous *polis*, without a regular import on a considerable scale of grain, metals and shipbuilding materials, and she could now guarantee that through her control of the sea. In not a single action, however, did Athens show the slightest

concern for private Athenian profits in this field: there were no Navigation Acts, no preferential treatment for Athenian shippers, importers or manufacturers, no efforts to reduce the large, perhaps preponderant, share of the trade in the hands of non-Athenians.[49] Without such moves, there can be no *Handelspolitik*, no 'monopolization of trade and traffic'.[50] And on this score there was no difference between the landowner Cimon and the tanner Cleon.

Many Greek *poleis*, and especially most larger and ambitious ones, had a comparable need to import. Athens could now block them, partially if not completely, and that was the other use of the 'closed sea' instrument. When the Athenians sent a fleet in 427 B.C. to support Leontini against Syracuse, their real aim, explains Thucydides (3.86.4), 'was to prevent corn from being exported from there to the Peloponnese'. How often and under what circumstances Athens used her fleet in this way in the course of the half-century after 478 cannot be determined from the pitiful evidence. The very existence of her navy normally made an open display of force unnecessary, and there is no reason to think that Athens blockaded other states merely for practice or sadistic amusement. In the absence of genuinely commercial and competitive motives, interference in the sailing and trading activities of other states was restricted to specific situations, as they arose *ad hoc* in the growth of the empire. Only during the Peloponnesian War (or so it seems), which radically altered the scale of operations and the stakes, did it become necessary to make massive use of the 'closed sea' instrument. And even then the volume of traffic in the Aegean was considerable enough for the Athenians in 413 B.C. to abandon the tribute for a five per cent harbour tax (Thuc. 7.28.4) *in an attempt to increase their revenue*.[51]

Obviously a steady flow of food and other materials was a benefit to many Athenians individually. But to include such a gain under the rubric, 'other forms of economic subordination or exploitation', would strain the sense unduly.

V

'Athens' is of course an abstraction. Concretely, who in Athens benefited (or suffered) from the empire, how and to what extent? In what follows, I shall remain within my narrow framework,

restricting 'benefits', 'profits', to their material sense, excluding the 'benefits' (not unimportant) arising from glory, prestige, the sheer pleasure of power. I shall also ignore such side-benefits as the tourist attraction of every great imperial city.

The traditional Greek view is well enough known, as it was 'quantified' by Aristotle (*Const of Ath.* 24.3): the common people of Athens, the poorer classes, were both the driving force behind, and the beneficiaries of, the empire. Their benefits are easily enumerated. At the head of the list is the extensive land confiscated from subjects and distributed in some fashion among Athenians. Perhaps as important is the navy: Athens maintained a standing fleet of 100 triremes, with another 200 in drydock for emergencies. Even 100 required 20,000 men, and, though we do not know how many ships were kept at sea regularly on patrol duty and for practice,[52] or how many ships campaigned for how long through all the fighting of the periods 478-431 and 431-404, there seems little doubt that thousands of Athenians earned their pay for rowing in the fleet through the sailing-season annually, and that tens of thousands (including many non-Athenians) were engaged for longer or shorter periods on campaigns in many years. Add the work in the dockyards alone and the total cash benefit to poorer Athenians was substantial though not measurable; to a large percentage of all the poor, furthermore.

To be sure, Athens maintained a navy before she had an empire, and continued to do so after the loss of the empire, but the later experience demonstrates that, without the imperial income, it was impossible to pay so large a body of crewmen regularly. Similarly with the corn supply: Athens succeeded in maintaining imports in the fourth century, too, but in the fifth century everyone knew how imperial power guaranteed those imports (as it supported the navy), even if not everyone knew the text of the Methone decree or had heard of the *Hellespontophylakes*. And it is always the poor who are most threatened by shortages and famines.

Finally, there was pay for office, on which Aristotle laid his greatest stress in his attempt at quantification. No other Greek state, so far as we know, made it a regular practice to pay for holding public office or distributed the offices so widely.[53] That was a radical innovation in political life, the capstone of

'Periclean' democracy, for which there was no precedent anywhere. Fundamental radical measures require powerful stimuli and unprecedented necessary conditions. I believe that the empire provided both, the necessary cash and the political motivation.[54] 'Those who drive the ships are those who possess the power in the state', wrote Pseudo-Xenophon (1.2), and I have already indicated that this unpleasant writer did not always miss the mark with his gnomic propaganda statements.

What, then, of the more prosperous Athenians in the upper classes, the *kaloi kagathoi*? The paradox, in modern eyes, is that they both paid the bulk of the domestic taxes (in which I include the liturgies) and constituted the armed forces. Yet, as we have already seen, they also supported the imperial advance of Athens, surely not out of idealistic or political interest in the benefits to the lower classes. How did they benefit? Did they? There is total silence in the literary sources on this question, save for a remarkable passage in Thucydides (8.48.5-6).[55] During the manoeuvres leading to the oligarchic coup of 411, Phrynichus spoke against the proposal to recall Alcibiades and replace the democracy. It is false, he said (in Thucydides' summary), to think that the subjects of Athens would welcome an oligarchy, for 'they saw no reason to suppose that they would be any better off under the *kaloi kagathoi*, considering that when the democracy had perpetrated evils it had been under the instigation and guidance of the *kaloi kagathoi*, who were the chief beneficiaries'.

Phrynichus was a slippery character and we are not obliged to believe everything (or anything) he said in a policy debate. However, Thucydides went out of his way, to an unusual degree, to stress the acuity and correctness of Phrynichus' judgements,[56] and that puts a different light on his assertion about upper-class benefits from the empire. It at least suggests something more than glory and power-as-such as the aims of the long line of *kaloi kagathoi* beginning with Cimon who built, defended and fought for the empire. The puzzle is that we are unable to specify how the upper classes could have been the chief beneficiaries. Apart from the acquisition of property in subject territories, I can think of nothing other than negative benefits. That is to say, the imperial income enabled the Athenians to construct splendid public

buildings and to float the largest navy of the day without adding to the taxpayers' financial burdens. How much of a burden the navy could impose became clear in the fourth century. That is something, but it is hardly enough to resolve the puzzle Phrynichus has left us with.

Be that as it may, the conclusion seems to me compelling that the empire directly profited the poorer half of the Athenian population to an extent unknown in the Roman empire, or in modern empires. There was a price, of course, the costs of constant warfare. Men were lost in naval engagements and sometimes in land battles, most shatteringly in the Sicilian disaster. Athenian farmers suffered from periodic Spartan raids in the first stage of the Peloponnesian War, and even more from the permanent Spartan garrison at Decelea in the final decade of the war. The connexion between those evils and the empire was obvious, but what conclusions were drawn? War was endemic: everyone accepted that as fact, and therefore no one seriously argued, or believed, that surrender of the empire would relieve Athens of the miseries of war. It would merely relieve them of certain particular wars, and the loss of empire and its benefits did not seem worth that dubious gain. Athenian morale remained buoyant to the bitter end, reflecting their calculus of the profits and the losses.

VI

No doubt the subject states would have preferred freedom from Athens to subjection, other things being equal. But the desire for freedom is often a weak weapon, and other things are rarely equal in real life. I am referring not merely to the staggering difficulties of staging a successful revolt - Naxos tried and was crushed, Thasos tried and was crushed, later Mytilene tried and was crushed - but to the more complex relationships inherent in all situations of subjection and domination. 'The allies (or subjects)' are as much an abstraction as 'Athens'. Athens had friends in every subject city.[57] In 413, before the final battle at Syracuse, when the position of the Athenian army had become hopeless, the Syracusans offered the allied contingents their freedom and a safe-conduct if they deserted. They refused and accepted the Athenian fate. Two years later, the people of Samos

reaffirmed their loyalty to Athens and remained faithful to the bitter end.

We do not know why the Samians reacted in this way in 411, the Mytileneans in the opposite direction in 428. We lack the necessary information. The history of empire reveals a similarly divergent pattern everywhere: the view from the imperial state is more or less unitary, whereas the view from the receiving end varies from community to community, and within each community from group to group. Among some of Athens' subjects, the common people preferred democracy backed by Athenian power to oligarchy in an autonomous state. That would be one explanation of a particular reaction (though Athens did not always oppose oligarchies). In this connexion, it is worth remembering that we are never told how the tribute was collected *within the tributary state*. If the normal Greek system of taxation prevailed - and there is no reason to believe that it did not - then the tribute for Athens was paid by the rich, not by the common people. That burden would therefore not have caused the latter any concern. In sum, the material costs borne by the subjects were uneven, and by and large their weight and impact elude us.

In Thucydides' account of the debates at Sparta that ended with a declaration of war against Athens, the historian attributes the following words to an Athenian spokesman (1.76.2):

'We have done nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to human practice, in accepting an empire when it was offered to us and then in refusing to give it up. Three very powerful motives prevent us from doing so - honour, fear and self-interest. And we were not the first to act in this way. It has already been a rule that the weak should be subject to the strong; besides, we consider that we are worthy of our power.'

There is no programme of imperialism here, no theory, merely a reassertion of the universal ancient belief in the naturalness of domination. Looking back, the historian is free to make his own moral judgements; he is not free to confuse them with practical judgements. Too much of the modern literature is concerned, even obsessed, with trying to determine whether Athens 'exploited her allies in any extensive way', 'how much exploitation and oppression took place', whether or not '*Ausbeutung*' is an applicable

epithet. Such questions are unanswerable, when they are not meaningless. Athenian imperialism employed all the forms of material exploitation that were available and possible in that society. The choices and the limits were determined by experience and by practical judgements, sometimes by miscalculations.

6: ATHENS IN THE FOURTH CENTURY

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In the fifth century the *arche* stands for the imperialism of Athens in all its strength (and its weaknesses). In the fourth century one might expect the Second Confederacy to perform a like service, of offering the aids (*tekmeria*) through which to interpret the imperialism of this later generation of Athenians. Have they learned something? Have they forgotten anything? In the scope of this essay there would be no point, clearly, in trying to summarize the history of the Confederacy or its institutions, which have been well served by studies in detail whether of the whole or of various parts.[1] It is a matter of focusing on one or two points of interest and of querying one or two orthodoxies, even if there is no hard evidence which refutes them. Especially, can it really be true that the Athenians not only tried but in large part contrived to repeat the 'confederacy-to-empire' *tour de force* for a few years?

The most prevalent opinion seems to be that the Athenians at heart changed little. Of Demos one could say, as of the poor prince in another context, 'He is no better, he is much the same'. Though *arche* had been a thing unknown in the Greek experience before the subjugation of Naxos (*para to kathestekos*), and though it could be seen as at best an impropriety and at the worst a crime, still it had been a crime to be proud of, not ashamed. (So 'Pericles' in 430, so 'the Mantineans' in 418.[2]) In 395, according to the contemporary Xenophon, the Theban ambassadors at Athens, whose mission persuaded the Athenians into alliance and started the Corinthian War, said, 'We all know that you would like to recover the *arche* which you had before' (*HG* 3.5.10). Xenophon was not in Athens at the time, and his report has been discredited as unreliable, and obviously it may well be that, for several reasons; but it is still good evidence of what Xenophon thought the Thebans *could* have said (or should have said?) on this occasion. It tells us that *arche* was still nothing to be ashamed of (if you could get

away with it). The Spartans were getting away with it at that moment, as it happened - having marched out 'to liberate the Greeks' in 431, and again in 414. Seager, in his good study of the Athenians in the 390s, goes forward from Xenophon's proposition here to interpret the Athenian policy from 395 onwards as aimed at a regaining of the *arche*. Indeed he believes that the Athenians thought now of their whole alliance-system of the *arche* as still in existence: when the Aegean allies were liberated by Conon in 394, 'the unfortunate break in Athenian domination was now at an end and could henceforth be disregarded'.[3] True, Conon liberated them for Persia not for Athens, as Seager rightly emphasized (ibid.); but this did not stop the Athenians from basing their policies abroad on an assumption that it had all been done for them. They it was that the Greek world had been waiting for as leaders (again). We hear of no Athenian in these years (as we do see Isocrates and others forty years later) suggesting that times have changed, fashions have changed, the first duty of leaders, now, is to the led (and so on).[4] Thucydides had noted that in 411 the whole political ethos of the Athenians was moulded by 'the habit of ruling others' (8.68.4). This 'habit' produced, too, some assumptions about leadership, and helped to form the attitudes to it of the politicians of the 390s and 380s; see especially (for example) Andocides *On the Peace* and the *Epitaphios* of Lysias.[5]

The Athenians perhaps were ripe to take up the empire again from where they had been forced to drop it. The material attractions of empire were just as seductive now as ever, and the Athenians, though they were only about 30,000 now instead of 50,000 or nearly, were no less liable to be seduced by them. The 'mass of the people and the common soldiers' (*ho polus homilos kai stratiotes* of Thuc. 6.24.3) needed 'pay' no less in the 390s than in 415, and could easily be talked into voting for war as a provider of pay in the short term, and (with luck, and in the longer term) a provider of goodies of several kinds (booty, and new colonies, the most obvious) as well as all the benefits to all kinds of people that were liable to accrue from an active foreign policy and a vigorous use of naval power.[6] For a start, there were the places overseas which in the course of a misspent youth (of naval hegemony and rule) Athens had actually annexed and came to count as

her own territory. Nobody (in the 390s) wanted to start saying anything that could be seen as speaking out of turn, this is self-evident. But there could be no harm in stating or restating an Athenian claim to any of these places which no longer had any of their original inhabitants left in them. The Athenians, relatively weak though they still were, did state their claim to Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros; and by the Peace of Antalcidas their claim was recognized by the King of Persia and by the Greeks in general.[7]

The mentality of *arche* does not appear in the actual terms of their alliances at this time of course. As it happens, no alliance-treaty survives from the years of the Athenian revival 394-387. Before Cnidus, with Athens still 'unfortified', with the fleet still a ghost of the past, with the hoplites still bleeding from the terrible encounter with the Spartans near Nemea (Xen. *HG* 4.21.19ff.), in the treaties of 395 (with Thebes and with the Locrians) and in that of July 394 with Eretria of the old allies, one would not expect butter to melt in anybody's mouth - and it does not.[8] And the same again after the King's Peace in 386, for obvious reasons (below). But after Cnidus (and before the King's Peace), it is not even clear how many new alliances Athens did make with old allies, though no one will doubt that she made some. Seager, whose extreme position on the Athenian view of their old allies I mentioned above, is equally extreme in his view of the Athenian revival of the 390s as including a revival of the *arche*.[9] Yet at a certain level of interpretation, I can see no ground for disagreeing with him. Though the evidence is very defective, some of the symptoms of *arche* as we learned to recognize them in the fifth century (the taxation of allies to meet the costs of war, the occasional introduction of a garrison, the occasional appointment of Athenians as 'archons in the cities'), do appear in these years, just enough to leave us unhappy if we try to explain everything away in terms of 'military necessity'. Significant, too, at this same level of interpretation, is the appearance occasionally in the language of the Athenian decrees of one or other of those cliché clauses that do betray what may be called an *arche*-mentality. 'If any man kills Archippus ... etc., he shall be an exile from the city of the Athenians and from the other cities that are allies of

the Athenians ...' (*IG* II^2 24(b).3ff.). The proposer or drafter of this Athenian decree concerned with Thasos in 389 or soon after was doing his best to remember his manners; but his best was still not good enough. He knew better than to say 'from the other cities whom the Athenians *rule*', as they used to say in the bad old days of the fifth century (*IG* I^2 56.13ff.). But he still did not know any better than to take it for granted, simply, that the Athenian jurisdiction extended beyond the frontiers of Athenian territory and into the territory of all the allies of Athens. Or again, 'And if the Eteocarpathians need anything, the Coans and the Cnidians and the Rhodians and any of the allies that are able in that vicinity, are to do them any service in their power.'[10] Not only Ctesias who drafted this, but also the citizens who voted for it and made it 'law', had been indeed for more than half a century (as Thucydides had put it) 'in the habit of ruling others'. Likewise (or not so very differently), 'Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Requests and Requires in the name of her Majesty all those whom it may concern to allow the bearer to pass freely without let or hindrance, and to afford the bearer such assistance and protection as may be necessary.'

I mention this Secretary of State, and his pretensions expressed on the passport of British subjects, as a reminder that we probably do need to be careful about the level on which we interpret our bits of evidence about Athens at this time. Since 1945 or not long after, no British Secretary of State has been in a position to 'require' anything of any foreign government, not even that it should do what it has undertaken to do by treaty. Since the Suez fiasco of 1956, there is no excuse for anybody, anywhere, taking the Secretary's 'require' seriously, and so far as one knows nobody ever has. The Athenians, too, of the 390s had no excuse for being deluded by a too-grand word or phrase. Aegina stared them in the face across the Gulf, 'the eyesore of the Piraeus': it was in the hands of the enemy, the base from which he squeezed Athenian seaborne trade.[11] While this was so (and it was always going to be so unless Athens could re-create the resources which had overpowered Aegina before), no Athenian citizen could conceivably think that he was starting up an Empire again when he made a few alliances with this city or that in the Aegean,

whatever nonsense borrowed from the vocabulary of *arche* the windbag politician might have written in to his *psephisma* about it. And not only the Athenians; 'the Greeks' too knew the difference between Athens then and Athens now. We need to remind ourselves of this perhaps, when we notice, fascinated, the former victims of Athens re-entering into association with her. They will not have seen Demos or his advisers as reformed characters now. But they will have seen him as very much the worse for wear, and not in the least capable of great crimes, however evil his hopes or intentions.

Even the old symptoms, then, if we detect them, are not telling us necessarily of the old disease. When we read of the Athenians in 389 levying money for the war from their allies, ten per cent at the Bosporus, five per cent on seaborne cargoes,[12] when we hear of a garrison, or even of an Athenian archon, in an allied city, it is not enough to recognize these Greek nouns and instantly congratulate ourselves on recognizing how quickly the Athenians were back in business again. It is wiser to try to see the context in these years as the Athenians themselves and 'the Greeks' could see it; that is, to see Athens strong again as compared with her years of impotence (403-394), but still impotent compared with her years of strength. No Greeks in the 390s or 380s were put in a panic by the name *eikoste* (five per cent), any more than mid-nineteenth-century Europeans were panicked by the name Napoleon Bonaparte popping up again as Emperor of the French. In the early 380s cities freed recently from Sparta were at war with Sparta now, as was Athens. Those of them who turned again to Athens for alliance knew that this war would cost good money, like any other naval war, and they knew that Athens, financially and fiscally the merest ghost of her Periclean self, had no chance whatever of paying for it alone, and that the Persian money had dried up for the time being. All allies would have to pay something; the *eikoste* need have come neither as surprise nor grievance to anybody.

As to garrisons in cities, still more to Athenian archons in cities, though the past Athenian record is an invitation to interpret any new instances strictly, the context of each case is still important. For garrisons, the exigencies of war do provide a 'blanket' cover in all the years before 386, for what that is worth; but as it happens the only two Athenian garrisons that we

hear of before 386 prove to have almost impeccable credentials. The one is a garrison (for Clazomenae) discussed at Athens in the Assembly, which decided against it (below, p.133). This garrison, then, never happened. The other is a garrison on Carpathus which we know of only from the record of the Athenian decision to withdraw it (its installation at some time in the years 394-390 was pretty well justified by exigencies of war, it may be thought).[13] Much more equivocal is the instance at Thasos, the only one known in these pre-386 years, of an Athenian archon appointed to an allied city. The decree which includes this appointment is the one quoted above (p.129) for its use of a phrase betraying '*arche*-mentality' in its proposer. Presumably 'an archon to Thasos' *was* 'appointed right now' (*autika mala*) (*IG* II^2 24(b).12ff.); and by any standards this must be counted a serious matter. Juridically speaking, 'an archon to Thasos' is indefensible, incompatible with Thasian sovereignty and autonomy. Pragmatically speaking, the functions and character of Athenian 'archons in the cities' will have varied greatly from place to place, from case to case. At worst, an Athenian archon in a punitive context can have been an autocrat like a Spartan harmost. At best, he may have been more like an agent or a consul (in the modern sense) than like a governor; and especially (depending on personalities) his presence in a city may have been a positive advantage to it on occasions when an Athenian general stormed in, needing money desperately to pay his crews.[14] Above all, the general context is vital for interpreting what the appointment of an archon really meant. Juridically indefensible at any time, and genuinely a sign of subjection (*douleia*) when Pericles proposed it, was it still a sign of *douleia* if a Thrasybulus or an Agyrrhius proposed it in the dicey 390s or 380s, when it was manifest to all that Athens was no more capable of 'enslaving' Thasos than she was capable of facing Spartan hoplites and making them run, or of manning 200 triremes and paying their crews? I doubt it. I can see the Thasians irritated by this appointment, but I do not see them shaking in their shoes. It was ham-fisted perhaps, but to call it tyrannical might be to dignify it unduly.

By contrast at Clazomenae (where, again, the question of an archon was raised) the Athenians will have been seen in 387 as

veritable models of correct deportment. 'Concerning an archon and a garrison the [Athenian] *demos* is to decide by vote at this meeting whether to put them in at Clazomenae, or whether the *demos* of Clazomenae is to be free to decide whether it is willing to receive them or not.' And concluding the same long record, 'The *demos* voted that they pay no additional taxation [beyond the five per cent tax mentioned earlier], that they receive no garrison and no archon, and they are to be free just like the Athenians.' The worst that can be said against this exemplary decision is that in an ideal world such decisions ought to be unnecessary, their purport taken for granted.[15] But let there be no mistake about the sensitive nature of Clazomenae's place in the scheme of things, an offshore island of Asia and right in the front line of current operations of war. And when a few months after this the King's Peace is made, it is in the front line of that too. 'King Artaxerxes considers it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, and of the islands Clazomenae and Cyprus; the remainder ...' (Xen. *HG* 5.1.31). Certainly there were several good reasons why the Athenian *demos* should watch its next step where Clazomenae was concerned.

As to all this, the King's Peace itself came as an excellent rule of thumb, no doubt. The decree of Aristoteles reinforced it. From this time forth *arche* is outlawed, in general by the keywords 'free and autonomous', in particular by the prohibiting of its more obvious symptoms; tribute (*phoros*), garrisons, governors (*archontes*). Sparta had accepted the rule of thumb, conveyed as it was from the King by their own Antalcidas; but the Spartans did not immediately choose to comprehend all its implications, or they were able to give a passable imitation of people who had not yet comprehended it all (so the antics of Phoebidas and Sphodrias seem to be saying, and their condoning by the Spartan 'establishment' does nothing to contradict them (Xen. *HG* 5.2.25-35, 5.4.20-33, etc.)). This gave the opportunity to Athens, 'in order that the Lacedaemonians may allow the Greeks, free and autonomous, to live at peace and in full and secure possession of their own territory' (Tod 123.9-12), to advertise their own new alliance system now (378-377); no *arche*, this, but a genuine and respectable hegemony, in which each ally shall be 'free and autonomous, under the form of government of its own choice, admitting no garrison, accepting no *archon*, paying no

phoros, but on the same terms as Chios and Thebes and the other allies' (Tod 123.19-25).[16] The rules were all here, written in; and in addition there was that very popular rule forbidding Athenians to own land or property in the territory of allied states (Tod. 123.25-31, 35-46). In this way a repetition of the fifth-century cleruchies was ruled out. At the moment of its foundation the new confederacy offered both to Athens and to the Aegean cities the thing that they most wanted and needed and at a reasonable cost, security against Sparta. Was it reasonable to think that, taking a much longer view too, these people could reckon that their best hopes for the future lay in holding together?

The answer to this question seems clearly 'Yes', they did reckon this. Alliances of this nature, in which a group of allies gathered round a *hegemon*, had always started from a tacit assumption (if no more) of permanence, if only because the *hegemon* assumed it if nobody else did.[17] But it is interesting to see that still in 384, when cities forming alliances needed very much to mind their Ps and Qs (because of the King's Peace with all its implications), Athens and Chios write in to their alliance the clause 'and the alliance is to be for all time'.[18] Surprising that these allies, who are being so careful about the terms of their alliance,[19] do not see *this* as one of the things that they need to be careful about? Perhaps because this was an alliance between two individuals, of equal status, and not a corporate arrangement or part of one? Between individuals of equal status, 'for all time' meant 'for the foreseeable future and so long as the general background of things remains as it is'? Men of sense in Athens, and in Chios, would always know this? Yes indeed (let us say). But this same clause in the treaty's solemn undertaking did become built in to the corporate agreement of the Second Confederacy in a few years' time ('free and autonomous ... and on the same terms as the Chians and Thebans and the other allies', Tod 123.23-5). The states that joined joined 'for ever', as the surviving alliance document of Corcyra confirms (headed 'Alliance of the Corcyraeans and the Athenians for all time', Tod 127.1-2). How solemn was this, we wonder? There was room for disagreement, obviously, or for interpretation at different levels.

Meanwhile, however, the Confederacy seems well designed to

give Athens a hegemony while denying her an *arche*. Especially, the Council of allies (*sunhedrion*) underlined the difference between the two things. The 'allies' under the *arche* had had no voice or vote in the taking of decisions. But there is no reason to think that this *sunhedrion* now was a mere formality or a rubber stamp.[20] Its existence is not an absolute insurance against *douleia*, but it must have been quite a strong deterrent, in the sense that the Athenians could be sure that nothing that happened now would go unremarked. Every move in the busy relationships of *hegemon* with each of the allies, each difference of opinion on policy, every quarrel about money, could now (and this means would, now) achieve a publicity loud and clear in the Council's debates. It is this that helps to make academic, largely, some of the questions that are the natural questions for us now (as for the principals then, in the earliest days of the alliance). The taxation, for instance, that raised the money which year after year needed to be raised while war went on. It was called, we see, *suntaxis* now, and we remember that the well-hated *phoros* had been banned by the treaty.[21] Was this, then, just a cynical joke (as Theopompus seems to imply), or a bureaucratic reluctance to call a spade a spade? Ignorant as we are of most of the details of *suntaxis*, it still seems clear that the rate of this taxation was not very high (comparable to the fifth-century rate under Pericles, probably, rather than under Cleon), and that there was no prospect whatever of the Athenians being able to use it to build up a reserve fund.[22] On the contrary, their war finances were always hand to mouth at this time.[23] The *phoros* of the fifth-century *arche*, a novelty then and in some ways a sort of miracle, had been prize-money on a scale quite unrepeatable now. Athens was not in it now for the money: the money was chickenfeed compared with the great days of old.

This Confederacy of seventy or more states in the twenty years of its period of success (377-357) cannot truly be said to have become an Athenian *arche* in the same sense as the Delian Confederacy a century before. The well-known symbols of 'subjection' (*douleia*), the garrisons in cities, the Athenian 'governors' (*archontes*, *epimeletai*), do appear, but the number of instances known is very small compared with the fifth-century record, and most of them seem well justified by a state of war and emergency at the time.[24] Only at

Ceos, and perhaps at Naxos, can we see an interference with the city's autonomy which looks sinister.[25] Ceos, we see, had tried to secede from the alliance.[26] Secession was not allowed, any more than it was allowed to Megara by Sparta in 460. No *hegemon* was going to allow it unless obliged, for the obvious reasons.[27] On the other hand member-states of the Confederacy (or at least important ones) were allowed to 'answer back' now and to complain in public. This seems a necessary inference from the inscription which preserves part of an Athenian reply (proposed by Callistratus) to messages from Mytilene, in which Athenian policy *vis-à-vis* Sparta evidently had been criticized.[28] This in 369-368 B.C., when Sparta, so recently the aggressor against whom this confederacy for mutual protection had been formed, became now an ally in great need of care and protection itself. The allies of a *hegemon* always might expect to find themselves fighting in quarrels which meant much more to the *hegemon* than to them; and in this instance neither the Mytilenaeans nor any single one of the allies was shocked by the Theban victory at Leuctra in the way that the Athenians had been shocked by it, or shared the Athenian determination not to let Sparta go under, or the Boeotians go top.[29]

This was one factor making for trouble between *hegemon* and allies, the wider interests and involvements of the *hegemon*, forever acting or reacting to developments in central Greece or in the Peloponnese for which most of the allies cared not at all. Another factor (which is really an extension of the first) was an Athenian practice of making separate alliances on the side, with states or potentates who became allies without becoming members of the Confederacy. Such were (almost certainly) Amyntas III of Macedonia perhaps as early as 375, Jason of Pherae by 373, Dionysius I of Syracuse in 367, to say nothing of a number of kings in Thrace, Paeonia and Illyria, and presently Philip of Macedon himself.[30] The more important the potentate, obviously, the more unthinkable that he would have accepted Athenian hegemony by joining the confederacy; but even with the less important kings of the north, there were reasons of instability and incompatibility that made them inappropriate as members while still acceptable as allies. These alliances could still be of use and benefit

to the Confederacy as a whole, and probably there is no need to see anything sinister in them, or objectionable.

More questionable however was the making of separate alliances with individual *cities*, especially when it is recalled that so far as we know no new members at all were ever admitted to the Confederacy after 371 (though the Euboean cities were readmitted when they reverted from the Boeotian alliance to the Athenian in 357).[31] These new acquisitions of Athens in the 360s included the northern cities Methone, Pydna and Potidaea, besides Samos, the Thracian Chersonese except Cardia; and after the Peace of 362 they formed alliances with Arcadians, Achaeans, Elis and Phleious, and with the Thessalian League. The last two need not delay us, for the Athenian motives here represent most obviously an insurance against the Boeotians and their allies and against Alexander of Pherae, while the Peloponnesians and the Thessalians on their side had no need at all to accept Athenian hegemony by joining the Confederacy. In each case they became the allies 'of the Athenians and their allies';[32] and they were capable of looking after themselves, if Athens had had designs on them of some improper kind. Vigilant critics have sought reasons, and rightly, for what seems to be a 'closing of the list' by Athens (the list of the decree of Aristoteles, where every one of the fifty-three or so member-allies whose names survive belongs to the very first few years after 378).[33] But these two instances of the Peloponnesians and the Thessalians are not the ones that are to show us Athens behaving like an imperial power. Rather the reverse: if these people would not join as members anyway - and nothing would make them: why should they? - the form of the two treaties as they stand is a sign of 'correctness' on the part of the *hegemon* acting in consultation and cooperation with 'the allies'.

It is the single cities which associate with Athens but without becoming members, that rouse our suspicions (aided as we are by hindsight). Something does seem to be going on, we see; and it may be by design. The decree of Aristoteles, by its clause prohibiting land ownership by Athenian citizens in the territory of any member-state of the Confederacy (p.134 above), purported to rule out this the most attractive and worth-while of all the material rewards of empire, colonization on land belonging to somebody else. So far as

we know, the Athenians honoured this undertaking scrupulously, at least till after the great war of secession that ended in 355. Before that date we know of no cleruchy, or colonization in any form, on the territory of allies who were members of the Confederacy. Our information admittedly is not fully complete: only fifty-three or so names survive on the 'Aristoteles' stone out of the seventy or more members (D.S. 15.30.2, Aeschin. 2.70). And the very earliest (fourth-century) Athenian cleruchy that we learn of, belonging almost certainly to the year 370-69, was bound for a destination unknown to us.[34] But all the identifiable Athenian cleruchs went to places which became associated with Athens after 371, and most probably without their ever becoming Confederacy members. This was the generation in which Athens in most years had about two-and-a-half quite good generals simultaneously. In the 360s especially were some notable successes. In 365 Timotheus took possession of the island of Samos after a blockade and siege. A year or two later, in the north, Methone and Pydna and Potidaea came over to Athens. In 353 Chares had recovered Sestos, whence followed a reoccupation of the Chersonese. We see cleruchies go out presently to Samos, Potidaea, and the Chersonese. Samos and Potidaea certainly were not members of the Confederacy: the Chersonese cities may have been, but it seems far from certain.[35]

If there was room now for more spacious moves in foreign policy, here or there, might it be a pity, perhaps, to deny oneself something interesting merely because the terms of the decree of Aristoteles ruled it out?[36] Unfortunately only once (so far as I know) are we favoured with a contemporary expression of opinion on just this question, of admitting a new ally to the Confederacy, or not admitting him, when the alliance is made. Aeschines in retrospect was indignant (or professed to be) because Demosthenes had connived with Callias of Chalcis that Chalcis and other Euboean cities should become allies without joining the Confederacy (in 341). As he put it, 'they quietly relieved you of the *suntaxis* of Oreus and of Eretria, the ten talents'; 'he proposed a motion that you elect ambassadors to go to Eretria and beg them ... to pay their *suntaxis* no longer to you, the five talents, but to Callias'; 'his motion that the ambassadors require the people of Oreus, too, to pay their five

talents not to you but to Callias' (Aeschin. 3.94 and 100; cf. 91 and 93). Naturally Aeschines makes much of the loss to Athens of the *suntaxis* of cities which were allowed here to be allies without rejoining the Confederacy - thanks to Demosthenes! We would not expect him to make much of any prospects of cleruchies in Euboea which these arrangements might have opened up. But in truth of course there were no prospects of cleruchies in Euboea here and now. The Euboeans now were forming their own Euboean Confederacy with Chalcis its *hegemon*, and were just as capable of looking after themselves as the Peloponnesians in 362 and the Thessalians in 361-360 (above p.137).[37]

But with the isolated cities of the north and the small cities of the Chersonese things could be different. If they became allies without the safeguards of the decree of Aristoteles, they could be thought to offer some temptation, perhaps, to the Athenians. Their *suntaxis* payments individually were modest enough, and could not compare as an attraction with a colonial prospect. To provide permanently for some hundreds, perhaps thousands, of poor citizens as cleruchs was unquestionably the most substantial and direct economic gain that the Athenian state could possibly hope for at this date. If it could be done, it was emphatically worth doing, unless the moral or political consequences of doing it were going to be disastrous.

Most intriguing in this context is the case of Samos. Samos was not a small, weak island or one geographically in Athens' pocket (like Andros or Ceos). But in the long siege which won Samos the Athenians were overcoming virtually a Persian or pro-Persian garrison and a government of oligarchs (a tyrant and his circle); they were not fighting the Samian *demos* (Isoc. 15.111; Dem. 15.9f.). Nor had they any business to fight the Samian *demos* of course, now or ever, if they remembered their love affair of 405, and its renewal in 403. No other allies (except the Plataean remnant) had ever been honoured and cherished like the Samian *demos* in 405, granted the Athenian citizenship *en masse* (at the one moment in the history of Athens when to possess it was a real and deadly danger to all possessors).[38] In 403 the grant was confirmed (and when the danger was over); but with no discernible effect on the political behaviour or standing of

Samos in the years after.[39] When both cities free themselves from Sparta (in 395 and 394 respectively) they do not come together, and so far as can be seen the Athenian gesture was as abortive in reality as Churchill's corresponding gesture to the French in 1940.

Presumably there can be no question, then, (attractive though the notion might be) that the Athenian annexation of Samos in or after 365, and the sending of Athenian cleruchs, was no more than a marriage of true minds and a fusion by consent of good democrats with good democrats, fused as they were already in law, by the decrees of 405 and 403. The union was a more earthy affair, we may be sure, though there is no need to doubt that the Samian *demos* may perhaps have welcomed an Athenian 'presence' now which got their own upper class off their backs. The lands for the cleruchs will have been found from the estates of these newly-exiled and unpopular Samians. All good democrats, Samians, Athenians, and Athenian cleruchs at Samos, shared a common interest in continuing always to make absolutely sure that not one of those exiles ever came back.

This is how it could be in 365 at least, and while the honeymoon was still on. But as is well known, this is a sad and a cautionary tale which even ended by 'winning out into mythology' (the *muthos* of an Aesop rather than a Herodotus). It was Samos, alas, that made of 'the Attic neighbour' the Greek counterpart to our 'cuckoo in the nest'.[40] The details of the colonization are still not wholly established, but the first cleruchy certainly was sent there in 365/364.[41] There may have been a second in 361-360 (Aeschin. 1.53 and Schol.). But it was the sending of 2,000 cleruchs in 352/1, evidently, that really made Samos an Athenian possession, and reduced 'the Samians' to exiles.[42] Whether or no we believe the writer (Heraclides) who wrote 'They expelled them all', it is clear enough that in the end most of the Samians did find themselves exiles, whether they had quitted Samos by compulsion or by their own choice. The rich and desirable island ended firmly in Athenian hands, with some thousands of former Athenian thetes now comfortably settled as farmers there. This was really the biggest imperialist coup since the colonizing on Lesbos by the cleruchs sent there after the revolt of Mytilene (Thuc. 3.50.2).

The opening up of this policy in Samos in 365 was followed

quickly, we have noticed, by a second enterprise of the same kind in the north, at Potidaea. It will have been a smaller affair than Samos, no doubt; but it still looks as if 'the cleruchs of Potidaea' of the Athenian decree of 361 may be a second batch, sent now by request of a first batch already there.[43] These are the years, too, when Athenian generals repeatedly tried to get possession of Amphipolis, that genuine *apoikia* of the fifth century, offering full scope for the sending of new colonists, in this place quite outside the safeguards of the decree of Aristoteles. An adventurous foreign policy, in the north especially, but at Samos too by a piece of opportunism, could bring this of solid advantage to the *demos* of Athens. The same adventurousness and its results could have effects, perhaps, and repercussions on the allies of Athens deeper than is at once obvious.

It has never been easy to explain just why the war of secession broke out in 357. When full weight has been given to the occasional breaches of the decree of Aristoteles by Athens that we know of, and to the occasional exuberances of Athenian foreign policy to the advantage of Athens alone, it still seems clear that in 360 there is no *arche*, no general *douleia*, in the sense that there had been in 440; unless it is *douleia* to be unable to make a free choice about seceding. This last is a very important matter, obviously, and we see, still in the 360s, Byzantium and Ceos and others being treated as enemies when they tried to secede - and of course again in 357 when Chios, Rhodes and others tried and were successful. What made them try this time? Not just as a matter of principle, one supposes (however unreasonable, frustrating, maddening, to be forbidden). There was no tyranny or terror. The *sunhedrion* still met and voted on what to do with this year's *suntaxis*.[44] But is it fanciful to think that this story of Samos, the story that was 'winning out into mythology' before their eyes, might have been very influential?[45] True, it was not till 352, or after, that the cuckoo finally cleared the nest. But for the large, prosperous island-allies like Chios and Rhodes the whole tale of Samos may have been seen as cautionary, not just the end of it; the tale of how this large, prosperous island could be besieged and won, its Persians and pro-Persians sent packing, its good democrats jollied along by Athenian

democrats, and then the cleruchs arriving. However many or few the cleruchs of the first wave, or first two waves (above, p.140), they were, really and truly, that number too many; for no state or people needs help from outside in making the best use (its own) of its own territory. Samos had got into this mess by keeping bad company, in a way that invited a 'liberation'. It is not surprising if Chios and Rhodes now saw Mausolus of Caria as (in this context) exceedingly good company, a man of real substance where the meddler at Samos had been no more than a man of straw.

In 357, then, it could be a good time to have it out with Athens. And then the second big surprise about this war of secession: it was really such a very small war when it came to it, and when all was said and done. After only two summers and battles only mildly disastrous by the standards of Athenian fifth-century disasters, Athens was financially crippled, we are told; and quite certainly she has lost the will to fight. In 355 peace is made. Those allies who want to secede, may secede now, and do. (Samos, however, has come to no harm in the war, and still awaits its final wave of cleruchs.) This is the peace and the policy (we presume) of Eubulus, extricating Athens from the danger of a long and unproductive struggle.[46] It was a waste of time and money to carry on a war to stop unwilling allies from seceding; even when they were willing, their *suntaxis* was not really a paying proposition. Moreover if the war went on long enough, somebody might liberate Samos again, this time from Athens; and Samos was a paying proposition.

Presumably there were some hard-headed notions of this sort behind the Athenian change of attitude in 355 towards their allies and their foreign policy in general, as well as the larger, warmer notions which Demosthenes was to complain of a year or two later, and which we see from time to time in the writings of Isocrates.[47] Ten years later (341 B.C.) Demosthenes could tell the Athenians (keeping a straight face), 'You are not well designed by nature to be imperialists: your talents lie in defending victims of imperialism and thwarting the aggressor' (Dem. 8.42). And (mellowing?), 'No leader of the Greeks was ever yet allowed to please himself entirely' (9.23ff.). But Demosthenes need never have feared that the *demos* was becoming altogether soft,

and 'wet'. It was not thus that the Samians found them in 352, when the 2,000 cleruchs were sent, and 'they expelled them all'. What provoked this drastic performance we do not know. Nor do we know the provocation at Sestos in the previous year to which the Athenians replied with their most disgusting atrocity since Melos: 'Chares the general of the Athenians sailed to the Hellespont where he captured the city of Sestos: the men of military age he slaughtered, the rest of the population he sold as slaves' (D.S. 16.34.3). This single sentence represents the sum of our knowledge about Sestos at this time. What can the Athenians have thought they were doing? What can the world have thought of it? Naturally this savage act did not inhibit Demosthenes presently from complaining often of Philip of Macedon for his treatment of the Olynthians and others. But more surprisingly (and more depressingly) it did not stop other Greeks from associating just as freely with Athens as though it had never happened. Mytilene had no need to remain an ally of Athens when Chios and the rest had made their point and seceded. Euboea had no need to turn to Athens again, instead of to Boeotia again, in 341. And a few months later 'the Greeks' in general had no need to listen to Demosthenes when he told them to follow Athens' lead in a war to defend freedom against Philip. In spite of Sestos, and Samos, the Greeks were not all of a tremble now about what Athens would do to them next (and rightly not). Even the odious Speusippus, who was happy to back Philip's claim to Amphipolis against that of Athens and to tell the world that Philip could not have attacked Olynthus (Olynthus must have attacked Philip) - even Speusippus never thought of calling on Philip to liberate Greece from the horrors of Athenian new imperialism.[48]

It is no accident, I suppose, that the Greeks had no word for imperialism; no word, that is, corresponding to our word, developed out of 'empire', and echoing 'empire' easily, if eerily, through many an empty mind. It is no help, probably, to fancy that we see bits and pieces of fifth-century *arche* in the nursery-tea atmosphere of the Second Confederacy. *Polypragmosyne* for the Greeks contained most of the efficient and disagreeable characteristics that imperialists are made of. Isocrates sagely reminded the Athenians once (in 355) that behaving themselves

('peace', as he called it) actually paid better than *polypragmosyne*, justice than injustice, looking after their own possessions than wanting other people's (8.26). It may well be true to say that the Athenians still were just as beastly to people as they knew how, whenever they found themselves able; but their capacity for doing harm was so much less now. They were nowhere near capable, any more, of 'enslaving' everybody. They were lucky, now, if they could enslave anybody; and (paradoxically) when they can, it is not a sign that they have become all powerful, but a sign that they are less powerful than they were; this in spite of the great navy of the 350s and later.[49] To build and maintain this fleet served some purposes, material and moral. But its utility in the foreign field was limited by the Athenian will or capacity to pay for it on active service - as appeared in 355.

They could ill-treat Sestos, Samos, because no one feared Athens much now, and no one (alas) cared for the Sestians or the Samians enough, or for freedom enough, to start a row about them. Oddly enough, it fell to Philip, arch-equivocator with Greek freedom, to liberate Sestos and Samos in 338 if he chose. Characteristically he liberated the one but not the other. Athenian imperialists (and Greek) had met their master.

7: THE ANTIGONIDS AND THE GREEK STATES, 276-196 B.C.

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Wars of liberation were well known in the ancient world. They go back at least to the time at the beginning of the sixth century when Cleisthenes of Sicyon undertook the First Sacred War to 'free' Delphi from the control of Cirrha.[1] When states freed by such conflicts are called *eleutheroi* or *autonomoi* it is clear enough that these words by no means denote what we would mean by freedom or independence. In concluding the Peace of Nicias in 421 Athens and Sparta found no difficulty in agreeing that certain states φερούσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου αὐτονόμους εἶναι (Thuc. 5.18.5). There is no doubt, too, that the freedom granted to the Greek states of Asia Minor by Alexander was beset by a number of conditions and that these cities were subject to a considerable degree of interference from Alexander's officials.[2]

During the period of the Diadochi the 'freedom of the Greeks' was simply a slogan in the wars of propaganda conducted by the contenders for power. In 319 Polyperchon aimed to gain the support of the Greeks of the mainland against his rival Cassander by declaring them free,[3] and in 315 Antigonus Monophthalmus proclaimed that all Greeks, that is, both those on the mainland and those in Asia, were to be *eleutherous*, *aphrouretous*, *autonomous*.[4]

Once Antigonus had made this move, his opponents had little choice but to follow his lead and the freedom of the Greeks was one of the provisions of the peace concluded between Antigonus and his adversaries in 311 (Diod. 19.105.1), though it appears from a letter of Antigonus to the city of Scepsis that even then certain restrictions on Greek freedom were explicitly mentioned in the agreement.[5] A year later Ptolemy Soter was accusing Antigonus of maintaining garrisons in Greek states in violation of the terms of the peace of 311 (Diod. 20.19.3). It is obvious enough that the freedom of the Greek states was, as it had been under Alexander, something limited, something very much at the disposal of the person granting it, and that the prime motive behind the policy of the

Diadochi in this respect was to gain support for their respective causes. If at any moment such freedom, or any element of it, seemed to be against the interests of the dynast concerned, it was naturally those interests that came first. Rhodes, for instance, was not allowed to be free to continue its commercial relationships as it had in the past because such freedom endangered Antigonus' interests.[6] Another clear indication of the degree of sincerity in the successors' defence of Greek freedom is the fact that while it was the policy of Antigonus to establish democratic regimes in Greek states, in the years after the battle of Ipsus his son Demetrius Poliorcetes installed a harmost in Boeotia, and, though he had 'freed' Athens, in alliance with Athenian democrats, from the tyranny of Lachares, he proceeded to abolish two of the cornerstones of the democratic constitution - election of archons by sortition and prohibition of iteration of the archonship - and, a little later, restored the oligarchs whom he himself had exiled in 307.[7] The reason that Antigonus had chosen to support democracies was not, of course, that he had any particular attachment to that form of government, but simply that Cassander was following the usual Macedonian tradition of support for oligarchies. With Cassander dead Demetrius could revert to a more normal pattern.

Demetrius' policy towards the Greeks differed from that of his father in another way. While Antigonus had been subtle in his relations with the Greek cities and had resorted to military occupation only in extreme circumstances, Demetrius had no hesitation in throwing garrisons into places that came into his possession.[8]

When Demetrius' son, Antigonus Gonatas, took advantage of the confusion that followed Seleucus' victory over Lysimachus at the battle of Corupaedium in 281 - the assassination of Seleucus by Ptolemy Ceraunus and the death of the latter at the hands of the Gallic invaders - to establish himself on the throne of Macedonia in 276,[9] he had to take fresh decisions about his relations with the rest of the mainland. Thessaly, of course, was to all intents and purposes part of Macedon, even though Polybius could say that the Thessalians were in a different category from the Macedonians themselves.[10] Euboea, with the important garrison at Chalcis, was also under virtually direct Macedonian control.[11] Otherwise, in 276 there were Macedonian garrisons only at Corinth

and, probably, the Piraeus.[12]

What, though, were the choices confronting Gonatas? Though the rulers of Macedon had never claimed direct rule over Greece as a whole, there had been, over the seventy years since the battle of Chaeronea, varying and shifting degrees of interference in Greek affairs. What mattered immediately to Gonatas was to preserve Antigonid rule in Macedon itself, together, of course, with control of Thessaly and Euboea. It is wrong, I think, to see Macedon as an imperial power consciously seeking to extend its control in Greece or with a carefully worked out idea of the degree of influence it should exercise over its neighbours. The period after 280 has often been described as one of equilibrium between the main successor kingdoms. Though he was not averse to taking such opportunities as arose to increase his power, Gonatas accepted this equilibrium as much as did the rulers of Egypt and Syria, and to have aimed at complete domination of Greece would certainly have been regarded by them as a threat to it.

It is tempting to assert that if the Antigonids had abstained completely from interfering in the mainland - their long-standing possessions of Thessaly and Euboea apart - and relied on the goodwill of genuinely independent Greek states, then Rome three-quarters of a century later would have had considerably more difficulty in finding allies to fight with her against Philip. It is very doubtful, though, whether Gonatas could ever have seriously considered such a policy. In part, no doubt, this is because it would simply never have occurred to him voluntarily to abandon such positions in Greece as he already held; that would have been regarded as an indication of weakness and an invitation to Thessaly and Euboea to attempt revolt. Pericles had warned the Athenians that to give up their empire could lead to the destruction of Athens itself (Thuc. 2.63.3). Gonatas may have feared that to give up such possessions as he had in the mainland would lead to the weakening of his basic position in Macedon itself.

But equally as important was the fact that the Greek states were continuing to behave in the way they had for so long. In disputes with other states they were always willing to call in an outside power, or, as Thucydides had noted (3.82.1), one faction in a state called for such help in order to gain the upper hand over its

rivals. If Macedon had declined all such invitations, the appeals would have been directed elsewhere - primarily, no doubt, to Egypt, and Gonatas would certainly have seen that as a threat to his position. But if the invitations were accepted, as they often were, it was always likely that the opponents of those who had called on Macedon would look elsewhere for help against Macedon. Macedon was the nearest imperial power and so the one most available. But equally it was the one of whose interference the Greeks had most experience, and as a result there was never any lack of anti-Macedonian sentiment in Greece, which Rome, in time, was able to exploit.

The difficulty that confronted Gonatas, then, was inherent in the situation. Rome faced the same difficulty later. In 194, the senate, at the instance of Flamininus, decided that a free Greece, loyal and grateful to Rome, was the best defence against the aggressive intentions of Antiochus III. One important unit, the Aetolian League, was dissatisfied, and little more than two years after the withdrawal of Roman forces from Greece, amid scenes of great emotion, Antiochus invaded the mainland, and Roman troops had to return.[13]

The situation is exemplified in the events that led to the failure of Pyrrhus' attempt to wrest control of Macedon from Gonatas.[14] Pyrrhus had responded to an appeal by the Agiad pretender Cleonymus for help in deposing the Spartan king Areus I. Antigonus saved Sparta from Pyrrhus and might expect some genuine gratitude - the Spartans' spirited defence of their city against Pyrrhus certainly suggests that there was little enthusiasm there for Cleonymus and Pyrrhus.[15] At Argos the situation is particularly clear: of the two rival leaders, Aristeas called on Pyrrhus 'because Aristippus appeared to have the support of Antigonus'.[16] The result must have been to leave a pro-Macedonian government in power. In Messene counsels may have been divided. We hear both of a Messenian embassy welcoming Pyrrhus when he reached the Peloponnese and of Messenians helping Sparta against him (Justin 25.4.6; Paus. 1.13.6, 4.29.6).

What is unfortunately not clear is what further measures Gonatas took in the Peloponnese at this time. A very obscure passage of Justin seems to suggest that he had governments friendly

to him in a number of Peloponnesian states (26.1.3). At some point he adopted a general policy of installing and supporting tyrants in Greek states. It would make sense if this policy began after the death of Pyrrhus, but this cannot be regarded as at all certain; only two specific cases can be securely dated to this time.[17]

The lack of any steadfast loyalty to Antigonus was made clear by the events of what we call the Chremonidean war. Both the causes and the course of the conflict are obscure, and this is not the place to discuss them.[18] What is important is that the appeal of Ptolemy Philadelphus to the Greek states to make an alliance against Gonatas was so readily and widely accepted. Even though Athens had rid herself of the garrison at the Piraeus a few years previously, without any retaliation from Gonatas, even though, as we have seen, several of the governments in the Peloponnese had good reason to be grateful to Gonatas, yet the degree of Antigonid control and influence exercised in the mainland after the defeat of Pyrrhus, and fear of what might happen, was sufficient to ensure a ready response to Philadelphus' rallying call of freedom from Macedon. The call was accepted by Athens, Sparta, Elis, Achaea, Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenus, Aliphera, Caphyae, and Spartan allies in Crete (*Syll.*[3] 434-5, 11.25, 39-40). Areus had clearly quickly forgotten that he owed his position to Gonatas.

Gonatas won the war, though exactly how remains obscure. And it is still uncertain whether, if he had not done so earlier, he now instituted the policy of imposing pro-Macedonian tyrants in Greek cities. What is certain is that his treatment of Athens was severe. The reimposition of the garrison at the Piraeus must date from this time, and troops were also placed at other strategic places on the Attic coast.[19] Even more important, symbolically, a garrison was installed in the city itself, at the Mouseion. Though the form of the constitution was maintained, Macedonian nominees held the magistracies and there was a Macedonian *epistates* (Apollodorus, *FGH* 244 F 44; Paus. 3.6.6). In 256, according to Eusebius, Antigonus 'freed Athens'. Quite what was involved is unclear - perhaps just the removal of the Mouseion garrison, which could be represented as 'freeing' the city.[20] But the other garrisons remained, and Athens was not yet free to choose its own officials.[21] As elsewhere, the maintenance of a garrison was not incompatible with

'freedom'.[22]

This severe degree of control shows clearly that Gonatas was not prepared to risk any further movement against him in Greece, especially when it was organized by one of the other successor kingdoms. But I doubt if Gonatas asked himself whether Athens was now to be regarded as part of the Macedonian empire. His motives for reacting as he did were doubtless mixed. Thucydides had made the Athenian ambassadors at Sparta in 432 talk of Athens being driven by three factors - *time*, *deos*, *ophelia* (1.76.2). Whether Gonatas' possessions in Greece brought any material, economic advantage we may doubt. But *time* and *deos* can well be applied to Gonatas. If Athens were left in complete independence, he would be afraid of further movements against him. And Athens' actions in the Chremonidean war were a blow to Gonatas' pride, his self-esteem (particularly in view of his intellectual links with Athens[23]). One could rationalize this factor by reducing it to a fear that if such actions were left unpunished, others would act likewise. But it is not necessary to do so - irrational motives for political actions should never be discounted.

The troubles of the early part of the reign of Gonatas gave the Aetolian League the opportunity to pursue its growth in central Greece undisturbed.[24] In 251 came the decisive moment in the rise of the second great power on the mainland, the Achaean League, when Aratus seized power at Sicyon.[25] If the Aetolian League had risen more or less independently of Macedon, there is no sign that Aratus was planning to act independently of the great powers - indeed he appealed, albeit unsuccessfully, to both Antigonus and Ptolemy for help in getting rid of Nicocles, the tyrant of Sicyon.[26] It seems that after first accepting financial help from Antigonus, and attacking Alexander, the son and successor of Craterus as governor of Corinth, and now in revolt against Gonatas, Aratus then turned to support Alexander, and sought and obtained financial help from Egypt.[27] Aratus had chosen one side in a conflict. He did not try and indeed could not have hoped to remain independent of the contending powers. Aratus, in fact, made the most rational choice he could in the circumstances in which he found himself. The Aetolians, whose rise had been tolerated by Antigonus, doubtless felt that they would be threatened if Alexander's rebellion

succeeded and took the opposite side.[28] They, too, could not remain aloof from the conflicts of the time.

In the 240s, then, the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues were on opposite sides and the Antigonid ruler was aligned with one of them. For the rest of the third century, and into the second, we have a shifting pattern in the tripartite relationship between the two Leagues and Macedon. For most of the time it is a question of any two of the three powers finding themselves on one side of the fence in opposition to the third. Alexander did not last long, and Antigonus was able to regain control over Corinth and Euboea,[29] but in 243 Aratus freed Corinth, perhaps with financial support from the new Egyptian king, Ptolemy Euergetes.[30] Just before this the Aetolians had intervened in the Peloponnese to the disadvantage of the Achaean League.[31] The battle lines were thus clearly drawn - Ptolemy and the Achaeans on one side, Antigonus and the Aetolians on the other. Aratus was acting as independent agent within the limits of some severe restraints.

In 239, though, Gonatas died. And under his son Demetrius II there was a rapid change in the situation. For instead of the Aetolians being on the side of Macedon against the Achaeans, the two leagues were soon united against Macedon. It was, no doubt, Demetrius' action in accepting an appeal for help from the Epirotes, who were threatened by the Aetolians, that brought about the change,[32] though we must always reckon with that aggressive, almost irrational streak in Aetolian behaviour that made Polybius so hostile towards them. As for Demetrius, not much can be deduced about his motives. He was cementing the marriage-link he had formed with Epirus and acting to check the growing power of the Aetolian league. But in so doing he was seeking to preserve the existing situation, not to change it. What is important for the future, I think, is that both the large confederations were now in opposition to Macedon and both were very conscious of the threat posed by Macedonian power. There was to be one more change before Rome became involved, but we already have the situation that made Rome's task so much easier. Moreover, faced with the alliance of the two federations, Demetrius naturally moved into central Greece, and Boeotia and Megara came into his possession.[33] The more states had experience of more or less direct Macedonian

control, the more anti-Macedonian parties grew up in those states and there arose the kind of internal dissension that Rome was later able to exploit.[34]

The major change that came over the situation in the 220s, of course, was the complete volte-face by Aratus and his success in persuading the Achaean League to abandon its long-standing hostility to the Antigonids and seek an alliance with Macedon. This was the only way he could see of countering the threat from Sparta under Cleomenes III, a threat not just to the territorial integrity of the Achaean League but of the export of Cleomenes' social reforms - increasing the number of Spartiates, redistribution of land, abolition of debts, which can be not too inaccurately described as a left-wing revolution.[35] Whatever the force of the arguments that drove Aratus to adopt this policy, the result was clear enough. For the price that had to be paid was the reinstallation of a Macedonian garrison in the Acrocorinthus, which meant de facto control of Corinth itself.[36] At a stroke, one might say, the most important of Aratus' achievements of the past twenty-five years was undone. And, once again, the message is clear. Even a relatively strong, undoubtedly independent state like the Achaean League could look only to Macedon for help against threatening neighbours. And once again one state calls in an imperial power for help against another.

Doson accepted the invitation when it came, but he had not himself taken the initiative towards expanding Macedonian power. He will have welcomed the fact that he was being accepted as the arbiter of Peloponnesian affairs - especially so soon after Athens had finally expelled its Macedonian garrison (in 229).[37] Doson was in a position to demand the restitution of the garrison on the Acrocorinthus as his price for cooperation, and the events that followed - the broadening of the alliance between Macedon and the Achaean League into the new Hellenic symmachy[38] and the victory of this organization over Cleomenes at Sellasia in 222[39] - meant that Macedon now had a stronger position in the mainland than at any previous time in the third century. But it would still be wrong to think that Doson had any aim of continual expansion, or any clearly defined idea of how far he wanted to expand and what degree of control he wanted to exert.

But with the accession of Philip V in 221 the situation changes considerably. It was the symmachy that in 220 entered on the so-called Social War with the Aetolian League,[40] and to begin with Philip appeared to be simply following the path of Doson.[41] But it soon became clear that Philip was far more active in seeking new spheres of influence, and far less sensitive in his dealings with the Greeks than his predecessors. In the case of Philip it becomes increasingly possible to talk of aggressive imperialism - and not only in Greece, for by making an alliance with Hannibal he forced Rome to intervene in Greece in the First Macedonian War.

Rome, indeed, had twice before sent an army across the Adriatic in what we call the First and Second Illyrian wars, in 229 and 219 respectively. But on neither occasion was her action directed against Macedon. The first war is best explained, with Polybius, as being motivated simply by the need to protect Italian traders against Illyrian piracy.[42] The second was a pre-emptive strike, to ensure that there was no danger from east of the Adriatic at a time when war with Carthage was imminent. The senate must have been aware that Demetrius of Pharos, whom they had left in charge of a considerable part of Illyria, had allied himself with Doson, and may have been afraid that Demetrius' actions against the Roman protectorate in Illyria had Macedonian support, but its sole motive was to secure the Adriatic for the duration of the war against Hannibal.[43] As for the Macedonian attitude towards Rome, it is by no means clear that the Illyrian protectorate particularly worried Doson. It marched with Macedon only at Antipatreia, and throughout the 220s Doson took no action against it. In any case the protectorate represented only a diplomatic, not a military foothold in Greece.[44]

But, of course, the action Rome took in 219 will have worried Philip. Demetrius of Pharos fled to him, and tried to persuade him not only to eradicate Roman influence in the Greek mainland, but even to invade Italy.[45] It was Philip, not Hannibal, who took the initiative in making the alliance which led to the First Macedonian War, and forced Rome to fight on two fronts.[46] Although Philip's first aim was the eradication of the Illyrian protectorate, it is wrong to think that he did not envisage an ultimate invasion of Italy. That is what the sources say, and it is reasonable

to interpret the clause in the treaty with Hannibal providing that Philip should aid Hannibal ὡς ἂν χρεία ᾖ καὶ ὡς ἂν συμφωνήσωμεν (Polyb. 7.9.11) as looking to Philip's eventual coming to Italy.

Clearly the war was not of Rome's choosing and her aim in it was purely defensive. The mandate given to M. Valerius Laevinus, the first Roman commander in the war, was *ut Philippum in regno contineret* (Livy 23.38.11). Philip had to be prevented from crossing to Italy and aiding Hannibal. Naturally Rome found her allies in states with a history of antipathy to Macedon - the Aetolians, Sparta, Elis (an ally of Aetolia in the Social War), and Messene, formerly a member of the symmachy, but completely alienated by Philip's two extraordinary attacks on her in 215 and 214.[47] Philip neither got a great deal of help from his allies in the symmachy, nor was able to give them much. The Achaeans were fully involved in dealing with Rome's Peloponnesian allies, and Philip was fully involved in coping with the Roman and Aetolian forces in the north.[48] Livy makes the Achaean *strategos* Aristaenus, arguing in 198 for alliance between the Achaean League and Rome, point to the lack of Macedonian help.[49] Epirus, nominally a member of the symmachy, in fact adopted a position of neutrality,[50] and Boeotia was more threatened by Aetolia than a threat to her.[51]

The hostility to Macedon among those who threw in their lot with Rome evidently ran deep. Pro-Macedonians, like an Acarnanian speaker in 210, attempting to dissuade the Spartans from joining the Romano-Aetolian alliance, might describe the Romans as barbarians, and appeal to feelings of Hellenism.[52] But the memories of Philip's behaviour, the sacking of Thermos in the Social War[53] and the two attacks on Messene[54] rankled a great deal. It is also significant that one of the results of the Social War was that Philip assumed direct control of Phocis (as, during the First Macedonian War, he did of Eastern Locris[55]). It was far from clear that if Greek states had to throw in their lot with an imperial power Rome was a very much worse bet than Macedon. For the Aetolians, of course, their hostility to the Achaean League was now such that the mere fact of the Achaeans remaining allied to Philip was enough to predispose them in favour of Philip's opponents.

In the event Rome's performance in the First Macedonian War

did little to win friends. The second commander, P. Sulpicius Galba, behaved in a cruel and insensitive way that left bitter memories - he plundered captured towns ruthlessly, and in the case of Aegina refused to allow prisoners of war to send representatives to friendly states to arrange a ransom, and wanted to sell them all into slavery.[56] And Rome made it clear that she was motivated by nothing more than her own self-interest. Once the defeat of the Carthaginian fleet off Sicily had removed the danger of an imminent invasion by Philip - who would have had to rely on Carthaginian ships for transporting his troops - the senate lost interest in Greece and the Aetolians were forced to negotiate their own peace with Philip. The Romans, with a typically superior disregard for the facts, chose to portray the Aetolians as having broken the terms of their treaty with Rome by making peace; technically they had done so, but in fact they had no alternative.[57]

If Philip had played his cards differently he might still have secured some goodwill from the Greeks and given Rome a far more difficult task. But immediately after his making peace with Rome, at Phoenice in 205, he embarked on a series of actions which it is hard to describe as anything but sheer and unashamed aggressive imperialism.[58] The previous history of his reign, I believe, justifies this description, and it is over-rationalization to think that Philip's purpose was only to improve his position in order to defend himself against Antiochus, or Rome. After some covert support from his henchmen making trouble for Rhodes and attacking states in the Aegean and Hellespont, in 202 Philip himself launched a major expedition in the Aegean and captured several states - Lysimacheia, Chalcedon, Cius - which were allied to the Aetolians. The latter, despite their disenchantment with Rome, appealed to the senate for help. They were turned down, perhaps more because the senate was not yet sure of peace with Carthage than because they really felt angry with the Aetolians for having made peace with Philip.[59] Philip proceeded to even more aggressions, and in 201 he captured many of the Aegean islands, now under de facto Rhodian protection following the decline of Ptolemaic power, and attacked a number of states in Asia Minor. Naturally he was opposed by Rhodes and Pergamum, both of whom already had friendly relations with Rome. Rhodes had been an *amicus* since the end of

the fourth century - if I may take a dogmatic view on a controversial matter[60] - and Attalus I had fought on Rome's side in the First Macedonian War, though, like Rhodes, he did not have a formal treaty with Rome.[61]

Philip made the position even worse by returning to Greece and invading Attica on a pretty flimsy pretext. Not only did he invade it, he caused great offence by his wanton destruction of cemeteries and temples.[62] Rome's initial campaign, though not an outstanding success (and diplomatically the fact that P. Sulpicius Galba, the insensitive commander of the First Macedonian War, was again in charge was not helpful) was impressive enough to bring the Aetolians back into the fold (Livy 31.41.1), and in the following year (198) the initial successes of Flamininus, and the diplomacy of his brother Lucius, produced the most important change: the Achaean League was detached from its alliance with Philip (Livy 32.23). The latter had foreseen the danger and attempted to forestall it by offering the League certain towns that he still held in the Peloponnese (Livy 32.5.4-5). It seems that he had promised to return the towns in 208 and failed to fulfil his promise.[63] What swayed the Achaeans was first, awareness of what Philip had done, and second, the realization that if they refused alliance with Rome, they would be attacked by the forces of Rome and her allies and Philip would be able to do nothing to help them.

These decisions of the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, like those made by Rome's allies in the First Macedonian War, were taken when Roman forces were already in Greece. The critical steps were the appeals to Rome for intervention against Philip made in 201 by Rhodes, Attalus, and Athens. It might perhaps be thought that these invitations represented nothing new. As I have stressed, appeals for outside intervention had long been a feature of disputes between Greek states - and not only appeals to other Greeks. It was Persian gold that finally settled the outcome of the Peloponnesian War, and the Great King was able to pose as arbiter of Greek affairs for the first third of the fourth century. But to open the door to a new and close-at-hand non-Greek power, whose growth in the western Mediterranean was well known, was very different from calling on Antigonus Doson

to defeat Sparta. We have seen the appeal to Hellenic sentiment made by the Acarnanian speaker in 210 - and similar views were expressed on other occasions.[64] What I have tried to emphasize is that the grounds for Roman intervention were well-prepared. From the battle of Chaeronea onwards the rulers of Macedon had been interfering in the affairs of the Greek mainland, whether directly or indirectly. As the nearest of the Hellenistic monarchs the Antigonids were obviously more of a threat to Greek independence than the Seleucids or the Ptolemies. Philip acted with far more open aggression than any of his ancestors since Demetrius Poliorcetes. If he behaved like a barbarian there could be no qualms for Greeks in inviting a non-Greek people to defend them against him. Whether the senate was really motivated *ob iniurias armaque illata sociis populi Romani* (Livy 31.6.1) we may doubt. What is important is that three quarters of a century of continuous Antigonid rule made Athens, the Aetolians, Rhodes, and Pergamum quite ready to bring their complaints to a non-Greek power. If Philip had restrained himself from his quite unnecessary aggressions in the last few years of the third century, Rome would not have had the opportunity to take the decisive step of intervention in 200. How long that would have delayed Rome in the process of achieving control of the Hellenistic world, however, is a question about Roman motives and Roman imperialism: which is not the subject of this paper.

8: LAUS IMPERII[1]

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I THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE

My purpose in this paper is to explore the conceptions of empire prevalent in Cicero's day. What Romans thought is often best ascertained from their institutions and actions, and some use will be made of this kind of evidence; it is necessarily inferential, and there is always a danger of reading into the actions of Greeks and Romans motives of too modern a kind. However this may be, I propose to draw principally on actual statements by Romans, as the clearest indications of what was most explicit in their own consciousness; how far this reveals the true driving forces in their imperial conduct is another matter, which may be left to bolder inquiry.

Only two authors supply much material: Cicero and Caesar. It may indeed be remembered that Virgil, Horace and Livy all matured in Cicero's lifetime, and that Livy may often reflect the views of annalists of this or of a still earlier period; moreover I believe that the imperial ideals of the Augustan age were much the same as those of the late republic.[2] Still, citations of these writers will be subsidiary. It remains, however, to ask how far the utterances of Cicero and Caesar can be regarded as representative of their time. Any assumption that they actually held typical views themselves may appear unwarranted and indeed implausible.

Cicero's own personal opinions can only be properly elicited from his intimate letters and those theoretical writings in which he speaks *in propria persona* (as in *de officiis*) or through an interlocutor in a dialogue who can be identified as his own mouthpiece, like Scipio and Laelius in his *de republica*, or Cotta in *de natura deorum*. It is astonishing that certain scholars freely quote from speeches, or from his exposition of those Stoic theories, which he may have been inclined to adopt but could never quite accept,[3] as if they are sufficient to attest his true beliefs. Even the grand statement of a political programme in his

defence of Sestius (96-139) can only be safely taken as sincere because it agrees so closely with what he says in other works, where he had no reason to veil or distort his real views. But for our present purposes the speeches are actually of prime value. The skilled and successful orator, such as he was, had to persuade his audience and, therefore, to play on their beliefs and feelings.[4] We know that Cicero could for this end express views he was far from sharing, for instance in the ridicule he cast on the study of civil law and on Stoic tenets in his speech for Murena (26-9, 60-7). His appeals to religion may in some degree be comparable (see below). Whereas his own genuine beliefs about the empire might in principle be treated as unique or unusual, his public utterances should tell us by implication what was widely thought by those who heard him. Orations delivered before the senate or upper-class juries would have mirrored the opinions of senators and equites, and *contiones* those prevalent in other strata of society.

Unfortunately we cannot overhear Cicero on the *rostra*; with one exception the published versions of the speeches we have were not verbally identical with those he delivered, and may sometimes have differed significantly in substance; some indeed had no spoken prototypes.[5] But it may surely be assumed that when Cicero published speeches he had delivered, as well as those he had not, his purpose was either to influence opinion or to immortalize his eloquence,[6] if not to do both. In the former case his speeches are evidently indicative of what others thought. The reading public must indeed have consisted only of men of education and therefore of wealth. It might then seem that the published versions of speeches delivered to the people *may* tell us little of what he said to them and consequently can provide no certain evidence of their sentiments. But this need not be true. In so far as his aim was to give permanence to specimens of his oratorical skill, he had good reason not to omit any of the sophistries of persuasion that he had actually employed and that connoisseurs of the art would enjoy. Although Cicero sometimes equated the perfect orator with the wise statesman,[7] statesmanship was to be judged by the ends pursued and the adoption of means appropriate to those ends, and he had no reason to fear that his readers would think less well of him as a politician, if it appeared that he had

pandered in words to the mob for such laudable purposes as defeating Rullus' land-bill or Catiline's conspiracy.[8] Such speeches in fact 'ring true', and surely reveal the popular sentiments on which Cicero found it expedient to play.

As for Caesar's *Commentaries*, I take it for granted that, however truthful they may be as a record of events, they were written partly at least in order to depict Caesar's conduct in a way that would win the approval of his readers. Thus Caesar too betrays the attitudes common in the whole upper class, to whom he is addressing an apologia.

II ROMAN AND ATHENIAN VIEWS OF THEIR EMPIRES

It will appear that the Romans themselves liked to believe that they had acquired their dominions justly, by fighting for their own security or for the protection of their allies. Victory had conferred on them the right to rule over the conquered, and they were naturally conscious that this right was profitable to them, nor were they ashamed of the booty and tribute they exacted. However, they preferred to dwell on the sheer glory of empire, which made Rome specially worthy of the devotion of her citizens (*de orat.* 1.156). Much of this thinking is reminiscent of the interpretation Thucydides put on Athenian imperialism, in the speeches he ascribes to Athens' spokesmen. Like all other peoples, the Athenians had been led to acquire their empire by considerations of security, profit and prestige (1.76), but it is on the undying fame that Athens had won by reducing the greatest number of Greeks to subjection (2.64) that he seems to lay the greatest weight, and it was the power of the city that should inspire the affection of her citizens and make them glad to sacrifice themselves in her service (2.43). To Romans the glory of their empire was even greater than that which Pericles could claim for Athens, because they had come to think that it properly embraced the whole world. Moreover, this dominion was ordained by the gods, whose favour Rome had deserved by piety and justice, and it was exercised in the interest of the subjects. It needs no proof that Thucydides did not look on Athenian policy in the same light. But less impartial or less cynical observers could go almost as far in justifying her imperialism. We can see this from Isocrates' *Panegyricus*, which certainly reflects ideas already current

in the fifth century, though it would take me too far afield to demonstrate this here. The Athenians too had liked to see themselves as protectors of peoples unjustly threatened or oppressed, and as benefactors of their subjects; it seems very doubtful if many of them acknowledged publicly or in their own hearts that their empire was a tyranny and unjustly acquired. What was most novel in the Roman attitude to their empire was the belief that it was universal and willed by the gods.

III THE GLORY OF IMPERIAL EXPANSION

In the political programme Cicero sketched in his defence of Sestius (96ff.) he maintained that all good men should seek *otium cum dignitate*. *Otium* must have included security from external attack (*de orat.* 1.14), and *dignitas* suggests, among other things, the glory of the whole state (*pro Sest.* 104); *provinciae*, *socii*, *imperii laus*, *res militaris* are expressly named among the *fundamenta otiosae dignitatis*. Much of Cicero's programme can have had no appeal to the poor either in Rome or in the country, but the urban plebs at least could apparently be moved by the glamour of imperial glory; in his speech for the Manilian law Cicero enlarges on the dishonour Rome had suffered from the pirates and from Mithridates, and on the necessity of entrusting the eastern command to Pompey, in order to restore 'the prestige of the Roman people which has been transmitted to you by our ancestors and whose greatness appears in every way and above all in the military domain' (6; cf. 7-11, 53ff.). No other people, he says there, had ever had such an appetite for glory, and we know that in his own judgement this had been a dominant motive for the old Romans (*de rep.* 5.9). He can argue for the propriety or wisdom of any practices which have in the past served to aggrandize the empire (*pro Rosc. Am.* 50, *Phil.* 5.47), or which its long existence in itself justifies. Both Pompey and Caesar are lauded for making its boundaries coterminous with the *orbis terrarum*,[9] a boast that Pompey made for himself on a monument recording his deeds in Asia (Diod. 40.4). The speech *de provinciis consularibus* is particularly significant in this connexion. As an encomiast of Caesar in 56, Cicero was in a delicate position. Both he and the majority of the senate had recently been in opposition to Caesar. However, he finds it plausible to assert that Caesar's achievements in Gaul

had changed their attitude, and rightly changed it, hence the extraordinary honours the senate had already voted to the conqueror (25; cf. *in Pis.* 81). In the long letter he wrote to Lentulus in 54, which was obviously intended as an apologia for a wider public, Cicero exculpates his own change of course in much the same way: it is now, he claims, the triumvirs who are doing most to secure *otium cum dignitate*, and Caesar's conquests are part of his case (*ad fam.* 1.9.12-18 and 21). It seems to me highly improbable that these sentiments, however insincere on the lips of Cicero, whose correspondence in the 50s, even with his brother Quintus in Gaul, betrays little interest and no pride in the conquests, were not genuinely felt by Romans, who had less than Cicero to lose from the dominance of the triumvirs, or that Caesar himself was untruthful in recording that in 49 the councillors of Auximum, from Pompey's homeland of Picenum, declined to exclude from their town *C. Caesarem imperatorem, bene de republica meritum, tantis rebus gestis* (*BC* 1.13).

There is abundant evidence for the value individual Romans set on *gloria*,[10] but, as Cicero says in his defence of Archias, they could win no greater renown than by victories in war, renown in which the whole people shared (21ff.; cf. 30). In *de officiis* Cicero admits that most men rank success in war above achievements in peace (1.74), and that it had been the most natural and traditional objective for a young aristocrat (2.45); in public he declared that military talent had brought eternal glory to Rome and compelled the world to obey her commands and that it was to be more highly valued than the orator's eloquence (*pro Mur.* 21ff.). He scoffed at the Epicurean Piso's professed disdain for a triumph as preposterous and incredible (*in Pis.* 56ff.), and for all his own rational expectation to be immortalized as the Roman Demosthenes (cf. n.6) and perhaps as the Roman Plato, he magnified his own petty exploits in Mount Amanus in hope of the honour.[11] The triumph, properly granted only to the general who had slain 5,000 of the enemy in a single battle (Val. Max. 2.8.1), was itself the institutional expression of Rome's military ideal. According to Cicero (*de rep.* 3.24) the words *finis imperii propagavit* appeared on the monuments of her great generals; in his speeches he takes it for granted that victory and the extension of empire are the objectives of any provincial governor (*de prov. cons.* 29, *Phil.* 13.14), and at his most theoretical he

prescribes that wise statesmen should do their utmost in peace and war *ut rem publicam augeant imperio agris vectigalibus* (*de offic.* 2.85), thus accepting in 44 B.C. a principle of statecraft that no contemporary had done more to fulfil than Caesar, whom at this very time he was concerned to vilify (1.26, 2.23-8, 3.83 etc.). In *de oratore* 1.196 he roundly asserted that no fatherland deserved so much love as Rome, *quae una in omnibus terris domus est virtutis, imperii, dignitatis.*

IV VIRTUS, FORTUNA AND THE WILL OF THE GODS

Thus Cicero could not free himself from the militarism of the traditions he revered, which appeared in the old prayer of the censors for the aggrandizement of Rome (Val. Max. 4.1.10), in the rule that the *pomerium* might be extended only by those *qui protulere imperium* (Tac. *Ann.* 12.23) - among them was Sulla - and perhaps in the alleged predictions of *haruspices* that the wars with Philip V, Antiochus and Perseus would advance *terminos populi Romani.* If these predictions recorded by Livy (21.5.7, 36.1.3, 42.30.9) are not annalistic fabrications, they cast doubt on the view that any of these wars were merely defensive in motivation, but even if they were invented by Valerius Antias or Claudius Quadrigarius (if not earlier), they still illustrate the imperialistic conceptions dominant in the time of their invention, and accepted by Livy, in whose work *belli gloria* is naturally a pervasive theme. In particular, the legend of Marcus Curtius, for which our earliest source is a contemporary of Cicero, Procilius, enshrined the truth that it was *arma virtusque* that guaranteed Rome's perpetuity (7.6.3). In Livy's view it was the number and valour of Rome's soldiers and the talents of her generals - elsewhere he also stresses military discipline, to which Cicero only once alludes (*Tusc. disp.* 1.2) - which with the help of fortune had made Rome unconquerable.[12]

It was, however, not only military qualities that were thought to have made Rome great. Wise policy was another factor (*de rep.* 2.30). Like Polybius, Cicero clearly laid great weight on Rome's balanced constitution.[13] Most Romans were not political theorists, but traditions counted heavily with them; as Cicero's innumerable allusions in speeches to ancestral wisdom[14] indicate; in his defence of Murena (75) he casually refers to *instituta maiorum quae*

diuturnitas imperi comprobat, and we may conjecture that a widely shared conviction that these institutions had contributed to the acquisition of empire was one reason why Augustus felt it necessary to veil the extent to which he had subverted them.[15] In one speech Cicero suggested that Rome's readiness to share political rights with other peoples, even with defeated enemies, had been of the highest importance in her aggrandizement (*pro Balb.* 31); more was to be made of this theme by Livy, and by Dionysius who doubtless drew the idea from Romans he met or from the annals he read.[16] Posidonius too was obviously following Roman mentors when he extolled the frugality, simplicity, good faith and piety of the old Romans in a passage in which he is accounting for Rome's rise to power:[17] *moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque*. Sallust and others apprehended danger to Rome from the degeneration from those pristine standards which they detected in their own day.[18]

Romans themselves acknowledged that fortune as well as virtue had assisted them; for instance the situation of the city, and the centrality of Italy within the Mediterranean world, had favoured expansion, and Italy's natural resources were actually exaggerated.[19] But the Roman conception of fortune tended to be that of which Cicero speaks: *divinitus adiuncta fortuna* (*de imp. Cn. Pomp.* 47). The gods were the guardians of city and empire.[20] It was Roman piety that had earned their goodwill. In Propertius' words (3.22.21), *quantum ferro tantum pietate potentes stamus*. Virgil's Aeneas, *pietate insignis et armis*, was the prototype of the people aided and destined by the gods to conquer. In public Cicero gave the most eloquent expression to the notion, which we can trace from a praetor's letter of 193 B.C. to the time of Augustine, that 'it was by our scrupulous attention to religion and by our wise grasp of a single truth, that all things are ruled and directed by the will of the gods, that we have overcome all peoples and nations'.[21]

It may be doubted if Cicero himself had firm religious convictions. There is no hint of personal devotion in his intimate letters; above all, he never expresses hope of assistance from the gods in moments of the deepest distress or anxiety.[22] But he held that it was expedient to imbue the citizens with religious faith, in order that they might be deterred by the fear of divine retribution from infringing oaths and treaties, and from crimes in

general. If men ceased to think that the gods took no care for mankind and to pay them due honour, good faith, social cooperation and justice would surely be extinguished. Polybius had already traced the high moral standards of old Rome to the prevalence of a scrupulous fear of the gods.[23] The ideal system of sacred law Cicero sketches in the second book of *de legibus* is expressly modelled on the Roman (2.23). He lays great emphasis on the powers of the aristocratic priesthoods, 'for it helps to hold the state together that the people should always need the advice and authority of the *optimates*' (2.30). Cicero unhesitatingly approved the abuse of priestly authority for obstructing 'seditious' proposals.[24] The truth of beliefs implicit in the ancestral rituals was irrelevant to their utility. In the same way Varro adopted the view of Q.Mucius Scaevola that philosophic views on religion were unsuited to the masses and that traditional rites should be kept up for their benefit. Varro indeed held that there was a basis of truth in the old religion, which he reconciled with Stoic pantheism.[25] In *de legibus* Cicero adopted a similar standpoint.

In this work he accepted the Stoic justification of divination; it was at least credible in principle, though Cicero already denied that the augurs of his own day (he was one himself) any longer enjoyed knowledge of the future,[26] and insisted above all on their political importance. By the end of his life he had come to reject every kind of divination. Yet in the very treatise, *de divinatione*, in which he discredits belief in the supernatural power of *haruspices* and augurs as mere superstition, he reiterates that for political reasons the old practices should be maintained.[27] This work is a sequel to his *de natura deorum*, in which his mouthpiece, Cotta, refutes all Stoic teaching on divine providence in a way which could be said *deos funditos tollere* (*de div.* 1.9). Cotta is actually made to say that experience throws doubt on the very existence of gods, though as a pontiff, bound to maintain the cults, he would never avow this *in contione* (*de nat. deor.* 1.61). It is true that at the end Cicero makes Cotta indicate that he would like to be convinced that the Stoics were in the right (3.95), and declare that no philosophic reasoning could induce him to question the truth of ancestral beliefs on the worship of the gods, and that Rome could never have achieved such greatness but for her supreme care in placating them

(3.5ff.; cf. 14). Strictly this means that Cotta accepts on authority all the traditional *beliefs* including those which Cicero was to ridicule in *de divinatione*. I suspect that Cicero has gone further than he really intended here, and that he should have made Cotta say merely that all the ancient *practices* were to be preserved, irrespective of their truth.

Whatever Cicero's personal convictions may have been, they are primarily of biographical interest; we cannot properly generalize from a single individual. But the cynical manipulation of the official religion for political ends is itself one piece of evidence for the decay of belief in it among the controlling aristocracy. Of course it does not stand alone: at this time many cults were neglected, the calendar was often in disarray, priesthoods were unfilled, temples were falling into disrepair, the pontifical law was no longer studied, and in public and private life auspices were not duly observed.[28] Can we then suppose that the conception that the empire depended on divine favour really had much influence on men's minds?

The answer is surely that Cicero and other highly educated aristocrats were not representative figures. It is significant that Cicero in his speech *de haruspicum responsis* (18) finds it necessary to deny that his philosophical studies have alienated him from the old religion. The frequency of his public appeals to religion is surely proof that belief was still widespread.[29] There can be no doubt that superstition was rife among the ignorant masses.[30] But Cicero was just as apt to play on religious sentiment when addressing members of the higher orders. To take only one example, *religiones* and *auspicia* come first in the *fundamenta otiosae dignitatis* as a part of the programme that was to enlist the support of all *boni et locupletes* throughout Italy (*pro Sest.* 98). I do not suppose that they were meant to think only of the opportunities for political obstruction which the old religion furnished. The so-called religious revival that Augustus was to attempt may well have appealed to the old-fashioned municipal gentry, who were already playing a larger part in the political life of Cicero's time and whose support he sought, like Augustus after him.[31] It may be noted that the incest of Clodius in 62 aroused indignation first among the lower ranks in the senate, a body of which probably under

thirty per cent belonged to noble houses.[32] Most Romans may well have retained the conviction that it was to the gods that they owed their empire, an empire that was said to be coterminous with the *orbis terrarum*.

V THE CONCEPTION OF WORLD EMPIRE

Virgil's Jupiter was to bestow on Rome a dominion without limits in space or time (*Aen.* 1.277ff.). Cicero and his contemporaries, and perhaps Virgil's, were somewhat less confident. More than once Cicero avers that Rome had no external enemies to fear, but that her eternity could only be assured if she remained faithful to the institutions and customs that had made her great.[33] On the other hand he constantly speaks, and sometimes in quite casual ways with no rhetorical inflation (e.g. *de orat.* 1.14), as if Rome already ruled all peoples or the whole *orbis terrarum*.[34] This conception also appears in an admittedly rather grandiloquent preamble to a consular law of 58: *imperio amplificato pace per orbem terrarum*. A century earlier, Polybius had held that by 167 B.C. the whole, or virtually the whole *oikoumene*, or its known parts, had come under Roman dominion. His true meaning is better conveyed in other texts in which he ascribes to Rome mastery over land and sea *kath'hemas*, or of those which had fallen under inquiry (*historian*); evidently these did not embrace all the parts of the world that geographers had described but only those which formed Polybius' political universe.[35] *Orbis terrarum* was often used in the same restricted sense (cf. n.34).

Even so, it is obvious that in the time both of Polybius and of Cicero Rome did not herself administer the whole of this political universe. Both must then have conceived that her dominion extended beyond the provinces to the kings, tribes and cities who were bound to Rome by alliances, even if the terms of the treaty, as with little Astypalaea,[36] affected a formal equality between the High Contracting Parties which harsh reality rendered meaningless, or who were linked by the looser tie of *amicitia*, which within Rome's own society was often a courteous synonym for clientage.[37] In form the status of such allies and friends of Rome beyond provincial frontiers was no different from that of others like Massilia whose territories constituted enclaves within a

province. In reality the degree of their dependence was determined by the advantages or disadvantages that might induce Rome to punish or overlook disobedience to her will.

Augustus was to regard all *reges socios* as *membra partisque imperii* (Suet. *Aug.* 48). Owing their thrones to recognition, if not to appointment, by Rome, they were not necessarily scions of an established royal house nor even drawn from the people they ruled; normally they now enjoyed Roman citizenship, a symbol of their function as creatures and agents of the suzerain. Augustus naturally included his dealings with them in his record of the deeds *quibus orbem terrarum imperio populi Romani subiecit*. In his view Armenia was in revolt when it rejected the princes he named. He justified by ancestral practice his decision not to annex that country; Lucullus and Pompey had in fact already reduced it to vassalage.[38]

Under his more efficient regime 'client' states were perhaps more closely controlled than in the republic, but Cicero had already included all kingdoms and *liberae civitates* in the *orbis terrarum*, where every Roman in virtue of his citizenship should be safe from arbitrary punishment (II *Verr.* 5.168), and in 47 B.C. an attack on king Deiotarus could be construed as a violation of *populi Romani ius maiestatemque* (*B. Alex.* 34). In Cicero's phrase Rome was *dominus regum* (*de dom.* 90), and when Tacitus declared it to be an ancient and long-approved practice of the republic to make kings *instrumenta servitutis* (*Agr.* 14), he was echoing Sallust, who represents Mithridates as telling how Eumenes of Pergamum had been reduced by Rome to the most wretched slavery (*ep. Mith.* 8; cf. *BJ* 31.9). Sallust too makes Adherbal recall to the senate that his father, Micipsa, had enjoined on him *uti regni Numidiae tantummodo procurationem existumarem meam, ceterum ius et imperium eius penes vos esse*.[39] From the second century such rulers had had to look to Rome for recognition, and like free cities and friendly tribes, they were expected to conform their policy to Rome's will, to furnish military aid and money or supplies, when occasion demanded; some were actually tributary. In return they had a moral claim to Rome's protection (e.g. *BJ* 14, *B. Alex.* 34). In 51 B.C. king Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia plainly depended wholly on Rome to defend him against Parthian attack or internal discontent, fostered no doubt by the exactions required to meet the usurious demands of Pompey and

Brutus. Modern descriptions of such client kingdoms or peoples as 'buffer states' is never adequate and often quite misleading. Analogies with the princedoms of British India or the system of 'indirect rule' in British Nigeria would be more to the point.[40] A recent writer has drawn a distinction between the Roman empire *stricto* and *lato sensu*, the former comprising only territory under Rome's own administration and the latter the subordinate states as well. This is clearly a useful tool of analysis, but it does not correspond to Roman usage.[41]

VI UNLIMITED EXPANSION

The duty acknowledged by the Romans (but not invariably performed) of protecting their friends and allies could involve them in wars with peoples who had hitherto lain beyond their orbit. Victory made these peoples in turn Rome's subjects. Thus the limits of the *orbis terrarum* within which she claimed dominion were continually advancing. There was no point at which such expansion could halt, so long as any independent people remained. Indeed, as P.Veyne has recently argued, the very existence of a truly independent power was viewed at Rome as a potential threat to her own security.[42]

The early treaties with Carthage, and perhaps one with Tarentum, had bound Rome to keep out of certain lands or seas.[43] There is no certain evidence that she ever accepted such a restriction after the war with Pyrrhus. Livy indeed says that under the pact with Hasdrubal the Ebro became *finis utriusque imperii* (21.2.7), but Polybius that it simply forbade the Carthaginians to cross that river, and there is no hint that Hannibal argued that Rome had infringed its terms by intervening on behalf of Saguntum.[44] At one time Flamininus offered Antiochus III a line of demarcation between his sphere of authority and Rome's, but the treaty of Apamea certainly set bounds for Antiochus, without debarring Rome from interfering beyond them.[45] Caesar would not accept either Rhine or Channel as limits to Roman power. Whatever the practice of earlier ages, his attitude was characteristic for his own time.

It is true that according to Orosius (6.13.2) the Parthian king complained that Crassus' crossing of the Euphrates was an infringement of 'treaties' made by Lucullus and Pompey; Florus (3.11.4) refers instead to 'treaties' made with Sulla and Pompey.

Many scholars suppose that one or more of these generals had in fact recognized the Euphrates as a boundary delimiting the Roman and Parthian spheres of influence or at least as one which neither party was to cross in arms. Yet, since Crassus was patently launching an offensive against Parthia, the Parthian king was perhaps merely reminding him of previous pacts of friendship, which need have comprised no such precise stipulation. Certainly none is recorded in the other texts, admittedly meagre, which relate to the negotiations between these generals and the Parthians.[46] Lucullus was actually quartered far east of the Euphrates at the time, having overrun much of Armenia. Pompey too invaded Armenia, reduced king Tigranes to vassalage, and sent troops into Gordyene. According to Plutarch (*Pomp.* 33.6) Phraates then proposed the Euphrates as a frontier, but Pompey merely replied that he would adopt the just boundary. That was manifestly an evasion. In his monument he claimed to have 'given protection to' not only Armenia but Mesopotamia, Sophene and Gordyene (Diod. 40.4), and if he was unwilling to fight the Parthians, who did indeed forbid him to cross the Euphrates again (Dio 37.6), for Tigranes' right to Gordyene, he successfully offered Roman arbitration between the rival claims there of Tigranes and Phraates (Dio 37.6f.). It is significant that he denied Phraates the title of 'king of kings' (Dio 37.5; Plut. *Pomp.* 38), which might have suggested that his state was on a parity with Rome. He entered into friendly relations with the rulers of Osrhoene, Media Atropatene and even Elymaitis,[47] as well as Armenia; when and if it suited Rome, she could intervene to defend her friends beyond the Euphrates against Parthia.

When Crassus did cross the river, he was received as a liberator from Parthian oppression at least by many Greek cities (Dio 40.13, Plut. *Cr.* 17), and he had the support of the vassal king of Armenia (Dio 40.19), while the ruler of Osrhoene pretended to be friendly (ibid. 20).

Although Cicero denied that Crassus had any justification for war (*de fin.* 3.75), and our authorities all represent him as the aggressor, perhaps condemning him, as Plutarch suggested (*comp. Nic. et Cr.* 4), only because he failed, we can easily surmise that he had excuses for intervention, on behalf of peoples with whom Rome had already entered into friendly relations, as plausible as

Caesar for his Gallic offensives. It is, moreover, significant that even though Romans could see the disaster at Carrhae as divine retribution for an unjust and undeclared war, just as Cicero ascribes the destruction of Piso's army by pestilence to the judgement of heaven on Piso's alleged aggressions (*in Pis.* 85), they continued to assume down to 20 B.C. that it was right for them to punish the Parthians and even to conquer them, in order to vindicate Rome's honour and secure her eastern dominions.

Whatever the provocation they had received, foreign peoples which attacked Rome could at best be said to wage a *bellum prope iustum* (*de prov. cons.* 4). It would be hard to say how far the conviction that the gods had destined them to rule the world predisposed Romans to treat as legitimate *casus belli* which the uncommitted observer would have thought nugatory.

VII RELUCTANCE TO ANNEX TERRITORY

It is then quite mistaken to deny that Roman policy was imperialistic whenever it did not result in outright annexation. Until the first century B.C. Rome was notoriously slow to annex territory.

Gelzer explained this on the ground that the Roman state absolutely lacked an organ for carrying through far-reaching plans of expansion, with annual magistrates whose choice rested on the caprice of the electorate, who were often incapable, and who in any event could not assure continuity in policy, and a senate which met only when summoned by a magistrate to consider such matters as he referred to it.[48] It seems to me that he unduly depreciated the real power of the senate to make decisions, and that the fluctuations in its policy did not differ significantly from those we find in the policy of imperial states governed either by absolute rulers or by parliamentary democracies; for instance, no change in senatorial foreign policy was more marked than that which occurred when Hadrian succeeded Trajan.

Badian, while rightly insisting that at any rate after 200 Rome was determined 'to dominate whatever was within reach and to build up strength to extend that reach' and practised what he calls 'hegemonial imperialism', argues that the Roman governing class was reluctant to resort to annexation, because it early became conscious 'that large increases of territory could not easily be administered

within the existing city-state constitution'. I know of no evidence for such consciousness, and I doubt if it be true that 'under the Roman Republic no real system of administering overseas territories was ever evolved'.[49]

As Gelzer observed, we must not think in terms of a modern bureaucracy when we speak of Roman government. But this applies almost as much to government in the Principate as in the republic. Pliny actually had not so many high officials to assist him in governing Bithynia and Pontus under Trajan as Cicero in Cilicia.[50] The activities of government were far fewer than they are today, and they were largely left to local authorities; at most these were gradually subjected by the emperors to somewhat closer supervision. It was only rarely under the Principate that even barbarous tribes were directly governed by Roman military officers; the centralized administration of Roman Egypt was always exceptional.

Nor was there anything unusual by ancient standards in Roman practice. In the Persian empire Greek and Phoenician cities had been left to manage their own affairs; so had the Jews, and doubtless most other unurbanized peoples of whom we know nothing; it is immaterial that the Persian kings, like Rome, sometimes installed local rulers on whose loyalty they could count. Athens and the Hellenistic kings (except again in Egypt) had followed the same practice. The Romans had no reason to think that they were less able than other ruling powers to administer subjects in this loose way. The only puzzle is that they did not always choose to demand tribute (as distinct from heavy war indemnities, which could ultimately be paid off), outside the frontiers of a province; the first known cases are those of Macedon and Illyria in 167 (Livy 45.18.7f.).

In the republic the tasks of provincial government may be classified under four heads.

(a) *Taxation*. Collection of taxes was left to publicans or to local authorities; a host of officials employed by the central government was not needed. This long remained true under the Principate.[51]

(b) *Jurisdiction*. The governor was omnicompetent, outside privileged communities, but we need not assume that he as yet possessed that monopoly of jurisdiction over serious crimes which may be inferred from evidence of later centuries, and in civil cases he may generally have limited himself to suits in which Romans were

concerned. A *lex provinciae* might actually reserve many types of case to local courts. In Cilicia such rules evidently did not exist, and Cicero makes out that it was his innovation to let the Greeks settle their own disputes in local courts under local laws, but I suggest that he did no more than *guarantee* this 'autonomy' to them, whereas his predecessors had been ready to assume jurisdiction if ever they saw fit, perhaps to the advantage of influential magnates and to their own pecuniary gain.[52]

(c) *Supervision of local government*. Cicero praised his brother for ensuring that the Asian cities were administered by the *optimates*. This was no doubt normal policy, though in Asia, for instance, popular assemblies were allowed to retain some power,[53] and Caesar on occasion installed kings in Gallic *civitates*.[54] In general local rulers, whether or not Rome had placed them in control, were left to administer their own communities with little interference. Cicero indeed must have spent much time in checking municipal accounts and unveiling corruption, but the mere fact that he examined accounts for the past ten years indicates that within that period no proconsul had thought this a task necessary to perform.[55]

(d) *Internal order and defence*. Here lay the governor's inescapable obligation. Spain, Gaul, Macedon and some parts of the east nearly always required legionary garrisons. As Badian saw,[56] this was costly to the treasury and burdensome to the Italian peasantry.[57] Generations of war in Spain might well have made the senate apprehensive of assuming military responsibilities that could be shifted on to reliable vassals. Even with the threat of a Parthian invasion in 51, the worthy consul, Servius Sulpicius, vetoed a *supplementum* for the weak forces in Syria and Cilicia.[58] The elder Cato is said to have opposed annexation of Macedon in 168 because Rome could not afford protection (*HA Hadr*. 5.3).

It may be thought that this aversion to assuming the task of military defence ill fits the Roman passion for military glory. But we have to reckon, as Badian argued (cf. n.56), with the prevalence of mutual jealousy among the Roman aristocracy. Provincial commands gave particular individuals better than average chances of augmenting their personal glory and wealth, and their influence at home. This jealousy is manifest in the *leges annales*, in the normal restriction of provincial commands to a single year, and in the

strength of the objection in the late republic to extraordinary commands. In 57-56 no agreement could be reached on the restoration of Ptolemy Auletes to the Egyptian throne, whether by Pompey or any one else; success would bring too much honour even to such a respectable figure of the second order as Lentulus Spinther. Moreover, once a commander was in the field, it was hard for the senate to exercise any control over him. For over two years (57-55) the proconsul L. Piso did not so much as send a single despatch to Rome, though Cicero claims that this was abnormal. The provisions that appeared in Sulla's law on *maiestas* and in Caesar's on *repetundae*, and in many older enactments, forbidding governors *exire de provincia, educere exercitum, bellum sua sponte gerere, in regnum iniussu populi Romani ac senatus accedere* (*in Pis.* 50) were clearly unenforceable.[59] Both in order to restrict the opportunities for individuals to attain pre-eminence and to preserve its own authority, the senate had good reason to frown on annexations. And that was not all. Just because annual commands were preferred, there was always the danger that incompetent nonentities would sustain ignominious defeats, and it became hard for generals to carry through a systematic course of expansion or pacification; hence it was not until Augustus' time that order could be established throughout Spain, though it is hard to believe that the complete conquest of that country can ever have seemed undesirable.

VIII THE THEORY OF THE JUST WAR

Following Panaetius, Cicero implied that states as well as individuals should respect the just principle of *suum cuique*. Men should not only abstain from doing wrong themselves but so far as possible prevent wrong-doing by others (*de offic.* 1.20-4). Wars should therefore be fought only *ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur* and as a last resort, if diplomacy failed; they were, however, justified not only in self-defence but also for the protection of friends and allies against injury.

Cicero claimed that Numa had implanted in the Romans a 'love of peace and tranquillity, which enable justice and good faith most easily to flourish', and in rebutting an argument, which had been advanced by Carneades on his visit to Rome in 155, that all men necessarily followed their own interests without regard to justice,

and that Rome had naturally pursued a policy of aggrandizing her own wealth and power, he maintained that her wars had been just: in particular, it was by defending her allies that Rome had secured world dominion. (Sallust propounds a similar view.) According to Cicero, by strict observance of the old fetial procedure, or of a procedure modelled on it, under which war had to be formally declared, and was to be declared only when reparation had been sought and refused, with the gods invoked to punish unjust demands, Rome had demonstrated her respect for the rights of others. Cicero's insistence that every war must have a *iusta causa* was certainly not peculiar to himself, but corresponded to Roman practice or propaganda since at least the third century.[60] Nor, despite lamentations on the supposed decay of moral standards, had it been abandoned in Cicero's own time. Caesar followed it with as much, or rather as little, scrupulosity as the senate had done in the second century. Augustus was later to boast that he had pacified the Alps *nulli genti bello per iniuriam inlato* (*RG* 26).

In fact the primitive fetial procedure was certainly formalistic and permitted the enforcement in arms of demands that had no equitable basis. Livy, to whom we owe the preservation of what he took to be the ancient ritual (1.32), put into the mouth of the Alban dictator the cynical observation that though both Romans and Albans were putting forward claims for reparation *ex foedere*, 'if we are to say what is true rather than what is plausible, it is lust for empire that rouses two kindred and neighbouring peoples to arms' (1.23.7). For Livy himself the two cities were contending for *imperium servitiumque* (1.25.3); as Drexler observed, we are in a world where there can only be rulers and subjects, not equal independent powers. It was particularly hard for others to concede that Rome was merely fighting in defence of her friends and allies if (as was sometimes the case) she admitted states to her friendship and offered them protection at a time when they were already threatened or under attack; it was all too obvious that she was then acting for her own interest,[61] and of course victory would give her control of the conquered *iure belli*, and justify mass-enslavements, heavy indemnities or annexation, at her own discretion. Moreover, even Cicero adopted a wide formulation of the rights of a state to defend itself and its friends: 'we may ward off any disadvantage that may

be brought to us' (*si quid importetur nobis incommodi propulsemus*, *de offic.* 2.18).

To an enemy like Perseus (Livy 42.52.16), and even to so sympathetic an interpreter of Roman policy as Polybius (1.10.6), it could appear that Rome took the mere existence of a powerful and potentially dangerous neighbour as such a disadvantage, and Cicero's principles were quite compatible with Cato's argument for finishing Carthage off: 'the Carthaginians are our enemies already; for whoever is directing all his preparations against me, so that he may make war on me at the time of his own choice, is already my enemy, even if he is not yet taking armed action' (*ORF*^{2} fr. 195). In all cases the Romans were in Hobbes' words 'judges of the justness of their own fears'. In retrospect Lactantius could aver that 'it was by using fetials to declare war, inflicting injuries under cover of law and unceasingly coveting and carrying off what belonged to others that Rome obtained possession of the world' (*de div. inst.* 6.9.4). Roman reactions to the possibility of a threat resembled those of a nervous tiger, disturbed when feeding. It is hardly surprising that Polybius, although in his analysis of the origins of many particular wars Rome's policy appears to be defensive, concluded that Rome had persistently and deliberately aimed at extending her dominion.[62]

Cicero himself casually refers to Roman wars like those waged with Italian peoples, Pyrrhus and Carthage, the purpose of which was empire or glory. Such a purpose was hardly consistent with Panaetius' general account of justice, and I take it that it was Cicero who inserted the reference to them, half-conscious that Panaetius' doctrine did not after all permit the justification of all Rome's wars. He does indeed hasten to add that just causes must be found even in such cases.[63] But a just cause is now nothing but the 'decent pretext' that Polybius (36.2) thought the Romans were right to look for, after deciding on war for reasons of self-interest; it might be as legalistic and inequitable as those adduced for the Third Punic War.

Polybius thought that Rome needed them to impress the world, i.e. the Greek world, and it may be that as late as c. 150 the senate still had some regard for Greek public opinion, such as it had shown in the previous generation. This sort of consideration

is certainly ascribed to the Romans on other occasions,[64] and their propagandist assumption of the role of protector of Greek liberty finds an analogy in Caesar's attempt to parade himself in 58 as the champion of the freedom of Gallic peoples against German invaders (*BG* 1.33 and 45); indeed his relations with the Gauls in a single decade offer a sort of telescoped parallel to those of Rome with the Greek cities between 200 and 146.

But Polybius may have been both too cynical and too inclined to overrate the importance in Roman eyes of his own fellow-Greeks. We must not forget that for Romans a just war was one in which the gods were on their side. The very formalism of Roman religion made it possible for them to believe that this divine favour could be secured, provided only that all the necessary ceremonies and procedures had been duly followed. Drexler (p.110) suggested that the Romans fought better because they were convinced in this way of the rightness of the cause, even in cases when it does not seem morally defensible to us.[65] However Machiavellian the *principes* may have been in directing policy, they had perhaps to think of the morale of the common soldiers. Dio at least supposed that the near-mutiny at Vesontio in 58 was inspired not only by fear of Ariovistus but also by the suspicion that Caesar was entering on a campaign out of personal ambition without a just cause (38.35).

IX CAESAR IN GAUL

The most remarkable document of Roman imperialism is Caesar's *de bello Gallico*. Sallust thought that he hankered for a new war in which his *virtus* would shine out (*Cat.* 54.4). Suetonius was later to write of his shameless aggressions and ascribe them principally to greed (cf. n.81). Conquest was clearly bound to fill his purse and enhance his fame.

Plutarch said that by crossing the Channel he carried Roman supremacy beyond the *oikoumene* (*Caes.* 23.2), just as Claudius later boasted of extending the empire beyond the Ocean (*ILS* 212.1.40), that encompassing stream which Alexander had done no more than reach. According to Sallust (*Hist.* 3.88), Pompey had sought to emulate Alexander from his youth; his assumption of the *cognomen* 'Magnus' suggests this, and Cicero could refer to him as 'invictissimus' (*in Pis.* 34), just as Alexander had been honoured as the 'unconquered

god' (Hyperides, *c. Dem.* 32). There is indeed little reason to believe that Alexander was much in Caesar's mind,[66] and even Pompey had had no such freedom as the autocratic king to carry his arms whithersoever he would. Still it was Alexander who had first conceived, or so it was generally supposed, the ideal of world conquest, which figured in the contemporary appearance of the globe on Roman coins, a symbol that became more common under Caesar's rule,[67] and which was voiced in the imperialist language of Cicero; he extolled Pompey for making the Roman empire coterminous with the limits of the earth and sky, and found it necessary to praise Caesar in almost similar terms (cf. n.9). A writer so friendly to Caesar as Nicolaus held that at the end of his life he was bent on subduing not only the Parthian empire but India and all lands up to the marge of the Ocean.[68]

However that may be, before Caesar had attained absolute power, he could, like Pompey whom he was no doubt intent on rivalling, pursue only limited objectives. He did not even start with the project of conquering Gaul. His original purpose must have been to operate in Illyricum; he was diverted by the accident of the Helvetian migration.[69] But he seized every opportunity to extend Roman dominion. He assumes the sympathy of his readers. Every forward step he took could be said to conform with the peculiar Roman conception of defensive war, which covered the prevention and elimination of any *potential* menace to Roman power. The *Commentaries* candidly reveal that *casus belli* were subsidiary at least to that end. Though they voice no grandiose aspirations for world conquest, world conquest, if attainable at all, could be attained only by stages, and as opportunities offered. It would be unwise to affirm that belief in Rome's mission to rule the world did not underlie Caesar's own attitude, and that which he expected in his readers.

Beyond the narrow confines of the province it is convenient to call Narbonensis, Rome had recognized the freedom of Gallic peoples such as the Arverni, whom she had defeated c. 120 B.C., and had established ties of friendship with some of them, for instance the Aedui. Her policy had, however, been largely one of non-intervention. She had not sought to arbitrate in wars in which her own friends were involved. The Sequani had called in bands of Germans under Ariovistus to aid them against the Aedui, apparently in

72, and inflicted a heavy defeat on that people, only to find themselves gradually reduced to submission by their own *condottieri*. So far from answering an Aeduan appeal for protection in 61, Rome at Caesar's own instance honoured Ariovistus with the name of friend in 59 allegedly at his own request.[70] None the less, the ties of friendship formed outside the province gave the Romans what they could regard as a just cause for intervention, whenever it suited them.[71]

In 58 the Helvetii sought to migrate from Switzerland to Saintonge. Very naturally, Caesar refused them passage through Narbonesis (*BG* 1.5-8). But he was also resolved to resist their movement by any route. They were (he claims) a fierce, warlike, people, who had destroyed a Roman army in 107, an event Caesar harps on,[72] and who evidently had no peaceful relationship with Rome. He contends that whereas they were useful in their old home, as a buffer between north Italy and the Germans, their presence in Saintonge would endanger the security of Narbonensis (*BG* 1.10). They designed to march through the lands of the Aedui, whose appeals gave Caesar a *iusta causa* to fight and hinder or punish their depredations.[73] But he leaves no room for doubt that he had decided to bar their migration simply because of the danger so strong a people might constitute in Gaul to Roman interests.

Meantime Ariovistus had been bringing more Germans into Sequanian territory. Not only the Aedui but the Sequani were encouraged by Caesar's victory over the Helvetii to seek his aid against the German intruders (*BG* 1.30-2). Caesar says that, recalling the Cimbric invasion of Gaul, he thought the presence of this growing German power there a threat to Rome, and considered it disgraceful *in tanto imperio populi Romani* that the Aedui, as friends and brothers of the Roman people, should be in servitude to them (*BG* 1.33). Yet their plight must have been well known to him when he had procured Ariovistus' recognition as king and friend of Rome. He presented Ariovistus with the demands that he should settle no more Germans across the Rhine, restore the Aeduan hostages and make no wrongful attack on the Aedui and their allies. Ariovistus, on Caesar's own showing, found these demands inconsistent with Rome's previous neutrality and his own position as her friend. He retorted that Caesar had no better right to

interfere in his part of Gaul than he in the Roman province; both had acquired legitimate dominions *iure belli* (*BG* 1.34.4; cf. 44). Caesar obviously intended his readers to find here proof of what he calls the German's insolence. Ariovistus was told that Rome expected from her friends dutiful compliance with her will. Of course compliance would have dissipated his own prestige and power. War inevitably followed. It was clearly not the consequence of Aeduan appeals which had hitherto been disregarded, nor of any German aggression - Caesar lays no stress on the fact that the Germans actually struck the first blow (*BG* 1.46) - but of Caesar's decision to destroy a potential menace to Rome, and to aggrandize Roman dominion.[74]

He claims that by his success in 58 he pacified all Gaul, evidently in the restricted sense of that term, excluding Aquitania and Belgica.[75] This meant in effect that its peoples had become subjects. Like so many others who had sought Roman protection, they had become *subiecti atque obnoxii* to the Romans (Livy 7.30.2). The legions wintered in Sequanian lands (*BG* 1.54), and henceforth even the Aedui were bound to obey Caesar's directions, to submit like other friendly peoples to interference in their internal affairs, and to send contingents to his army.[76] In his reply to Ariovistus Caesar had said that the victory over the Arverni in 121 had already given Rome the best title to rule over the Gauls, and that it was an act of grace on her part to allow them freedom, an act that also debarred any one else from taking it away from them (*BG* 1.45). It soon appeared that Rome rather than the Germans would deprive them of liberty.

In 57 the Belgae already feared attack and 'conspired' to anticipate it. Caesar took this as a justification for striking first. He does not bother to suggest that a Belgic raid on the territory of the Remi, who had voluntarily submitted to him, was the warrant for his offensive operations.[77] One by one the Belgae were forced to surrender. If such peoples took up arms again, it was rebellion and a breach of faith.[78] In 56, without so much as an allegation that any attack on Roman territory was brewing, Roman troops invaded Aquitania, where the people could be treated as hostile because they had assailed Roman forces in the Sertorian war (*BG* 3.20).

In 55 Caesar first crossed the Channel on the plea that Britons had assisted his Gallic enemies in almost every war; this hitherto unmentioned assistance cannot have been significant. Some *civitates* were forced, or induced, to promise obedience to Roman orders, and the second invasion could then be justified, either to hold them to their undertakings or to protect them against still independent neighbours.[79] Tribute was imposed (*BG* 5.22.4); this must have been Caesar's general practice in Gaul, whenever he had met and subdued resistance (cf. *BG* 7.76.1); in 51/50 he was careful to impose no *new* burdens (*BG* 8.49). Even peoples which had voluntarily submitted were required to send military contingents and in general to obey Caesar's will.[80]

Again in 55, after refusing to allow some German tribes to settle peacefully west of the Rhine, in the fear that they would combine with disloyal Gauls against him (*BG* 4.5f.), Caesar attacked and massacred those who had crossed. The preventive action he took was no different in principle from his previous offensives, of which his enemies at Rome do not seem to have complained, and he no doubt expects his readers to infer that his Machiavellian detention of the German chiefs who had come to him as ambassadors, while he cut their leaderless followers to pieces in time of truce, was warranted by an earlier violation of the truce on the part of the Germans (*BG* 4.11-14; cf. 8.23.3). At Rome, as usual, supplications were voted for his victory, though Cato urged that for his perfidy he should be delivered up to the Germans.[81] Both in 55 and 54 Caesar went further, crossing the Rhine himself, to punish German inroads and spread the terror of the Roman name. Once again he had clients (the Ubii) to protect beyond the river, whom he characteristically treats as subject to his orders - and that made it absurd in Roman eyes if the Sugambri claimed that the Rhine was the frontier of the Roman empire. But Caesar does not conceal the fact that his German campaigns were essentially designed for the security of Roman dominion in Gaul.[82]

Caesar's account of these transactions is self-exculpatory only in a certain sense. He undoubtedly intends his readers to think that it was not for personal greed or glory that he undertook his campaigns, but he has no need to insist on their justice. Though he never claims to have planned the conquest of Gaul, it is implicit in

the *Commentaries*, from the very first sentence, that this was what he had achieved. Few Romans besides Cato needed to be convinced of the propriety of any measures he took to this end. In his speech of 56 *de provinciis consularibus*, without troubling himself about the niceties of Caesar's treatment of this or that individual Gallic people, Cicero argues flatly that Caesar was performing the highest service to the state by conquering the whole country, since there was no other way of providing permanently for Italy's security; it made no difference that Caesar had mastered peoples whose very names had never been heard at Rome before.[83] On this sort of principle no war that Rome could fight against foreign peoples who might some day be strong enough to attack her could be other than defensive. There is no indication in the speech that this view was contested. Those who wished to relieve Caesar of his command evidently argued not that his campaigns had been unjust or unnecessary, but that the war was already over.

Of course this was far from true. Caesar's greatest crises were yet to come. In 52 he had to contend with an almost pan-Gallic rebellion. It may be that he actually exaggerated Gallic unity on sundry occasions (n.75); and made it plausible that Rome could not stop short of subduing the whole nation and implicitly excused operations against any one *civitas* whose offence was solely that of not having submitted. Caesar himself allows that his opponents were fighting for liberty, 'for which all men naturally strive'. Roman writers were never reluctant to recognize this motive for resistance and revolt.[84] But they did not concede that their subjects or dependants had any right to be free of Roman rule. Liberty was the privilege of the imperial people, as Cicero boasted to the Quirites: *populum Romanum servire fas non est, quem di immortales omnibus gentibus imperare voluerunt.*[85] Caesar's admiration for Vercingetorix is easily to be discerned, but as the great rebel, he still merited death.[86]

X ROMAN 'CLEMENCY'

Wherever necessary, the most brutal methods of repression were therefore in order. Death or enslavement was the common penalty for freedom-fighters. Caesar was alleged to have made a million slaves in Gaul;[87] he himself casually refers to a load of captives he shipped

back from Britain in 55 (*BG* 5.23.2), the only kind of booty, Cicero had heard (*ad Att.* 4.16.7), that could be expected from this poor island; he was delighted at Quintus' promise to send him some of them (*ad QF.* 3.7.4). Caesar did all he could to extirpate the Eburones (*BG* 6.34 and 43). On one occasion, like Scipio Aemilianus, that paragon of Roman *humanitas* (App. *Iber.* 94), he had the right hands of all his prisoners cut off (8.44). Yet he speaks, as does Hirtius, of his clemency.[88]

It was characteristic of Romans as early as Cato (Gell. 6.3.52) to boast of what Livy calls their *vetustissimum morem victis parcendi* (33.12.7). Once again Cicero held that Roman practice conformed to Panaetian laws of war; especially when wars were fought for glory, the conquered were to be treated with mercy. Only the destruction of Corinth had perhaps marred Rome's record. Not indeed that Cicero considered that mercy was always proper; it was not due to enemies who were themselves cruel or who were guilty of violating treaties, Rome naturally being the judge, nor when Rome's own survival was at stake. He does not make it clear how he would have justified the destruction of Numantia, which he approves.[89] But Numantia had rebelled; to Romans rebellion was in itself proof of perfidy. Polybius reports Flamininus as saying in 197 that the Romans were 'moderate, placable and humane', since they did not utterly destroy a people the first time they fought them (18.37). By implication repeated resistance might call for severity, which was also regarded as a virtue. When Virgil defined Rome's mission as *parcere subiectis et debellare superbos*, he was in effect dividing mankind into two categories, those too insolent to accept her god-given dominion, and those who submitted to it. The latter were to be spared: what of the former? Germanicus was to set up a monument boasting that he had 'warred down' the Germans, after exterminating one community with no distinction of age or sex (Tac. *Ann.* 2.21f.).

Naturally this was not the practice Romans preferred. We may readily believe Augustus' claim that it was his policy to preserve foreign peoples who could safely be spared rather than extirpate them (*RG* 3). After all, the dead paid no taxes. Moreover it was usually more expedient to accept the surrender of an enemy, offered in the hope or expectation of mercy, rather than to incur the expense of time, money and blood in further military operations, and

then to fulfil that expectation, if only to encourage others not to prolong their own resistance. Hampl found a precedent for Rome's normal conduct in Hittite inscriptions. It was not motivated primarily by humanity, but by rational consideration of self-interest.[90]

It is true that Cicero connected with Rome's supposed clemency to the vanquished her liberality with the franchise. In degree, if not in kind, this was undoubtedly a practice for which we can find no parallel in the policy of other city states. But for Cicero himself it was not altruistic generosity, but a device by which Rome had extended her empire (see p.165). In early days it must have been prompted by self-interest, however enlightened, and it was not always welcome to beneficiaries such as the Capuans, if they did not attain to full equality of rights in the Roman state. By the time that Roman citizenship had come to be an object of the subjects' aspirations, it was a privilege granted reluctantly and sparingly. In Cicero's youth the Italians had had to wrest it from Rome by force of arms. Few now wished to go further and add to the numbers of *Romanos rerum dominos gentemque togatam*. All efforts to enfranchise the Transpadani failed until Caesar could carry the measure by military power in 49.[91] It was Caesar too who began to extend citizenship to provincial communities. More often he was content to bestow the Latin right, as to the Sicilians. They were Cicero's old clients, whose loyalty to Rome he had extolled in fulsome terms in 70; none the less, he regarded this grant as 'insufferable'.[92]

XI JUSTICE FOR THE SUBJECTS

In general Cicero speaks with contempt of provincials. Thus the most eminent of Gauls is not to be compared with the meanest of Romans; they were an arrogant and faithless people, bound by no religious scruples, the true descendants of those who had burned down the Capitol (*pro Font.* 27-36). Conceivably there might be Sardinians whose testimony a Roman court might believe, but most of them were mere barbarian half-breeds, more mendacious than their Punic forebears, and not one community in the island had earned the privileges of friendship with Rome and liberty (*pro Scaur.* 38-45). Even the Greeks, to whom Rome owed her culture, as Cicero often allowed,[93] were now for the most part degenerate,[94] yet they stood at a far higher level than such peoples as Mysians and Phrygians (*ad QF.*

1.1.19), who constituted most of the population of the province of Asia. Jews and Syrians were 'nations born for servitude' (*de prov. cons.* 10). Admittedly in most of the passages cited Cicero was trying to discredit witnesses hostile to his clients, and he could speak, when it suited him, honorifically of provincial magnates and communities, but none the less such statements are eloquent of the prejudice he could easily arouse, and some of his private remarks even on Greeks are disdainful (e.g. *ad QF.* 1.2.4).

The '*ideal* of inclusiveness' which Last treats as an 'outstanding feature of the political technique devised by the Roman Republic' had not in fact emerged.[95] The third book of Cicero's *de republica* preserves traces of an argument in which imperial dominion seems to have been defended as just in much the same way as the rule of soul over body or masters over slaves; men who were incapable of governing themselves were actually better off as the slaves or subjects of others.[96] The theory naturally did not imply that any actual slaves or subjects belonged to this category, but a Roman could easily persuade himself that experience showed the subjects to be unfitted for independence.

Under Roman private law the master was entitled to exploit his slaves as he pleased, and the *iura belli*, accepted throughout antiquity, allowed similar rights to the victor in war. Beyond doubt Romans took it for granted that Rome was justified in profiting from her empire. Yet in Panaetius' theory, which Cicero adopted, just as masters were bound to give slaves just treatment (*de offic.* 1.41), so an imperial power had a duty to care for the ruled, which Rome had faithfully discharged in the 'good, old days' before Sulla (2.27). Good government was due even to Africans, Spaniards and Gauls, 'savage and barbarous nations' (*ad QF.* 1.1.27).

Many or most of Rome's subjects had come under her sway, not always after defeat, by *deditio*, which involved the surrender of *divina humanaque omnia* (Livy 1.38) and the extinction of the community concerned, but Rome regularly restored to the *dediti* their cities, lands and laws, often recognized them as her friends and sometimes concluded treaties with them; they thus acquired rights that *fides* or *religio* bound Rome to respect. In practice Rome left them all to manage their own internal affairs, at most ensuring that they were administered by persons loyal to the sovereign.[97]

Indemnities or taxes might be demanded from defeated enemies as *quasi victoriae praemium ac poena belli* (II *Verr.* 3.12), and provinces could be described as virtual estates of the Roman people (ibid. 2.7), yet Cicero at least felt it necessary to argue that taxation was in the interest of the provincials themselves: armies were required for their protection, and revenue was indispensable to pay them (*ad QF.* 1.1.34). Thus taxation of the subjects was justified by the benefits conferred on them. Precisely the same argument was to be advanced by Tacitus.[98] There was not even anything new in Tiberius' celebrated dictum that he would have his subjects sheared, not shaved (Suet. *Tib.* 32): Cicero rebutted Verres' claim that he had acted in the public interest by selling the Sicilian tithes at unprecedentedly high amounts, by observing that neither senate nor people had intended him to act in such a way as to ruin the farmers and jeopardize future returns (II *Verr.* 3.48). This, however, is only a question of rational exploitation of the subjects, not of justice towards them.

We may indeed ask how far Cicero spoke for many more than himself in advocating justice to the subjects. Here I attach some significance to his denunciations of the misgovernment prevalent in his time, in the Verrines written for an upper-class audience, in his speech before the people on the Manilian law, and even in a despatch from Cilicia to the senate.[99] He assumes that his own sentiments are generally shared. He actually tells the senate that because of the oppressive and unjust character of Roman government the *socii* are too weak or too disloyal to contribute much to defence against Parthia. About the same time he wrote to Cato that it was his principal object, given the lack of adequate military resources, to provide for the protection of his province by his own mild and upright conduct that would ensure the fidelity of the *socii*, and he later claims that he had reconciled the provincials to Roman rule by the excellence of his own administration.[100] It was indeed a commonplace of ancient political thinking, doubtless based on oft-repeated experience, that in Livy's words *certe id firmissimum longe imperium est quo oboedientes gaudent*;[101] it recurs, for instance, in discussions of absolute monarchy, which teach the king to show justice not only for its own sake but in order to secure the affection of his subjects and make his rule more secure.[102]

However, Cicero's letters from Cilicia and his advice to his brother in Asia (*ad QF*. 1.1) do not suggest that good government was to be practised purely for this prudential reason. Cicero tells Atticus, for instance, that his integrity as a governor afforded him the greatest intrinsic satisfaction of his life. It mattered to him, he says, more than the fame it brought (*ad Att*. 5.20.6). But the allusion to fame should also be marked. 'Fame' he says in the first *Philippic* (29) 'is demonstrated by the testimony not only of all the best men but by that of the multitude.' It was in this sense that he expected his reputation to be enhanced by his virtues as a governor. So too he surely supposed that denunciations of misrule would evoke indignation - Pompey in 71, he tells us (I *Verr*. 45), had actually roused the people in this way - and equally that there would be a popular response to his laudation of Pompey, not only as a great general but as one whose upright behaviour won the hearts of the subjects (*de imp. Cn. Pomp*. 36-42); he does not add in this encomium that his behaviour would strengthen Roman rule. In the same way Caesar in his *Civil War* digresses to excoriate the cruelty and rapacity of Metellus Scipio and his officers in the east (*BC* 3.31-3); this was in part a propagandist work, and Caesar evidently hoped that his readers would condemn his enemies for their ill-treatment of provincials. The author of the *Bellum Africum* also contrasts Caesar's care for African provincials (3.1, 7.2) with the depredations, and worse, of his adversaries (26).

Perhaps the constant use of the term *socii* to describe provincials in itself indicates something about Roman attitudes to them; it could hardly have been totally divested of the nuance imparted by its other senses. Much more striking, however, is the history of *repetundae* legislation. At least from the late third century the senate had been ready to hear compaints from the *socii* against Roman officials and to provide for reparation or punishment.[103] The statutes on this subject passed between 149 and 59 were the work of politicians of varying complexion, but according to Cicero (*de offic*. 2.75) each enactment made the law stricter. It is notable that the clause authorizing recovery of money from third parties who had benefited from the governor's extortions, a clause that could affect equites and was apparently often invoked, was introduced by Glaucia, who sought their political backing, and was

simply adopted in later statutes (*Rab. post.* 8-10). Cicero briefly characterizes Sulla's law as *lex socialis* (*div. in Caec.* 18). Caesar's statute, comprising no less than 101 clauses (*ad fam.* 8.8.3), and approved by Cicero (*pro Sest.* 135; *in Pis.* 37), remained in force until Justinian's time and formed the basis of the law throughout the imperial period.[104] Our accounts of the eventful year in which it was passed are fairly full, yet they do not allude to its enactment. It was probably uncontroversial. Like earlier *repetundae* laws, it was concerned only with the wrong-doing of senatorial officials. The governor himself was supposed to protect subjects in his courts against publicans and usurers. On paper even Verres promised heavy damages against the former, if they were guilty of illicit exactions (II *Verr.* 3.26), and some governors gave the provincials real protection.[105]

No proof is needed that provincials found insufficient aid in the *repetundae* laws, *quae vi, ambitu, postremo pecunia turbabantur* (Tac. *Ann.* 1.2), or that many governors, for prudence or profit, connived at or participated in the rapacity of tax-gatherers and moneylenders. Personal or political connexions could also distort the conduct of senators who, like Cicero, had no wish for their own part to pillage the subjects.[106] In practice the provincials were usually at the mercy of the proconsul, who was virtually absolute in his province, *ubi nullum auxilium est, nulla conquestio, nullus senatus, nulla contio* (Cic. *ad QF.* 1.1.22). Their best hope lay in his probity and courage. In general he was restrained from indulging in or permitting extortion only by his conscience, or regard for his own reputation. Cicero enjoins upon Quintus and claims for himself, and for Pompey, such virtues as justice, mercy, accessibility and diligence. No quality is more often commended than that elementary honesty for which the most revealing Latin term is *abstinentia*.[107] The very frequency with which it is ascribed, whether truly or falsely, to individuals shows how little it could be assumed as a common characteristic of officials (cf. n.110). Still, we must not too lightly treat a Verres or an Appius as typical of republican governors. Others are known to have been men of personal integrity, or, like Scaevola, Lucullus and perhaps Gabinius (n.105), to have protected the subjects against usurers and publicans. Scaevola remained an exemplar; Cicero took his edict as the

model for his own (cf. n.105). In 50 Cicero tells Atticus that he had heard only good reports of all but one of the eastern governors; they were behaving in conformity with the high principles of Cato, *a quo uno omnium sociorum querelae audiuntur*,[108] and, incidentally, with those which Atticus had himself repeatedly recommended to Cicero.[109] The standards of good government were already recognized and approved in the republic, and the only change that came about in the Principate in this regard was that they were somewhat better observed, an improvement that it is easy to exaggerate.[110]

When Cicero included *provinciae, socii* among the *fundamenta otiosae dignitatis*, I feel sure that he meant among other things care for their welfare (cf. *de leg.* 3.9). But *aerarium* is another of the *fundamenta*, and in his day it was the provinces which supplied most of the revenue. It was probably not until the nineteenth century that any imperial power scrupled to tax subjects for its own benefit; the Romans were not ashamed to do so, and I imagine that most of them would have thought Cicero's justification of the practice, which I cited earlier, as superfluous. In one way or another senators and equites, soldiers and grain recipients at Rome all profited from the empire. In addressing the people Cicero can refer to 'your taxes' and 'your lands'.[111] He did not forget in advocating the Manilian law to argue that it served the interests of the treasury and of Romans with business in the east (*de imp. Cn. Pomp.* 14-19). Pompey boasted of the enormous accretion of revenue his conquests had brought (Plut. *Pomp.* 45). Nor must we overlook what Romans seldom mentioned, that victorious wars stocked Italian estates with cheap slaves.

I will add only one further point. Under the Principate the worst features of republican misrule were obliterated; above all peace and order were better preserved. But exploitation did not end. Italy benefited as much as the provinces from the Roman peace, yet until Diocletian the land there was immune from tax.[112] While contributing less than the provinces to the common needs for expenditure, Italians continued, as late as the third century, to enjoy a share of the higher posts disproportionate to that of provincials, if we simply equate Italy with an area in the provinces of like size and population.[113] Moreover provincial revenues were spent lavishly on feeding and amusing the inhabitants of Rome and beautifying the

city, to say nothing of court expenditure. These privileges were not challenged by provincials in the senate or on the throne. Equality as between Italians and provincials was not attained, until all were sunk in equal misery.

9: GREEK INTELLECTUALS AND THE ROMAN ARISTOCRACY IN THE FIRST CENTURY B.C.

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Roman attitudes to the Greek world and Greek attitudes to Rome in the first century B.C. were alike complex.[1] The development of Roman hegemony and the intermittent occurrence of brutality had long provoked both protests and attempts to throw off the Roman yoke; yet the first century B.C. saw the final consolidation of Roman rule in spite of the efforts of Mithridates VI and the increasing incidence at Rome of civil strife; the demands of the opposing sides in the civil wars actually increased the pressures on the Greek cities and encouraged acts of brutality culminating in the sack of Rhodes in 42 B.C. Recognition, however, of the futility of armed resistance to Rome did not prevent the continued voicing of opposition to Roman rule or to particular aspects of it.

One thinks at one level of Timagenes,[2] brought to Rome as a captive by A.Gabinius, bought by Faustus Sulla, who followed the profession of *sophistes* at Rome; he was notorious for the claim that Theophanes persuaded Ptolemy Auletes to leave Egypt in order to provide a command for Pompeius and publicized the story of Caepio and the gold of Tolosa; he was described as *felicitati urbis inimicus*, jealous of the well-being of the city, who regretted fires at Rome because the city always rose more glorious than before; he may be one of the *levissimi ex Graecis qui Parthorum quoque contra nomen Romanum gloriae favent*, 'frivolous Greeks who rate the glory of Parthia above the reputation of Rome', who stimulated Livy to an angry refutation of their view that Rome would have been no match for Alexander.[3] One thinks also of the anti-Roman historians who favoured barbarian kings attacked by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, some of whom perhaps belonged to the end of the republic.[4] One thinks of the critique of Rome reproduced by Pompeius Trogus.[5] On another level, there is the 'oracle of Hystaspes' and the later portions of the third book of the Sibylline oracles.[6]

At the same time, numerous Greek individuals and communities not only attempted to avoid the possible unfortunate consequences

of Roman rule, but actively sought the benefits which could be won from Roman notables or the Roman senate; in their struggles the still undiminished and ever more widely acknowledged cultural superiority of the Greek world provided an important weapon; at the same time there developed in the late republic 'the open conspiracy in which Greek and Roman aristocracies found a bond of sympathy and material interest' and which formed the basis of Roman rule in the Greek world under Augustus and his successors.[7]

Increased acceptance by the Greek world of Roman rule, indeed, did not lead to any decline in the value attached to traditional Greek institutions or to any reluctance to assert Greek cultural superiority; one reaction to the early stages of the Roman conquest of the Greek world had been the defensive one of claiming superiority in matters other than military, combined with the naive belief that the Romans only needed to have things explained to them in order to appreciate the Greek point of view; so too in the first century B.C. Greek communities consciously sought to preserve their Greekness and Greeks continued to claim the right to set cultural standards. A Roman acceptance, even if hesitant and only occurring in some quarters, of Greek cultural standards of course lies behind the early stages of the Hellenization of Rome; by the first century B.C. the Greek orientation of certain aspects of Roman culture is, I think, strong enough not only to provide a stimulus to Greek intellectual activity, but even to influence its nature. The mediating factor is the existence on a scale previously unknown of links between Roman notables and Greek intellectuals, which may be taken as a special form of the links in any case existing between Greek and Roman aristocrats. But in order to understand this state of affairs, some discussion is necessary of the vitality of Greek institutions and of the Greek assumption of cultural superiority.

The persistence, despite the decline of Magna Graecia, of Greek customs and institutions in those Greek cities of Italy which survived until the coming of the Romans is well known. The Tarentini, a miserable and poverty-stricken community in the second century,[8] regarded by Lucilius as on a par with Cosentini and Siculi,[9] in 102 welcomed Archias, Greeks welcoming a Greek, along with Rhegium and Neapolis.[10] Neapolis, along with Heraclea, where also Archias had been honoured by being given citizenship (Cic. *pro Arch.* 6),

hesitated over whether to accept Roman citizenship after the Social War (Cic. *pro Balb.* 21), no doubt in part because of a fear of being swallowed up in Roman Italy.[11] Neapolis, along with Velia, provided Rome with priestesses of Ceres, who had to be Greek (Cic. *pro Balb.* 55). Neapolis, along with Dicaearchia (Puteoli), offered prayers in the manner of the Greeks when Cn. Pompeius was ill in 50 (Cic. *Tusc. disp.* 1.86; cf. Festus 109 L). Tarentum, Rhegium, Velia and Neapolis remained Greek in character in the early empire, an attribute perhaps shared by the Hellenized native community of Canusium.[12]

The reluctance of Neapolis and Heraclea to accept Roman citizenship is paralleled by a clear, though diminishing, reluctance to become Roman citizens among Greeks in general. No firm conclusion can be drawn from a list of such individual enfranchisements as are attested; but it is striking that when Asclepiades and his two associates were lavishly rewarded in 78 for their services to Rome they were not granted citizenship (Sherk 22). With interesting forthrightness, a Cretan serving on the Italian side in the Social War had already rejected citizenship as a reward for betraying his companions with the remark that 'in the eyes of Cretans citizenship is high-sounding claptrap' (Diod. 27.18). It is also striking that although Theophanes of Mytilene was enfranchised by Pompeius, another great friend, Pythodorus of Tralles, did not acquire citizenship. A changing attitude is perhaps implied by the fact that Lyso of Patras, a friend of Cicero, allowed his son (perhaps in about 50), to be adopted by a Roman, albeit exiled (*ad fam.* 13.19.2). The Civil Wars after 49 brought large-scale enfranchisement in the Greek east and Octavian's navarch Seleucus was granted citizenship *ad hominem* (Sherk 58); when T.Statilius Lamprias of Epidaurus died between A.D. 40 and 42, the Athenians described him, in marked contrast to the earlier Cretan viewpoint, as honoured by possession of 'that great gift, renowned among all men, Roman citizenship'.[13]

Reluctant to accept Roman citizenship, the Greeks of the east in the late republic are also attested as acting to preserve the traditional limitation of land-holding to members of their own communities. We hear of clashes over *enktesis* at Parium and at Colophon, with Cicero writing to get support from the provincial governor for the intending Roman in each case, also of preposterous manoeuvres by Decianus at Apollonis to get possession of land against the wishes

of the community.[14]

On the whole content with their own citizenship and sometimes attested as resisting *more maiorum* the holding of land by outsiders, the Greeks of the first century B.C. in religious matters also normally kept to their own ways. The dedication of the Lycian Aichmon, who served with P.Servilius Isauricus against the pirates in 78, to Mars (Ares) instead of to Jupiter is conspicuous for its isolation (*OGIS* 553). Agonistic festivals in the Greek world continued to follow the traditional pattern, of which participation by Greek competitors was a conspicuous feature; gladiatorial contests were of course imported into the Greek world, but remained an alien excrescence, without attracting Greek participation.[15] The use of aromatic plants in funeral rites remained an almost purely Roman custom, unattested in the Greek world except for isolated introductions (in the context of Roman settlement) in the early empire.[16]

Normal Greek practice in dedicating a statue was to name the honorand in the accusative, Roman practice to name him in the dative; the Greek usage persisted, with only four imperial dedications in the Greek world in the dative (from Mytilene, Athens, Sparta and Asia, this last Hadrianic).[17] There is one isolated republican example of a private dedication in Greek in the dative,[18] a few more from Augustus onwards. The Greek place of honour was on one's right, the Roman on one's left;[19] the Gytheum inscription shows Livia on Augustus' right, the more honoured in Greek usage than Tiberius on Augustus' left.[20]

The imperviousness of the Greek world to Roman customs is attested also by archaeological evidence. Even in Sicily, Roman styles and techniques of architecture are rare.[21] The Roman urban pattern of *insulae* with shops around continues to contrast with the Greek pattern of small housing units with separate shops.[22] The Roman *vicus* organization is unknown in the east, except in a colonial context.[23] In Cyrenaica the Greek (and native) population in a sense took over, but metamorphosed almost out of recognition, Roman funerary art.[24]

The vitality of Greek institutions, then, is amply attested; the Greek assumption of cultural superiority is no less clear. There is still little trace of any interest in Latin literature in any Greek author and not even the grudging admission of some Athenians of the early second century A.D. that *some* of the poetry of Catullus and

Calvus was up to the standard of Anacreon and other Greek lyric poets.[25] Assertion or reassertion by a Greek community in the east of the value of its past and of its culture is attested by the re-inscription at Miletus around 100 of the decree of the *molpoi* of 450/49 and of the third and early second-century list of *aisymnetai*.[26] The Greek world in general and Greek intellectuals in particular also expected to set standards. The trio of adjectives applied, we do not know on what grounds, by Posidonius to Marcellus is significant[27] - despite his military ability, moderate, benevolent and loving *Hellenike paideia* and Greek learning, admiring those who engaged in intellectual activity though he had not time enough for it; the expectations of Posidonius emerge clearly from the improving tale, for which he is the sole source, of the successful intercession of Nicias of Engyion with Marcellus for his city. It is also clear from what Cicero tells us of Cato the Younger and from what Nepos tells us of Atticus that the Greek ideal was for Greek philosophical precepts to govern Roman conduct.[28] The implausibility of the notion is evidence of the obsession with the ideal. Evidence for Greek standards of behaviour may also be drawn from the account in Dionysius of Halicarnassus of the opposing Roman and Tarentine claims to Neapolitan friendship in 327, presumably reflecting attitudes of the first century B.C. and cast in terms of what Greeks should or should not do.[29] And the story in Strabo of Demetrius' protest to Rome over Antiate piracy, again presumably in a first century B.C. dress even if the essence of the story is authentic, is a perfect example of Greek didactic moralizing (5.3.5 (232)).

Greek cultural claims in the first century B.C. are therefore clear enough; what is less immediately clear is the nature of the relationship between these Greek intellectual claims and their Roman addressees and the nature of the hold which Greek intellectuals had over members of the Roman aristocracy. I shall suggest, first, that in the first century B.C. the cultural interests of the Roman aristocracy were more Greek oriented than before, despite the persistence of certain readily intelligible ambiguities; second, that men who were never able like Cicero, or for that matter Catullus or Lucretius, to pursue whatever cultural interests they had acted as patrons of the arts instead; third, that the availability of patronage for Greek men of letters and the form which it sometimes

took of lightening the burden of Roman rule for the communities of the men concerned provided a possible stimulus to intellectual activity which was not directly beneficial to the patron. I suggest that not all Greek men of letters were wholly honest in the way they went about their business; if some Romans wished first and foremost to be seen to be men of Hellenic culture, not all Greeks lived up to the tenets of the *paideia* which they professed.

Even in private, Cicero found little to admire in the Greeks of his own day;[30] in public, there was a rich vein of prejudice to be exploited. It was easy to equate Epicurean philosophy with the immorality for which the Greeks were notorious (*in Pis.* 68-72). Jews and Syrians, that is, the Greeks of Syria, could be described as *nationes natae servituti*, peoples born to slavery; the Greeks, despite their culture, were hopeless liars as witnesses;[31] they were easily led into passing decrees against Roman magistrates, indeed irresponsibility was the dominant feature of their assemblies, which actually *sat* to deliberate.[32] Allied to the Roman view, that when it came to running a state the Romans were incomparably better than the Greeks, was the clearly held belief that Roman civil law was superior to anything which the Greek world had to offer;[33] it is amazing, remarks Cicero, how all *ius civile* apart from our own is crude and almost absurd.[34]

But in a famous passage in a letter to his brother, Cicero characterized his debt to Greek culture: even if his brother were in charge of Africans, Spaniards or Gauls, *immanes ac barbarae nationes*, 'wild and barbarous peoples', he should look after them; but since he is in charge of Greeks, from whom *humanitas* has spread to others, he must show it to them.[35] Cicero goes on to say that his achievements are due to what he has learnt from the Greeks. But even here there is a reservation: the story of Cicero's life does not allow what might otherwise be a possible inference, namely that an interest in Greek learning is a sign of *inertia* or *levitas*. Too great a knowledge of Greek culture could be misunderstood; Cicero had been reproached for speaking Greek in Syracuse and in attacking C.Verres was careful to apologize for knowing the names of Greek artists, even an artist such as Praxiteles.[36] There is in fact a fundamental ambiguity in the attitude of Cicero and his contemporaries, an ambiguity which echoes that of the elder Cato and his contemporaries a

century earlier and which cannot be adequately explained in terms of the difference between contemporary and classical Greece or between intellectual and immoral Greeks.

Despite the dangers, Cicero and his peers sometimes seem to have behaved as if Greek culture was the only culture which mattered. Education by Greeks and through the medium of Greek was taken for granted by the upper classes. Although Cicero learnt from the Roman speech-writer and antiquarian, L.Aelius, *eruditissimus et Graecis litteris et Latinis*, 'an outstanding Greek and Latin scholar', and naturally listened to Roman orators and studied the *ius civile*, most of his education was at the hands of Greeks, beginning with the Epicurean Phaedrus.[37]

When Philo, the head of the Academy at Athens, came to Rome in 88 as a refugee from Mithridates, Cicero spent all the time he could with him.[38] He went on to devote himself to philosophy and rhetoric, under the guidance of the Stoic Diodotus, who lived for a time under Cicero's roof and in his company;[39] the oratorical exercises undertaken by Cicero were in Greek rather than in Latin;[40] the visit of Apollonius Molo to Rome in 82-81 provided Cicero with an opportunity to broaden his education still further.[41] Finally a trip to the east saw Cicero studying for six months under Antiochus of the Academy and also under Phaedrus once more and under Zeno, another Epicurean philosopher; he also studied with Demetrius, a teacher of rhetoric; he then went to Asia and travelled round in the company of a number of great orators, Menippus of Stratonicea, Dionysius of Magnesia, Aeschylus of Cnidus, Xenocles of Adramyttium; then on to Rhodes to study again under Molo.[42]

Nor was Cicero untypical; C.Aurelius Cotta had set the fashion (Cic. *ND* 1.59); Caesar also sailed to Rhodes to study under Molo, though he was diverted by the outbreak of the Third Mithridatic War.[43] And when Sertorius set out to educate the Spaniards, he provided teachers in Greek and Roman learning (Plut. *Sert.* 14). The three nonentities, P. and C.Selius and Tetrilius Rogus, in Alexandria with Lucullus, had listened to Philo in Rome with some attention (Cic. *Acad.pr.* 2.11). A generation later, Cicero's son and nephew went through the same educational process as he had himself.[44] Caesar had Octavian given a rhetorical education in Greek and Latin (Zonaras 10.13). Massalia was able to profit from the Roman desire for a

Greek education by setting itself up as a rival to Athens (and thereby perhaps recovering some of the prosperity lost as a result of backing Pompeius) (Strabo 4.1.5 (181)). Things had progressed so far that the Greek education of Juba II actually took place in Italy.[45]

It comes as no surprise to discover that it is for the period of Cicero's youth that there is recorded the first occasion on which a Greek ambassador addressed the senate without an interpreter, Apollonius Molo in 82-81.[46] Twenty years later, in 62, Cicero asserted that Greek literature was read in almost all countries (in contrast to Latin), Italy clearly included (*pro Arch.* 23). Within Cicero's lifetime, there apparently emerged the catchphrase *utraque lingua*, automatically understood as referring to the two languages available to an educated Roman.[47]

But the Roman aristocracy in the generation after Sulla was not only Greek educated and Greek speaking; for them apparently only Greek culture was good enough. There was a ready market in Rome for the library of Aristotle;[48] L.Gellius, censor in 70, equipped himself with a Greek mythological ancestress in the shape of Lamia-Gello, daughter of Neptune and queen of the Laestrygonians, and probably used the Palazzo Santa Croce reliefs to illustrate the claim;[49] early contacts between Greece and Rome in the shape of Delphic oracles were recklessly invented;[50] Caesar felt himself obliged to include 500 Greeks among the 5,000 new colonists of Comum (Strabo 5.1.6 (213)); the future triumvir M.Lepidus advertised on his coinage the at best exaggerated claim that an ancestor had been tutor to Ptolemy V.[51] Greek fashions in everything from metal ware to perfume were all the rage.[52]

Some Romans even seem to have gone so far as to ignore most contemporary developments in the field of Latin literature, aping the Greeks thereby. This attitude is both exemplified by and particularly striking in Cicero, himself both outstandingly creative in one branch of Latin literature and clearly aware of his oratorical achievements; Latin literature is apparently of almost no interest to him before the last decade of his life and only a Greek is thought suitable as the author of a monograph on his consulship.

To take history first, Claudius Quadrigarius, writing a history

of Rome from the Gallic sack down to his own day in the decade after Sulla, is mentioned neither by Cicero nor by any other writer before Livy; Cn.Cornelius Sisenna, a perhaps younger contemporary, praetor in 78,[53] writing a monograph on the wars of 91 to 82, is quoted once by Cicero in connexion with dreams and omens (*de div.* 1.99), once by Varro on a point of grammar (*LL* 8.73); this despite the favourable judgement by Sallust (*BJ* 95.2). C.Licinius Macer, tribune in 73 and praetor perhaps in 68, author of a history of Rome probably down to his own day,[54] appears to have been almost wholly ignored by the age of Cicero; but Sisenna and Macer were at least discussed by Cicero when he came to reflect on Roman historiography towards the end of his life. The unfortunate Valerius Antias is mentioned by no one before Dionysius and Livy, although he may have been used by Varro.[55]

Cicero's critique of Roman historiography, placed in the mouth of Atticus, is indeed remarkable (*de leg.* 1.5-7). A request to Cicero to write a history of Rome comes first, *ut in hoc etiam genere Graeciae nihil cedamus*, 'so that in this genre also we may not be inferior to Greece'; the concern is characteristic of Cicero's later years. Brief and derogatory remarks about Pictor and other early writers are followed by savage attacks on Macer and Sisenna, the former for learning nothing from the Greeks,[56] the latter for learning only from Cleitarchus and thereby ruining his style.[57]

I find it hard to believe, however, that Cicero's contempt for the efforts of contemporary Latin historians can be explained solely by reference to their stylistic inadequacies or by reference to their regrettable mendacity, castigated by Cicero in general terms (*Brut.* 62), or in terms of the accepted convention whereby all historians denigrated their predecessors. His attitude is not dissimilar to the view apparently widespread among his contemporaries that only Greek culture was good enough. It was for this reason that Cicero's *commentarius* on his consulship was in Greek[58] and that Atticus' piece on the same subject was in the same language;[59] more significantly, Cicero sent copies to Posidonius and others, with a request to work the *commentarius* up into something grander.[60] (He appears to have believed their polite protestations that they could not possibly improve on his work.)

Nor does Latin poetry of the age of Cicero attract any more attention than Latin historiography from Cicero and his friends.[61]

Cicero's admiration for Varro can be readily explained in terms of his interest in those aspects of Roman history and institutions where her greatness was most apparent.[62]

The dominance of Greek culture in the minds of Cicero and his contemporaries in the period between the Sullan settlement and the outbreak of war between Caesar and Pompeius can best be explained, I think, in terms of a whole-hearted acceptance of Greek cultural values, of the attitude against which the elder Cato had protested, that all except Greeks were barbarians: all that a Roman could do was to seek admission to the magic circle. In the same passage in which Cicero apologized for knowing the name of Praxiteles, he remarked of a 'Greek' of Messana, the owner of the work by Praxiteles under discussion, that he regarded Romans as ignoramuses in artistic matters; it would be hard to think of a more striking expression of the Roman inferiority complex.[63] This complex is apparent also in the urge which Cicero and other Romans evinced to defend their cultural backwardness.[64]

Cicero's pathetic desire for Greek approbation for his Greek literary efforts is also relevant; in 60 he instructed Atticus to distribute copies of his *commentarius* on his consulship to Athens and the other cities of Greece (*ad Att.* 2.1.2). His angry letter to Pelops of Byzantium should be interpreted in the light of this instruction; it was, according to Plutarch (*Cic.* 24), one of the only two angry letters which he wrote to Greeks (the other one was to Gorgias, accused of miseducating his son) and complained of failure to get Cicero certain honorific decrees at Byzantium. Honorific decrees for Greeks were part of Greek city life; they must now be conferred on Cicero, as on other Romans before him.

Equally revealing of the Roman attitude as a whole is the context of Cicero's remarks about Piso's Epicurean leanings; they are prefaced by careful flattery of his audience: he is talking *in hominum eruditissimorum et humanissimorum coetu*, in a gathering of learned and educated men; the flattery continues with Cicero (following a basic precept of ancient rhetoric) careful to appear not to know more than his audience, but to be citing facts well known to them and to all men of culture (*in Pis.* 68). Similar flattery appears before Cicero's discussion of Cato's Stoic views, in his defence of Murena, prosecuted by Cato.[65] At the beginning of the

pro Archia, Cicero talks about being in a gathering *hominum litteratissimorum*, of well-read men (*pro Arch.* 3). Greek intellectuals were in business, I think, in part in order to provide flattery of the same kind.[66]

It is of course true that from the earliest days of Roman involvement in the Greek East prominent members of the Greek cities used their friendship with the commanders sent out by the Romans to ensure the safety or the advancement of their own or other communities and that Greeks often performed real and tangible services for Romans. Despite the warning which Cicero gave to his brother while governor of Asia about trusting the Greeks of that province, Cicero himself made use in Cilicia of one Apollonius, a former freedman of P.Crassus, whom Caesar also used in Egypt (*ad QF.* 1.1.15-16; *ad fam.* 13.16).

It is also true that the abilities of intellectuals as persuaders were early harnessed by Greek cities in their dealings with Rome, as they had been harnessed in dealings with the Hellenistic monarchs.[67] One has only to think of the Athenian embassy of the three philosophers of 155, of the missions of Posidonius and Molo. But it seems to me that for the period after Sulla one can document a relationship between Greek intellectuals and republican *principes* (which may indeed be surmised earlier), in which flattery of Roman cultural pretensions was one service which was provided in anticipation of rewards for the individuals concerned and their own or other communities.

The central and for my purposes paradigmatic figure is Pompeius. In no meaningful sense a man of culture, Hellenic or otherwise,[68] he clearly had pretensions to Hellenic culture. He was accused of retaining for his own use hunting-nets and books from the booty of Asculum; if the accusation was just, Pompeius was clearly imitating L.Aemilius Paullus, who introduced the Greek, or perhaps rather Macedonian, recreation of hunting to Rome and retained for his own use the library of Perseus (Plut. *Pomp.* 4). Pompeius' last words to his family before disembarking to meet his end in Egypt were two lines of Sophocles, yet he had to write down beforehand the Greek speech he proposed to deliver to Ptolemy XIII.[69]

The pretensions of Pompeius chiefly took the form of surrounding himself with Greeks, of whom Theophanes of Mytilene was only the most

notable.[70] Theophanes' willingness to involve himself in Roman politics meant that he was able to perform certain services for Pompeius;[71] he claimed in his history and no doubt made it clear from an early stage of Pompeius' presence in the east that he was going to claim that the archives of Mithridates included a *logos* of P.Rutilius Rufus urging the massacre of the Romans in Asia which Mithridates instigated in 88 (Plut. *Pomp.* 37); this slander, Plutarch surmises, was a response to Rufus' criticism of Pompeius' father. I am, however, not persuaded by Strabo's assertion that Theophanes, although a historian, became a friend of Pompeius primarily because of his political skill and was responsible for his successes, whence great benefits for Mytilene (13.2.3 (617-18)). Cicero speaks of Theophanes only as the author of an account of Pompeius' deeds in discussing his grant of citizenship to him (*pro Arch.* 24); the period of his influence on Pompeius in the sphere of politics, such as it was, comes only in and after 51.[72]

The rewards for Theophanes and Mytilene, however, belong at the end of the Mithridatic War; the latter are explicitly dated there by Plutarch. Theophanes' acquisition of Roman citizenship antedates the *pro Archia* of 62, where it is explicitly described as conferred *militia*, on active service. And the account of Pompeius at Mytilene in Plutarch makes it quite clear that what Theophanes provided for Pompeius in return for the freedom of Mytilene was a cultural egotrip (*Pomp.* 42). His achievements provided the only subject matter for the poets competing at the traditional festival that year; his reaction to the theatre was a decision to build a similar one at Rome, but bigger. That Pompeius did not simply want an account of his achievements in Greek by Theophanes and the poets competing at Mytilene is clear from his next moves; he went on to Rhodes and listened to all the teachers of philosophy, including Posidonius (who later published the piece he delivered), giving them a talent each, and then to Athens where he behaved similarly towards the philosophers and in addition gave the city fifty talents for building works.[73] His deeds recorded by a Greek historian, sung by Greek poets, himself conversant with the philosophers of Rhodes and Athens, patron of the centre of Greek civilization - how could Pompeius not be a man of deep Hellenic culture? I do not doubt that it was an illusion which Theophanes carefully fostered.

A similar figure to Pompeius and no doubt a model was L.Licinius Lucullus; he is described by Plutarch as possessed of an adequate knowledge of Greek and Latin; Sulla's dedication to him of his *Memoirs* tells us nothing of his intellectual abilities, any more than does the polite remark accompanying the dedication that Lucullus was someone who would improve the history by editing and arranging it.[74] The unusual story of a literary competition, involving an impromptu composition in Greek or Latin between Lucullus, Hortensius and Sisenna, is equally unrevealing for our purposes.[75] Lucullus' real philistinism can be inferred from Cicero's desperate protestations to the contrary in the *Academica priora* (2.4; cf. 7 and 1), even without the benefit of the letters in which he explained that Lucullus, Catulus and Hortensius were wildly unsuitable interlocutors in a philosophical dialogue (*ad Att.* 13.12.3, 16.1, 19.5).

Yet Lucullus collected works of art, including a globe and a statue of Autolycus by Sthenis chosen from the booty from Sinope, and a library, which he ostentatiously opened to all and took care to frequent.[76] He also had the Greek Eupolemus of Caleacte with him during the Third Mithridatic War (II *Verr.* 4.49), Archias of Antioch in Syria, who had travelled with him in 102 and attached himself to the Luculli, with him in both the First and the Third Mithridatic War (*pro Arch.* 11). The result was a poem celebrating Lucullus and the Mithridatic War.[77] Archias' native city had no serious contact with Rome until Pompeius annexed Syria, in circumstances in which Archias, as a protégé of Lucullus, could be of little help. His own reward for aiding and abetting Lucullus' cultural pretensions were material gifts from Sulla as proconsul and protection when citizenship was challenged (*pro Arch.* 11).

Lucullus, however, also associated with Antiochus of Ascalon, resident for most of his working life in Athens; like Archias, Antiochus accompanied Lucullus both in the First and in the Third Mithridatic War and referred to one of Lucullus' brothers in a treatise on the gods.[78] Lucullus took care to advertise his refusal to billet troops in a friendly Greek city (Plut. *Luc.* 33) and it is, I think, a legitimate surmise that the two inscriptions in honour of Lucullus at Athens reflect benefactions to that city, requested by Antiochus in return for his association with Lucullus (*IG* II-III^2 4104-5).

A clear example of a benefaction to a Greek city through the mediation of a Greek intellectual involves Caesar. Herodes, who wrote badly on Cicero's consulship and complained to Cicero and Atticus about the lack of appreciation for his work (*ad Att.* 2.2.2), is plausibly to be identified with the Herodes who in 51 got a gift of fifty talents from Caesar for Athens.[79] The amount and the timing are both significant: the amount is the same as that given by Pompeius after the Mithridatic War (see above); the gift occurs at the end of the war in Gaul, which provided Caesar with glory and resources to match those of Pompeius.

The role of Greek intellectuals who possessed links with members of the Roman governing class was of course crucial at moments of crisis. Caesar spared Athens despite her aid to Pompeius, because of the glory of her citizens of the past and, no doubt, because of her present reputation as a centre of learning;[80] the teacher of Cassius pleaded with him for the safety of Rhodes; Areius saved Alexandria from revenge by Octavian.[81]

I conclude therefore that by being or appearing to be an intellectual a Greek of the right social class could in the generation after Sulla and probably earlier attract the attention of Roman *principes* and by flattering their pretensions acquire a hold over them which enabled them to win benefits for themselves and for communities whose claims they chose to advance, whether their own or others. It is reasonable to suppose that Roman rule in the Greek world actually provided a stimulus to Greek intellectual activity.

There is, however, another way in which the lives of Greek intellectuals became bound up with the destinies of their rulers; the efforts of Mithridates VI and the just hatred for Rome of her eastern subjects had come close to ending Roman rule in the east; many who called themselves philosophers had supported Mithridates; thus Diodorus had been his general at Adramyttium, Athenion had held Athens for him.[82]

To a Greek, intellectual activity was possible either within the framework of a city or at the court of a monarch; while one Hellenistic monarchy after another crumbled, only partially replaced by the emergence of Roman *principes* as patrons, the former mode remained important; but the survival even of that now depended increasingly on the survival of Roman rule. It was not only that

Roman magnates acted as patrons to Greek intellectuals (and facilitated scientific exploration); Rome underwrote the society in which alone such as Posidonius who had thrown in their lot with Rome could exist and pursue their *métiers*.[83] It is not surprising that Posidonius was deeply worried about the quality of Roman rule; his vitriolic account of Athenion is equally a measure of his insecurity.

In retrospect, all seemed simple; the *Geography* of Strabo breathes a serene nonchalance about the inevitability of Roman rule and its cultural underpinning (9.2.2 (401)); to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the emergence of Rome as ruler of the world and the qualities of her leaders had resulted in the spread of worthwhile cultural activity, both Greek and Roman, and in the revival of Atticism (*de orat. ant.* 3); to Plutarch, despite the views of the elder Cato, 'during the period in which the city was most successful in her affairs (i.e. the years in which her empire was created), she became much attached to every form of Greek learning and culture' (*Cato Mai.* 23.3). But to the embattled Greek intellectual of the last generation of the Roman republic, desperately deploying his skills to ward off the effects of the Roman revolution, such sanguine views were surely impossible.

10: THE BENEFICIAL IDEOLOGY

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It was the great eighteenth-century classic and orientalist, Johann Jakob Reiske, who remarked that of all the authors he had read - and he had read many - the orations of Aelius Aristeides came second only to the speeches of Thucydides in difficulty of comprehension; and that their substance was of major importance for the understanding of the Roman empire in the second century, with the exception of the 'Sacred Tales', which he dismissed as woeful superstition and absurdity.[1] Today it is the 'Sacred Tales' that are most fascinating and revealing, and in their turn the political discourses are left unread, with the regrettable consequence that despite the volume of ink outpoured on the speech 'To Rome' there is still no satisfactory study of Aristeides' political ideas in the context of other literature of the period.[2] On the one hand, while individual snippets of information given by him have been subjected to the closest of scrutiny to discover their truth,[3] his general themes and major ideas have been largely neglected: on the other hand, the frequent condemnation of him as a declaimer uttering commonplaces,[4] even if it is acknowledged that in his day the main criterion of literary excellence was an ability to express in beautiful and striking language traditional themes and concepts, obscures the fact that for him and his audience the commonplaces themselves had some value. The general categories in which he and his contemporaries described the benefits of Roman rule, however vague they may be, can be used neutrally to define provincial attitudes to the Roman empire and to construct an ideology in which both orator and audience shared.[5]

The traditional Roman explanations and justifications of their supremacy in the theological or moralistic terms of their *fortuna*, *constantia*, *fides* and so on,[6] although accepted to some extent by the Greeks,[7] do not figure prominently in their writings, and we have little means of telling the effectiveness of the propaganda that stressed the emperor's *providentia*, *liberalitas* and similar virtues.[8] But some practical benefits were acknowledged by both

ruler and ruled and became part of the common stock of ideas on the merits and duties of an emperor and governor towards their subjects.

The sophists, rhetoricians and litterateurs who furnish the evidence for such theories come from similar backgrounds in the wealthy local aristocracy of the eastern provinces. Plutarch was high priest at Delphi;[9] Dio's affluence involved him in contentious litigation with his fellow townsmen of Prusa;[10] Aristeides had property at Hadriani, Hadrianoutherae and Smyrna;[11] Galen's father, an amateur architect, owned at least two estates and a town house at Pergamum, which, when bequeathed to Galen, effectively freed him from the normal economic constraints of a doctor's life;[12] and whatever the truth that lies behind Lucian's 'Dream', his family was not one of agricultural peasants, *oreitupoi*, who only occasionally visited the city,[13] and even if he had a hard struggle to survive in the world of the great sophists - and Galen's evidence suggests that this notion is exaggerated[14] - he nevertheless had several friends and acquaintances among the governors and leading provincials of the East.[15] As Bowersock has shown,[16] the links between litterati and the government in Rome were many and strong, and it is enough here to emphasize that only Aristeides of the authors so far mentioned had no close connexion with the court and emperor in Rome itself, and that more from ill-health than from reasons of political ideology. Dio was an adviser to Trajan, Galen doctor to several emperors, while Lucian and possibly Plutarch held office as procurators.[17] In short, they were just the sort of men whose learning and culture would be expected to advance them in the mandarin society of the second century; domestic wealth provided them with an entry, their literary talents made them especially valuable guests. Thus it is not surprising that their assessment of the merits of the Roman empire is generally favourable, for they were prime beneficiaries, yet they are often doing little more than expressing in more ornate phrases opinions widely held and found in many less prestigious authors.

Of their broad themes, the most prominent is that of peace, established and maintained by the emperor throughout the whole world and bringing an end to *stasis* and civil war, which also develops into a recognition that the empire provides its inhabitants with *asphaleia*, security against external attack.[18] Dio in his second oration stresses the martial virtues of the emperor, and both Aristeides and

the author of the *eis basilea* welcome the fact that thanks to the emperors dangerous barbarians are kept beyond the frontiers of the empire.[19] But of the economic consequences of the peace, much less is said: peace for the Greek sophists is primarily interpreted in terms of its effect on the internal politics of the cities. True there are exceptions: thanks to the Roman peace Galen could draw on larger stocks of drugs from all over the world (Gal. 14.7-9, 12.216-17), and Aristeides talks of ships sailing freely, of cargoes coming to Rome from the whole world, of travellers no longer in danger of brigands in the mountains, and of universal prosperity.[20] But Aristeides was too rich to appreciate the Alexandrian sailors' reaction to Augustus, *per illum se vivere, per illum navigare, libertate atque fortunis per illum frui* (Suetonius, *Aug.* 98), and it seems to have been among the Christians that the social and economic consequences of the peace are emphasized. Origen believed, rightly, that the spread of Christianity was facilitated by the imperial peace,[21] and Tertullian, in a passage worthy of Aristeides,[22] noted the changes that followed the peace:

> *omnia iam pervia, omnia nota, omnia negotiosa*; smiling farms have replaced famous wastes, fields have conquered forests, domesticated animals have driven out wild beasts, the deserts are sown, marshes are drained; there are now cities where once not even houses stood; neither lonely islands nor rocky crags deter us: *ubique domus, ubique populus, ubique respublica, ubique vita*. The world is over-populated; we should hope for plague, famine, war and earthquake to cut man down to size.

A second major theme developed by the Greek sophists is that of the true freedom of the inhabitants of the Roman empire, for an essential difference between it and other ancient empires is that the Romans govern free men, not slaves;[23] no man is prevented by law or fear of punishment from cherishing his ancestral ways (Athenagoras, *Leg.* 1.1). The cities have an equal share in honour according to their merit; they govern themselves without reference to Rome; and the tribute that they pay is in no way excessive (Athenagoras, *Leg.* 1.2; Arist. 26.36, 36.16). But Dio, Plutarch and the Ephesian magistrate of Acts 19 knew the reality behind the facade. Their energies and advice are directed to preventing local disorder or at least restraining it lest the Romans be led to

intervene. The stress in speeches and on coins on the importance of concord between cities and citizens has a twofold purpose, to emphasize what little remains of a city's independence, its ability to enter into agreements with other cities, and apotropaically to announce to the governor and the emperor that police action is unnecessary.[24] Plutarch's *Precepts of statesmanship*, so informative on the possibilities open to a local provincial politician, aim to keep the Romans out of local politics, for the intervention of the proconsul is a sign of a failure of the polis.

Yet the Roman empire to which Dio advocated loyalty and whose merits Aristeides extolled at length was over and above the polis, and Aristeides' formulation of the relationship between the two requires some elucidation, for of all the adjectives he used to describe it, the most prominent, *koinos*, is also at the same time the most vague and elusive. Far from indicating, as Oliver argued,[25] that the sophist saw the Roman empire as a Greek league, *koinon*, with Rome as its hegemon, the frequent usage of the word elsewhere in his speeches suggests that it denotes something in which the speaker shares, although it was not his originally. Corinth is the *koine agora*, the *koine panton kataphuge*, and the *koinon astu*; Pergamum is the *koine tis koruphe tou ethnous*; Ephesus the *tamieion koinon* of Asia, as well as its *patris* (Arist. 46.23-4, 23.13, 23.24). Significantly, only Smyrna, where Aristeides is an insider, is not qualified by this adjective - except that its destruction by an earthquake is a *koinon ptoma*, for Aristeides was willing to share his lamentations, if not his privileges, with the rest of the world.[26] The fact that this adjective appears so often in the *eis Romen* indicates that Aristeides, and presumably at least some of his audience, found something in the Roman empire in which they could share and which they acknowledged not to have been theirs from the beginning. But in which of all the many *koina agatha* given by the emperors were the Greeks most interested?[27]

For the upper classes the Roman empire was indeed a *koine arche*, for they could pass easily from the leadership of their polis into imperial service, as *advocatus fisci* perhaps, or into the senate, and Hippolytus acknowledged that Rome collected *tous gennaiotatous ton ethnon* and made them Romans (Arist. 27.32; Hippolytus, *Comm. in Dan.* 4.9). Those who stayed at home might gain authority by attaching

themselves like ivy to the growing power and influence of a senator or emperor, while residence abroad at the very least enabled the unpolitical to escape the daily troubles and turmoil of life in their native city (Plut. 805E, 605B-C). For the politically ambitious the prospects were even brighter: a man from Chios or Bithynia might even become *consul ordinarius* (Plut. 470C). A traditionalist such as Plutarch regarded this flight from the city to the senate and to lush procuratorships with horror as both time-consuming and unprofitable, but his strictures appear to have had no effect.[28]

Aristeides also refers twice to *koinoi nomoi*. At 26.102 he says that the Romans assigned common laws to all, and at 24.31 he asks, 'Is not all the land *koine*? Is there not one emperor, common laws for all, and a freedom to act and participate in politics or not as one thinks fit?'. Oliver suggested that every man would recognize in this an echo of Aristotle's universal law, the *koinos nomos* of *Rhetoric* 1.10-15,[29] but Aristeides is clearly thinking of something far more specific and relevant, the commonplace in Roman propaganda that it is Rome's duty and privilege to give laws to all nations, even to the races of the East.[30] The equity and fairness of Roman justice is accepted by many Greeks, and Roman *eunomia* is a fit subject for a loyal epigram,[31] but, granted that these laws are just, in what ways are they common? Oliver is here on stronger ground when interpreting *koinoi nomoi* to refer to the gradual assimilation of Greek law codes to Roman practice in various ways.[32] Roman citizens resident in the provinces may well have exercised their right to have their cases tried under Roman rather than local law; the decisions of a governor applied equally to Greek and Roman, and the justice of the emperor consisted in administering the law impartially to all (Athenagoras, *Leg*. 1.2; Arist. 26.37-9); and there is some evidence that the Greeks themselves were modifying their local law codes in the direction of Roman law, and, especially in public law, were unlikely to pass a municipal decree hostile to Rome's interests.

Aristeides, it is agreed, is speaking about public law, for until the universal grant of citizenship by Caracalla the private affairs of non-Roman citizens, one with another, were unaffected by Roman law, but whether Caracalla's edict put an end to peculiar non-Roman private law has been hotly debated.[33] General statements by

clerics that Rome on conquest abolished all the laws of the Arabians, including circumcision, or that all the inhabitants of the empire were under one and the same law can be easily dismissed as idle rhetoric,[34] but the more detailed comments of Menander of Laodicea demand greater respect. In his handbook of oratory, written about 270, Menander lays down instructions on how to praise a city: one should stress the *sophrosune* and *phronesis* of its laws, and explain how they stand out from the generality in their treatment of, for example, widows and orphans, marriage and *ta akosma* - some cities expressly forbade women to engage in trade, others prevented them from appearing in a full agora, others kept them indoors after late afternoon.[35] But twice Menander has to say, a little sadly, that this argument about the merits of an individual city's laws is now obsolete because all are now governed according to the common laws of Rome (202, 205): the justice of the emperor is administered to all by impartial governors (227), with the result that marriages are more lawful and contracts juster, the rights of inheritance are better protected, the pleas of the poor do not fail, and the proud boasts of the wealthy cease.

It may very well be doubted whether this glorious age of legal rectitude that succeeded Caracalla's edict was ever more than a figment of rhetorical exaggeration, yet the examples that Menander uses of *koinoi nomoi*, marriage and inheritance, certainly imply that in his opinion there was now a universal (Roman) law which embraced both public and private law throughout the empire.[36] Local law was now suppressed, everywhere there was uniformity. Yet, despite the vigorous advocacy of Professor Talamanca on his behalf, Menander is either badly informed or exaggerating from his own limited experience.[37] In his favour can be set the gradual assimilation of Greek law to that of Rome, a process undoubtedly accelerated by the edict of Caracalla and the change in attitude towards local practice, *consuetudo* and *mos*, that can be seen in the third century. At the beginning, *longa consuetudo* is allowed some validity, especially where no specific enactment has been made, and in A.D. 224 governors were encouraged to see that nothing was done against ancient custom:[38] Ulpian (D. 43.24.3.4) accepts that additional rights could be given to a *curator civitatis* by a *lex municipalis*, and Gordian (CJ. 7.9.1) recognized a grant of freedom made in accordance with a *lex*

municipalis. But ever tighter limits were laid down for the operation of non-Roman rules and ideas. According to Ulpian (D. 47.12.3.5) burial was forbidden within the city walls even if local law had permitted it; Decius in 250 (CJ. 6.58.3) confirmed the right of a woman to inherit from an intestate brother as greater than that of the sons of a second brother, thereby rejecting the Greek law of inheritance; a decision of 285 (CJ. 5.5.2) forbade any man *sub dicione Romani nominis* to have more than one wife; *abdicatio* of a son was prohibited by Diocletian in 288 (CJ. 8.46.6) although it was a Greek institution; and in 290 it was declared that a will written in local customary form was invalid unless *speciali privilegio patriae tuae*.[39] No customary law was adjudged so strong as to vanquish reason or the law (CJ. 8.52.2 (319)) and not even *mos provinciae* was to be taken into account in deciding a man's *origo*, the place where he was primarily eligible for *munera*.[40]

Yet local law and custom continue to find a place in Roman law, even in family matters where Menander implies they had disappeared. Emancipation according to *lex municipii* was accepted by Diocletian (CJ. 8.48.1) and an emperor might restrain a governor from acting against *lex civitatis* in certain property cases (CJ. 11.30.4). A guardian might have to pay interest on his ward's property 'according to the custom of the province' (D. 26.7.7.10) and *mos regionis* had a part to play both in determining security against eviction (D. 21.2.6) and in deciding who paid for losses in a contract that were occasioned by the vagaries of the weather (CJ. 4.65.8). The fact also that Decius and Diocletian decided against certain non-Roman legal practices indicates that these practices were current in some provinces at least until then. At best, however, even when it survives, local law and custom are always subsidiary and ancillary,[41] and never override Roman law, which as the third century progressed became ever more universal in its penetration, without attaining the complete uniformity of domination that Menander implies.

One of the most striking assertions by Aristeides in the *eis Romen* is that the Romans have best proved that earth is the *patris koine panton*.[42] From this Sherwin-White concluded that the orator was looking at the Roman or Ciceronian ideal of *communis patria* and adapting an argument that dealt primarily with individual citizens to one concerned with the relationship between Rome and the cities

of the provinces.[43] But it is the earth that is the *patris koine*, not Rome, and Aristeides is merely repeating the unexceptionable philosophical commonplace of the unity of mankind on the earth[44] in a context that suggests that, thanks to Roman rule, a man may travel wherever he wishes and that Roman citizens are to be found everywhere. Although he refers elsewhere to other cities as *patrides*, implicitly at 26.100, where the traveller goes *ek patridos eis patrida*, and explicitly at 23.24, where he declares that all men are brought to Ephesus *hos eis patrida*, he does not go so far as to assert that Rome is the *patris* of all citizens. For that formulation we must wait another generation until the lawyers Callistratus and Modestinus, both jurists with strong links with the Eastern provinces (D. 48.22.18 pr., 27.1.6.11).

Yet there is a possible connexion between the idea of earth as the *communis patria* and that of Rome, through the theme of *urbs Roma* as a microcosm of the *orbs*, which can be found in poets and orators from all over the empire:[45] and it cannot be doubted that Polemo's famous description of Rome as the epitome of the whole world was largely true (Gal. 18A.347; Athenaeus 1.20B-C). All races and creeds of the known world could be found there, and most of the major Greek authors visited it at some point. Galen, who describes so well the terrifying anonymity of the big city and who fiercely accuses provincial doctors of fleeing thither to avoid detection and punishment for their crimes[46] - even he, a provincial from Pergamum, spent over thirty years there. And Lucian's belief (*Nigrinus* 15) that Rome was not the place for the pure philosopher but only for the avaricious, the debauched, the gluttonous and the devotee of the bangings, scrapings and dreadful wailings of modern music, did not prevent him from visiting the city. In Rome, and possibly also for a time in the army, there was a real *epimixia andron*,[47] and the city could with justice be described as the *communis patria* of the whole world.

My catalogue of *agatha* has so far been confined almost entirely to vague generalities - peace, freedom, common laws and a common fatherland - which may indeed support A.H.M.Jones' contention that on the whole the Greeks were passive and indifferent to Roman rule.[48] But they undoubtedly appreciated that the Romans, and especially the emperor, could be of practical advantage to them, and the imperial propaganda that the emperor was accessible to all his subjects,

responsive to their needs and effective in action would have confirmed them in their view that in him was a sure source of help and assistance.[49] The only enthusiastic comment relating to Rome in Plutarch's *Precepts* (814C) is that they are always most eager to promote the interests of their friends in the provinces; Dio (47.13) claimed that all emperors were interested in the prosperity of cities; and Galen (14.217) believed that they regarded the welfare and safety of their subjects as the greatest duty of kingship. Menemachus is advised by Plutarch to attach himself to a leading Roman, whose friendship he may use to benefit his city by turning away wrath or by securing an emperor's interest in its problems.[50]

For a local politician the favour of the emperor was a strong card to play. Dio defended his conduct towards his native Prusa by enumerating Trajan's services to him at his request (Dio 40.15, 45.3). How munificent imperial gifts might be imagined, or even expected, to be, is clear from Dio's description (40.14) of the rumours that Trajan had given the Smyrniote envoys many presents and untold wealth for the city, and that a river of gold was now flowing from the emperor to Smyrna. When disaster struck, the emperor was the obvious saviour.[51] When an earthquake destroyed Tralles in 26 B.C., Chaeremon rushed to Spain to appeal to Augustus, who restored the city in response to his plea;[52] and the moving letter of Aristeides to Marcus Aurelius and Commodus on the earthquake at Smyrna brought both tears and results.[53] But even in normal times the emperor was besieged with requests, and his friends could use their influence with him to secure titles and privileges for their home towns. Statilius Criton, the doctor and historian of Trajan, was responsible for the appellation, *Ulpia*, given to his native city of Heraclea.[54] Alexander of Cotiaeum, the tutor of Marcus Aurelius, brought only happiness for his kinsmen, his friends, his city and for the eastern cities in general; and although he charged a fee for his services as a teacher of rhetoric, he secured these benefits for others without demanding any payment.[55]

In general it is true that Greek writers regard the empire from the point of view of people receiving rather than distributing benefits - apart from their *paideia*.[56] Aristeides mentions Greeks serving in the army - in contrast to Menander a century later, who remarks that the army of the emperor gives better protection than city

walls and that the Greeks have now no need to fight for themselves[57] - but on the whole the Greeks' perception of the imperial qualities of the Roman empire are few indeed. It may be only Galen, an acute observer of society in Rome and the provinces, who praises an imperial achievement that has nothing to do with the East, the road-building programme of Trajan in Italy.[58]

> He laid stone causeways over marshy and swampy ground, hacked through thorny jungles and rough ground, bridged dangerous rivers: where possible he shortened the route or took it on an easier way than over a high and difficult crag, abandoning a lonely road infested by wild beasts in favour of a broad highway, and making the rough places plain.

In Latin there is a parallel in Statius (*Silvae* IV 3), a poem on the Via Domitiana, which contains, as well as the memorable conceit of the river god Volturnus peering over his new bridge to congratulate Domitian and to express his loyal thanks (67-94), a considerable amount of technical detail.[59] The new road speeds up the journey from Sinuessa to Baiae from a day to just over two hours (36-7); it takes the Puteoli and Baiae traffic from the slower Via Appia (102-4); and lines 40-55 describe the methods of road construction. 'Some workers are cutting down woods and mountain forests; others are prising out rocks and beams; others are laying the road surface; others are draining ponds or diverting streams.' In Greek, Cassius Dio (68.7.1) notes in passing Trajan's many necessary repairs to roads, harbours and public buildings, and there are several references in other writers to the ease and freedom of travel as a result of the Roman peace,[60] but, with one exception, they differ in both tone and precision from Galen's eulogy. The exception is Plutarch, who in his life of Caius Gracchus, ch.7, notes his zeal for road building, combining practical utility and graceful beauty:

> For his roads were carried straight through the country without deviation, and had pavements of quarried stone, and substructures of tight-rammed masses of sand. Depressions were filled up, all intersecting torrents or ravines were bridged over, and both sides of the roads were of equal and corresponding height, so that the work had everywhere an even and beautiful appearance. In addition to all this, he measured off every road by miles ... and planted stone pillars in the

ground to mark the distances.

This passage, however, does not say where Gracchus' roads led, and it may be that Plutarch is describing the roads of his own day rather than of the Gracchi's, and, like Galen, developing a commonplace about the stone roads that marched straight, bridging hollows and streams and letting no obstacle defy them.

Epigraphy and archaeology confirm the truth of Galen's observation: Trajan built the Via Traiana Nova, and possibly two others, in Etruria; he repaired the Via Aemilia near Rimini; he continued the repaving of the Via Appia *ex glarea silice* and cut through a projecting cliff at Terracina; and his construction of the Via Traiana and some new access roads, complete with bridges and causeways, shortened the journey from Beneventum to Brundisium by a day.[61] Which of these new roads struck Galen so forcefully is an idle question, but they left a tremendous impression on him, for I know of no other example of a Greek describing his own achievements in terms of a Roman one. Hippocrates discovered and planned the road; Galen, like Trajan, swept aside the tangled confusion, repairing and realigning the old ways of Hippocrates; and his implicit claim was that the Galenic system of medicine would be as impressive and enduring as the road system of Trajan.[62]

I have deliberately excluded epigraphic evidence from the discussion so far, because, while a long list could be made of imperial gifts of buildings, endowments, corn for starving cities and so on, it would merely exemplify the banal conclusion that the emperor was often and in various ways a great benefactor of the eastern cities, and would reveal very little about the attitude of the provincials to the gifts and the giver.[63] But an overall consideration of eastern inscriptions set up in honour of provincial governors suggests a significant change in the relationship between the cities and the central government from the mid-third century.

Thirty years ago, Louis Robert assembled a long series of Greek epigrams in favour of provincial governors, dating from about A.D. 250 until the sixth century, praising them in the most florid language for their services and their gifts of buildings, and extolling their virtues of justice, incorruptibility and so on.[64] Previously the governor, unless himself a local man, is a remote figure, whose achievements and merits are briefly and plainly

recorded. In part this change can be ascribed to a preference for verse instead of prose - although the grandest prose eulogies are for local magnates, scholars and officials, not for governors[65] - and in part also to a general tendency towards a more contrived and recherché style, but many of the themes and epithets can be found in the first century, and earlier,[66] applied to local magistrates. The virtues of the small-town bigwigs of the East, from Paros to Petra, from Crete to Bithynia,[67] are commemorated in the same ornate phrases and conceits, and justice, prudence and wisdom are seen to prevail among the leading families of all the East. But from about A.D. 250, before the Diocletianic reforms, the governor begins to displace the city magistrate as the object of such praises,[68] and even a governor's servant can receive a laudatory epigram for his supervision of the Phrygian gold mines (*GVI* 1170).

This transfer of interest from local to imperial officials, evident from these late epigrams, can be confirmed from other sources. Firmicus Maternus regards civic magistrates of the early fourth century as mere extensions of the central government and subservient to higher, imperial authority;[69] and Menander of Laodicea emphasizes that it is the governor who is the mediator between city and emperor, who transmits the complaints and requests of provincials to the emperor, who executes imperial decisions, and who guards the laws and the emperor's justice.[70]

This growing dependence of the cities on the emperor and his officials may be a direct result of the financial and social crisis of the third century,[71] when in some areas traditional ties of patronage and dependence were shaken and destroyed, and when new forms of relationship, both formal and informal, grew up between the central government and its subjects. In the West the power of the great landlords was gradually recognized by the emperor at the expense of the free tenant;[72] and in the East, imperial officials (and, later on, the bishop and the holy man[73]) took on the role formerly occupied by the local aristocracy. In the *Precepts* of Plutarch, the governor is involved in the affairs of the city only in emergencies; in the orations of Aristeides, the governor dispenses justice, but is inferior to the mighty provincials who are on the most intimate terms with the emperor and who might even throw a proconsul out on the street.[74] It is some measure of the

decline of the city that a century and a half later this official has become the arbiter and saviour of its fortunes.[75]

11: ROME'S AFRICAN EMPIRE UNDER THE PRINCIPATE

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With the inauguration of the Principate of Augustus, the history of Roman imperialism entered a new phase. Augustus' long reign was marked by conquest, pacification, colonization and administrative reorganization designed to secure the provinces and make possible their rational exploitation.

In this paper I analyse the character of Roman rule in North Africa in the period of the Principate and the nature of the society it produced.[1] My original purpose was to assess the material benefits of Roman rule for provincials, and especially for Africans. This theme is not lost sight of here, but I have thought it necessary to set it against the background of the interests of the imperial power and the methods of Roman imperialism in Africa. Just as in the context of Roman social relations *beneficia* were given for services rendered, so the most tangible benefits[2] received by subjects of Rome were granted in return for support of the imperialist enterprise. The main beneficiaries were those who cooperated in the work of pacification, political and social control, and economic exploitation.

How far the mass of Africans benefited from membership of Roman provincial society is uncertain. To the assertion that the basic *beneficia*, security and order, were enjoyed by all sections of African society, there is the rejoinder that the establishment of the *pax Africana* was accompanied by physical coercion, expropriation, and social dislocation; and that the continuation of peaceful conditions was contingent on the docility of an exploited peasantry.[3] Whether or how far the rural population gained from the expansion of the economy is similarly a matter for dispute. Such issues will not be easily resolved, given the difficulty, or impossibility, of estimating the net gains and losses of incorporation in the Roman imperial system for those at the lower levels of African society. But there is a chance that they will be constructively debated, if the aims and policies of the imperial

power are properly understood.

I THE LAND

Africa Vetus was won by conquest from Rome's traditional and most hated enemy. Africa Nova was annexed by Caesar following the defeat of the Numidian king Juba I and the Pompeian forces in the civil war. Bocchus, who backed the winning side, and later Juba II, were presented with the Mauretanian littoral down to the Atlantic coast, an arrangement suspended temporarily when Bocchus died, bequeathing the kingdom to Rome, and permanently when Gaius brought the house of Juba to a violent end. Such of the interior of Africa as was occupied after the initial annexations (in South Numidia, for example, the Romans penetrated as far as Castellum Dimmidi, about 700 kilometres east-south-east of Carthage) was taken by force of arms.

This background largely explains the dominant feature of the pattern of landownership in Roman North Africa, which is the frequency and the extensiveness of large estates. The bulk of African land was classed as *ager publicus* of the Roman people, to be disposed of as they saw fit. By the lex Rubria of 121 B.C., 200 *iugera* (120 acres, 50 hectares) of choice land near the site of Carthage were set aside for each of 6,000 colonists; these allotments were many times larger than those customarily awarded to communities of colonists whether of Roman or Latin status, or in viritane assignations. The law was subsequently cancelled, but some of the 6,000 took up their land and were confirmed in possession of it by the agrarian law of 111 B.C. This law, which in the section relating to Africa (*FIRA* I^2 no.8, 52ff.) provided for the sale or lease of land, offered security of tenure not only to the seven loyal cities and the Carthaginian deserters, but also to the ordinary subject communities whose land was held on usufruct. But in practice the large holdings of senators, equestrians and wealthy men of lower status must have been built up to some extent at the expense of existing African landholders. Meanwhile, grateful generals, most conspicuously Caesar, freely awarded generous land-grants to their followers. In time the emperors entered the field, assigning land to discharged soldiers, and acquiring it for themselves.

An early fifth-century constitution of Honorius and Theodosius II (CTh. 11.28.13, 422) gives the sum of imperial property in

Proconsularis and Byzacena as 15,152 square kilometres at that time, or about one-sixth of the total area of the two late imperial provinces.[4] This figure obviously cannot serve as the basis of a calculation of the size of imperial holdings in an earlier age. The emperor's stake in Africa, initially modest, became substantial after Nero sequestered the properties of six senatorial landowners (Pliny, *NH* 18.35).[5] Thereafter the imperial properties grew more or less continuously through confiscations, gifts, legacies, inheritance and other methods. The largest concentration of imperial properties lay in the rich Medjerda (Bagradas) valley south-west of Carthage, and in the region of Sitifis in Mauretania Caesariensis.[6]

The imperial estates grew mainly at the expense of wealthy private landowners, who had been permitted to carve out *saltus* in areas once held by Carthaginian magnates and Libyan kings. However, an authority quoted by one of the Agrimensores and writing under the Principate considered the private estates in Africa to be comparable in dimension with the rural territories subject to cities, and remarked on the frequent litigation between *privati* and *res publicae* on the issue of jurisdiction over the countryside. The passage ends with an acknowledgement of the 'not inconsiderable' possessions of the emperor (who was also caught up in controversies with municipal authorities), but it was the *saltus* of the *privati*, with their 'substantial population of common people and villages like cities grouped around the villa' which impressed the writer.[7] Recent archaeological investigation in a relatively un-Romanized area of Mauretania Caesariensis has shown that the largest farmhouses in the countryside dependent on Caesarea, the administrative capital, were flanked by villages, the whole forming sizeable agglomerations.[8] Such settlements when fortified could provide protection for their inhabitants in unsettled times, and in a different age could serve as focal points for rebellion mounted by native chieftains against the Roman power.[9] Across the Numidian border at 'Aïn Mechira, which lies between Cirta and Diana Veteranorum, an inscription records the 'foundation' of a village and a twice-monthly market by Antonia Saturnina, aunt of *clarissimi viri*, and presumably a large landowner in the locality.[10] It may be suggested that a large number of villages in North Africa were closely linked to, if not fully integrated with, villa-based estates.

As to the relative significance of imperial and private estates, the implied judgement of the source of the Agrimensor cannot be tested in detail, but at least areas can be pointed to which were relatively unencumbered by imperial possessions. Cirta, second only to Carthage among the cities of Roman Africa, had a dependent rural territory of immense size, covering perhaps 10,000 square kilometres, in which there are few traces of imperial estates.[11]

At all times, therefore, large tracts of African land were in the hands of wealthy *privati*. Among them, members of the Roman upper classes must have been prominent, although in the early empire we have also to reckon with a group of beneficiaries of the civil-war period and their descendants, of whom the most familiar examples are P.Sittius and his followers in the territory of Cirta, and a certain C.Julius, another supporter of Caesar along with his father Masinissa, Vitruvius' friend and companion in philosophical discussion, and proprietor of the *oppidum* Ismuc thirty-two kilometres from Zama.[12] The senatorial and equestrian property-owners were in the early period predominantly non-African by birth, but decreasingly so after the turn of the first century A.D. In the Antonine and Severan periods numerous Africans, whether descended from colonial (largely Italian) or purely local families, or of mixed stock, acquired senatorial rank or followed equestrian careers.[13] The basis of their wealth and the foundation of their careers was rural property in Africa accumulated sometimes over generations. Cirta and its environs provided the first African-born consuls, probably descended from an Italian family, and many of those who followed.[14] It can be no accident that a city with such an extensive rural territory, the bulk of it apparently in private hands, was particularly productive of senators. It therefore becomes important to decide whether in the case of Cirtenses, and other successful Africans, promotion into a higher order which necessitated a change of residence was accompanied by the liquidation of their African assets.

On this point the information provided by the sources is limited in quality as well as quantity. So Septimius Severus, the first African emperor, is said to have owned only a modest house in Rome and a single farm (*fundus*) for much of his earlier career as senator (*HA* Sev. 4.5).[15] I assume that Severus also owned estates in the region of his native Leptis Magna and retained them when he

embarked on a senatorial career. I would expect most African senators to have been similarly placed and to have behaved in a similar way.

Senatorial ownership of land outside Italy was never questioned by the emperors, themselves owners of provincial property. On the contrary, Augustus gave senators an automatic right to visit their properties in Sicily, and Claudius extended the dispensation to cover Gallia Narbonensis.[16] 'Exeats' must have been freely available to senators who wished to travel further afield for the same purpose. No province was subsequently put on a level with Sicily and Narbonensis, but this does not reflect any growing appetite among senators for Italian investments. Trajan endeavoured to compel senators, many of whom were by now of non-Italian origin, to invest one-third of their resources in Italian land (Pliny, *Ep.* 6.19.4). The measure was ineffective. Marcus revived it, setting the less ambitious target of one-quarter (*HA Marc.* 11.8).

Moreover, there are indications that the residence rule was relaxed in just this period (from Trajan to Marcus), so that some senators are found re-establishing domicile in their native or adopted cities after careers of moderate length.[17] This development is a reflection of the senate's loss of political power, but it is also probably related to the influx into the senate of men from the East. Thus far African senators do not figure among known returning expatriates.[18] One factor may have been the relative accessibility of many African estates to their Rome-based proprietors. A few days' journey from the imperial capital would have sufficed to bring Marcus' urban prefect Lollius Urbicus to his family estates near Tiddis, within the territory of Cirta.[19] It may also be conjectured that some African senators were consciously turning their backs on a provincial culture.[20] Fronto, tutor of Marcus, orator, born in Cirta and domiciled in Rome, compared himself with the philosopher Anacharsis, 'Scythian of the nomadic Scythians', who had settled at Athens. Fronto too was a barbarian, 'Libyan of the nomadic Libyans', who had found his way to a centre of civilization and culture.[21] Behind the laboured joke lies a heart-felt tribute to the city which was for Fronto the cultural centre of the world. The Eastern senators, on the other hand, were not ashamed of their heritage, whether or not they came from great cultural

capitals (as many of them did). Their cities commanded a level of patriotism in their leading citizens unrivalled in the West.

Be that as it may, the inscription set up in Cirta in honour of P.Iulius Proculus Celsinus on the occasion of his election as consul at Rome exemplifies a common pattern: the senator is pursuing his career at the capital, having entrusted his interests at home and the celebration of his exploits there to an agent (*actor*) of slave or freedman status.[22] In the same period the Antistii of Thibilis, a *pagus* of Cirta, who provided a general of Marcus' wars and shortly afterwards a colleague for Commodus in the ordinary consulship and husband to a daughter of Marcus, committed their house in Thibilis, and probably their land in the locality, to the care of an equally dutiful freedman.[23] The most that could be hoped for from expatriates of this kind was that they would favour the city of their origin with benefactions, and use their influence to gain benefits for it and promotion for its leading citizens. Some had special opportunity to renew contact with their *patria*, when their careers took them back to Africa.[24] Others like Fronto, who appears to have kept his distance, may be supposed to have played some part in the recruitment of senators from their home towns. Whether the advancement of individuals was adequate compensation to the community for land held by absentees and rents lost abroad is another matter.

But there is a rival recurring pattern, which is illustrated by an inscription from Bulla Regia.[25] An equestrian statue voted at public expense for a newly appointed patrimonial procurator of Narbonensis is paid for by the man's brother, who is shown to be at home and in control of the family fortunes (*AE* 1962, 183). The continued local residence of relations of successful men - and the parents and brothers of Lollius Urbicus are another example (*ILAlg.* II 3563) - demonstrates both that the family has maintained its roots in Africa and that its estates have remained basically intact. It is a matter for debate, or conjecture, how far in such cases the senator or equestrian, once launched on his public career, continued to draw upon the revenues of those estates, which had to sustain the political activities and social life of those left behind.

There remain to be considered under the heading of large

landowners two categories, first, a group of equestrian officials who were not permanently lost to their *patria* and province, and secondly, a class of wealthy men who never pursued a higher career. A number of equestrians who had served the emperor in a military or civil capacity, or in both capacities, returned home on completion of their term of service.[26] Born into local aristocratic families, and having in some cases held local offices and priesthoods, they resumed their position as local aristocrats after a hiatus (usually brief, for only a small minority had extended careers), with enhanced status and additional resources. For other local aristocrats, however, whether of equestrian status or not, the locality or the region remained the centre of their activity and attention, though they might like Apuleius or his wealthier friend and future stepson Sicinius Pontianus (an equestrian) travel abroad for educational or other reasons (Apul. *Apol.* 62,72). A considerable number of inscriptions from Africa concern 'equestrians of status', holding perhaps honorary membership of the jury courts at Rome, but more often merely the rank of equestrian.[27] Of the thirty-odd equestrians from Cirta and its dependencies the great majority had no record of imperial service.[28] Apuleius' *Apologia* gives us a glimpse of the level of wealth attained by 'local equestrian' families in Oea in the middle of the second century A.D.[29] Aemilia Pudentilla the widow whom Apuleius married at the instigation (he claimed) of Pontianus, her elder son, had a fortune of four million sesterces at her disposal, almost four times the senatorial census (*Apol.* 77), her own dowry came to 300,000 sesterces, a sum not far below the equestrian census (*Apol.* 92), and she gave away in largesse one sixth of this sum on the occasion of Pontianus' marriage (*Apol.* 87). Pontianus married the daughter of one Herennius Rufinus, who, according to Apuleius, had squandered the inheritance of three million sesterces received from his equestrian father (*Apol.* 75). From Apuleius we learn also that she brought with her into the marriage a dowry of 400,000 sesterces (borrowed the day before according to our hardly impartial source), which compares favourably with Pudentilla's own 'modest' dowry (*Apol.* 76-7).

Little in terms of wealth separated 'local equestrians' from the richest non-equestrian city leaders. A member of the Gabinii of Madauros, the home town of Apuleius, could claim only one

equestrian among his relations, a cousin, but the 375,000 sesterces that he spent on a theatre about the end of the second century points to a patrimony of several millions (*ILAlg.* I 286). Apuleius' father, ex-duumvir and princeps at Madauros (*Apol.* 24), left two million sesterces.

There is no way of comparing the value of the land held by, on the one hand, African-born senators and procurators, and on the other, the richest stratum of the curial class. In any case I have suggested that absentee landowners resident abroad did not withdraw all the Africa-originating revenues to which they might have been entitled, and that a proportion of procurators returned to their homeland. On the other side allowance must be made for African land held by non-Africans, and especially by the emperor. The general conclusion seems secure, that a substantial amount of African land of good quality was owned by landlords residing outside Italy, and that a sizeable proportion of the surplus was withdrawn, in the form of rents, from the local economy. Moreover, we have not yet taken into account the question of taxation.

Two important items are missing from this survey of landholding in Africa, which has concentrated on the larger estates. They are, the properties of moderate size belonging to the bulk of the members of the curial class, or the class of local politicians and benefactors, and peasant tenures. These curial properties, though modest, were numerous; they may indeed have exceeded in value the *saltus* of the very few rich provincial notables.[30]

The best known but by no means the largest group of smallholders in North Africa consisted of discharged soldiers.[31] It is not known for certain how much land, or cash-equivalent, was given to those who settled in Africa under the Principate, but 15 *iugera*, or 9 acres (3.75 hectares) is a reasonable estimate.[32] In the fourth century the retiring soldier received about 20 *iugera*, or 12 acres (4 hectares).[33] A farm of this size would have produced at best a small surplus. By the middle of the first century A.D. something in the region of thirty colonies had been planted in North Africa, largely the work of Augustus; the only part of the empire which approaches this tally is the Iberian peninsula with perhaps twenty-six, but several Spanish colonies were old foundations, dating to the first hundred years of Roman rule.[34] If the African colonies, which in

the early period were mainly on or near the coast, contained a nucleus of 300-500 colonists each,[35] then about 10,000 smallholders were established in formal colonies. To this total we must add the pockets of veterans established in the territories of the peregrine *civitates*, such as the *cives Romani pagani veterani pagi Fortunalis*, who were given land by Augustus in the region of Sutunurca in the Miliana valley not far from Carthage (*ILAfr.* 301),[36] and farmer-veterans who set themselves up individually in an area of their choice.

The next period of vigorous colonization extended from Vespasian's to Trajan's reign. Augustus had used the provinces, particularly Africa, as a dumping-ground for veterans to ease the pressure on Italian land. For Vespasian and his successors, veteran colonies were a means of consolidating new conquests; colonies like Ammaedara, Thelepte, Cillium, Theveste, Madauros, Thamugadi, Diana Veteranorum, Cuicul and Sitifis, all cities with a central core of veterans, were established in strategic areas: the interior of Tunisia, southern Numidia, and eastern Mauretania.[37] After Trajan there was a change in policy; no more veteran colonies were founded. Many of the soldiers discharged in later reigns are likely to have taken up residence in communities not far from the permanent military base at Lambaesis in Numidia. Verecunda, just east of Lambaesis, Lamasba, a neighbour of Lambaesis to the north-west, and Lambaesis itself are conspicuous examples of communities in which veterans participated to some degree. Verecunda and Lambaesis evolved into *municipia* in the second half of the second century, and Lambaesis had secured the higher rank of colony (by now a purely honorific title) by the middle of the third century.[38] There is no sign that Lamasba was promoted. There is a little evidence, though not from Africa, that frontier lands were being distributed to veterans as early as the first part of the third century (e.g. D. 21.2.11). The settling of serving members of regular units on the limits of the empire as soldier-farmers is a late imperial development. In Africa, however, it appears that barbarian tribesmen (*gentiles*) under Roman officers (*praepositi limitis*) rather than regular troops guarded the frontier zone and received land as a reward. There are signs that this system was already in operation in Tripolitania by the middle of the third century.[39]

The assignment of land to tribes or fragments of tribes by imperial functionaries is recorded as early as the reign of Tiberius and was commonplace thereafter.[40] How far this policy resulted in the conversion of tribesmen to a sedentary existence is obscure. As Berthier, drawing on the work of Despois, has recently demonstrated, it is a mistake to imagine that the Roman authorities had no other policy towards nomadic groups than 'sedentarization'. In the Flavian period the Suburbures Regiani and the Nicives were given rights over the plain of 'Aïn Abid south-east of Cirta; the city lost some municipal land in the process.[41] It was once thought that this exemplified an imperial policy of seeking to 'sedentarize' tribes which might otherwise have imperilled the peace of the countryside.[42] The location of a *res publica gentis Suburburum colonorum* one hundred kilometres away in the region of Azziz ben-Tellis, attested in an inscription of Severan date (*BAC* 1917, 342-3), and the somewhat later evidence that N'gaous, which is twice as far from 'Aïn Abid, and about fifty kilometres west of Lambaesis, was a centre of the Nicives (the name apparently deriving from the locative Nicivibus), were considered to be evidence that the scene of tribal sedentarization had shifted, following the adoption of a 'later' strategy of forcing the tribesmen further west and south towards the desert. Such a hypothesis, however, must give way before the finding of Despois that the plain of 'Aïn Abid was one of the terminal points of the transhumance route leading through the depression of N'gaous.[43] Here a Severan inscription from the area south of the Chott el Hodna becomes relevant. A commission of three, operating under the orders of the legate of the Third Augusta, assigned *agri et pascua et fontes* to persons unknown (*AE* 1946, 38). The beneficiaries are likely to have been tribesmen.[44] The region of the Chott el Hodna forms part of the waiting zone whence the nomads of Metkaouak and Barika drive their flocks in May or early June into the high plains of Constantine. Despois explains the land-allocations as aimed at regularizing and controlling nomadic life.

There was no question of suppressing nomadism. Quite apart from the military problems that a policy of sealing off the nomadic routes would have created, there were sound economic reasons for leaving them open.[45] The nomads carried commodities for which

there was demand in the north and further afield; and customs stations set up on key points on the transhumant routes, as at Zarai, brought the state useful revenues.[46] Moreover, the nomads (plus semi-nomads and transhumants) doubtless filled out the ranks of the seasonal workers, whose annual appearance en route to employment in the corn fields 'around Cirta, the capital of the Numidians, or in the plains dominated by the mountain of Jupiter' was the signal to the peasant of Maktar to set about harvesting his own crop (*CIL* VIII 11824). The triangular Bedouin tent on the mosaic of the house of the Laberii at Uthina (a city which a rustic poet might well describe as dominated by Jupiter Balcarnensis) provides useful corroborative evidence of the extent of their penetration into the region of settled agriculture.[47] The Romans could live with nomads, once they had been tamed and their movements regulated.[48]

On the other hand, the participation of at least the tribal leadership in cities such as Thubursicu Numidarum, Gigthis and Turris Tamelleni (centres of the Numidae, Chinithi and Nybgenii, respectively), suggests that a policy of sedentarization had achieved some success.[49] Again it is difficult to explain otherwise the emergence of communities such as the *res publica gentis Suburburum colonorum*. It is noteworthy, however, that the members of this particular community style themselves *coloni* rather than *possessores*. It may be surmised that in some areas at least the tribesmen were transformed not so much into peasant proprietors as into tenant-farmers and agricultural labourers on the large estates.

Another group of smallholders is revealed by those inscriptions referring to *coloni* or *cultores* or *possessores* awarded the *ius possidendi* on *subseciva* or virgin land or land that had gone out of cultivation on the fringe of imperial estates. A law of Hadrian, referring back to a lex Manciana of unknown origin, gave anyone who undertook the farming of such lands the right to possess them, and enjoy their produce, alienate them or transmit them to heirs, together with tax-exemption for an initial period.[50] Hadrian and later emperors such as Septimius Severus who apparently attempted to revive the law are often credited with a desire 'to improve the lot of the peasantry', in Africa and in other provinces of the empire.[51] In the first place, however, one should always be on the look-out for an essentially practical motive underlying any imperial

beneficium, here the extension of the cultivated area and the raising of agricultural output. Secondly, while it can be agreed that several emperors had the general aim of bringing abandoned and uncultivated land into production, and that Hadrian at least may have pursued this aim on an empire-wide scale, there is little sign that they offered farmers outside Africa enhanced rights over the land. Thus in Egypt Hadrian merely lowered rents on deserted or damaged property belonging to the state.[52] Thirdly, as was noted long ago by Leschi, capital was needed both to cover the planting of vines and olive trees on virgin land and to tide the farmer over during the years in which the trees were unproductive.[53] An ordinary landless peasant who sought to take advantage of the law would have been a debtor from the start, with only a slight chance of establishing his financial independence. Temporary tax-concessions would not have sufficed. The farmer (*agricola*) who restored the *fundus Aufidianus* which lay in the region of Mateur (Matera) to the north of the Bagradas valley, and improved the property by planting more olive trees and vines, and adding an orchard and water-storing facilities, proudly advertised his debt-free status as a *conductor pariator*. We can be sure that he had accumulated some capital as well.[54]

Thus the Hadrianic law 'concerning virgin soil and fields that have remained untilled for ten consecutive years' is unlikely to have created a new race of independent farmers out of landless peasants, although it may have enabled small and medium landowners to widen the gap separating them from the mass of the rural population. This class of proprietors presumably had incomes and investments below those of decurions, for the most part. The *conductores* of the imperial *saltus*, doubtless more important men than the lessee of the *fundus Aufidianus* who belonged to an insignificant peregrine community, are probably to be found in the top stratum of this sub-curial class, if they did not actually penetrate into the local aristocracy. One of the wealthy Gabinii of Thugga is thought by some to have been a *conductor* of the estates of the region, though the reading is disputed.[55] The many imperial laws of the late empire which deal with the subject of deserted and uncultivated land are addressed principally to the large landowners, who were best able to take up imperial land offered on perpetual or emphyteutic lease with favourable terms.[56] But the sublease, and

therefore the *conductor*, must have remained an essential feature of estate management on the *saltus*.

The general impression I derive is one of fluidity, with land being acquired under the supervision of Roman officials, sometimes at the expense of existing possessors, and a social hierarchy emerging equally fashioned under imperial direction. Three main categories of beneficiaries can be identified. The first consisted of members of the Rome-centred ruling elite. It is not unlikely that the larger portion of the most fertile and productive land in Africa was within their grasp. This land may have been removed from the jurisdiction of cities, in practice if not in theory, and the profits from its exploitation, or a good proportion of them, went out of the region. The other privileged groups were members of the local elite, and military men. In rewarding the African elite with land and other material benefits, the Romans were following their traditional policy of building up a network of families, groups and communities with vested interests in the prolongation of Roman rule.[57] What emerged in Africa, as elsewhere, was a highly stratified society, reflecting an unequal distribution of the land. The *curiales* made up a tiny percentage of the population,[58] yet a wide social and economic gulf separated even the poorest of them from the mass of the rural population. Among the *curiales* themselves there were significant differences in wealth. The average small-town decurion was no match in status and wealth for the Carthaginian grandee before whose carriage all other travellers withdrew (Apul. *Flor.* 21). As for the military men, their land was granted in return for a specific service. It is to be noted that Africans made up a respectable portion of the beneficiaries in the first category, and dominated the remaining categories.

It is difficult to assess the degree of dislocation and upheaval which accompanied the changes I have described. One relevant factor is the extent to which the Romans introduced new and alien modes of production into rural Africa.

One specific question to be faced is, how far was the condition of the *coloni* of the Principate, or, for that matter, the *coloni* of the Late Empire, comparable with that of the *coloni* of the pre-Roman period? It has been suggested that a tied colonate was a feature of Numidian royal estates.[59] The case rests on one passage of

Diodorus (32.16), which describes Masinissa's gift to his sons of estates 'with all their *kataskeuai*' (or *instrumenta*, equipment), and on another from Vitruvius (8.3.24) concerning an estate, part, it is thought, of a royal domain, which included a whole *oppidum*. The *kataskeuai* in Diodorus, if comparable with the Roman civil law definition of *instrumentum*, might or might not include 'human equipment' (see e.g. D. 33.7.8), and if it did, we would have no means of telling whether slaves or tied workers of free status were meant. The Vitruvius passage cannot resolve this problem for us, as it notes only that the *agri* of the *oppidum* were in the possession of the landlord (his friend C.Julius, son of Masinissa), without touching on the relationship between landlord and *oppidum*-inhabitants or the status of the latter. In short, a comparison of pre-Roman and Roman colonates is hardly possible. It is open to us to hypothesize that the position of the free tenant-farmer and agricultural worker changed very little under the Principate, and that the major innovation lay in the fact that the Romans spelled out the obligations of their tenants in laws (the lex Manciana and the lex Hadriana), which also defined their rights over the land, in the case of those undertaking to occupy uncultivated or abandoned land. The Carthaginians, for their part, drew taxes and military manpower from the subject Libyan population, but as yet there is no evidence that they employed them as rent-paying tenant-farmers and agricultural labourers. It is normally accepted that they made extensive use of slave-cultivators.[60]

This brings us to a second question, which is, how far did the Romans introduce or extend the slave mode of production, which was dominant at least in large areas of Italy and Sicily in the late republic and early empire? Slaves were regularly utilized on the farms of the wealthy in Roman Tripolitania, at least around the middle of the second century.[61] This is the clear implication of a statement of Apuleius, addressed to Aemilianus, that he neither knew nor cared 'whether you have slaves to till your land, or work on exchange with your neighbours' (*Apol.* 17). Apuleius' object in making this apparently casual remark was to raise in the minds of his audience the possibility that his enemy was hard-up. This is confirmed a little later, when the information (true or false) is released that Aemilianus had himself lately ploughed the *agellum*

which represented his entire inheritance from his father, with a single donkey in three days (*Apol.* 23). Our interest is not so much in Apuleius' (in the end) vain attempt to brand Aemilianus a pauper, as in the disclosure that a substantial landowner would be expected to have a labour force of slaves. Moreover, in due course Apuleius furnishes an example. To allay the fears of her sons that her marriage with Apuleius would deprive them of their inheritance, Pudentilla made them the gift of some highly productive land, complete with a luxury villa, a quantity of valuable flocks and produce, and 'hardly fewer than 400 slaves' (*Apol.* 93). What is unclear is whether agricultural slavery in Tripolitania was an inheritance from the Carthaginian period or a Roman implantation. Given the continued dominance under the Romans of Punic families at Leptis Magna (the only Tripolitanian city where we can study the membership and public activities of the governing class and therefore of the landowning class), and the evidence for the infiltration of Punic culture into the countryside, the former alternative appears to be worthy of serious consideration. The Punic background of Pudentilla's own family is disclosed in a passage of Apuleius, where he charges her younger son Pudens with speaking nothing but Punic plus a few words of Greek learned from his mother, and having neither the desire nor the ability to speak Latin (*Apol.* 98).

In other parts of Roman North Africa, including areas which had seen slaves under the Carthaginians, the evidence for agricultural slavery is much less convincing.[62] The crucial texts are usually ambiguous or difficult to evaluate. We should resist the temptation to find a parallel between Pudentilla's slave-run estate and the *fundus Cornelianus* of another African lady, who legated it with all *instrumenta* including both *mancipia* and *reliqua colonorum* (D. 33.7. 27.1). If these slaves included agricultural workers, which is likely,[63] then they may have cultivated one part of the estate, perhaps 'the home farm', while the rest was leased to *coloni*.[64] Whether this was a common pattern in rural Africa we cannot tell. That slave-estates on the Italian model may have existed cannot be ruled out altogether, considering the amount of land held by wealthy absentee landlords domiciled abroad, but evidence is lacking before the late empire.[65] The agricultural work-force was largely free in Africa,[66] as it was in Egypt, the other main grain-producing

province of the empire.[67]

II TRIBUTE

Tribute was as inevitable a concomitant of imperial rule as territorial expansion (cf. Cic. *de off.* 2.85).[68] It was imposed 'by right of conquest' (*iure victoriae*). The words come from the well-known speech attributed to the Roman commander Petilius Cerialis, but are less often cited than the justification that follows: 'For peace between nations cannot be maintained without armies, nor armies without pay, nor pay without taxes' (Tac. *Hist.* 4.74). On the whole, the Romans do not appear to have bothered to justify themselves in this way; I know of no parallel passage in any writer of the imperial period.

Similarly, it would be hard to construct a 'provincial' point-of-view on the basis of the surviving literature. A few short utterances emanating from wealthy easterners represent the level of tribute as moderate (Athenag. 1.2; Arist. 26.36, 36.10). That is nearly all, apart from Tertullian's charge that the land tax and capitation tax were 'marks of captivity' (*notae captivitatis*, *Apol.* 13.6). This would be a startling comment if Tertullian had been an orthodox spokesman for this same, basically loyal, class of local aristocrats. But ordinary provincial subjects would have shared his dislike of tribute, especially those for whom tribute-paying in whatever form was an unfamiliar experience. In Tertullian's own province, one of the wilder and more militant tribes, the Nasamones, had massacred tax-collectors in the reign of Domitian (Dio 67.4.6).

The specious logic of the argument of Cerialis is undermined (in advance, as it were) by a provincial who lived under Augustus, Strabo. In discussing the decision of the Romans, that is, of Augustus, not to occupy Britain and turn it into a province, Strabo writes as follows: 'For it seems that at present more revenue is derived from the duty on their province than tribute would bring in, if we deduct the expense involved in the maintenance of an army for the purposes of guarding the island and *collecting the tribute*; and the unprofitableness of an occupation will be still greater in the case of the other islands about Britain' (C 115-16). In a later section Strabo estimates that at least one legion and some cavalry would be needed 'in order to carry off the tribute from them' (C 200).

In fact three legions and numerous auxiliaries held down the province of Britain under the Principate;[69] and when Appian was writing a century and a half after Strabo, the Romans still regarded Britain as unprofitable (App. pref. 5; cf. 7).

In the event it was Africa not Britain which received the one legion and auxiliaries from Augustus. The decision to provincialize Africa had of course been taken long before, in 146 B.C. Appian records the imposition of direct taxes on persons and on property from that date (*Lib.* 135). But it was left to Augustus to take a census, here as elsewhere in the empire, with the aim of putting the tax-system on a sound footing and extending the circle of tribute-payers. Taking our cue from Strabo, we can see that the introduction of a military garrison was part of this same strategy. *Publicani* or civil officials could not be expected to collect taxes beyond the relatively settled area in the heart of the province. The barbarian tribes of the interior, unused to paying tribute in any form, would have to be compelled to do so by soldiers. This lesson had been learned in other settings, notably in Spain in the middle Republic.[70] We can perhaps assume that the *praktores* who were victims of the Nasamones were soldiers (Dio 67.4.6); as for the tax-collectors gibbeted by the Frisians in Lower Germany in A.D. 28, they are expressly said to have been soldiers, under the command of the senior centurion Olennius (Tac. *Ann.* 4.72). It is a fair assumption that the *praefecti gentium*[71] who were put over partially subjugated tribes in Africa from the late Julio-Claudian period, if not before, had fiscal responsibilities parallel to those of Olennius *regendis Frisiis impositus*. In short, the army, in addition to its more obvious functions, acted as an agent of exploitation.

There is little unambiguous evidence concerning the tax-system in Africa. The rate of the poll-tax is known only for Syria: one per cent of assessed capital (App. *Syr.* 50; cf. Mark 12.14). In the African section of the agrarian law of 111 B.C. reference is made to *vectigalia*, *scriptura* (fees for grazing livestock) and tithes, this last perhaps representing the *stipendium* which is early mentioned as levied on land (*FIRA* i^2 no.8, ℓ.78; cf. 82,85). This evidence is hard to reconcile with a passage in the *Verrines* (3.12-13) where Cicero states that 'most of the Poeni', like the Spaniards, pay a fixed tax (*vectigal certum*), in contrast with Asia, where the

tax-system is regulated by the censor's contracts, and with Sicily, where the ordinary unprivileged Sicilian cities are subjected to a tithe on produce.

The next reference to rates of direct taxation is from the second century A.D., and concerns the great imperial estates. The *coloni* of the estate of Villa Magna Variana were required to pay a fixed percentage of the crop in most cases, a third of wheat, barley, wine and oil, and a fourth of beans (*CIL* VIII 25902, Hr.Mettich, I 20ff.). (In addition, six days' work were due each year at peak periods on the estate (IV 23ff.).) The same inscription refers to *ager octonarius*, apparently land adjacent that paid one eighth in kind. The payments of the imperial tenants are presumably higher than this because they represent rent plus tax. How far these tax-rates were notional, what percentage of the produce was actually taken from the threshing-floor, vat or press, what percentage of the produce, or its equivalent in cash, reached the city of Rome or other officially designated destinations, what was the total volume or value of commodities (or their cash-equivalent) exacted as land-tax from the North African provinces - these are matters for speculation.[72] We have Josephus' statement that Africa fed the people of Rome for eight months of the year and paid taxes of many other kinds besides (*Bell.Jud.* 2.383). This is an exaggerated figure, no doubt, but at least it can be agreed that Africa was Rome's largest corn-supplier under the Principate. If Cicero's figures for Sicily are any guide (*Verr.* 3.163),[73] then it is possible that as little as one third of the African corn that found its way to Rome was tribute-corn.

Rome had other needs, for example, oil. Septimius Severus is said to have added a daily distribution of oil to the traditional monthly distribution of corn to the urban plebs of Rome (*HA Sev.* 18.3; cf. 23.2). It is now recognized that Africa had supplanted Spain as the main supplier of oil to the capital by the middle of the third century.[74] A certain proportion of it, perhaps one third, was exacted as tribute.

To the direct taxes on persons and property we must add the miscellaneous taxes referred to by Josephus, such as customs dues, sales taxes, death duties, and the various irregular imposts, one of which, the periodic requisition of provisions and equipment for

the Roman army, became more and more regular in the course of the third century.[75]

Shortage of information makes impossible any close comparison between the tax-burdens of the various provinces in the period of the Principate.[76] Egypt was certainly more heavily taxed than Africa - the Egyptian peasant surrendered one half of his crop. Meanwhile Italy (not of course a province) paid no direct tax except the death duty until the time of Diocletian. Despite the influx of provincials into the senate and civil service, the empire was run chiefly in the interests of Rome and Italy throughout the Principate.

III MILITARY MANPOWER

It has been suggested that Africans were regularly conscripted for service abroad, at least up to the time of Hadrian.[77] If true, this might mean, at worst, that Africans were used as cannon fodder in wars that did not concern them, at best, that under Roman management, considerable numbers of Africans were lost to their fatherland. Tacitus (*Ann.* 16.13.4) mentions a levy held in Gallia Narbonensis, Africa and Asia at the end of Nero's reign with the aim of filling up the Illyrian legions. There is little other evidence.[78] Africans do not appear to have been used on the Rhine in the first century,[79] nor in significant numbers in Egypt in the same period. In the second and third centuries, about 8% of the Egyptian garrison (of which we possess only a small sample) came from Africa, Egypt itself supplying two thirds.[80] The Nicopolis inscription is an aberration: of 133 soldiers recruited into legio II Trajana in A.D. 132-3, apparently to meet the great Jewish rebellion under Bar Kochbar, 89%, or 66% of those who survived to be discharged in A.D. 157, came from Africa (34 from Carthage, 16 from Utica, and 4 only from Numidia), and not one from Egypt.[81] Other evidence for the II Trajana shows 5% of its recruits drawn from Africa, and 75% from Egypt (*CIL* III 6580 = *ILS* 2034). The Nicopolis inscription, then, merely shows that Africa was a favoured recruiting ground in emergencies, because of its reserve of manpower and the quality of its troops. We must therefore conclude that, as far as the legions were concerned, recruitment for service abroad was only a modest drain on African manpower.[82]

The thesis we have been considering might, however, apply to auxiliary troops, within a fairly restricted period.[83] Spaniards and Gauls had frequently served abroad as auxiliaries in the republican period.[84] As for Africans, Moors were certainly conscripted and probably fought abroad as early as the Flavian period, at which time one or more cohorts of Musulamii and at least one cohort of Numidae were put together for service in Syria. Probably also under the Flavians six Gaetulian tribes, described as located in Numidia, were led in some unknown arena of war by Pliny the younger's maternal grandfather. Further Gaetuli are recorded as soldiers at Cemenelum (Cimiez) in the Maritime Alps, in Judaea and in Lower Moesia, as early as Vespasian's reign.[85]

It has been suggested that for the Musulamii, for example, to have contributed soldiers on this scale, they must have 'accepted Romanization'.[86] Yet formidable opponents of Rome such as Arminius and Tacfarinas served in the Roman army, and the loyalty of auxiliary brigades was far from assured, as the *cohors Usiporum* demonstrated dramatically in Britain (Tac. *Agric.* 28). So unsure were the Flavian emperors of the Musulamii, that they established a triangle of two military colonies (Ammaedara, Madauros) and a legionary camp (Theveste) on their territory, which was much reduced in size. Trajan moved the legion from Theveste to Lambaesis, but Theveste was transformed into a third military colony, further cutting into tribal land, while Trajan's legates finished the job of delimiting Musulamian territory. It was standard practice (again there are numerous parallels from the republican period) to demand *auxilia* from a native tribe;[87] the men conscripted would be virtual hostages and the tribe itself less capable of organizing or sustaining resistance against the occupying power. Thus the Romans are likely to have pressed Musulamii into service abroad as part of the continuing process of pacification in the interior of Tunisia and eastern Algeria. The strategy was no doubt effective. No Musulamian cohorts are known after the reign of Trajan.

We must next consider the military needs of North Africa itself and the way in which they were met. Africa was served under the Principate by one legion, the Third Augusta, and a variable number of auxiliary brigades (plus an urban cohort based in Carthage). There could not have been a demand for more than two- to three-

hundred new recruits each year in normal circumstances. From what sources were they drawn?

We no longer believe as did Cagnat that in the first century soldiers for the Third Augusta were chosen exclusively from Italy and the Romanized provinces of the West.[88] This, if true, would have constituted a signal vote of no-confidence in the trustworthiness of Africans. In fact, the origins of only eleven soldiers were known to Cagnat. Since his day the number of inscriptions of soldiers of known origin from the first century has been doubled (but only doubled);[89] we can see that at least some Africans entered the legion (less than twenty per cent of our tiny sample are Africans), probably conscripted in the main from established cities like Carthage and Cirta and their hinterlands, and that the Tres Galliae were drawn upon more heavily than Gallia Narbonensis.

There is more information available for the Antonine and Severan periods, and a new pattern has arisen. By the second quarter of the second century, local and regional recruitment was becoming common throughout the empire. The army lists at Lambaesis from the second half of the century show a considerable proportion, up to about fifty per cent, of men of camp origin, that is, sons of legionaries.[90] Since Hadrian, men born in the camp (*castris*) were permitted to inherit by will from their fathers, though they were not legitimate heirs (*BGU* 140 = *W.Chrest.* II 373). The proportion of Berber blood in the Roman army of Africa must have increased with each generation. This was now, moreover, an army largely of volunteers, not conscripts.[91]

The significance of this is as follows. Veterans were a privileged group. We need think only of the economic benefits that accrued to them and the status improvement that could result from the award of land on discharge.[92] The Caesarian and Augustan colonies had established foreigners on African soil. The veterans set up in colonies by emperors from Vespasian to Trajan, however, at least included Africans, men who had joined the army in the second half of the first century. The same can be said of the veterans of the Third Augusta or an auxiliary brigade who settled in groups or as individuals in other areas in the early empire. In contrast, most of the leading citizens as well as the smaller landowners of Lambaesis when it was promoted to municipal status were not recent

immigrants from outside Africa, but families already settled in the area. They were Africans by birth not adoption; their families had provided soldiers in the past and would continue to do so in the future. Imperial policy was now working in favour of Africans, but in this, as in most cases, Africans who had done service for Rome.

With the military men who became landowners and socially and politically prominent in their localities, we have reached the fringe of the group which most obviously benefited from Roman rule, the city-based aristocracy or curial class. But before we consider the composition of this group, its accessibility to Africans and the opportunities it afforded for further advancement, it is appropriate to discuss the role of the cities themselves, as seen by the central government.

IV THE FUNCTION OF CITIES

Africa is acknowledged to have been, outside Italy, the most heavily urbanized region of the empire in the west. The phenomenon of urban growth, and the process by which peregrine *civitates* and *vici* gained promotion into fully fledged *municipia* and *coloniae*, have been much studied.[93] One theme that has received stress has been the progress of Romanization in the urban centres of Africa. Two other factors which form an essential part of the background of the drive for status promotion among the urban communities of Africa have been less generally recognized: the role of the self-governing city within the imperial administrative system, and the exploitation by the city of the rural communities dependent on them.

For the furnishing of taxes and military manpower, which were the most crucial needs of the empire, the central authorities depended on local administrative units, principally urban communities, which had responsibility for their adjacent rural territory (*pertica* or *territorium*).[94] A passage in a work of one of the Agrimensores shows that city officials in Africa characteristically exacted, or tried to exact, from the rural population unspecified compulsory services (*munera*), recruits, transport and supplies.[95] There were, to be sure, large tracts of Roman Africa where the writ of city officials did not run. In the tribal reserves responsibility rested with the *praefectus gentium* where he existed, or other officials, usually military, who collected taxes in kind and raised recruits

with the cooperation of the leading tribesmen. The large estates, whether under imperial or non-imperial ownership, appear to have been largely independent of the city authorities, although it is doubtful whether the legal position on this subject was clear. The Agrimensor indicates that city officials frequently came into collision with agents of both imperial and private landowners in a judicial setting, and it is improbable that all such disputes concerned merely the precise territorial limits of estate and city territory, especially as it is indicated that the initiative for litigation came from the cities. Be that as it may, there can be no doubt that there were substantial areas of Africa which fell within the jurisdiction of the cities.

The *territorium* of a city was divided into *pagi*, territorial units which were likely to contain one or more nucleated settlements, or *vici*. In raising the tax-revenues and recruits that were needed for the central government, the city authorities worked through the *pagus* and *vicus* officials. It was an unequal relationship, which the former were no doubt able to exploit to their own and their city's advantage.[96] It is clear that financial contributions and services were regularly exacted from dependent communities for the benefit of the city itself.[97] The cities prospered through their exploitation of the countryside.

It follows that in the upgrading of urban centres the interests of local community and central government might well coincide. There were clear material advantages to be gained by a community and its leadership which managed to free itself from the territorial jurisdiction of another community (or the supervision of a prefect or other official imposed from outside); for that community was in a position to milk the resources of its dependencies for its own purposes, and unfairly distribute the burdens imposed on it by the imperial power. Thus the Galatian village of Orcistus sought city status from Constantine in order to escape the oppressive rule of the neighbouring city of Nacola (*ILS* 6099). Again, insofar as the central authorities were concerned to increase (or maintain) the level of tax-revenue and the supply of military manpower, and to impose effective law and order on the countryside, they would have had positive reason to favour the multiplication of self-governing administrative units. Africa, it is agreed, was relatively well

stocked with cities.

Imperial policy was not in practice so coldly rational, or not continuously so, at least prior to the third century. It was left to individual cities to strive for improved status, and inevitably some were more successful than others. The progress of city-promotion was uneven, and the result of any particular request for upgrading not always predictable. Antoninus Pius favoured only Gigthis, among African cities. His reasons are unknown. The fact that Orcistus was a community of Christians prejudiced Constantine in its favour. The person, status and relation to the emperor of the representative or patron of the petitioning community, the effect of the arguments he adduced (concerning, for example, the community's loyalty, its level of Latin culture, its economic resources), the emperor's character, background and attitudes (including any personal connection he might have had with the relevant city, region or province) - any of these matters might be decisive. Nor should the possibility be overlooked that vested interests might stand against change and oppose it successfully. I suspect that a coalition between the many influential senators from Cirta and the local leadership was able to prevent the carving up of the city's vast territories and the loss of revenues and services this would have entailed, well into the third century.[98] The mediation of high-placed patrons was not entirely disinterested, if they were major landowners in the region.[99] Again, the immense *pertica* of Carthage was only slowly broken up through the award of municipal status to individual *pagi et civitates* or *vici*, and to explain this the influence of the grandees of Carthage and their allies in the capital should be invoked.[100] An additional reason for the failure of the Romans to municipalize this, the heartland of Africa Proconsularis, for so long was the scale of imperial interest and presence in the area, which included the grain-producing Medjerda valley. Administration and control, the traditional functions of self-governing communities, were to some extent accounted for by the imperial authorities in Carthage and on the extensive imperial domains in the region. When the pace of municipalization eventually quickened, under Septimius Severus, the size of the imperial estates, the number of communities and their proximity to one another ensured that the new *municipia* would have exiguous territories and

little opportunity for growth.

The municipal policy of Septimius Severus and some later emperors should be set against the background of the gradual transformation of the whole system of provincial administration in the course of the second century. Indirect rule, resting on the voluntary cooperation of the local elite, was giving way, and a regime of compulsion replacing it, as the central authorities strove to control more closely the process of tapping the resources of the provinces.[101] The key to the performance of the various tasks imposed on the cities lay in the liturgical system. There was bound to be conflict between the patriotic, but not altogether altruistic, desire of the local magnate to spend his surplus funds on something tangible and relevant to the life of his city, and the obligation to perform expensive and time-consuming tasks for the central government. The central government showed an increasing tendency to divert or direct the energies and funds of the wealthy from the former to the latter, and to increase the total burden on the wealthy. The interventionist inclinations of the central administration are very much in evidence in the reign of Septimius Severus. It was during his rule that municipal or quasi-municipal government came to Egypt, as a way of spreading more widely the burdens of administration among the better-off members of the subject population. The newly promoted African *municipia* had more to gain than the Egyptian *metropoleis*, but to interpret the stepping-up of the municipalization of the *pertica* of Carthage as a demonstration of liberality is to overlook the ambivalent attitude which the central authorities had long displayed towards city-foundations and -promotion.[102]

V THE AFRICAN ELITE

In this section I outline some of the ways in which social advancement and recognition were available to Africans. My examples of successful Africans will be drawn from cases where social background or ethnic origin is indicated more or less overtly. Some indigenous Africans and their descendants give themselves away by their adopted family names or their *cognomina*, or by the Berber or Punic names which they or their relations bear.[103] Again, some are designated tribal chieftains. I will not attempt to calculate the proportion of local aristocrats belonging to various social or ethnic groups.

Even if this were a fruitful enterprise, for my purposes it is unnecessary. If social and political promotion was possible for Africans in the several ways that are outlined below, then it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that membership of local government was predominantly African - given that the level of immigration was not high.[104]

There are several points to be made concerning indigenous Africans and their mobility chances.

(1) The success of the peasant of Maktar in entering the council of his city and becoming censor (*CIL* VIII 11824) is misleading.[105] Ordinary Africans had little hope of social advancement unless they joined the army. If they survived twenty-five years of military service, they had a chance of obtaining curial office for themselves or their descendants, especially in strategic areas near the frontiers. Social prominence was all but guaranteed in the case of those who rose in the ranks.

(2) Indigenous Africans may be found with Roman citizenship and holding public office in areas where they have not been pushed off the land by immigrants from abroad or by aristocratic Roman landowners, emperors included.

(3) Such men tend to be already possessed of high status in their communities by virtue of their wealth, birth and military prowess.

(4) Under Roman rule, the gap between native leaders and their followers probably widened.

(5) Some citizens and office-holders can be shown to have been promoted by Roman commanders or emperors for services rendered.

(6) Some natives gained *beneficia* not so much as a reward for services rendered, as an incentive to future obedience or acquiescence in Roman rule.

(7) Romanization or cultural assimilation was by no means a necessary prelude to the promotion of individuals or, for that matter, of cities.

(8) For a privileged few, local politics was a springboard to higher status and a public career outside the locality and the province.

The military men may conveniently be dealt with first. Given that the Roman army in Africa was increasingly African in terms of

the ethnic origin of its members, we can take it that the governing class of the cities where military men were prominent had a strong indigenous element. With veterans and their descendants, however, we have only penetrated the outer fringe of the class of successful Africans. Military men were not prominent everywhere. As in the empire at large, so in Africa, ordinary veterans were apparently influential mainly in the smaller cities in the interior, such as Verecunda, Madauros and Diana Veteranorum in southern Numidia.[106] However, ex-officers are found in prominent positions in local society and government in other areas as well.[107]

Under points (2)-(4) I maintain that there was continuity of leadership under the Romans in some areas, and if anything an enhancement of the distinction between leaders and followers. One thinks of heavily Punic Leptis Magna, and its pre-colonial rulers with names like Iddibal (*IRT* 319) and Anobal (*IRT* 324 a-c), or heavily Berber Gigthis, with its Memmii, Messii, Servaei, Servilii, many or most of native stock, most obviously Memmius Pacatus, described as *Chinithius*, and celebrated by the Chinithi in words implying that he was their *princeps*: *ob merita eius et singularem pietatem qua nationi suae praestat* (*CIL* VIII 22729 = *ILS* 9394). His selection as juryman at Rome by Hadrian antedates the city's promotion to municipal status by the successor of Hadrian, and the award of citizenship to an ancestor may go back to Flavian times. Although the Chinithi had formed part of the coalition of Tacfarinas in the first decades of the century, the tribe itself was not displaced or dispossessed. Its leadership, however, was perhaps reshuffled. The accentuation of the natural distance between chiefs and rank-and-file tribesmen may also be illustrated from Gigthis. Memmius Pacatus *princeps* was a juryman, and his family produced senators by the Severan period, while the ordinary tribesmen remained non-citizens, both under Hadrian and under Pius *conditor municipii*, whose charter for the city provided for the acquisition of citizenship only through entry into the local council (*CIL* VIII 22737 = *ILS* 6780). Later in the second century, the tribe, or a section of it, was still under the surveillance of a *praefectus* (*CIL* VIII 10500 = *ILS* 1409).[108] Again, at Thubursicu Numidarum, another tribal capital, the Numidian chieftain, A.Larcius Macrinus, *princeps gentis Numidarum* (*ILAlg.* I 1297 = *ILS* 9392),

outstripped the mass of indigenous Africans in the city and in the countryside, citizens in some cases, but with non-Roman names and few prospects.[109]

Points (5)-(7), on the other hand, imply a background not of continuity, but upheaval, engineered by the occupying power, which is seen distributing rewards for signal service without respect for status. An early case concerns the Marii.[100] Some of the 189 Marii identified in African inscriptions, though not nearly as many as has been suggested, were descendants of, or were linked with, Gaetuli who fought for Marius and were rewarded with citizenship and land (*Bell.Afr.* 56.3, 32.3, 35.4). The title Mariana is borne by Uchi Maius and Thibaris, two cities in one pocket of the extensive territory of Carthage, lying to the west of the Fossa Regia, and the connexion of this area with C.Marius *cos.* VII seems assured. The heaviest concentration of Marii, and the only Marii of any importance in Africa, were connected with cities such as Uchi Maius, Thugga and Mustis. They held office at Carthage or had marriage links with important Carthaginians. The one or two other municipal magistrates among the African Marii were of recent Berber extraction, had been soldiers, and were significant individuals only in southern Numidia. Most Marii are of no importance. One of them, Marius Gaetulicus, son of Iulia Silleha of Theveste, provides a bridging link to another group of Gaetuli of no importance, those bearing the *cognomen* Gaetulus or a variant.[111] Out of seventy-four one or two only shine through, such as Seia Gaetula of Cirta, whose son-in-law was a senator of praetorian rank in the first half of the third century (*PIR*^{2} F 538). This is a small reminder of the fact that the native populations were not excluded from positions of influence even in this relatively cosmopolitan capital with its strong immigrant element.[112] The same point can be made rather more powerfully with reference to the numerous and important Sittii and Iulii who owed their hold on Cirta and its environs to a whim of Julius Caesar.[113]

Under the empire the promotion of individuals and cities continued. The most dramatic instance of an imperial *beneficium* for services rendered is Claudius' in favour of Volubilis, a town in Mauretania. The whole body of Volubitani received citizenship and other privileges, and their city was awarded municipal status, in

return for their assistance in putting down the rebel Aedemon and his followers (*FIRA* I^2 no.70).[114] A more regular pattern is exemplified in the promotion of Gigthis - a local magistrate, an ancestor of whom had secured citizenship, gained for his town municipal status, but of a kind which benefited principally the elite. The arguments he used are unknown, but presumably he could have pointed to a certain level of Romanization among the beneficiaries (*CIL* VIII 22737 = *ILS* 6780). Volubilis, on the other hand, is a classic case of a promotion which preceded Romanization. The *principes* of the Baquates, a Mauretanian tribe whose relations with Rome can be followed to some extent for a century and a half, were sometimes awarded citizenship, but in quite different circumstances.[115] Aurelius Canatha is described as *princeps constitutus genti Baquatium* (*AE* 1957, 203), and the implication is that his position in the tribe has been strengthened with Roman assistance. This however was bribery, not the rewarding of services, and certainly not recognition of Romanization. Nor in the long run did this policy achieve positive results. A parallel is provided by the Banasa inscription from the reign of Marcus concerning the Zegrenses.[116] Julianus won promotion from one of the *primores* to *princeps*, and the new *princeps* and his family were awarded citizenship. These *beneficia* are dressed up as rewards for obedience, but the wording of the inscription conveys hope of future loyalty rather than gratitude for past performance. The initiative has come at least as much from the benefactor as the beneficiary.

There could be no greater contrast than that between tribal chieftains who were never integrated into the Roman provincial system and those members of the African aristocracy who passed into the imperial civil service and the senatorial order. By one estimate, by the later part of the second century about fifteen per cent of procurators[117] and about fifteen per cent of senators[118] originated in Africa. Precision is unattainable, but this matters less than the fundamental fact that Africans had access to the central administration and the highest status-group. The empire was still Rome-based, but the ruling class that directed it was cosmopolitan. 'You often command our legions in person, and in person govern these and other provinces. There is no question of segregation or exclusion' (Tac. *Hist.* 4.74). The words attributed to

Cerialis, inappropriate in their setting, Gaul in A.D. 70, had come true. Whether the provincial established at the capital remembered his native town and province and sought to advance their interests is another matter.

VI CONCLUSION: ROMANIZATION AND RESISTANCE

In Roman North Africa the work of pacification was continuous and long-lasting. The challenge represented by Tacfarinas and his formidable coalition of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribesmen, who maintained a destructive war for seven years, was never repeated in Proconsularis and Numidia; but hostile encounters with tribal forces occurred sporadically in certain areas, and in Mauretania they were occasionally of a serious nature.[119] It has been forcefully argued by Bénabou that this 'military resistance' was matched by 'cultural resistance' among the people of Africa.

This thesis is basically an attempt to account for the emergence of a particular and original Romano-African civilization, one that was, moreover, town-centred, having little impact on a solidly un-Romanized countryside. It makes much of the survival of indigenous cultural and religious traditions.[120] However, before accepting the tenacity of local traditions as evidence of resistance, we must enquire into the aims of the imperial power in the sphere of culture, and the prevalence of self-conscious opposition to the importation of an alien civilization. The notion of resistance has limited explanatory power if it is used indiscriminately to describe *unconscious* as well as overt opposition to a foreign culture.

Upper-class Romans had little respect for the quality of life of the peoples of the underdeveloped West.[121] For Cicero, Africans, Spaniards and Gauls were 'savage and barbarous nations' (*ad QF.* 1.1.27); for Velleius, the Germans had voices and limbs but nothing else in common with men (2.117.3). Treacherous conduct towards opponents of this nature merited no apology, while extermination and enslavement were acceptable policies.

Moreover, Roman or pro-Roman writers say nothing of any *mission civilatrice* undertaken in the interests of the subject populations. Nor was such a policy pursued by Roman administrators. Agricola, whose attempt at 'civilizing the (British) barbarians' is described by Tacitus in a well-known passage (*Agric.* 21), had strictly limited

aims. He did not, for example, impose a fully-fledged educational system on the Britons. This would not have been a practical proposition in Britain or anywhere else. But in any case Agricola would probably not have believed in it. Romanization for him was a means to an end, which was to turn a nation of warriors into peaceful subjects.[122] Moreover, his civilizing efforts were aimed at the British chieftains and their sons: it was they who were led to live a comfortable urban life, receive a Roman education and adopt Roman customs. He had no programme for the mass of the people, beyond administering justice equitably, moderating requests for taxes, supplies and military manpower, and maintaining a close supervision through the army (*Agric.* 19.3-4, 20.2). Again, the British leadership, according to Tacitus, quickly developed an appetite for Roman culture. Whether or not this is accurate in the case of the British, the Romans clearly believed, not without good grounds, that a native leadership would Romanize themselves, once shown the way. The attractiveness of Roman culture to less advanced peoples is not to be underrated.[123] There were additional incentives, on the subject of which Tacitus is silent. Within the Roman system, education was the key to social and political advancement. This was understood by one Seius Fundanus of Calama in Africa, who sent off his two sons to pursue their studies 'and thus assured them of honours' (*CIL* VIII 5770). Indeed Tacitus' assertion that the Britons 'instead of loathing the Latin language were eager to speak it eloquently' is more appropriately applied to the Africans. Africa produced both accomplished writers and orators and uninspired littérateurs in number. They came not only from the major cities but also from minor inland towns. Educational instruction was conducted in Latin and sometimes Greek, never Punic (cf. Apul. *Apol.* 98).[124]

In religion and cult a strong indigenous tradition survived throughout the period of Roman rule.[125] Given that the simple equation of survival with resistance cannot be accepted, one must again try to assess the Roman attitude to local practices, in this instance in the field of religion. To put it briefly, the Romans were on the whole tolerant of local cults as long as they did not become a focus of disturbance and rebellion. Thus a speaker in the *Octavius* of Minucius Felix (an African) can say:

Hence it is that throughout the wide empire, provinces and

> towns, we see each people having its own individual rites and worshipping its local gods, the Eleusinians Ceres, the Phrygians the Great Mother, the Epidaurians Aesculapius, the Chaldaeans Bel, the Syrians Astarte, the Taurians Diana, the Gauls Mercury, the Romans one and all. (6.1-2)

The only pagan cult practice in Africa to which hostility was shown by the Roman authorities was the human sacrifice associated with the worship of Saturn; its private performance, however, was tolerated.[126] African Christianity was also subject to intermittent persecution. It was this confrontation which provoked the only searching criticism of Roman imperialism and its theological underpinning which has survived in the literature of the Principate.[127] It would be rash, however, to assume that there was anything peculiarly African in the arguments to be found in Tertullian and Minucius Felix,[128] while the clash between state paganism and Christianity was of course empire wide. On the other hand, the resistance mounted by the Donatists against the imposition of Catholic orthodoxy by Christian emperors *was* a specifically African phenomenon.[129]

Roman rule in Africa produced a specific cultural complex, but its individuality was not a threat to the imperial power, any more than was the non-Roman character of the Hellenic civilization of the East. Any attempt by the imperial government to eradicate a local culture would have undermined its basic strategy of winning the support and active cooperation of the local elite by offering them material benefits. By choosing this course the Romans prolonged their rule. However, the loyalty of those Africans who accepted a certain level of cultural assimilation as a way of attaining more tangible rewards was likely to be undermined by the withdrawal or diminution of those rewards. In the event, long before the *pax Africana* (the basic *beneficium*) broke down, the continued and increased use of intervention and coercion, which were habits the Romans could never break, had weakened the consensus supporting Roman rule, because it upset the delicate balance between benefits and burdens.

12: JEWISH ATTITUDES TO THE ROMAN EMPIRE

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I

In any attempt to understand the attitudes of subject peoples to Roman rule, the Jewish evidence cannot be ignored. The surviving literature is ample, and spans the whole period of Roman rule. Its authors were literate and articulate, and many of them played a leading part in political events. The result is, for him who has eyes to see, a vivid and intimate picture of provincial life and attitudes. But it is not an easy picture to interpret. Much of the material is fragmentary in form. It has an esoteric character, being written for initiates. It tends to avoid the explicit, to prefer the hint, the allegory. There is little straightforward historical writing; instead we have snatches of dark prophecies, of homilies, of commentaries on ancient texts. The overall effect is frequently frustrating, and it is small wonder that the material has been so little exploited.

Perhaps the very inwardness of the Jewish literature militates against its use as a guide to provincial attitudes to Roman rule. The Jews are a peculiar people; they have never been able to keep religion out of politics. The combination is sometimes bizarre and often bewildering to the sober political historian. Yet in a sense every people is a peculiar people, and the 'uniqueness' of Jewish-Roman relations can be exaggerated. The history of the Jews under Roman rule presents special features, especially when viewed in the long perspective; but the Judaeans were also Roman provincials, and shared many problems with provincials everywhere. Unlike others, they have left written records of their thoughts about the empire. The scarcity of such material makes it precious, even if its form is strange. It can be read as a specimen, not a typical sample, of attitudes to the Roman empire.

In what follows I shall try to sketch the main lines of Jewish response to the Roman empire as they are represented in the Jewish literature. This literature is of diverse kinds. Some of it is

written in Hebrew or Aramaic, some in Greek; some only survives in Greek translation. Some, a very little, is Greek-style history, but most of the writers accept a Semitic view of time in which past, present and future are not easily distinguished. The rabbinic texts take the form mostly of anonymous, ill-dated compilations of fragments of oral teaching, arranged around a common theme and often attributed to their authors. We are bound to have blind faith in the soundness of these attributions: they are the only means we have of making chronological sense of the material. What is known generally of oral traditions justifies a measure of confidence. The fragmentary form entails a willingness in the reader to plunge, blindfolded sometimes, into the heart of an aphorism or an anecdote: it is possible to be hopelessly wrong. Still, with the exercise of reasonable precautions, the risk and effort are probably worthwhile.

II

The Romans appeared over the Jewish horizon in the first half of the second century B.C. They came from beyond the confines of the traditional Jewish world, and this gave them a certain initial advantage. The Jews tended to judge other nations in terms of a mythical history enshrined in their corpus of sacred writings. It was hard for any of their neighbours to avoid being type-cast, usually in an unenviable role. The Herodian family, for example, suffered from their Edomite origins, and the source of antisemitism can be located ultimately in the resentment felt by some Egyptians at a hostile Jewish stereotype of Egypt. A total outsider started on a more favourable footing, at least until the course of events dictated a policy, and he came to be identified, in a typical sense, with one of the ancient foes. The Greeks had benefited in this way: Alexander receives a good press, but as time went on the image of the Greeks progressively deteriorated, until they came to be cast as archetypal enemies.

It is as allies of the Jews against the Greek enemy that the Romans first appear on the Jewish scene. In this guise they make their solitary and shadowy appearance in the Greek Bible (Daniel 11.30, Septuagint), and a succession of treaties of alliance and friendship between the Jews and Romans against the Greek menace is recorded by Jewish writers.[1]

The first substantial Jewish account of the Romans and their power is in a Greek translation of a work originally written in Hebrew or Aramaic in the late second century B.C. They are powerful, but friendly to their allies. They have waged successful wars against Greeks, Spaniards and others. Nearer home, they have defeated a large army of Antiochus the Great.

> When the Greeks planned to attack and destroy them, they heard of it and sent a single general against them. Battle was joined, and many of the Greeks fell; the Romans took their women and children prisoner, plundered their territory and annexed it, razed their fortifications, and made them slaves, as they are to this day. The remaining kingdoms, the islands, and all who had ever opposed them, they destroyed or reduced to slavery. With their friends, however, and all who put themselves under their protection, they maintained firm friendship. They thus conquered kings near and far, and all who heard their fame went in fear of them. Those whom they wished to depose, they deposed; and thus they rose to great heights of power. For all this, not one of them made any personal claim to greatness by wearing the crown or donning the purple. They had established a senate where three hundred and twenty senators met daily to deliberate, giving constant thought to the proper ordering of the affairs of the common people. They entrusted their government and the ruling of all their territory to one of their number every year, all obeying this one man without envy or jealousy among themselves. (I Macc. 8.(1-)9-16, New English Bible)

The references to Antiochus and the Greeks are not accidental. 'The Greeks', or rather hellenized Syrians, were the principal enemy; the conquerors of the Greeks would naturally be the friends of the Jews, at least until Judaea was brought under the yoke of Roman rule. The memory of the ancient alliance with Rome survived this change. As late as the fourth century we have some reflections on the subject, including the grandiose claim that it was only after the alliance with the Jews that the Romans were able to defeat the Greeks (Dimi, B 'Abodah Zarah 8^{b}).

The precise date of the establishment of Roman rule over the Jews was a matter for dispute. Yose ben Halafta, the foremost rabbinic expert on chronology and the reputed source of the chronological work *Seder 'Olam Rabba*, stated (in the mid-second century A.D.) that it took place 180 years before the destruction of the Jerusalem temple, i.e. 110 B.C. (B 'Abodah Zarah 8[b], Shabbath 15[a]). It is hard to see to what event this refers. Josephus, however, unambiguously dates the subjection of the Jews to Roman rule to the conquest of Jerusalem by Pompey in 63 B.C., in the course of a civil war led by rival Hasmonean princes:

> The cause of this disaster for Jerusalem was the clash between Hyrkanos and Aristobulos. The consequences: we lost our liberty and became subject to the Romans; we were compelled to restore to the Syrians the territory we had won from them by force of arms; the Romans exacted more than 10,000 talents from us in a short period of time; and sovereignty, which had formerly been vested in the high-priestly family, became the preserve of laymen. (*Ant.* 14.77)

III

Pompey's conquest of Jerusalem is the subject of several contemporary Hebrew poems, preserved in Greek translation. In their analysis of the rights and wrongs of the disaster they betray a blend of attitudes which became standard in subsequent Jewish explanations of military defeats. For the Jews, it was axiomatic that historical events affecting them bore the mark of divine intervention. If the Jews won a war, God was on their side; if they lost, God was punishing them for their misdeeds. In the present case there is a strong emphasis on the sins of the Jews:

> They incited God by lawbreaking in underground hideouts:
> incest - son with mother, father with daughter;
> adultery - wife-swapping sanctioned by solemn agreements;
> plundering God's sanctuary with impunity,
> trampling his altar with impurity.
> They left no sin undone, they were worse than the Gentiles.

God responded by pouring them an undiluted draught:
  he brought the mighty smiter from the end of the earth,
  he declared war on Jerusalem and her land.
The rulers of the land welcomed him with joy,
  saying, Welcome! Come in peace!
They smoothed the way before him,
  opened the gates to Jerusalem,
  garlanded her walls.
He entered in peace like a father visiting his children,
  in total security he planted his feet.
He captured her strongholds and the wall of Jerusalem;
  God brought him in safety because of their errors.[2]

The conqueror, even if he is led by God, is not described in flattering terms: he is an alien, a sinner, an arrogant man (Ps. Sol. 2.1-2, 29-30; 17.13, 15). One of the poems describes how he himself is punished:

It was not long before God showed me his arrogance
  slain on the hills of Egypt,
  lower than the lowest on land or sea,
  his corpse unburied,
  arrogantly tossed by the waves,
because he scorned God contemptuously,
  not considering that he was a mere man,
  not considering the consequences,
  saying, I shall be Lord of land and sea,
  not recognizing that God alone is Great,
  mighty in his great strength (Ps. Sol. 2.30-3).

This, too, is God's justice. And the ultimate hope is for national restoration under God's appointed ruler:

See, Lord, and raise them up their king, son of David,
  at the time you, God, choose
  for him to rule over Israel your child.
Gird him with strength to shatter unjust rulers,
  to purge Jerusalem of the destructive trampling of Gentiles,

wisely, justly to expel sinners from the Heritage,
to smash the sinner's arrogance like a pot.[3]

The picture which emerges is a complex one. The conquest is a national disgrace, but it is a just punishment, and not a sign that God has abandoned his people. This attitude, a relic no doubt of the Babylonian exile, will reappear at later moments of national calamity, and will prevent the nation from losing its self-confidence. It contains little of specific judgement on Rome; on the contrary, we see the Romans gradually being assimilated into the traditional Jewish world-view.

A similar attitude can be discerned in other literary remains of the period, accompanied by a growing and more specific hostility to Rome. The most violent outbursts are to be found in the Third Sibyl,[4] where the theme of sin and punishment is frequently repeated. A strongly anti-Roman tract from Qumran insists that it is because of the sins of their defenders that the fortresses are destroyed, and contains the confident statement that 'God will not destroy his people by the hand of the Gentiles; he will execute the judgement of the Gentiles by the hand of his elect' (Habakkuk Comm. col.4).

It was in this early period of Roman hegemony, poorly documented in comparison with the later period of direct rule, that the fundamental Jewish attitudes to Rome were moulded. We can detect a certain ambiguity: the might of Rome is still admired, particularly her superiority over Greece (Nahum Comm. col.1; Orac. Sib. 3.520ff.), but the image is changing to that of the 'devouring eagle' (Habakkuk Comm. col.3). The nature of the surviving evidence probably distorts the picture; still a striking feature is the steadfast belief that God is in control, and the Romans are powerless to overrule his will.

IV

Roman-Jewish relations took a new turn after the death of the puppet-king Herod in 4 B.C. In the midst of the in-fighting of the Herodian princes, Josephus describes a popular embassy to Rome, appealing for 'autonomy' for the nation.[5] Autonomy is defined as freedom from the (Herodian) monarchy and subjection to the legates of Syria. The appeal is refused, but something like it is granted in A.D. 6, after the deposition of Archelaus. Judaea will be governed by Roman

prefects, under the eye of the Syrian legate. The Jews are left very largely in control of their own affairs, and in particular no attempt is made to interfere with the free practice of their religion. Roman rule is given concrete religious expression in the institution by Augustus of a regular daily sacrifice on behalf of the emperor in the Jerusalem temple.[6]

It might appear that the people have now achieved their desire: freedom from Herodian rule, and a powerful safeguard against Greek attacks and internal Jewish strife. 'Pray for the welfare of the empire', one priest declared, 'because but for the fear of it we would swallow one another alive.'[7] Philo gives a rapturous description of the world at the beginning of the reign of Gaius:

> Indeed, the life under Saturn, depicted by the poets, no longer seemed a fable, so great was the prosperity and well-being, the freedom from grief and fear, the joy which pervaded households and people, both by day and by night. (*Leg.* 13; cf. Jos. *Ant.* 16.38)

But, while some Jews were grateful for the blessings of Roman rule, the events of A.D. 6 also sparked off an extreme and militant anti-Roman reaction which eventually culminated in full-scale revolt. Throughout the period from 6 to 66 there were outbreaks of violence, and several of the zealot leaders are known to us by name. What is not entirely clear is the zealots' aim, if they had one. To throw off the Roman yoke, but then what? Probably they were motivated by extreme messianic fervour, such as we have already encountered in the Psalms of Solomon and other texts. Messianic feeling was certainly strong at this period. The messiah would restore the House of David and secure military supremacy for the Jews. It is hard to judge how much popular support there was for this extreme programme. Its proponents seem to have exploited a growing discontent provoked by the hardships of Roman rule, particularly the increased burden of taxation (e.g. Jos. *BJ* 2.118; Mark 12.15).

Whatever its popular appeal, it was a long time before the zealot movement received any official backing. Its propaganda has left few traces in the literature,[8] and it is only from its practical manifestations that it is known. It seems to have been stronger in

Galilee than in Judaea. In Jerusalem the priestly aristocracy is generally thought to have been pro-Roman, and this is probably true, although too little is known for us to enquire more deeply into its thinking. The high priests were in the unenviable position of having to appease both the Roman governors and an increasingly dissatisfied populace. In any case, the influence of the high priests was waning at this time. Roman rule served to buttress it artificially for a while; after the destruction of the temple the high priesthood disappeared without trace, and its loss does not seem to have been regretted.

Between the two extremes of militant zealotry and fawning appeasement we must imagine a whole gamut of attitudes to Roman rule. Probably the majority of Jews grumblingly accepted the status quo. Belief in messianic redemption was not inherently incompatible with acceptance of Roman rule and even appreciation of its benefits. Among the various popular movements which emerged at this time there are hints of an attempt to separate religion from politics:

> Jesus said to them, Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's.[9]
> Rabbi Nehunia ben Hakkanah said: Whoever accepts the yoke of Torah is relieved of the yoke of the empire, but whoever shrugs off the yoke of Torah is subjected to the yoke of the empire.[10]

This last statement is admittedly ambiguous. It might mean that the Roman burden is the result of neglect of Torah. More probably it means that each Jew is faced with a choice: religion or politics, but not both. This was an attitude which was to become more prominent later.

V

In A.D. 66 the militant tendency prevailed, and the Jews rose in revolt. The motives of the revolutionaries were not uniform; it is clear that many who had previously been moderate or even pro-Roman joined the revolt once it had started. Nor was the revolt purely and simply a war between Jews and Romans. Josephus' title 'Jewish War' is misleading. The Romans never declared war on the Jewish people, or the Jewish religion. The war was entirely a local affair,

involving the large and prosperous communities of the rest of the empire not at all. And, very significantly, it began with outbreaks of violence between Jews and 'Greeks' in the Hellenistic cities surrounding Judaea (Jos. *BJ* 2.266-70, 284-8, 457-98). Civil commotion on this scale could not but involve the Romans, and it was at this point that the fighting took on the appearance of a revolt against Rome. For Josephus, it was the abolition of the sacrifice for the emperor which marked the change;[11] this was an act of zealotry.[12] From now on the Jews of Judaea were plunged, whether they liked it or not, into a head-on clash with Rome, in which even those who had opposed the zealots were caught up.

Josephus gives a graphic description of attitudes in the towns of Galilee on the outbreak of hostilities (Jos. *Vita* 30ff.; cf. 345ff.). In Sepphoris the inhabitants supported the Romans; they were afraid of reprisals. In Tiberias there were three factions. The first, consisting of 'respectable men', was pro-Roman; a second, 'made up of the basest elements', was bent on war; a third faction, led by Justus, feigned hesitation, but were really in favour of revolution, hoping for personal advancement.[13] In Gischala, John tried to quell the mounting revolutionary feeling and failed. (He later became a leader of the war party in Jerusalem.) Finally, Gamala remained loyal to Rome, thanks to the efforts of Philip, an officer of Agrippa II.

If we accept Josephus' account - and there seems no reason to doubt its broad outline - the division was largely a social one: the wealthier, more hellenized, more powerful men and those close to Agrippa were against the war. Agrippa himself, according to Josephus, was strongly opposed to it. Josephus puts a speech into his mouth in Jerusalem in 66 which, while it agrees closely with Josephus' own speeches, may well represent Agrippa's view. The more honest and sincere elements of the people, he says, are in favour of peace. The war party are motivated by their youthfulness, by an unreasoned hope of liberty, and by the prospect of rich rewards. Many other nations - even the Britons - have submitted to Roman rule. Finally, he argues that God himself is on the side of the Romans - otherwise they could never have built up such a powerful empire (*BJ* 2.345-404).

Josephus, in his own speeches, makes similar points: The Romans respect their enemies' religious monuments; they are masters of the

whole world; and it is wrong to resist them. In any case, it is not Jewish to fight; Jews should put their trust in God's justice. The zealots do not represent what is best in Judaism; they are sinners who have polluted Jerusalem. And finally, again, God is on the side of the Romans in this war (*BJ* 5.363-419, 6.99-110).

The accusation that the zealots are bringing disaster on the city and have polluted it by their outrages is one that Josephus often repeats (*BJ* 4.377-88, 5.562-6, 7.259-74). He was clearly no lover of the zealots. It might be thought that, with his peculiar life-history and especially his need to conciliate the Romans, his attitude is uncharacteristic. Yet it is hardly different from the image of the zealots projected in the rabbinic literature.

> When Vespasian came to destroy Jerusalem he said to them [sc. the zealot leaders]:
>
> 'Fools, why are you trying to destroy this city and to burn the temple? All I ask of you is that you send me one bow or one arrow, and I shall leave you alone.'
>
> They replied:
>
> 'Just as we attacked and killed both your predecessors, so we shall attack and kill you.'
>
> When Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai heard this he sent word to the men of Jerusalem:
>
> 'My sons, why are you trying to destroy this city and to burn the temple? After all, what is it he asks of you? All he is asking for is one bow or one arrow, and he will leave you alone.'
>
> They replied:
>
> 'Just as we attacked and killed both his predecessors, so we shall attack and kill him.'
>
> Vespasian had men stationed near the walls who wrote everything they heard on arrows and shot them over the wall. They informed him that Yohanan ben Zakkai was one of Caesar's supporters.[14]

Yohanan ben Zakkai was the most influential Pharisee leader, and after the war he became, with Roman support, the undisputed head of the Jewish community in Judaea. The passage just quoted

introduces the oldest account of his escape from the besieged city.[15] According to another version,[16] Yohanan had a nephew who was a zealot leader in Jerusalem. The rabbis tried to persuade the zealots to make peace with the Romans, but they refused and deliberately burned the stores of wheat and barley. It was this act which decided Yohanan to leave the city.

However much or little historical fact there may be in these anecdotes it is clear that the later tradition was hostile to the zealots, and saw them as determined to fight to the death against the advice of the rabbis. The tradition also represents Yohanan ben Zakkai as the leading advocate of conciliation. Admittedly the tradition has the benefit of hindsight, and is also influenced by considerations similar to those which must have weighed on Josephus after the war. But if the legend of Yohanan was elaborated in the years after the war, it is not likely that it would have done crude violence to the attitude held by Yohanan and others before and during the fighting.

VI

The war of 66-73 marked the high point of the popularity of the zealot cause in Judaea. The zealots never enjoyed such widespread support before or after as they did at the time of the revolt. The Jewish leadership which prevailed after the war in the shadow of Roman rule repudiated them, and blamed them rather than the Romans for the destruction of the temple. The 'official view' which emerged was similar to that found in the Psalms of Solomon: it was because of the sins of the Jews that Jerusalem was destroyed.[17]

The non-rabbinic literature of the period following the war echoes the same theme:

> The Lord our God is just, but we are shamefaced - men of Judaea and Jerusalem, our kings and rulers, our priests and prophets, and our forefathers: we have sinned against the Lord and disobeyed him.[18]

These sentiments can be matched by any number of passages in the apocalyptic writings of this period, mingled with visions of the messianic age to come at a time of God's choice. And then

Rome's destruction will come:

> You have wielded power over the whole world with great terror,
> and over the inhabited earth with fierce oppression;
> you have dwelt so long in the civilised world with fraud,
> you have judged the earth, but not with righteousness.
> You have oppressed the weak and afflicted the peaceful,
> hated the upright and loved liars;
> you have destroyed the houses of the prosperous
> and razed the walls of those who did you no harm;
> and so your insolence has risen to the Most High,
> your arrogance to the Mighty One...
>
> Therefore you shall totally disappear, O Eagle,
> with your horrible wings and your hideous pinions,
> your harmful heads and your terrible talons,
> and all your worthless body. (4 Ezra 11.40-3, 45)

Yet side by side with such fiery invective we find evidence of a different attitude:

> Pray for Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon, and for his son Belshazzar, that their life on earth may last as long as the heavens; so the Lord will give us strength, and light to walk by, and we shall live under the protection of Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon and of Belshazzar his son; we shall give them long service and gain their favour.[19]

The tension between pro-Roman and anti-Roman sentiment comes to be characteristic of Jewish attitudes in the following years. Prayers for the welfare of the empire stand side by side with prayers for its overthrow and the establishment of the messianic empire. Jewish messianism could tolerate Roman rule, but it could also erupt in savage violence, as it did in the second Jewish revolt, at the end of the reign of Trajan. Like the first revolt, this began as a conflict between Jews and Greeks; unlike the first revolt, it hardly affected Judaea, if at all.[20] Its battlegrounds were Libya, Egypt, Cyprus, Mesopotamia. Being a revolt of the

diaspora, it has left barely a trace in the Jewish tradition,[21] despite its vast scale, and we lack the means to judge clearly its motives and aims.[22] It could not avoid taking on the character of a revolt against Roman rule, and it appears to have had messianic overtones (we even hear of a Jewish 'king' in Cyrene).

With the revolt crushed and Trajan dead, a new era seemed to be dawning, perhaps the age of the messiah. So at least it appeared to an apocalyptic poet, chronicling the Roman emperors of this period:

> ...Then shall come a great destroyer of godly men, displaying the letter of seventy.
> His son, who has the initial of 300, will succeed him and take over his power.
> After him will come an emperor of the letter four, a ?cursed man.
> Next a venerable man of the number of fifty.
> After him, one whose initial signifies 300, a Celtic mountaineer. Hot-footed for eastern war, he will not escape an ignoble fate, but shall succumb. Foreign dust will cover his corpse, bearing the name of the Nemean flower.[23]
> After him another shall reign, a silver-helmed man, bearing the name of a sea, an excellent man who understands all things. And in your time, most excellent, most noble, dark-haired prince, and in the time of your successors, all these days shall come. (Orac.Sib. 5.36-50)

VII

Hadrian's reign did not bring redemption, it brought another bloody revolt in Judaea, the messianic character of which is evident from the title 'Son of the Star' given to its leader by his supporters, among whom was one of the leading rabbinic authorities of the time, Akiba.[24]

But Akiba's support for Bar Kosiba should not lead us to suppose that all the rabbis shared his enthusiasm. The tradition preserves two interesting discussions of the time which present both sides of the argument. Both bear the stamp of authenticity, and they involve prominent Jewish figures.

> Rabbi Judah (bar Ilai), Rabbi Yose (ben Halafta) and Rabbi Simeon (bar Yohai) were sitting talking...
> Rabbi Judah began:
> 'How splendid are the works of this people! They have built market-places, baths and bridges.'
> Rabbi Yose said nothing.
> Rabbi Simeon bar Yohai answered him:
> 'Everything they have made they have made only for themselves: market-places, for whores; baths, to wallow in; bridges, to levy tolls.' (B Shabbath 33^b; cf. 'Abodah Zarah 2^b)

Simeon bar Yohai is known as an opponent of Roman rule. He is quoted as saying, 'If you see a Persian horse tethered in Palestine, look for the feet of the messiah' (Lamentations Rabba 1.13.41). According to tradition he was condemned to death by the Romans and went underground - literally - during the persecution.

Judah bar Ilai expresses an enthusiasm for the benefits of the empire which cannot have been entirely isolated.

Yose ben Halafta, whom we have already met as an historian, evidently took a middle position. To him are attributed the statements that the Romans and the Jews are brothers (B Pesahim 118^b), and that Rome only persecutes the Jews on God's instructions, to punish them for neglecting their religion (Genesis Rabba 67.7).

The second discussion involves Yose ben Kisma, who had survived the fall of Jerusalem in 70 as a young man, and died, honoured by the Roman authorities in Caesarea Philippi, during the third war, and Hananiah ben Teradion, who died as a martyr not long afterwards.

> When Rabbi Yose ben Kisma lay dying, Rabbi Hananiah ben Teradion went to visit him.
> 'Brother Hananiah', he said to him, 'do you not realize that it is Heaven who has ordained this nation to rule? For even though they have laid waste his home, burnt down his temple, slain his saints and persecuted his servants, still (the empire) is firmly established.' (B 'Abodah Zarah 18^a)

We have encountered this argument before, in Josephus, and no doubt it grew stronger, not weaker, as time went on. Another speech

of the dying Rabbi Yose, however, shows that in the long term he shared the view of Simeon bar Yohai, who looked to the east for redemption:

> His disciples asked him, 'When will the messiah come?'
> He said:
> 'When that gate (perhaps the gate of Caesarea Philippi) falls, is rebuilt, falls, is rebuilt, and then falls a third time - before it is rebuilt again the Son of David will have come'...
> When he lay dying he said to them:
> 'Bury my coffin deep, for there is not a palm tree in Babylon to which a Persian horse will not be tethered, nor a coffin in Palestine out of which a Median horse will not eat hay.'[25]

The reign of Hadrian marks a clear turning-point in Jewish attitudes to Rome. For the first time, Romans are seen as persecutors of the Jewish religion. It was remembered as a time of Roman brutality, and of heroic Jewish martyrdom reminiscent of the days of the Maccabees. Hadrian earned a reputation similar to that of Antiochus Epiphanes, and from now on it is conventional to refer to Rome as 'the evil empire'.

VIII

The image of Rome in the subsequent rabbinic literature is predominantly a negative one. Roman rule is increasingly accepted as a fact, but it is generally referred to in hostile terms, frequently derived from the sacred scriptures. The belief that these were a repository of all wisdom for all time led the rabbis to scan them carefully for guidance in their present situation, and to reinterpret the old texts to fit the new state of affairs. The image of Rome was now fixed with reference to certain biblical figures, the most constantly recurrent of which is Esau or Edom, already established as the type of the gentile, in opposition to Jacob-Israel, the archetypal Jew:

> A (Roman) prefect once asked a member of the family of Sallu:
> 'Who will enjoy sovereignty after us?'

He took pen and paper and wrote:

And after that his brother emerged, his hand clasping Esau's heel; and his name was called Jacob.

Of this it was said:

'See how ancient words become new in the mouth of a Sage!'

(Genesis Rabba 63.9, quoting Genesis 25.26)

The whole story of Jacob and his relations with his brother Esau is opened up in this way as a prophetic document of the relationship between Jews and Romans. The amount of preaching on this theme is enormous, but the lessons drawn from the texts are by no means uniform. They cover the whole range of attitudes, from the bitterly antagonistic to the positively enthusiastic, and we are often presented with two or more interpretations side by side:

Two nations are in thy womb (Genesis 25.23)

Two proud rulers of nations are in thy womb: Hadrian for the Gentiles and Solomon for Israel.

Another interpretation:

Two hated nations are in thy womb: all peoples hate Esau, and all peoples hate Israel. (Anon. Genesis Rabba 63.7 = Midrash Psalms 9.7)

The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau (Genesis 27.22)

Jacob's voice: This refers to the emperor Hadrian [sc. Trajan?], who killed in Alexandria-by-Egypt sixty myriads on sixty myriads (of Jews) - twice as many as came out from Egypt (under Moses).

Or it refers to the cry caused by the emperor Vespasian [sc. Hadrian?], who killed in the city of Bethar 400,000 myriads, or some say 4,000 myriads.

the hands of Esau: This refers to the Roman empire which has destroyed our shrine and burnt our temple and driven us out of our land.

Another interpretation:

Jacob's voice: No prayer is effective unless the seed of Jacob has a part in it.

> *the hands of Esau*: no war is successful unless the seed of Esau has a share in it. (Anon. B Gittin 57^{b})

Thus, while all interpreters agree that Esau represents Rome and Jacob the Jews, they can disagree about the moral of the story. While most commentators stress the irreconcilable hostility of the two brothers, there are always those who emphasize that 'even though he is Esau, he is still his brother' (Anon. Genesis Rabba 75.4; cf. Leviticus Rabba 15.9), and suggest that they have complementary roles to fulfil in the world.

The identification of Rome with Esau is only one instance of the tendency to apply biblical texts to the Roman empire. Other biblical enemies of Israel are identified with the Romans (e.g., Amalek, Pesikta Rabbati 12.4), and various texts are reinterpreted by various exegetical techniques to apply to the 'evil empire'. The famous prophecy of Isaiah, for example, 'watchman, what of the night?' (Isaiah 21.11f.), is ascribed to Rome by textual emendation.[26]

A particularly widely accepted interpretation is the identification with Rome of the 'fourth beast' of Daniel 7, 'whose teeth are of iron and his nails of brass', and also the 'little horn' which subdues three kings.[27] Many of the rabbis accept without question the apocalyptic view of world history, according to which the successive empires of Babylon, Persia, Greece are supplanted by Rome, which will eventually be overthrown and replaced by the world-domination of Israel, under God's messiah. Any number of texts speak of the violent punishment of Rome[28] and the hegemony of Israel in messianic times.[29] We may quote a striking example, one of many attributed to the third-century rabbi Samuel bar Nahman. It is an elaboration on Jacob's dream (Genesis 28.12). The angels ascending and descending are the guardian angels of the four empires. Each of the angels in turn ascends a number of rungs corresponding to the years of his empire's hegemony, and then descends, but the angel of Rome seems to be climbing for ever. Jacob is afraid. Is it possible, he asks, that this one will never be brought down? God reassures him with the prophecy of Jeremiah 30.10f., a powerful salve for national self-confidence.[30]

IX

The belief in the divinely assured destiny of the Jewish people is a striking feature of the Jewish thought of our period, and one which made an important contribution to the separate survival of the people and the religion. It is hard to imagine any other nation so powerless as the Jews maintaining so confidently, and in such an extreme form, the belief that they were destined ultimately to rule the world. We shall see presently, and indeed we have already observed signs, that some leaders of Jewish opinion tried to moderate the vigour of this grandiose ambition. But we should never lose sight of the fact that the Jewish world-picture was centred firmly on Israel. The Jews were unwilling to credit any foreign power with an independent existence and purpose. Events were judged solely in terms of their bearing on God's plan for his own people. We are seriously told, for instance, that the barbarian invasions were intended to distract Rome's unwelcome attention from Israel (Hama bar Haninah, Genesis Rabba 75.9). Given this ideological background, we should be less surprised by the persistence of apocalyptic visions of the destruction of the 'fourth empire' than by the repeated insistence that Esau and Israel are brothers, and that each has his allotted role to fill. The wealth and might of Rome, the security and permanence of the empire, evidently made a formidable impression even on minds committed to the belief that all human power is vanity, and that no foreign nation can rule for long over God's own people.

It was consistent with the Jewish belief in God's intervention in history to accept that the success of Rome was a sign of divine support, even if it entailed the continued subjection of Israel. This idea can be traced back, as we have seen, to the time of Vespasian and even Pompey. In the rabbinic period the Roman myth of the foundation of the city was translated into Jewish terms, and invested with divine sanction.

The Jewish myth runs as follows: God is the 'helper of the fatherless' (Psalm 10.14). When Romulus and Remus were left orphans, God brought a she-wolf to suckle the infants, and in due course they grew up and became great kings, and laid the foundations for the future city of Rome.[31]

Just as the various defeats of Israel were ascribed to the

sins of the people, so the emergence of Rome was linked to the sins of Jewish kings:

> The day that Solomon married the daughter of Pharaoh Nekho, Michael the Great Prince came down from heaven and planted a great pole in the sea. A sandbank grew up on this spot, and it became a bed of reeds. This was the future site of Rome. The day that Jeroboam made the two calves of gold, Romulus and Remus came to the reed-bed and built two quarters of Rome. The day that Elijah ascended, a king was proclaimed in Rome.[32]

The city exercised a certain fascination, and legend exaggerated its wealth:

> The great city of Rome has 365 streets, and in each street there are 365 palaces. Each palace has 365 stories, and each story contains enough food to feed the whole world. (Ishmael, B Pesahim 118b)

> The great city of Rome covers an area 300 parasangs square. It has 365 markets, one for every day of the year. The smallest, that of the poulterers, is sixteen miles square. Every day the emperor dines in one of them.
> Everyone who resides in the city, even if he was not born there, receives a regular portion of food from the emperor's household.
> So does everyone who was born there, even if he does not reside in the city.
> There are three thousand baths in the city, with five hundred ducts to carry the smoke outside the walls.
> One side is bounded by the sea, one side by hills and mountains, one side by an iron fortification, and one side by pebbly ground and swamps.[33]

Finally, on the subject of the city of Rome, it is worth recording the belief that, just as Moses was brought up in Pharaoh's palace, so the king messiah is living in Rome.[34]

X

Interspersed with the rabbinic commentary on Roman rule couched in typically Jewish language, there are many remarks about the benefits and burdens of the empire, such as one might expect to hear from any provincial.[35] The general verdict is not favourable. The rabbis adopted a high moral tone in castigating the immorality which they saw as characteristic of the empire: idolatry,[36] blasphemy,[37] sodomy,[38] rape and murder.[39] One preacher applies the words 'darkness on the face of the deep' (Genesis 1.2) to the unfathomable wickedness of Rome.[40] Another derives the word 'senator' from three Hebrew roots meaning hatred, vengeance and violence (Eleazar ben Yose, Genesis Rabba 67.8).

A common accusation against the empire is its rapacity and eagerness for gold. 'The eyes of Edom are never satisfied.'[41] In this context, the great wealth of Rome counts against her,[42] particularly since it was felt that the plundered Jerusalem temple had made a disproportionate contribution to this wealth (Hama bar Hanina, Genesis Rabba 70.8).

Taxation is mentioned frequently as a cause of discontent, coupled with conscription. Taxation had always been an issue, but the sources paint a desperate picture:

> Just as a bramble snatches at a man's clothing, so that even if he detaches itself on one side it sticks to the other, so the empire of Esau annually appropriates Israel's crops and herds. Even before that, it pricks them with its poll-tax. And even as this is being exacted, Esau's men come to the people of Israel to levy conscripts. (Pesikta Rabbati 10.1; cf. Midrash Psalms 10.6)

> You go into the country and you meet a bailiff; you come back to town and bump into a tax-collector; you go home and find your sons and daughters starving. (Simeon ben Lakish, B Sanhedrin 98^{b})

Another aspect of the rapacity of the empire was the milking of wealthy men by promoting them to public office (?Yohanan, Genesis Rabba 76.6), a practice which was no less objectionable for having

been supposedly recommended to the emperor by a Jewish ethnarch (Genesis Rabba 67.6). It was perhaps the son of this ethnarch who coined the maxim:

> Beware of the government. They never recruit a man except to serve their own needs. They feign love when it suits them, but they do not stand by a man when he is in difficulties. (Mishnah Aboth 2.3)

A peculiarly Jewish image to convey the duplicity and greed of the empire is that of the swine. The pig is technically an unclean animal because it does not chew the cud, even though it has cloven hoofs.

> Just as a pig lies down and sticks out its hoofs as though to say 'I am clean', so the evil empire robs and oppresses, while pretending to execute justice.[43]

The much-vaunted Roman justice was clearly felt by the rabbis, who were also lawyers, to be the strong point of the empire. A preacher whose view of Rome is normally far from complimentary produces the startling statement that the words 'God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good' (Genesis 1.13) referred to the empire, 'because it attempts to establish justice for mankind' (Simeon ben Lakish, Genesis Rabba 9.13). 'When you desired to bring justice into the world', another rabbi apostrophizes God, 'you entrusted it to two men, Romulus and Remus, so that each could veto what the other proposed', and he has praise for the Roman system of appeals.[44]

But if the theory is laudable, the practice might not always follow suit. In particular there were complaints that Roman judges asked leading questions of the 'when did you stop beating your wife?' variety. 'Why did you murder him? How did you kill him - with a sword, a spear or a dagger?' (Deuteronomy Rabba 1.17). 'You didn't do it? Who was your accomplice?'[45]

XI

Despite the long tradition of apocalyptic prophecy of the overthrow

of the 'evil empire', and despite the predominantly negative tone of much of the material we have considered, there is abundant evidence in the third-century sources of an attempt at reconciliation with Rome on the part of the rabbis, or at least of resignation to continued Roman rule.[46] The new attitude takes various forms in the literature. One preacher may dwell on the brotherhood of Jacob and Esau, another on the evident success of Rome, proof of divine support, yet another on the idea of peaceful co-existence, and the need to avoid confrontation. 'If you are for peace', Jacob is imagined as saying to Esau, 'I am with you; if you are for war, I am ready for you' (Anon. Genesis Rabba 75.11). Esau is God's sword, 'for with him you chastise the world' (Anon. Genesis Rabba 75.1). 'What must Israel do? They must open their hands to the Romans and appease them with money' (Midrash Psalms 68.15). 'Esau's warriors have wrested sovereignty from your hand... You [sc. God] gave them power in this world. Such men are destined for lives of serenity and prosperity, of peace and wealth in this world' (Midrash Psalms 17.12). The messianic vision of Rome's overthrow is not lost, but it is tempered by a plea for patience, and submission to God's will. Religion, to use modern parlance, should take the place of politics. The Jews should accept Roman sovereignty, and challenge it not by any show of force but by redoubled dedication to a life of goodness and study of Torah.

As we have seen, these ideas are not entirely new. Traces of them have been seen before, for instance in the teachings ascribed to Yose ben Halafta.[47] But in the course of the third century they assume a definite predominance, especially in the circle of the leading Palestinian rabbi, Yohanan bar Nappaha. Although it is never easy or safe to attempt to isolate the thought of individual teachers from the rabbinic literature, we shall try in what follows to trace the main lines of this quietistic approach to Rome in statements attributed to the third-century Palestinian *amoraim*, taking them in rough chronological order.

The period of the *amoraim* begins with the pupils of the ethnarch Judah I, the supposed editor of the Mishnah. Foremost among them was Hiyya, a Mesopotamian by birth, who firmly believed in the Babylonian diaspora and wished to see it grow as a centre of Judaism independent of Palestinian supervision. Hiyya was one of

a series of easterners who came to study in the schools of Palestine, but whose loyalty was to the land of their birth, and during this period there is a constant tension between the Land of Israel and the diaspora. The ethnarch, like other Palestinian rabbis, resented and opposed the pressure for Babylonian autonomy. On the political plane Hiyya's feelings show themselves in remarks contrasting Rome and Babylonia. 'God knew that Israel would be unable to endure the cruelty of Edom, and that is why he exiled them to Babylon' (B Pesahim 87^b). It is rash to put all your eggs in one basket: better for Jacob to divide his camps (cf. Genesis 32.7); if Esau attacks one the other will escape unscathed (Genesis Rabba 76.3). Resistance is useless: if Esau attacks, the best plan is to hide from him until his power has passed away (Deuteronomy Rabba 1.19).

Another pupil of Judah I in Sepphoris was Haninah bar Hama, who, like Hiyya, became an important and influential teacher. He disagreed with Hiyya about the reason for the Babylonian exile (B Pesahim 87^b), and was not in favour of emigration from Palestine to Babylonia (J Mo'ed Katan 81^c). While not being notably pro-Roman (e.g. Midrash Psalms 52.4), he is credited with the teaching that military might and political power are not for Israel. Other empires may enjoy world-domination; Israel 'enters in peace and departs in peace' (Song of Songs Rabba 7.1).

Yannai was a pupil of Judah I and of Hiyya who, like Haninah bar Hama, enjoyed something of a reputation for wealth. Owning orchards himself, he was sympathetic to the plight of farmers in times of economic difficulty, and is the author of a ruling permitting crops to be sown in the sabbatical year, on account of the hardship caused by taxation (B Sanhedrin 26^a). He has left few remarks which can be interpreted in a political sense, but we may deduce something of his attitude from the injunction 'Always display reverence towards the emperor' (B Menahoth 98^a = Zebahim 102^a), and from the statement that the law forbids a man to incur danger in expectation of a miracle (B Shabbath 32^a). This is perhaps a warning to those who were prepared to run any risk to hasten the coming of the messianic revolution.

Such a view is expressed with greater precision by a contemporary, Joshua ben Levi of Lydda. Preaching on a prophetic verse

which was no doubt much used by messianic activists, 'Say to them that are of a fearful heart, Be strong, fear not: behold, your God will come with vengeance' (Isaiah 35.4), Joshua turns the text against them by reading not 'those that are of a fearful heart' but 'those in a hurry', who try to force the end to come too soon (Leviticus Rabba 19.5). Joshua preaches patience and peaceful submission. The world is not big enough to contain the two contending powers of Israel and Rome; Israel has yielded the purple voluntarily to his elder brother (Genesis Rabba 75.4). Joshua had apparently been to Rome (Genesis Rabba 33.1); he returned with the cryptic message, 'If anyone says to you, "Where is your God?", reply, "In the great city of Rome"' (J Ta'anith 64^a).

Yet another contemporary of Yannai and Haninah, Jonathan, expresses himself on the subject of those who are preoccupied with the coming of the messiah: 'Blasted be the bones of those who calculate the end. They say that, since the calculated time has arrived and yet he has not come, he will never come. But you should wait patiently for him, as it is written, "Though he tarry, wait for him; he will surely come"' (B Sanhedrin 97^b).

This statement is quoted by a pupil of Jonathan and of Joshua ben Levi, Samuel bar Nahman, whose sermon on Jacob's dream has already been quoted.[48] Samuel agrees that the day will eventually come of which it is written, 'There shall come a Star out of Jacob, and a Sceptre shall rise out of Israel' (Numbers 24.17),[49] and he also reaffirms the traditional view that the Jews will overthrow the power of Rome (Genesis Rabba 73.7 = 75.5). But, like other rabbis of his time, he is opposed to active messianism. It is God alone who rules all things. The Bible speaks of 'the redeemed of the Lord' (Psalm 107.2, Isaiah 35.10), not 'the redeemed of Elijah' or 'the redeemed of the king messiah' (Midrash Psalms 107.1; cf. 36.6).

The outstanding Palestinian rabbi of the second half of the second century was Yohanan bar Nappaha. Yohanan had studied as a very young man under Judah I, but his main teachers were Yannai and Haninah bar Hama.[50] He had made a special study of the traditions concerning the Roman destruction of the temple, and he came to the conclusion that the Jews had brought destruction on their own heads, by initiating the war (B Pesahim 118^b). Although

he shares the common hostile view of the empire,[51] he does not believe in violence as a solution. Jews and Gentiles are both God's handiwork; he will not destroy one side for the sake of the other (B Sanhedrin 98^b; cf. Megillah 10^b). Of the messiah he says, 'Let him come, but let me not see him' (B Sanhedrin 98^b). The Jews can rely on their ancient covenant with God (Leviticus Rabba 6.5); only a preoccupation with religion can save them, not political flag-waving (Midrash Psalms 4.10; Genesis Rabba 44.24). The whole course of Jewish history shows that rebellion leads nowhere; at best it provides only temporary relief from oppression. The only sure hope is God:

> A man once tried to light a lamp, but every time he lit it it went out.
> Finally he exclaimed, 'How long shall I waste my effort on this lamp? I shall wait for the sun to shine, and then I shall have light.'
> So it is with the Jews. When they were enslaved in Egypt, Moses emerged to redeem them, but they were enslaved again by the Babylonians.
> Daniel, Hananiah, Mishael and Azariah emerged to redeem them, but they were enslaved again by the Elamites, Medes and Persians.
> Mordecai and Esther emerged to redeem them, but they were enslaved again by the Greeks.
> The Hasmonean and his sons emerged to redeem them, but they were enslaved again by the evil Edomites.
> Finally the Jews exclaimed: 'We are tired of being continually enslaved and redeemed, only to be enslaved again. Let us pray for redemption not through any human agency, but through our Redeemer, the Lord of Hosts, the Holy One of Israel. Let us pray for light not from man, but from God.' (Midrash Psalms 36.6)

The name of Yohanan is inseparable from that of his colleague and brother-in-law Simeon ben Lakish, a pupil of Haninah bar Hama and Jonathan. Several of his remarks have been quoted here already. Simeon may have been a zealot in his youth,[52] and he was certainly

no lover of Rome. He often challenges Yohanan's moderate statements[53] and expresses a more extreme view. He resented the strength of the Babylonian diaspora because it weakened the defences of Judaea. 'If the Jews had returned *en masse* under Zerubbabel, the temple would never have fallen.'[54] Yet even he was apparently capable of endorsing Yohanan's view of Israel's non-political destiny: the Jews have no wish to share power with the nations of the world; they are satisfied with the rule of God's law (Midrash Psalms 36.6).

Yohanan's attitude is reflected in the sayings attributed to his pupils. Yose bar Haninah, for example, attempts to allay impatience at Roman rule. The success and prosperity of the empire, despite its well-known oppression and rapacity, should be seen as an aspect of God's justice (Ecclesiastes Rabba 5.7.1). It is part of God's plan, too, that Rome and Israel should respect each other. Israel should not rebel against the empire, and the empire in its turn should not impose too heavy a burden on Israel (Song of Songs Rabba 2.7.1). According to another version of this saying (B Ketuboth 111[a]), Yose added that the Jews should not try to return to the Land of Israel *en masse*. This is clearly a challenge to the view of Simeon ben Lakish and other zealots. In its more fully developed form this programme is attributed to a pupil of Samuel bar Nahman, Helbo:

> The Jews should not rebel against their rulers,
> they should not seek to hasten the coming of the end,
> they should not reveal their mysteries to other nations,
> and they should not attempt to return from the dispersion *en masse* (otherwise why should the king messiah come to gather in the exiles of Israel?).[55]

A similar teaching is ascribed to another pupil of Yohanan, Levi.[56] Although he insists on the mutual antagonism of Rome and Israel[57] and is confident of the final violent overthrow of Rome,[58] Levi is among those who are opposed to the hastening of the end. Despite his grandiose claims, Jacob lacks the power to win Esau over (Genesis Rabba 78.7). The tyranny of Rome is part of the scheme of divine justice and retribution (Song of Songs Rabba 2.7.1).

Levi couches his quietism in language borrowed from Haimon's advice to Kreon (Soph. *Ant.* 712-14): 'He who stands up to a wave will be swept away by it; he who offers no resistance will survive' (Genesis Rabba 44.18).

Similar statements to these could be quoted from other Palestinian *amoraim* of the late third and early fourth centuries who likewise oppose violent resistance to Roman rule. The last word in opposition to messianism, however, belongs to Hillel, the brother of the ethnarch Judah II: all the messianic prophecies are irrelevant, because the messiah is not going to come (B Sanhedrin 99[a]).

XII

If there is any conclusion to be drawn from this survey, it is perhaps the persistence of certain typical attitudes over a long and varied period of time. These attitudes reflect in most respects a state of mind which is probably unique to the Jews, although to a certain extent they may have been shared by Christians in the empire.

From the early fourth century on, the condition of the Jews gradually changed. With the political triumph of Christianity they lost their privileged position. They came be be discriminated against and even singled out for persecution. Apart from a brief upsurge of national hope under Julian, the vision of this-worldly redemption receded ever further from view,[59] and at the same time the main centre of Jewish population and cultural activity moved outside the bounds of the empire, from Palestine to Persia. The rest of the picture lies outside our scope.

NOTES

Chapter 1. Introduction

1 For a study of the historiography of Roman imperialism see Flach (1976), who discusses the 'terminological struggle' and the problem of ideal types. In writing this introduction we have been influenced by A.P.Thornton, *Doctrines of imperialism* (New York, 1965), esp. 1-35.

2 E.g. Polyb. 1.63.9: 'On the contrary, it was perfectly natural that by training themselves in such vast and formidable enterprises, the Romans should have acquired the courage to aim at world dominion and also fulfilled their aim.' See Walbank (1964).

3 Holleaux (1920), 334.

4 M.Cary, *A history of Rome down to the reign of Constantine* (London, 1935), 145; Badian (1964), 21; R.M.Errington, *The dawn of empire: Rome's rise to world power* (London, 1971), 3. We might compare Tenney Frank's judgement in *Roman imperialism* (New York, 1914), 358: 'the free Roman people stumbled on falteringly and unwittingly into ever-increasing dominion', which recalls J.R.Seeley's famous remark that the British apparently acquired their empire 'in a fit of absence of mind'.

5 In 1.63.9 (quoted n.2) Polybius is countering the argument of certain unnamed Greeks, that Rome's acquisition of empire was merely 'accidental' or 'fortuitous'. But the debate is really about whether the Romans deserved to win their empire. If their success was unexpected, or actually belied all rational explanation, then any virtues they happened to possess, such as wisdom, courage and discipline, lacked causal significance. Polybius' view is echoed by Cicero: *non fortuito populum Romanum sed consilio et disciplina confirmatum esse* (*de rep.* 2.30). The debate has a modern parallel. Was it through luck or merit that the mid-Victorians were able to build up an empire?

6 Veyne (1975); the quotation is on p.796.

7 A.Lyall, *The rise of the British dominion in India* (London, 1893), 1; M.Kingsley, *West African Studies* (London, 1899), 280; Th. von Bethmann-Hollweg, *Reflections on the world war* (London, 1920), 20. These examples derive from Thornton (n.1).

8 Harris (1971). A book by the same author entitled *War and imperialism in republican Rome, 327-70 B.C.* is promised in the near future.

Chapter 2. Imperialism and empire in New Kingdom Egypt

Abbreviations used in this chapter

AJSL	*American Journal of Semitic Languages*
ANET	J.B.Pritchard, ed., *Ancient Near Eastern texts relating to the Old Testament* (Princeton, 1950; 2nd ed. 1955)
ASAE	*Annales du Service des Antiquités de l'Egypte*
Atlas	W.Wreszinski, *Atlas zur Altägyptischen Kulturgeschichte* (Leipzig, 1923-40)
BAR	J.H.Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt* (Chicago, 1906-7)
BASOR	*Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*
BIFAO	*Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale*
CdE	*Chronique d'Egypte*
HRR	W.F.Edgerton and J.Wilson, *Historical records of Ramses III* (Chicago, 1936)
IEJ	*Israel Exploration Journal*
JARCE	*Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt*
JEA	*Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*
JEOL	*Jaarbericht van het Vooraziatisch-Egyptisch Genootschap, 'Ex Oriente Lux'*
JESHO	*Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*
JNES	*Journal of Near Eastern Studies*
KRI	K.A.Kitchen, *Ramesside inscriptions, historical and biographical* (Oxford, 1968-)
LD	C.R.Lepsius, *Denkmaeler aus Aegypten und Aethiopien* (Berlin, 1849-58)
Lexikon	W.Helck and E.Otto, *Lexikon der Ägyptologie* (Wiesbaden, 1972-)
Mat	W.Helck, *Materialien zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Neuen Reiches* (Wiesbaden, 1961-9)
MDAIK	*Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Abteilung Kairo*
PEQ	*Palestine Exploration Quarterly*
PM	B.Porter and R.L.B.Moss, *Topographical bibliography of ancient Egyptian hieroglyphic texts, reliefs, and paintings* (Oxford, 1927-)
RdE	*Revue d'Egyptologie*
SAK	*Studien zur Altägyptischen Kultur*
Urk IV	K.Sethe and W.Helck, *Urkunden der 18. Dynastie* (Leipzig, 1906-9; Berlin, 1955-8). Partial translation of the earlier parts by K.Sethe (Leipzig, 1914), and of all the later parts by W.Helck (Berlin, 1961)
VT	*Vetus Testamentum*

Wb A.Erman and H.Grapow, *Wörterbuch der ägyptischen Sprache* (Leipzig, 1926-31)

ZÄS *Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache*

ZDPV *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins*

1 Frankfort (1948), 7-9; Hornung (1966), 1-29.

2 Fairman (1958), 89-92.

3 *Lexikon* I, 67-9: 'Ächtungstexte'; A.Vila, 'Un dépot de textes d'envoûtement au Moyen Empire', *Journal des Savants* (1963), 135-60; A.Vila, 'Un rituel d'envoûtement au Moyen Empire égyptien', in *L'homme, hier et aujourd'hui; recueil d'études en hommage à André Leroi-Gourhan* (Paris, 1973), 625-39; Fairman (1958), 90-1.

4 A.M.Blackman and H.W.Fairman, 'The consecration of an Egyptian temple according to the use of Edfu', *JEA* XXXII (1946), 75-91.

5 E.g. *ANET*, 365-9; A.H.Gardiner, 'Hymns to Amon from a Leiden papyrus', *ZÄS* XLII (1905), 12-42.

6 E.g. *ANET* 366, stanza vii, 371; J.Zandee, 'Prayers to the sun-god from Theban tombs', *JEOL* VI, no.16 (1959-62), 48-71, at p.61. The god Thoth was credited with creating or separating languages, see J.Černy, 'Thoth as creator of languages', *JEA* XXXIV (1948), 121-2; S.Sauneron, 'La différenciation des langages d'après la tradition égyptienne', *BIFAO* LX (1960), 31-41; *Urk* IV 2098.7. A useful note on the epithet 'of foreign/desert lands' as applied to Egyptian deities is D.B.Redford, 'The Hyksos invasion in history and tradition', *Orientalia* XXXIX (1970), 1-51, at p.12, n.5.

7 R.Herzog, *Punt* (Glückstadt, 1968); K.A.Kitchen, 'Punt and how to get there', *Orientalia* XL (1971), 184-208.

8 H.Brunner, *Die Geburt des Gottkönigs* (Wiesbaden, 1964). In at least three temples the creator-god Ptah takes the place of Amen-Ra in a brief version of this myth, *HRR* 119-21, *KRI* II 263.5-264.7.

9 E.g. *Urk* IV 82.13, 283.16, *KRI* V 22.4 = *HRR* 23. The inheritance myth: e.g. *Urk* IV 368.13-15, 1276.13-20, 2118.18-19, 2123.3-4.

10 *Urk* IV 1652.2-8. On the 'Nine Bows' see E.Uphill, 'The Nine Bows',*JEOL* VI n.19 (1965-6), 393-420.

11 E.g. the Prophecy of Neferty of the early Middle Kingdom, *ANET* 444-6; the Speos Artemidos inscription of Hatshepsut, *ANET* 231; the prologue to Papyrus Harris I for the reign of Rameses III, *ANET* 260. The theme is expressed in terms reminiscent of Neferty in the much later Potter's Oracle, see L.Koenen, 'The prophecies of a potter: a prophecy of world renewal becomes an apocalypse', *American Studies in Papyrology* VII (1970), 249-54.

12 Ra-Horus of the Horizon: *Atlas* II 184a; *KRI* IV 20; Ptah: W.M.F. Petrie, *The palace of Apries (Memphis II)* (London, 1909), pl. XXI; *KRI* IV 23; Atum: W.M.F.Petrie, *Hyksos and Israelite cities* (London, 1906), pls. XXIX, XXX; Seth: te Velde (1967), pl. XI; G.Loukianoff, 'Stèle du pharaon Séti Ier trouvée à Tell-Nebi-Mendou en Syrie', *Ancient Egypt* 1924, 101-8.

13 *Urk* IV 2085.9-12. W.Helck, '"Vater der Väter"', *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*. I. Phil.-hist. Klasse, Jahrgang 1965, Nr. 9, 173-6 concludes that the phrase refers to the principal gods of foreign countries. However, the key text is the speech referred to here which is apparently addressed, not to foreign princes as Helck assumes, but to Egyptian officials. See further, A.H.Gardiner, 'The Memphite tomb of the General Ḥaremḥab', *JEA* XXXIX (1953), 3-12; R.Hari, *Horemheb et la reine Moutnedjemet* (Geneva, 1964), 121; *ANET* 251 erroneously translates as 'their fathers' fathers'. Helck's other references are ambiguous.

14 te Velde (1967), ch.5.

15 *ANET* 200-1, cf. te Velde (1967), 119. E.Edel, 'Zur Schwurgötterliste des Hethitervertrags', *ZÄS* XC (1963), 31-5 discusses occurrences in this same text where the names of Hittite deities have been turned into place names, as 'the god of N'.

16 Simons (1937), 5-11; Yadin (1963), 192-241, 332-50; Pritchard (1954), 101-18; Giveon (1971); *Atlas* II, 184a, whilst 34-53 provides a good series of the chariot motif. See also D. Wildung, 'Der König Ägyptens als Herr der Welt? Ein seltener ikonographischer Typus der Königsplastik des Neuen Reiches', *Archiv für Orientforschung* XXIV (1973), 108-16.

17 E.g. W.M.F.Petrie, *Tell el Amarna* (London, 1894), pl. II; U. Hölscher, *The mortuary temple of Ramses III*, part I (Chicago, 1941), fig.25, pls. 6, 7, 33, 35; W.C.Hayes, *Glazed tiles from a palace of Ramesses II at Ḳantīr* (New York, 1937).

18 J.D.Cooney, *Amarna reliefs from Hermopolis in American Collections* (Brooklyn, 1965), 80-5; S.Schott, 'Ein ungewöhnliches Symbol des Triumphes über Feinde Aegyptens',*JNES* XIV (1955), 96-9.

19 W.M.F.Petrie, *Buttons and design scarabs* (London, 1925), pl. XV, 992-6; W.C.Hayes, *The Scepter of Egypt* II (New York, 1959), 422, fig.268; C.R.Williams, *Gold and silver jewelry and related objects* (New York, 1924), pl. VIII, 26a-c.

20 *Urk* IV 370.9-10. Lorton (1974), 121-4 takes the word as a technical term 'not to have relations with'. That any of the words used in these texts has precise juridical meaning is open to serious doubt, particularly since there is no obvious distinction between texts dealing with Nubia and western Asia. In this particular case some contexts seem definitely to demand a more figurative meaning. Thus the sentence quoted next in the text (*Urk* IV 1866.18) is paired with another referring to the

'hidden' (presumably 'unintelligible') character of their speech (line 13). The Hatshepsut Punt texts likewise enlarge on the 'unknown' character of the land, but here it is the Egyptians who have not previously 'known' it (*Urk* IV 324.9, 344.8).

21 *Urk* IV 324.6-14; similarly with Rameses IV's quarrying expedition to the Wadi Hammamat, *KRI* VI 13.11.

22 Simons (1937); Jirku (1937).

23 Edel (1966); also K.A.Kitchen, 'Theban topographical lists, old and new', *Orientalia* XXXIV (1965), 1-9; K.A.Kitchen, 'Aegean place names in a list of Amenophis III', *BASOR* CLXXXI (1966), 23-4.

24 Thus foreign princes or envoys bring 'tribute' 'on their backs' in attitudes of obeisance, e.g. *Urk* IV 341.13-342.5, 1094-1102, and in some cases in return for the 'breath of life' from the king, e.g. *Urk* IV 2006.15-20.

25 Grapow (1947); *ANET* 234-8; Spalinger (1974).

26 Gardiner (1960); Schulman (1962); A.F.Rainey, 'Reflections on the Battle of Qedesh', *Ugarit-Forschungen* V (1973), 280-2.

27 In a Twentieth-Dynasty letter concerned with the administration of the gold mines worked for the benefit of the temple of Amen at Thebes, what must have been a minor local bout of hostilities with desert nomads, to be dealt with by an armed escort, is described in terms of 'the mighty arm of Pharaoh' casting the nomads to the ground, a clear example of the use of this figurative phraseology in polite everyday language: see W.Helck, 'Eine Briefsammlung aus der Verwaltung des Amuntempels', *JARCE* VI (1967), 135-51, letter C.

28 E.g. Munn-Rankin (1956).

29 Lorton (1974), 3-4 provides a useful bibliography. Also Kestemont (1974); G.Kestemont, 'Le traité entre Mursil II de Hatti et Niqmepa d'Ugarit', *Ugarit-Forschungen* VI (1974), 85-127.

30 *ANET* 199-201; Théodoridès (1975), 115-40.

31 Edel (1974), (1976).

32 Knudtzon (1915); *ANET* 483-90; Oppenheim (1967), 119-34. For discussion see Edwards, Gadd, Hammond, and Sollberger (1975), ch.XX; Edwards, Gadd, Hammond, and Sollberger (1973), 483-93; Helck (1971), 168-87.

33 On relations with Cyprus see Y.L.Holmes, 'Egypt and Cyprus: Late Bronze Age trade and diplomacy', *Alter Orient und Altes Testament* XXII (1973) (Cyrus Gordon Festschrift 'Orient and Occident'), 91-8.

34 Kitchen (1962), 14. W.F.Albright and W.L.Moran, 'Rib-Adda of

Byblos and the affairs of Tyre (EA 89)', *J. Cuneiform Studies* IV (1950), 163-8 studies a good example of the involved politics of the area; cf. also Liverani (1971).

35 E.g. E.F.Wente, 'A letter of complaint to the vizier To', *JNES* XX (1961), 252-7.

36 T.E.Peet, *The great tomb-robberies of the Twentieth Egyptian Dynasty* (Oxford, 1930), 28-45.

37 J.Černy, in R.A.Parker, *A Saite oracle papyrus from Thebes in the Brooklyn Museum* (Providence, Rhode Island, 1962), 35-48.

38 Peet (1930), see n.36 above; J.Capart, A.H.Gardiner and B. van de Walle, 'New light on the Ramesside tomb-robberies', *JEA* XXII (1936), 169-93; *ANET* 214-16.

39 Säve-Söderbergh (1941); Vercoutter (1959).

40 D.K.Fieldhouse, *The colonial empires, a comparative survey from the eighteenth century* (London, 1966), 380-94: 'The myth of economic exploitation'.

41 W.Decker, *Die physische Leistung Pharaos: Untersuchungen zu Heldentum, Jagd und Leibesübungen der ägyptischen Könige* (Cologne, 1971); Edwards, Gadd, Hammond, and Sollberger (1973), 333-8.

42 Helck (1939); Schulman (1964a).

43 Sauneron (1968); R.A.Caminos, *Late-Egyptian miscellanies* (London, 1954), 91-9, 168-70, 188-98, 229-31, 400-10.

44 Caminos (1954, see n.43 above), 51.

45 In general see Säve-Söderbergh (1941); Arkell (1961); Emery (1965); Trigger (1965), (1976).

46 A useful introduction to the geography of Upper Nubia is contained in K.M.Barbour, *The republic of the Sudan* (London, 1961). Count A.E.W.Gleichen, *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, 2 vols. (London, 1905) is rich in detailed topographic information; interesting comments on Upper Nubia at the turn of the century can also be found in J.H.Breasted, 'Second preliminary report of the Egyptian Expedition', *AJSL* XXV (1908-9), 1-110.

47 Trigger (1976), ch.6.

48 *ANET* 555; L.Habachi, *The second stela of Kamose, and his struggle against the Hyksos ruler and his capital* (Glückstadt, 1972); H.S. Smith and A.Smith, 'A reconsideration of the Kamose texts', *ZÄS* CIII (1976), 48-76.

49 J.Vercoutter, *Mirgissa* I (Paris, 1970), 184-5; Vandersleyen (1971), 53-6.

50 H.S.Smith (1976), 8-9, no.488.

51 A.J.Arkell, 'Varia Sudanica', *JEA* XXXVI (1950), 24-40, at pp. 36-9; J.Vercoutter, 'New Egyptian texts from the Sudan', *Kush* IV (1956), 66-82, at pp.67-70.

52 Gebel Sahaba: T.Säve-Söderbergh, 'Preliminary report of the Scandinavian Joint Expedition', *Kush* XV (1967-8), 211-50, at pp.235-6; Sesebi: H.W.Fairman, 'Preliminary report on the excavations at Sesebi (Sudla) and 'Amārah West, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1937-8', *JEA* XXIV (1938), 151-6: the so-called 'Trench'; another possible example is Dorginarti near the end of the Second Cataract, see J.Knudstad, 'Serra East and Dorginarti', *Kush* XIV (1966), 165-86.

53 To the sources listed in the standard text books add J.Vercoutter, 'Une campagne militaire de Séti I en Haute Nubie. Stèle de Saï S.579', *RdE* XXIV (1972), 201-8; H.S.Smith (1976), 124-9, no.1595, the latter from the reign of Akhenaten.

54 Both references cited in the previous note, for example, clearly involved desert peoples.

55 *Atlas* II, 168a.

56 E.g. Speos Artemidos, Gebel Silsila, Bir Hammamat, Wadi Abbad, Serabit el-Khadim in Sinai, Timna, see *PM* IV 163-5; V 208-13; VII 321-5, 345-57; G.Goyon, 'Le papyrus de Turin dit "des mines d'or" et le Wadi Hammamat', *ASAE* XLIX (1949), 337-92; B.Rothenberg, *Timna. Valley of the biblical copper mines* (London, 1972), ch.5. Even these temples had been built for the benefit of mining or quarrying expeditions.

57 Soleb: *LD* III, Blatt 85a; Faras: *Urk* IV 2068.17-20; Sai: Vercoutter (1956, as cited in n.51 above), p.75 and n.51; Sedinga: Breasted (1908-9, see n.46 above), 98; Amara West: H.W.Fairman, 'Preliminary report on the excavations at Amarah West, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan', *JEA* XXXIV (1948), 3-11, at pp.9-10; Gebel Barkal: *Urk* IV 1228.12.

58 Kemp (1972); also *Wb* IV, 82.6,7.

59 A.J.Mills, 'The reconnaissance survey from Gemai to Dal: a preliminary report for 1963-64', *Kush* XIII (1965), 1-12; A.J.Mills, 'The archaeological survey from Gemai to Dal - report on the 1965-1966 season', *Kush* XV (1967-8), 200-10.

60 *PM* VII 193 cites a granite column fragment of Merenptah probably from Old Dongola. But the current Polish expedition there seems so far not to have located any further Pharaonic material. Until more is found the provenance of the fragment should be regarded with some suspicion.

61 Gleichen (1905, see n.46 above), 35.

62 O.G.S.Crawford, *The Fung Kingdom of Sennar* (Gloucester, 1951),

218, 267, 290, 296, 300, 306; P.L.Shinnie, 'A note on Ast-Raset', *JEA* XLI (1955), 128-9.

63 See n.51.

64 J.L.Burckhardt, *Travels in Nubia* (London, 1819), 209-53.

65 A recent brief discussion of the extent of Kerma remains is B.Gratien, 'Les nécropoles Kerma de l'île de Saï' III, *Etudes sur l'Egypte et le Soudan anciens* (Cahier de Recherches de l'Institut de Papyrologie et d'Egyptologie de Lille, 3, 1975), 43-66.

66 A.M.A.Hakem, 'The city of Meroe and the myth of Napata', *Ādāb* (Khartoum) II/III (1975) 119-33 is a recent treatment of the background.

67 Implied in the parallelism of *Urk* IV 2064.8 and 19; see also K.Zibelius, *Afrikanische Orts- und Völkernamen in hieroglyphischen und hieratischen Texten* (Wiesbaden, 1972), 162-3.

68 Cf. Priese (1974). If the Kurgus (Hager Merwa) incription of Tuthmosis III, see n.51, is the same as the boundary inscription referred to in *Urk* IV 1246.3-5 (the Armant stele) then presumably the important kingdom of Miu should be located in the Berber-Shendi area.

69 For the economic background to temples in Egypt see B.J.Kemp, 'Temple and town in ancient Egypt', in P.J.Ucko, R.Tringham, and G.W.Dimbleby, ed., *Man, settlement and urbanism* (London, 1972), 657-80. On Nubian administration see especially Säve-Söderbergh (1941), 175-86; Habachi (1957), (1969); H.S.Smith (1976), 198-217.

70 H.S.Smith (1976), 192 (no.963).

71 Simpson (1963), 37. Miam is the ancient name for Aniba.

72 G.Steindorff, *Aniba* II (Glückstadt, 1937), 25, no.47.

73 Mayors are attested at: Buhen: H.S.Smith (1976), 202; Aniba: Steindorff (1937), 254 IXb; Simpson (1963), 32; Faras: *Urk* IV 2068.18; Soleb: *Urk* IV 2068.12; M.Schiff Giorgini, *Soleb* II (Florence, 1971), 249, fig.484; Sai: P.Pierret, *Recueil d'inscriptions inédites du Musée Egyptien du Louvre*, II (Paris, 1878), 41; possibly also A.Minault and F.Thill, 'Tombes du Nouvel-Empire à Saï (SA.C.5)', *Etudes sur l'Egypte et le Soudan anciens* (Cahier de Recherches de l'Institut de Papyrologie et d'Egyptologie de Lille, 2, 1974), 75-102, pl. Va.

74 N. de G.Davies, *The tomb of Rekh-mi-rē' at Thebes* (New York, 1943), 32-6, 103-6; W.Helck, *Zur Verwaltung des Mittleren und Neuen Reichs* (Leiden-Cologne, 1958), 212-17.

75 *BAR* IV, sect.474-83; *Mat* (295)-(297).

76 Griffith (1927); Säve-Söderbergh (1941), 199-200. That the basic form of the decree was itself not exceptional is suggested by the Elephantine parallel cited by Griffiths, and by another fragmentary one from Armant: R.Mond and O.H.Myers, *Temples of Armant* I (London, 1940), 161.

77 *Urk* IV 194.15-196.9; *Mat* (361)-(362). That the phrase 'The Head of the South: Elephantine' refers essentially to Lower Nubia can be deduced also from its use in the accession decree of Tuthmosis I to the viceroy of Kush, copies of which have been found at Buhen and Kubban, *Urk* IV 80.15. Cf. also G.Godron, 'L'Eléphantine-du-Sud', *CdE* XLIX, no.98 (1974), 238-53.

78 On the high price of cattle in Egypt see J.J.Janssen, *Commodity prices from the Ramessid period* (Leiden, 1975), 525-7.

79 Davies (1943): see n.74.

80 *Mat* (478).

81 *Mat* (196)-(199); (224)-(233); D.Kessler, 'Eine Landschenkung Ramses' III. zugunsten eines "Grossen der *thrw*" aus *Mr.mš'.f'*, *SAK* II (1975), 103-34.

82 A.H.Gardiner, *The Wilbour Papyrus* (Brooklyn and Oxford, 1948); K.Baer, 'The low price of land in ancient Egypt', *JARCE* I (1962), 25-45 has a useful explanatory discussion.

83 Aul. Gell. XVI 13.9; E.T.Salmon, *Roman colonization under the Republic* (London, 1969), 18.

84 M.I.Finley (1976), 178.

85 Edzard (1970, see no.115), letters KL69: 277,279. For criticisms in general, see Ward (1972), 41-5. For the *'prw*, see below, p.55.

86 Cf. Säve-Söderbergh (1967-8), (1969).

87 Säve-Söderbergh (1960), (1963); E.Edel, 'Zur Familie des *Sn-msjj* nach seinen Grabinschriften auf der Qubbet el Hawa bei Assuan', *ZÄS* XC (1963), 28-31. For a statue of a prince of Teh-khet of very fine Egyptian workmanship, see B.V.Bothmer, 'Private sculpture of Dynasty XVIII in Brooklyn', *The Brooklyn Museum Annual* VIII (1966-7), 55-89, at pp.67-9.

88 Steindorff (1937, see n.72), 27, no.58, 187-9 (S66); for Pahul see p.221 (SA17).

89 Simpson (1963).

90 Helck (1971), 350-2. For the title in question see E.Reiser, *Der königliche Harim im alten Ägypten und seine Verwaltung* (Vienna, 1972), 91-3.

91 H.Ricke, G.R.Hughes, and E.F.Wente, *The Beit el-Wali temple of*

Ramesses II (Chicago, 1967), 18, 21, 25, 29; Steindorff (1937, see n.72), 26, 27, 28; A.M.Blackman, 'Preliminary report on the excavations at Sesebi, Northern Province, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1936-7', *JEA* XXIII (1937), 145-51, at p.149, n.1 (Maat-Ra); *BAR* IV, sect.479; Säve-Söderbergh (1941), 201, n.5. See also L.Habachi, 'Divinities adored in the area of Kalabsha, with a special reference to the goddess Miket', *MDAIK* XXIV (1969), 169-83.

92 Säve-Söderbergh (1941), 201, n.6, 11.

93 R.Engelbach, 'The quarries of the western Nubian desert: a preliminary report', *ASAE* XXXIII (1933), 65-74; nos.7, 11; Simpson (1963), 51.

94 Säve-Söderbergh (1941), 201-2; J.Vercoutter, 'La stèle de Mirgissa IM.209 et la localisation d'Iken (Kor ou Mirgissa?)', *RdE* XVI (1964), 179-91; M.Dewachter, 'Nubie - notes diverses, sect.1 à 5', *BIFAO* LXX (1971), 83-117, at pp.100-9.

95 Säve-Söderbergh (1960), 30, pl. XV.

96 The king is one of the triad group statue carved at the back of the temple, H. el-Achiery, M.Aly and M.Dewachter, *Le speos d'El-Lessiya* II (Cairo, 1968), pl. XXXIX(E9).

97 Soleb: M.Schiff Giorgini, *Soleb* I (Florence, 1965), 119, 128; *LD* III, 83a, 85a; Faras: F.Ll.Griffith, 'Oxford excavations in Nubia', *Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology* (Liverpool) VIII (1921), 93; Rameses II: L.Habachi, *Features of the deification of Ramesses II* (Glückstadt, 1969); Fairman (1948, see n.57), 9-10.

98 Säve-Söderbergh (1941), 146.

99 Simpson (1963), 36-41.

100 P.L.Shinnie, 'Preliminary report on the excavations at 'Amārah West, 1948-49 and 1949-50', *JEA* XXXVII (1951), 5-11. For Renenutet in Nubia, see Steindorff (1937, see n.72), 34; J. Vercoutter, 'Excavations at Sai 1955-7. A preliminary report', *Kush* VI (1958), 144-169, at p.164; A.Rosenvasser, 'Preliminary report on the excavations at Aksha by the Franco-Argentine Archaeological Expedition, 1962-3', *Kush* XII (1964), 96-101, at p.98.

101 Adams (1964), 108.

102 Scientific data on ancient Nile levels and climate in Nubia are hard to find, but note should be taken of the geological findings at Aksha that the high Nile level in the time of Rameses II was more or less the same as the recent one, J. de Heinzelin, 'Le sous-sol du temple d'Aksha', *Kush* XII (1964), 102-10.

103 G.Brunton, *Qau and Badari* III (London, 1930), 23, sect.49,

pls. XXII, XXIII, where among 130 graves given a positive clear date by the excavators, 104 belong to the Eighteenth Dynasty (53 of them to the early part), 25 to the Nineteenth, and 1 to the Twentieth. At Mostagedda and Matmar, neighbouring areas, the New Kingdom material as a whole is evidently unrepresentative, but note the comment of G.Brunton, *Matmar* (London, 1948), 80, sect.145 about the progressive disappearance of pottery in graves during the New Kingdom.

104 The evidence of scarabs and other small inscribed objects published in G.Brunton and R.Engelbach, *Gurob* (London, 1927), the same sort of evidence used for the Nubian conclusions, yields the figures: Eighteenth Dynasty to Tuthmosis III: 13; later Eighteenth: 1; Nineteenth: 2; Twentieth: 0.

105 E.g. Steindorff (1937, see n.72); Schiff Giorgini (1971, see n.73).

106 At Soleb, the remains of 733 bodies were obtained from 49 tombs, Schiff Giorgini (1971, see n.73), with 41 in the shaft of one tomb alone, pp.89-90, 311-13. Two chambers of a New Kingdom tomb at Shellal contained 135 bodies, G.A.Reisner, *The Archaeological Survey of Nubia, Report for 1907-1908* (Cairo, 1910), 69.

107 Burckhardt (1819, see n.64), 17.

108 S.Sauneron, 'Un village nubien fortifié sur la rive orientale de Ouadi es-Sébou', *BIFAO* LXIII (1965), 161-7; M.Bietak, *Studien zur Chronologie der nubischen C-Gruppe* (Vienna, 1968), 91-2.

109 L.Habachi, 'Five stelae from the temple of Amenophis III at Es-Sebua' now in the Aswan Museum', *Kush* VIII (1960), 45-52.

110 Y.Yoyotte, 'Un document relatif aux rapports de la Libye et de la Nubie', *Bulletin de la Société Francaise d'Egyptologie* VI (1951), 9-14.

111 A.E.P.Weigall, *A report on the antiquities of Lower Nubia* (Oxford, 1907), 98; F.Daumas, 'Ce que l'on peut entrevoir de l'histoire de Ouadi es Sebouâ en Nubie', in *Nubie par divers archéologues et historiens = Cahiers d'Histoire Egyptienne* X (Cairo, 1967), 23-49, at p.28.

112 In general see Helck (1971), and the relevant chapters in Edwards, Gadd, Hammond, and Sollberger (1973); Edwards, Gadd, Hammond, and Sollberger (1975). The initial conquests of the New Kingdom are dealt with in Vandersleyen (1971).

113 H.Klengel, 'Die neuentdeckten Tontafelarchive vom Tell Mardikh', *Das Altertum* XXII (1976), 112-13; G.Pettinato, 'The royal archives of Tell Mardikh-Ebla', *Biblical Archeologist* XXXIX (1976), 44-52; P.Matthiae, 'Ebla in the late Early Syrian period: the royal palace and the State archives', *Biblical Archeologist* XXXIX (1976), 94-113.

114 M.Bietak, 'Die Hauptstadt der Hyksos und die Ramsesstadt', *Antike Welt* VI (1975), 28-43; M.Bietak, *Tell el-Dab'a* II (Vienna, 1975), 165, 167 Abb.35.

115 Ta'anach: W.F.Albright, 'A prince of Taanach in the fifteenth century B.C.', *BASOR* XCIV (Apr. 1944), 12-27; Gezer: W.F. Albright, 'A tablet of the Amarna age from Gezer', *BASOR* XCII (Dec. 1943), 28-30; Tell el-Hesi: W.F.Albright, 'A case of lèse-majesté in pre-Israelite Lachish, with some remarks on the Israelite conquest', *BASOR* LXXXVII (Oct. 1942), 32-8; Kamid el-Loz: D.O.Edzard, 'Die Tontafeln von Kāmid el-Lōz', in D.O.Edzard, *et al.*, *Kamid el-Lōz - Kumidi; Schriftdokumente aus Kamid el-Loz* (Bonn, 1970), 55-62; G.Wilhelm, 'Ein Brief der Amarna-Zeit aus Kāmid el-Lōz (KL72:600)', *Z Assyriologie* LXIII (1973-4), 69-75; D.O.Edzard, 'Ein Brief an den "Grossen" von Kumidi aus Kāmid al-Lōz', *Z Assyriologie* LXVI (1976), 62-7.

116 Helck (1960); (1971), 246-255; Mohammad (1959); Edwards, Gadd, Hammond, and Sollberger (1973), 467-83; Edwards, Gadd, Hammond, and Sollberger (1975), 102-7.

117 A.Alt, 'Hettitische und ägyptische Herrschaftsordnung in unterworfenen Gebieten', *Forschungen und Fortschritte* XXV (1945), 249-51 = *Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte des Volkes Israel* III (Munich, 1959), 99-106.

118 O.Tufnell, *Lachish* IV (London, 1958), 133.

119 The information is available only in brief preliminary form: S.Groll, [A note on the hieratic texts from Tel Sera'], *Qadmoniot* VI, no.2 (22) (1973), 56-7, in Hebrew; brief notes on the excavations are in *R Biblique* LXXX (1973), 401-5; *IEJ* XXIII (1973), 251-4; XXIV (1974), 264-6.

120 G.R.H.Wright, 'Pre-Israelite temples in the land of Canaan', *PEQ* (1971), 17-32. For an Iron Age example from Tell Qasile of similar type see A.Mazar, 'Excavations at Tell Qasîle, 1971-72. (Preliminary report)', *IEJ* XXIII (1973), 65-71.

121 In general see Edwards, Gadd, Hammond, and Sollberger (1973), ch.X; Mazar (1970), (1971); also H.Reviv, 'Some comments on the maryannu', *IEJ* XXII (1972), 218-28; M.Heltzer, 'On tithe paid in grain in Ugarit', *IEJ* XXV (1975), 124-8.

122 Helck (1971), 252-3. The exact significance of a domain being royal is nowhere made clear, but presumably it was mainly a matter of the king being provided with revenues which were at his personal disposal.

123 Rothenberg (1972, see n.56), ch.5.

124 Edel (1976).

125 G.Loud, *The Megiddo ivories* (Chicago, 1939). On this topic generally see Smith (1965).

126 I.J.Winter, 'Phoenician and North Syrian ivory carving in historical context: questions of style and distribution', *Iraq* XXXVIII (1976), 1-22.

127 O.Tufnell, *Lachish* II (London, 1940). According to preliminary reports similar material from a temple has been found at Tell esh-Sharia, see the references cited in n.119; Amman provides a further example, V.Hankey, 'A Late Bronze Age temple at Amman: II', *Levant* VI (1974), 160-78.

128 R.Amiran, *Ancient pottery of the Holy Land* (New Brunswick, 1970), 172. For Mycenaean pottery in the Near East, see V. Hankey, 'Mycenaean trade with the south-eastern Mediterranean', *Mélanges Université Saint-Joseph* XLVI (1970-1), 11-30; for Cypriote pottery in Egypt, see Merrillees (1968).

129 See Caminos (1954), cited in n.43, p.138.

130 E.Oren, [An Egyptian fort on the military route to Canaan], *Qadmoniot* VI nos.3-4 (23-4) (1973), 101-3; reports in *IEJ* XXIII (1973), 112-3; *R Biblique* LXXXI (1974), 87-9. For the military road itself see Gardiner (1920). Note also the cemetery of Deir el-Balah, near Gaza, whose burials contain much that is Egyptian, perhaps because they belonged to officials connected with the Egyptian presence in this strategically important area, T.Dothan, 'Anthropoid clay coffins from a Late Bronze Age cemetery near Deir el-Balaḥ', two preliminary reports, *IEJ* XXII (1972), 65-72; XXIII (1973), 129-46.

131 W.M.F.Petrie, *Hyksos and Israelite cities* (London, 1906).

132 M.Avi-Yonah, *Encyclopedia of archaeological excavations in the Holy Land* I (London, 1975), 52-61 supplies references and discussion for this difficult site.

133 A.Kempinski, 'Tell el'Ajjûl - Beth-Aglayim or Sharuḥen?', *IEJ* XXIV (1974), 145-52.

134 Stadelmann (1967).

135 Rowe (1930), (1940); James (1966); H.O.Thompson, *Mekal, the god of Beth-Shan* (Leiden, 1970); an important revision of the chronology of the site is by W.F.Albright in *Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research* XVII (1936-7), 76-7. A convenient summary and bibliography is also in Avi-Yonah (1975, see n.131), 207-29, although in the discussion on chronology the comparison between the temple plan and the el-Amarna shrine from Egypt should not be taken too seriously, particularly since, at Deir el-Medineh, similar designs were common in the Ramesside period, and in any case the resemblance in plan is much closer to other Canaanite temples.

136 H.R.Hall, 'A Ramesside royal statue from Palestine', *JEA* XIV (1928), 280.

137 *KRI* II 174.13-14 = *Atlas* II, pl. 78. The straightforward

translation of the text which produced this information was challenged by K.Sethe, 'Missverstandene Inschriften', *ZÄS* XLIV (1907), 35-41, at pp.36-9, but this was before the discovery at Beth-Shan. The literal interpretation implies, of course, that Rameses II was able to recapture and hold Tunip for a while, cf. Edwards, Gadd, Hammond, and Sollberger (1975), 228. A bronze statue base of Rameses VI found at Megiddo, *PM* VII 381, is, because of its late Ramesside date, of imponderable significance. One might also note E.Gaál, 'Osiris-Amenophis III in Ugarit (Nmry.mlk.ʿlm)', *Studia Aegyptiaca* (Budapest) I (1974), 97-9.

138 A.Alt, 'Ägyptische Tempel in Palästina und die Landnahme der Philister', *ZDPV* LXVII (1944), 1-20; Helck (1971), 444-5. Doubts must linger over whether the epithet 'great prince of Askalon' on the Megiddo ivory of the 'songstress of Ptah' really does refer to the god Ptah, and thus imply a cult of Ptah there. The lady's title may belong to a period of upbringing or education at the Egyptian court.

139 J.Černy, *The inscriptions of Sinai* II (London, 1955), 188-9, no.276 publishes a stele of Rameses IV commemorating the building of a 'mansion of millions of years' at the Hathor shrine in Sinai. Whatever it was, its architecture must have been very slight to judge from the site itself.

140 *Urk* IV 1443.19. Helck (1971), 444 argues that the following damaged line must refer to an Amen temple further north still.

141 Strongly worded by W.F.Albright, *The archaeology of Palestine*, revised ed. (Harmondsworth, 1960), 100-1; also in Edwards, Gadd, Hammond, and Sollberger (1975), 104-7.

142 Cf. M.W.Several, 'Reconsidering the Egyptian Empire in Palestine during the Amarna period', *PEQ* (1972), 123-33.

143 Brief report in *IEJ* XXVI (1976) 51.

144 Avi-Yonah (1975, see n.131), 23-5.

145 A convenient summary is by M.Greenberg in Mazar (1970), 188-200; and by W.F.Albright in Edwards, Gadd, Hammond, and Sollberger (1975), 110-16. Also Greenberg (1955).

146 Helck (1968); Giveon (1971); Ward (1972); M.Weippert, 'Semitische Nomaden des zweiten Jahrtausends. Über die *Šꜣśw* der ägyptischen Quellen', *Biblica* LV (1974), 265-80, 427-33; A.F.Rainey, 'Toponymic problems', *Tel Aviv* II (1975), 13-16.

147 Helck (1968).

148 On the archaeological aspects of possible 'Sea People' settlement in Palestine, see J.B.Pritchard, 'New evidence on the role of the Sea Peoples in Canaan at the beginning of the Iron Age', in W.A.Ward, ed., *The role of the Phoenicians in the interaction of Mediterranean civilizations* (Beirut, 1968), 99-112.

149 For this approach see Grover Clark, *The balance sheets of imperialism: facts and figures on colonies* (New York, 1936).

Chapter 3. Carthaginian Imperialism in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

1 It is convenient here to acknowledge the help I have received in this paper from Mr P.Lomas. Details of this introductory section have been discussed and documented in Whittaker (1974).

2 For modern acceptance of Carthaginian imperialism, see most recently Hoffmann (1972).

3 Discussed by Merante (1972/3), esp. 78-89.

4 Badian (1968), 8; Veyne (1976), 813.

5 G.Vallet, *Rhégion et Zancle* (Paris, 1968), 328, suggests Phalaris of Acragas was the catalyst; Merante (1970) discounts a direct connexion between Phalaris and Malchus, but believes the rise of Acragas did provoke Himera's call for Carthaginian help c. 550-540 B.C.

6 Diod. 5.9.2-3, 4.23.3, and Hdt. 7.158 speak of Carthaginians; but Paus. 10.11.3, Hdt. 5.4.6 say Phoenicians only. Commented on by Finley (1968), 37. Merante (1970), 101, speaks of the 'relative independence' of Phoenician cities at this period.

7 For 'Carthaginian' losses, see G.Ch.-Picard, *Carthage* (trans. M. and L.Kochan, London, 1964), 81, upon which is built the theory of recession. The size of the booty is not in doubt, but for the silver of Rhegium and Selinus see Vallet (n.5), 86-7, 328, Merante (1970), 105-6, 112. The central importance of Motya's link with Himera is stressed by E.Manni, 'Tra Mozia ed Imera', *Mélanges Piganiol* (1966), esp. 702-6.

8 Ch.-Picard (e.g. see n.7) is the staunchest advocate of the Himera-decline theory; contradicted by L.Maurin, 'Himilco le Magonid: crises et mutations en Carthage au début du IVe siècle', *Semitica* XII (1962), 5-43, and A.R.Hands, 'The consolidation of Carthaginian power in the fifth century' in L. Thompson and J.Ferguson, eds., *Africa in classical antiquity* (Ibadan, 1969), esp. 93. The most telling economic challenge is summarized by J.P.Morel, *Kokalos* XIV/XV (1968/9), 327.

9 It is unfortunate that the crucial passage on inter-city relations in Diod. 15.16.1 is so ambiguous. After a defeat and demand for the evacuation of Sicily by Dionysius I in 383, Carthage asked for a truce on the grounds that 'they themselves were not empowered to hand over the cities', and they asked for time to consult *tois archousi*. Were these magistrates in Carthage (as the imperial school argues) or in the allied cities, as seems to be more consistent with the other evidence? In the event no one was consulted; but Carthaginian

commanders frequently did negotiate terms in the field before and after this without reference to Carthage. Maurin (n.8) argues from this dubious passage for the advent of a new regime of oligarchic control over kings and generals abroad, which is methodologically unsound and historically difficult to substantiate.

10 Merante (1970), quoting earlier discussions.

11 Barreca (1974), 45-51.

12 In the Monte Sirai reports Barreca puts the destruction of the earlier archaic buildings somewhere from the seventh to the sixth centuries (Barreca (1971), 123, summarizes) and the second, classical phase as late as the fourth century (e.g. *Monte Sirai* III = *Studi Semitici* XX (1966), 43, n.1).

13 Moscati (1966), 243; although M. concedes it may not be 'dominio continuativo' but 'un controllo per capisalsi'. Barreca (1968), 76, while accepting a new phase of Carthaginian domination says we should *not* stress the cultural aspects.

14 Barreca (1971), 16, 23 and in *Monte Sirai* III (n.9), 59.

15 For refs. see Warmington (1964), 114; Barreca (1974), 52, connects this with the rebellion in Diod. 15.24.2, although Diod. himself links the trouble to Carthaginian events. It may be the aftermath of this rebellion which has produced the extraordinary story in Arist. *de mirac.ausc.* 838b, that Carthage 'ruled' the island and cut down 'all the produce needed for food and prescribed death for any inhabitant who replanted anything'. Manifestly not a permanent arrangement.

16 Note the wise scepticism of Garbini (1966), 140.

17 Garbini (1966) and Whittaker (1974).

18 For a general discussion, see J.P.Morel, 'Les Phocéens en occident', *PP* XXI (1966), 378-420, esp. p.396; detailed refs. are given by P.Bosch-Gímpera, *CQ* XXXVIII (1944), 53-9, F.Villard, *La céramique grecque de Marseille* (Paris, 1960), 85-90.

19 I do not include here the vague and undatable ref. to Carthaginian attacks on Gades, which contradicts the notion of alliance but could be in the third century B.C.; ref. Gsell (1928), I 444.

20 Toscanos and Trayamar - summary by Niemeyer and Schubart (1971), 166. Tangiers - M.Ponsich, *Recherches archéologiques à Tanger* (Paris, 1970), 163-5, 169. For the Mogador gap, A.Jodin, 'L'archéologie phénicienne au Mogador', *Hesperis* VII (1966), 9-16; with which compare 'Fouilles puniques et romaines à Lixus', *Hesperis* VII (1966), 17, 22, for the break between archaic building in the seventh century and later fifth-fourth century 'Punic'-style buildings.

21 Ponsich (n.20), 181.

22 Gsell (1928), II 287-330; M.G.G.Amadasi, *Le inscrizioni fenicie e puniche delle colonie in occidente* (= *Studi Semitici* XXVIII (1967)), *Sard.* 12, gives other examples of *scribae* (e.g. *CIS* I 86 in Crete).

23 Warmington (1964), 85; Gsell (1928), II 310.

24 480 B.C. - Diod. 11.20.4; 396 B.C. - Diod. 14.77.6; 291 B.C. - Diod. 21.16.1; 241 B.C. - Polyb. 1.82.6-7.

25 Warmington (1964), 118, 184, 188; but Heraclea went over freely to Pyrrhus in 277, *ibid.* 176.

26 Gsell (1928), II 295, n.3, 311, n.1.

27 E.LoCascio, 'La leggenda s.y.s. delle monete siculo-puniche e il concetto politico dell' ἐπικρατεια', *PP* CLXI (1975), 153-61, makes the ingenious suggestion that the initials *s.y.s.* are a semitic transliteration of the word Sicelia-Sicily, implying a geographic and political union that goes a good deal further than the evidence. For a more sceptical view, see G.K.Jenkins, 'Coins of Punic Sicily I and II', *SNR* L (1971), 25-78 and LIII (1974), 23-46; Jenkins is now reasonably sure that the 'Carthage type' coins began c. 410 B.C. before the fall of Acragas and were first struck during preparations in Carthage.

28 On the date of Motya, see V.Tusa, *Mozia* VII = *Studi Semitici* XL (1971), 54; A.M.Bisi, 'L'irradiazione semitica in Sicilia', *Kokalos* XIII (1967), 57, speculates on a second colonization based on cultural parallels. In addition to Motya, the archaeological evidence from other sites such as Selinus, Eryx, etc. suggests Carthaginian colonization; it will be collected and discussed in a forthcoming article by P.Lomas.

29 Refs. in Gsell (1928), I 410, 427-8, although none is very convincing.

30 See n.39.

31 Mommsen's position is discussed by Gsell (1928), I 477, II 289; the ancient refs. to Libyphoenicians are in Gsell (1928), I 440, 427-8, 441, II 112-15, 288-98.

32 M.Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, 4th ed. 1956), II 524. As far as I can follow it, this also seems to be the view of S.Moscati, *Problematica della civiltà fenicia* (Rome, 1974), ch.vi, 'La funzione delle colonie'.

33 Gsell (1928), II 240 interpreted the phrase *epi tas poleis* as 'put in charge of the cities'; but this seems extremely unlikely in the context.

34 Merante (1970), 129-30.

35 M.I.Finley, *The world of Odysseus* (new ed. London, 1977), 98-102; P.Gauthier, *Symbola* (Nancy, 1972), 17-22.

36 *magon* here is usually thought to be 'ein Mager', Gosser, *RE* s.v. 'Heracleides', 482; but the ref. to Libya makes it more plausibly a corruption of the Phoenician name Mago.

37 This was the basis of Maurin's argument, op.cit. (n.8).

38 See n.17.

39 The ancient refs. are collected by Gsell (1928), I 440-8, in addition to Ps. Scylax, *GGM* I, p.16 (51), p.91 (111).

40 Discussions of Hanno's and Himilco's voyages are legion - most recently by R.Mauny and G.Ch.-Picard, *Archéologia* 37 (1970), 76-80 and 40 (1971), 54-9. The silent gold trade of Hdt. 4.196 is enough to show the fifth- and fourth-century activity of Carthage. For recent studies of Carthaginian influence see the works of Jodin and Ponsich quoted in n.20.

41 Gsell (1928), I 457-8, IV 118-19; cf. F.Walbank, *A commentary on Polybius* (Oxford, 1970), I 341-2; although Gsell apparently subscribes to the theory of a trade embargo in eastern Libya by the second treaty of 348.

42 Timosthenes, although constantly denigrated by Strabo, had better geographical knowledge than Strabo about the Metagonian coast of Africa and the harbours of the Spanish coast; e.g. Strabo 17.3.6. Cf. M.Rostovtzeff, *Social and economic history of the Hellenistic world* (Oxford, 1941), 395-6. G. and C. Ch.-Picard, *The life and death of Carthage* (translated D.Collon, London, 1968), 136, explain away Pytheas' voyage as a special concession to a new, hypothetical, friendly relationship with Massilia and the Phoceans. But then Carthage's relations with Rome in 348 were also friendly - so what was the point of the treaty? Garbini (1966), 140-1, gives some archaeological reasons for believing Gades and Utica had more than simply nominal independence.

43 Whittaker (1974), 77-8.

44 For further refs. to piracy and the protection against pirates, see Gsell (1928), IV 126.

45 Cf. C.Lévi-Strauss, *The elementary structures of kinship* (Paris, 1969), 67, 'Exchanges are peacefully resolved wars, and wars are the result of unsuccessful transactions.' For a general exposition, see M.Sahlins, *Stone age economics* (Chicago, 1974), 298-302.

46 Polanyi (1957), 265 and elsewhere; Lepore (1972/3), 132-4; Humphries (1969), esp. 191-5.

47 Arist. *Pol.* 1280a says of Carthaginian-Etruscan relations, 'They have covenants (*synthekai*) about imports and trade

agreements (*symbola*) not to act dishonestly and treaties (*graphai*) of alliance.' Evidence of this close rapport collected by M.Pallotino, 'Les relations entre les Etrusques et Carthage du VIIe au IIIe siècle av. J.C.', *CT* XI (1963), no.44, 23-9, to which add, J.Ferron, *Latomus* XXV (1966), 689-709 and Pallotino, 'La Sicilia fra l'Africa e l'Etruria', *Kokalos* XVIII/XIX (1972/3), 48-76.

48 Discussed by Lepore (1972/3), 412, with earlier views that this passage refers to either Sicily, Africa or Spain - the last two most unlikely. For the historicity of Gelo's speech, see the problem of Phoenicians and Carthaginians in n.6.

49 The most recent evidence of this Assyrian trade is published by K.R.Veenhoff, *Aspects of old Assyrian trade and its terminology* (Leiden, 1972) and by a number of authors who comment on an article by R.McC.Adams, 'Anthropological reflections on ancient trade', *Current Anthropology* XV (1974). In spite of attempts by Veenhoff and Adams to cast doubt on Polanyi's model of state administered trade, only two texts out of the several thousand can be produced to suggest loss trading, and even they are highly dubious in context; see esp. the comments by G.A.Wright on Adams.

50 *Encyclop. Brit.* (XIth ed. Cambridge, 1910), V 283-4, s.v. 'Capitulations'; Finley (1976), 177.

51 Unreasonably rejected by Walbank (n.41), 345.

53 Cf. Polanyi (1957), 165 and the study by A.Leeds, 'The port of trade in pre-European India as an ecological and evolutionary type', *Proc. of 1961 spring meeting of Amer.Ethn.Soc.* 26-48. Carthage herself smuggled Cyrenaican sylphium out from an unauthorized *emporium* (Strabo 17.3.20).

53 Greek refs. collected by H.Knorringa, *Emporos; data on trade and traders in Greek literature from Homer to Aristotle* (Amsterdam, 1926), 71. Cf. the example given by Polanyi (1957), 256, in the fourteenth century, when the Sultan of Fakhanar forced ships off the Malabar coast into his port to trade at fixed prices.

54 The quotation is from Polanyi (1957), 7; I am here indebted especially to P.S.Cohen, 'Economic analysis and economic man' in R.W.Firth, ed., *Themes in economic anthropology* (London, 1967), 91-118.

55 M.Godelier, *Rationality and irrationality in economics* (translated B.Pearce, London, 1972), esp. 304-8.

56 Polanyi (1957), 96, 160; Humphries (1969), 95.

57 The fullest discussion is still that of Gsell (1928), II esp. 193-243. The inner council or *consilium sanctius* (Livy 30.16.3) was probably a controlling elite of the noble 'order' of grandees; cf. *IRT* 318 for the Punic word *addire* translated as *ordo* in Latin.

58 Gauthier (n.35), 200, although G. wrongly asserts that the Rome treaties were only extensions of rights of *asylon*.

59 R.Laqueur, 'Σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν', *Hermes* LXXI (1936), 469-72, with comments by Gauthier (n.35), 102.

60 J.Heurgon, 'The inscriptions of Pyrgi', *JRS* LVI (1966), 1-15; full modern refs. are collected by Amadasi (n-22), 159-60.

61 Kahrstedt's solution was to suggest that Tyrians in the treaty really meant 'Tyrians of Carthage'; accepted by Walbank (n.41), 346-7, although it is inconceivable why such an odd form should be used.

62 See P.Xella, 'Sull'introduzione del culto di Demetra e Kore a Cartagine', *SMSR* XL (1969), 215-28, esp. 227.

63 I see no evidence to support Veyne's argument either that Carthage posed a threat to southern Italy or that Sicily was the only approach route if she had wished to invade; Veyne (1976), 827-8; I come much closer to the view of Heuss (1949), that Sicily was a Roman adventure.

64 The Libyan inscription from the Djebel Massaoudje has transformed our understanding of this new provincial system; discussed by G.Ch.-Picard, 'L'administration territoriale de Carthage', *Mélanges Piganiol* (1966), III 1257-66.

Chapter 4. Spartan imperialism?

1 For instance, considerable argument would be needed to support any particular interpretation of Kleomenes' action at Plataia (Hdt. 6.108.2-4); and Herodotus' account of his motive might well be thought to depend on hindsight.

2 On the birth-dates of Pausanias and others of his family, see M.E.White, *JHS* LXXXIV (1964), 149-52.

3 προϊσχόμενοι indicates that the 'excuse' was to some extent spurious, and obviates argument about the meanings of πρόφασις.

4 Herodotus wrote in the knowledge of Pausanias' downfall, and we can fairly assume that he was familiar with the version given by Thucydides. C.W.Fornara, *Herodotus* (1971), 62-6, makes an attractive case for thinking that Herodotus expected his readers to grasp in full the unstated contrast with Pausanias' disgrace; but he did not need to deny (63) Herodotus' doubts about the degree of Pausanias' guilt.

5 Recently, C.W.Fornara, *Historia* XV (1966), 257-71; M.L.Lang, *CJ* LXIII (1967), 79-85; P.J.Rhodes, *Historia* XIX (1970), 387-400; Meiggs (1972), 465-6. H.D.Westlake, accepting many of these criticisms, suggests a written source, Ionic in manner and probably in dialect (*CQ* XXVII (1977), 95ff. I am grateful to him for allowing me to see this in advance). Fornara's chronological

objection is telling, that there was not enough time during Pausanias' first period in Byzantium for the correspondence and Xerxes' other measures; fuss about the *skytale* (Thuc. 1.131.1) is less helpful.

6 Xenophon does not mention Pausanias, but says that Gongylos was rewarded as the only Eretrian exiled for Medism; but were there no refugees after 490 (cf. Hdt. 6.101.2)? The letter which Gongylos carried to Xerxes may be spurious, but it would be too sceptical to deny the connexion with Pausanias entirely.

7 Lotze (1970), 274 thought in terms of a concession to the king's pride in return for recognition of the leading position of Sparta and Pausanias; M.L.Lang, *CJ* LXIII (1967), 82-5, of Pausanias as the agent of the Spartan government, disowned and made a scapegoat when their peace plan failed. Most refrain from precise definition.

8 On Gomme's belief that Thuc. 1.131.1 implies 'no long stay' see M.E.White, *JHS* LXXXIV (1964), 144. Pausanias' absence from Sparta would be lengthened if we accepted, with Meiggs (1972) and others, a confused passage of Justin (9.1.3) as serious evidence that he spent seven years in Byzantium; but there is no certainty what Trogus wrote, and I should find it hard to believe that he was left in control of this key position for several years, even if there were no evidence tending the other way.

9 According to Thucydides (1.132.2), his 'private' inscription on the tripod set up by the Greeks, for which the one we know (Meiggs and Lewis 27) was then substituted. But Thucydides' couplet is for a personal dedication, such as Pausanias is likely to have made from his large share of the booty (Hdt. 9.81.2): did Thucydides' source confuse two dedications?

10 See the list in de Ste Croix (1972), app.xxvi 351-2; but I cannot agree with him (132) that none of these was held in the assembly. The most spectacular case in our period is that of Leotychidas (Hdt. 6.85). At 5.63 Thucydides maintains consistency by claiming that the Spartans' rough treatment of Agis in 418 was 'against their custom'.

11 This is the controversial phrase τῷ μὲν λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν πόλεμον (1.128.3). Wars are commonly named after the opponent (so for a Peloponnesian the 'Attic War', Thuc. 5.28.2, 31.5), some from the theatre (Dekeleian, Corinthian), a few from a leading personality (Archidamian, Chremonidean). Pausanias would then have said (sc. to his Spartan supporters), to put it at a minimum, that he was going out to hold what could still be held against Athens, i.e. Byzantium. The alternative is to understand, abnormally, a 'war on behalf of the Greeks', but a 'private' war (ἰδίᾳ ... ἄνευ Λακεδαιμονίων) of Pausanias against Persia is not much less odd than one against Athens. The objection to the latter is the obscurity of the phrase in a context of the Persian War where Thucydides has said nothing about fighting Greeks, whereas at 1.112.2 the sense of 'Greek war' is

plain when Athens turns from the Peloponnese to Cyprus. Gebhardt's emendation Μηδικόν is possible: for the type of psychological error supposed cf. the generally accepted emendation of Λακεδαιμονίων to Ἀθηναίων in Philochoros, *FGH* 328 F 148. Steup and Gomme note that the Lamian War is called 'Hellenic' in Plut. *Phoc.* 23.1, *IG* II^2 505.17, and also in *IG* II^2 448.43-5 (not cited by Gomme), where ὑ]πὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων strongly supports this sense; otherwise one might take this name geographically, the war in Greece as opposed to others currently waged elsewhere, and in any case this may not be a safe guide to Thucydides' usage. Westlake (n.5) conjectures that we have here an abnormal usage taken over from Thucydides' source, and he notes another abnormality in τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἀρχῆς below in the sense 'rule over Greeks'. A shade of doubt remains: and if Pausanias claimed that he was safeguarding Byzantium from the Persians, that meant in effect holding it against Athens, which is how the Athenians saw it.

12 See n.8.

13 Meiggs (1972), 38-9, 56-8, 482 stresses the importance of this often neglected problem. If the intention was to safeguard the Aegean against a Persian naval offensive, this called for effective maintenance of a Greek position in Cyprus, which might seem to be foreshadowed by Thucydides' strong phrase (1.94.2) αὐτῆς τὰ πολλὰ κατεστρέψαντο, a verb he uses elsewhere only for the subjection by Athens of rebellious allies and others, or for comparably complete conquests. It is not easy to conjecture what Pausanias may have had in mind. The problem would be sharply reduced if we could suppose that the version of Diod. 11.44.1-2 had any solid base. Here Pausanias' mission is to liberate the cities still garrisoned by the barbarians, and he does this in Cyprus.

Herodotus presents a comparable problem, relevant to Sparta's post-war intentions, at 6.72.1, where he uses of Leotychidas in Thessaly the phrase παρεὸν δέ οἱ πάντα ὑποχείρια ποιήσασθαι. That too is normally used of outright conquest or the like; but at 5.91.2 it is used of the relationship that the Peisistratids might have created between Athens and Sparta, and this must be something less than total subjection. Herodotus also uses the verb καταστρέφεσθαι of total conquest and subjection; but when at 1.68.6 he says that the bulk of the Peloponnese was κατεστραμμένη to the Spartans this must, exceptionally, mean something milder than e.g. Kroisos' rule in Asia Minor (1.28). Cf. de Ste Croix (1972), 109.

14 Gomme's note on Thuc. 5.105.2 was printed as he left it, in spite of some obscurity, which is due to his insistence, both here and in the passages of vol.I to which he refers back, on the degree of autonomy which Athens left to her subjects. One misses reference to the way in which the Athenian assembly legislated for the empire without consultation, a massive difference between the two leagues. See also de Ste Croix (1972), 96-101: his full-scale examination of the Peloponnesian League (101ff.) is a most valuable contribution.

15 Gomme was certainly right to take Thuc. 3.93.2 καὶ ὧν ἐπὶ τῇ γῇ ἐκτίζετο as a reference to hostility from others besides the Thessalians; it is less clear that he was right to exclude the Trachinians themselves. Steup, who did take the passage as referring only to the Thessalians, understood it to mean 'those whose land the foundation threatened', comparing the ἐπί of 92.4 (and cf. e.g. 5.33.1); but 'those on whose land it was founded' would be at least as natural. Someone's land was surely annexed for the colonists, and the Trachinians are the likely victims.

16 Diod. 14.38.4-5, to be corrected from 82.7 and Polyaen. 2.21; cf. Andrewes (1971), 222-3. The date should be either 399 or 400.

17 On the usage of this word see D.J.Blackman, in J.S.Morrison and R.T.Williams, *Greek oared ships 900-322 B.C.* (Cambridge, 1968), 181 n. At the least some ship-sheds must have been built.

18 On the anomaly that the pass of Thermopylai was blocked to the east of the city, whereas its likely enemies were to the north, see Gomme's note to Thuc. 3.92.6.

19 On all this Parke (1930) is still the best guide, though some modification is by now needed. G.Bockisch, *Klio* XLVI (1965), 129-239, castigates Sparta unsystematically and adds nothing very useful.

20 Evidently not available to Brasidas in 424, they make their first appearance in 421 (Thuc. 5.34.1: see my note ad loc.).

21 Parke (1930), 55-6, with an estimate of Sparta's costs at n.35, argues that this is not greatly disproportionate to her commitments.

22 R.E.Smith, *CP* XLIII (1948), 150-3, argued that the dekarchies survived until 397; on this see Andrewes (1971), 206-16. The cities, at least till 394, will have had to take care that their 'ancestral constitutions' were suitable: Thuc. 1.19 is still relevant.

23 Beloch (*Gr.Gesch.* 3^2.1.11, n.3) assumed that these were the ephors of 403/2, newly entered into office; but this makes for a very tight chronology in autumn 403, and a change of ephors is not needed for a change in policy. I would understand Xenophon literally, that Pausanias 'persuaded' one or more of the ephors of 404/3 to take up a new stance. Pausanias was on friendly terms with the democratic leaders of Mantineia (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.3, 6), and his sons are occasionally credited with a liberal outlook (Diod. 15.19.4, Polyb. 9.23.7), but this is mainly in contrast with Agesilaos. I make no attempt here to interpret the closing lines of Ephoros, *FGH* 70 F 118, or Arist. *Pol.* 1301b20: there is much that we do not know about King Pausanias.

24 Gauthier (1973), 163-78 cites the striking remark attributed to Phrynichos at Thuc. 8.48.6, which is not in all respects clear but certainly charges the Athenian upper class with aggravated oppression of the allies. See also de Ste Croix, *Historia* III (1954), 37-8.

25 The bad evidence is Plut. *Per.* 11-12, to which too much deference has been paid. I have analysed this in detail in an article to appear in a forthcoming *JHS*: meanwhile see W.G. Forrest in *The ancient historian and his materials*, ed. B.M. Levick (Farnborough, 1975), esp. 22-4.

Chapter 5 The fifth-century Athenian empire: a balance sheet

1 The ancient authorities and modern bibliography will be found in Schuller (1974), Meiggs (1972). I have kept both to a minimum.

2 A.P.Thornton, *Doctrines of imperialism* (New York, 1965), 47.

3 E.g. H.B.Mattingly in *Historia* X (1961), 184, 187; Erxleben in *APF* XXI (1971), 161.

4 See R.Folz, *L'Idée d'empire en Occident du Ve au XIVe siècle* (Paris, 1953).

5 E.Will, *Le monde grecque et l'orient: le Ve siècle (510-403)* (Paris, 1972), 171-3; cf. V.Ehrenberg, *L'état grec*, translated C.Picavet-Roos (Paris, 1976), 187-97.

6 As an outstanding illustration, note how the 454 'turning-point' dominates the analysis of Nesselhauf (1933). For an incisive brief critique, see E.Will, *Le monde grecque et l'orient*, 175-6. It is anyway far from certain that the transfer of the treasury occurred as late as 454; see W.K.Pritchett, 'The transfer of the Delian treasury', *Historia* XVIII (1969), 17-21.

7 J.A.O.Larsen, 'The constitution and original purpose of the Delian league', *HSPh* LI (1940), 175-213, at p.191.

8 Schuller (1974), 3. His central thesis of 'two layers' (*Schichte*) in the structure of the later empire and his listing of continuities and discontinuities, follow from his initial confusion between the psychological notion of 'eine Interesse am Beherrschtwerden' and the realities of power.

9 Even if one thinks, as I do not, that at the end of his life the historian came to believe, retrospectively, that the Athenian empire had been a mistake, that would not affect my argument.

10 Perlman (1976), 5.

11 Martin Wight, *British colonial constitutions 1947* (Oxford, 1952), 5. The parallel with Roman 'allies' in the third and second centuries B.C. comes immediately to mind.

12 I need hardly say that I find it both irrelevant and anachronistic to play with the notions of *de iure* and *de facto* exercise of power, as does e.g. Schuller (1974), 143-8.

13 Meiggs (1972), 215.

14 The fullest accounts will be found in Meiggs (1972), ch. 11; Schuller (1974), 36-48, 156-63. Neither includes the *Hellespontophylakes*, discussed below, sect. IV.

15 See Blackman (1969), 179-83.

16 Meyer (1960) weakens an otherwise sharp-eyed analysis by his insistence that there were never more than half a dozen or so ship-contributing states, and by treating ship construction solely as a privilege granted deliberately by the Athenians.

17 Meyer (1960), 499.

18 The most convincing discussion of this text seems to me to be M.Chambers, 'Four Hundred Sixty Talents', *CPh* LIII (1958), 26-32.

19 Throughout I shall ignore the temporary wartime reassessment of the tribute in 425, certainly an important indication of the strength and character of Athenian power but too much of an anomaly to be included in the analysis I am trying to make.

20 It does not trouble me that Thucydides calls the 600 talents *phoros*. Xenophon surely had the same figure in mind when he gave the total Athenian public revenue at the time as 1,000 talents 'from both domestic and external sources' (*Anab.* 7.1.27).

21 For what follows, the fullest collection and analysis of the evidence will be found in Amit (1965).

22 See L.Casson, *Ships and seamanship in the ancient world* (Princeton, 1971), 278-80.

23 Blackman (1969), 195.

24 R.S.Stanier, 'The cost of the Parthenon', *JHS* LXXIII (1953), 68-76.

25 Blackman (1969), 186.

26 I see no need to spend time on R.Sealey's view that the 'League of Delos was founded because of a dispute about booty and its purpose was to get more booty': 'The origin of the Delian league', *Ancient society and institutions. Studies ... Victor*

Ehrenberg (Oxford, 1966), 253; see A.H.Jackson, 'The original purpose of the Delian league', *Historia* XVIII (1969), 12-16; Meiggs (1972), 462-4.

27 On the ancient evidence for what follows, see Gomme's commentary on Thuc. 1.116-17.

28 See de Ste Croix (1972), 394-6.

29 Thuc. 1.101.3; Plut. *Cimon* 14.2 (presumably based on Stesimbrotus of Thasos, 107 F 5).

30 The list is conveniently set out in Jones (1957), 169-73. One need not accept the demographic argument in which the data are embedded.

31 It is unnecessary for me to embark on the unresolved difficulties faced in trying to sort out colonies and cleruchies; all earlier discussions have been replaced by Gauthier (1966) and Erxleben (1975).

32 See Finley (1976).

33 Gauthier (1973), 163. This article is fundamental for what follows.

34 For the texts of this block of inscriptions, now conventionally known as 'the Attic stelai', see W.K.Pritchett in *Hesperia* XXII (1953), 225-311, with full analysis in XXV (1956), 178-328.

35 Col. II, lines 311-14; cf. II 177. The figure is so large as to create the suspicion that there may be an error in the text.

36 J.K.Davies, *Athenian propertied families 600-300 B.C.* (Oxford, 1971), 431-5, estimates Pasion's total wealth at about 60 talents.

37 I am not persuaded by the argument of Erxleben (1975), 84-91, that the Euboean holdings, including that of Oionias, were built up through purchase of Athenian cleruchic estates on the island; or by the unsupported suggestion of de Ste Croix (1972), 245: 'I would suppose that the Athenian State claimed the right to dispose of land confiscated from the allies ... also by making grants *viritim* to individual Athenians, who would presumably purchase at public auction.' Such suggestions were effectively undercut in advance, in a few lines, by Gauthier (1973), 169. Nor do I understand how Erxleben, like many others, can accept as fact the statement of Andocides (3.9) that after the peace of Nicias, Athens acquired possession of two thirds of Euboea. The whole passage is demonstrably 'one of the worst examples we have of oratorical inaccuracy and misrepresentation': de Ste Croix (1972), 245.

38 On the excess phraseology see M.I.Finley, *Studies in land and*

credit in ancient Athens (New Brunswick, 1952), 75-6.

39 Finley (1965); (1973a), ch. 6. On the fiction of 'commercial wars' see also de Ste Croix (1972), 214-20.

40 *IG* I^2 57.18-21, 34-41 (Methone); 58.10-19 (Aphytis).

41 G.B.Grundy, *Thucydides and the history of his age* (London, 1911), 77. We have no idea of the duties of the *Hellespontophylakes* apart from this reference. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.22 and Polyb. 4.44.4 say that Alcibiades introduced the first toll collection in 410, at Chrysopolis in the territory of Calchedon across the straits from Byzantium.

42 Correctly Schuller (1974), 6-7.

43 The best statement of this proposition is by Nesselhauf (1933), 58-68, though I shall indicate disagreement on two points.

44 An interesting example of 'rewarding friends' has been seen in the 24 small cities, most of them in the Thracian and Hellespontine districts, who 'volunteered' tribute in the years from 435, by Nesselhauf (1933), 58-62, and more fully by F.A.Lepper, 'Some rubrics in the Athenian quota-lists', *JHS* LXXXII (1962), 25-55, who take these instances as proof of the doctrine that tribute payment was a necessary condition of sailing the sea. The explanation is admittedly speculative; nothing more may be involved than local manoeuvres in a period of unstable relations between Athens and Macedon; see Meiggs (1972), 249-52.

45 Nesselhauf (1933), 64.

46 De Ste Croix (1972), ch. 7; see the judicious critique by Schuller (1974), 77-9.

47 I shall not repeat my reasons for holding the currency decree to be a political act without any commercial or financial advantage to Athenians; see Finley (1965), 22-4; (1973a), 166-9.

48 First formulated in a lecture (Hasebroek 1926), the analysis was then extended in a book (Hasebroek 1928); see Finley (1965).

49 See most recently E.Erxleben, 'Die Rolle der Bevölkerungsklassen im Aussenhandel Athens im 4. Jahrhundert v.u.Z.', in *Hellenische Poleis*, ed. E.C.Welskopf (Berlin, 1974), I 460-520; more generally, de Ste Croix (1972), 214-20.

50 Nesselhauf (1933), 65.

51 I do not understand how some historians can seriously doubt that this tax was to be collected in all harbours within the Athenian sphere. At the end of the century, the 2% harbour-

tax, in the Piraeus only, was farmed for 39 talents (Andoc. 1.133-4), and no arithmetic can raise that figure to a sum, in 413 B.C., that would warrant the measure, when, as there is reason to believe, the tribute in the period 418-414 amounted to about 900 talents a year. I should add that I am prepared to leave open the possibility of a widespread toll system in the empire even earlier, as argued by Romstedt (1914) from the still unexplained reference to a *dekate* (tithe) in the 'Callias decree', *IG* I^2 91.7. Romstedt's analysis is not convincing, but the possibility seems to me to deserve better than the neglect in all recent works on the empire.

52 I shall not become involved in the discussion about the reliability of the statement by Plutarch (*Pericles* 11.4) that 60 triremes were kept at sea annually for eight months. Meiggs (1972), 427, concludes: 'However dubious the details in Plutarch, his source ... is not likely to have invented the basic fact that routine patrols annually cruised in the Aegean.' That is surely right, and it is enough for my argument.

53 G.E.M. de Ste Croix, 'Political pay outside Athens', *CQ* XXV (1975), 48-52, has contested my argument on this point (see next note), but his evidence, that Rhodes occasionally paid for some offices in the late fourth century and perhaps in the Hellenistic period, and Hellenistic Iasos, too, and that Aristotle made some general remarks on the subject of pay in the *Politics*, completely misses the force of my argument.

54 See Finley (1973a), 172-4; (1973b), 48-50. Jones (1957), 5-10, tried to falsify this proposition by pointing to the survival of pay for office after the loss of empire, and he has been gleefully quoted by scores of writers. However, it is easily demonstrated that institutions often survive long after the conditions necessary for their introduction disappeared. Trial by jury is a sufficient example.

55 For what follows, I am grateful to A.Andrewes for an advance copy of his forthcoming commentary on the passage. I am also happy to thank him for several discussions of the relevant problems and for reading the text of this essay.

56 8.27.5, 48.4, 64.2-5. That Thucydides did not specifically endorse this particular argument of Phrynichus does not seem to me very important.

57 I see no need to enter into the debate over the 'popularity of the Athenian empire' initiated by de Ste Croix in *Historia* III (1954/5), 1-41; for the bibliography and a statement of his own most recent views, see de Ste Croix (1972), 34-43.

Chapter 6 Athens in the fourth century

1 Especially, Accame (1941); Gschnitzer (1958), 98-112; Perlman (1968); Seager (1967); Sealey (1957); Woodhead (1957 and 1962).

2 Thuc. 1.98.4 (Naxos); 1.124.3, 2.63.2, 3.37.2, etc. (impropriety, or crime; 'tyranny'); 2.64.3 ('Pericles'); 5.69.1 ('the Mantineans'); Xen. *HG* 2.2.3 and 10 (atrocities).

3 Cawkwell (1956), 72ff.; Seager (1967), 100ff., 115.

4 For Isocrates in 355 and Demosthenes on 'liberals', see below, p.142 and n.47.

5 Andoc. 3.1ff., 7-9, 12-16, 29-31, 37-40. Lysias 2.48-70; and see Seager (1967), 105-13, for many refs. of the contemporaries to matters pertaining to policies of *arche* or imperialism.

6 Aristoph. *Eccles*. 197ff. (of 392 B.C. probably): 'We must launch a fleet. The poor man votes in favour, the wealthy and the farmers vote against it.' Cf. Mossé (1962), 404ff. for a discriminating discussion of the moral and material motives for imperialism; and ibid. 110ff. and 124ff. for a certain decline of Athenian commerce in the fourth century.

7 Xen. *HG* 5.1.31 (cf. Andoc. 3.12 and 14); see Graham (1964), 174, 188.

8 Defensive alliances between contracting parties of equal status, and each containing a variant of a particularly pious thought on the reaching of decisions by joint consultation (Tod 101.11ff., 'Boeotia' - ἐὰν δέ τι δοκῆι ἢ προσθεῖναι ἢ ἀφελεῖν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Βοιωτοῖς κοινῆι βουλευομένοις... Tod 102.9ff., 'Locrians' ὅ τι δ'ἂν ἄλλο δοκῆι Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λοκροῖς συμβουλευομένοις, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι. Tod 103.8ff., 'Eretria' ὅ τι δ'ἂν δοκῆι ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῖν πολέοιν κοινῆι βουλευομέναιν, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι.

9 Seager (1967), 104ff.

10 Tod 110.28ff.

11 *Hell. Oxy.* (Bartoletti) 6.3, 8.1f.; Xen. *HG* 2.2.9, 5.1.1ff., 5.1.19ff. and 29, 6.2.1.

12 Xen. *HG* 4.8.27 and 31; Tod 114.8.

13 Tod 110.18-20. Tod's dating of it to these years follows from the internal evidence of the inscription, at ll. 28-31. (*Contra* Seager (1967), 109, but wrongly in my opinion.)

14 Allowance made for the language of compliments, it is hard to see Androtion, Athenian archon at Arcesine in 357-356, as anything other than a benefactor (Tod 152).

15 So e.g. Seager (1967), 114 considers this much more scandalous than I do.

16 For the alliance with Chios (384) see Tod 118.

17 One need only think of the origins of the Peloponnesian League

and of the Delian Confederacy. Cf. for the one, de Ste Croix (1972), 107ff.; for the other, Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 23.5.

18 Tod 118.35f.

19 Tod 118.6ff.

20 See esp., Accame (1941), 122ff.; Tod 127.12ff., 21ff., 31ff.; 144.12ff.; 152.25; 156.10ff.

21 Tod 123.23; Theopomp. F 98 (*FGH* 115).

22 For details see Accame (1941), 134ff.

23 Cf. Dem. 23.209, contrasting the fifth-century affluence with the present.

24 So Sealey (1957), 108: I agree. Instances at Cephallenia in 372 (*epimeletai*, and garrisons), Xen. *HG* 6.2.38, 6.4.1; *IG* II^2 98, 18-23 (= Bengtson (1962), no.267), cf. Tod p.86; at Arcesine and Andros in 356 (Tod 152 and 156).

25 For Ceos, Tod 142.45ff., 73ff. and see too perhaps idem 162; for Naxos, *IG* II^2 179, 7-16.

26 Tod 142.17ff., 27ff., 57ff. (And cf. Tod 141, belonging probably to a moment when Ceos was *not* allied to Athens.)

27 Cf. Tod 151.18f. (alliance of Athens with Thracian kings, 357 B.C.): 'if any of the cities [= of the Chersonese] secedes from Athens', the kings are to give military help to Athens on demand.

28 Tod 131.35ff. The Athenian reply seems distinctly defensive in tone.

29 For the Athenian reaction to the news of Leuctra, Xen. *HG* 6.4.19f.

30 Alcetas and Neoptolemus, father-and-son rulers of the Molossians, are the only potentates who appear in the 'Aristoteles' list (Tod 123.109f.). No one has ever seen Dionysius I or Philip as a member of the Confederacy. But for Jason, below, n.34.

31 This seems to follow for certain from Aeschin. 3.94f. and 100f., where the orator alludes to the *suntaxis* of Oreus and Eretria, in a context which requires that the *suntaxis* was still paid till 348, when these cities seceded again.

32 Tod 144.12ff., 17ff.; 147.12ff.

33 For a discussion of the dates of the new entries, Sealey (1957), 105ff., with Woodhead (1962), 265f.

34 *IG* II^2 1609.88ff.; cf. especially Sealey (1957), 95-9; I accept Sealey's date 370-369 for the cleruchy of *IG* II^2 1609, and his inferences of a harder Athenian policy drawn from the fact that

no new names are added to the list of allies after (I think) 373. His theory is not seriously undermined by the collapse of one of its supports, a belief in Jason of Pherae as a member of the Confederacy from 375. Woodhead (1957), 367ff., shows conclusively that there is really no good reason for thinking that the restoration of Jason as the deleted name of Tod 123.111 can possibly be right. Jason was never a member, though he did become an ally of Athens briefly and without being a member by 363: [Dem.] 49.10; Nep. *Timoth.* 4.2f.; with Xen. *HG* 6.1.10.

35 Of the Chersonese cities only Elaeus appears on the decree of Aristoteles list (Tod 123.123). The Athenian treaty of 357 with the three Odrysian kings (Tod 151) is heavily restored in every place that is concerned with the Chersonese cities. If the restorations are accepted, their '*suntaxis*' and the possibility of their 'secession', to say nothing of their (unrestored) 'freedom and autonomy' seem to make Confederacy members of them. Yet their names are not added to the 'Aristoteles' list, where there is still room for them (below line 130). Probably they are not protected by the 'Aristoteles' oath.

Moreover, in spite of the Athenian claim to the cities, recognized by the Thracian kings in this treaty, it is not clear to me that the cities themselves recognized it at this date. See on this Dem. 23.173, 178ff., with Schäfer (1887), I 444, and especially Isoc. 8.22, where κομιούμεθα requires that the cities were not in Athenian hands in 355.

36 Sealey (1957), 108-9 puts this motive clearly.

37 For the Euboean Confederacy, Aeschin. 3.94.

38 Meiggs and Lewis 94.

39 Tod 97.3ff., 11ff.

40 Craterus, *FGH* 342 F 21; *ap.* Zenobius, *Prov.* 2.28, 'Αττικὸς πάροικος: 'Krateros says it comes from the Athenian *epoikoi* who were sent to Samos. For the Athenians who reinforced those already there in Samos settled and pushed out the native Samians.'

41 D.S. 18.8.9. For discussion, E.Schweigert (1940), 194-8; R.Sealey (1957), 95ff.

42 Heraclides, *FHG* II, p.216 (= Arist. F 611.35 Rose); Str. 14.639.18; D.S. 18.8.9.

43 Tod 146.9ff., with 4f.; cf. Dem. 6.20; [Dem.] 7.10. The extraordinary 'those who have come on the mission from those from Potidaea' of the inscription, alludes presumably not to the Potidaeates but to a first batch of cleruchs.

44 Tod 156.10ff. (356 B.C.).

45 It is not clear to me what Demosthenes meant when he wrote, 'The Chians and the Byzantians and the Rhodians complained that we had designs on them, and for that reason they started this latest war against us' (Dem. 15.3). If it is a specific allusion and not a purely general one, Samos fits it better than anything else we know of.

46 For the contemporary views on Eubulus, Aeschin. 3.25f.; Theopomp. *FGH* 115 F 99-100; and see in general G.L.Cawkwell (1963), 47ff.

47 Dem. 15.25 (351 B.C.): 'There are some people, gentlemen, who are marvellously good at arguing the rights of our neighbours, as against you, and I'd like to give them just this piece of advice: let them give their minds to stating your rights against the neighbours, so that we can see them practising what they preach. It's a queer thing for a man to start instructing you about "rights" when he's behaving quite wrongly himself. There is nothing "right" in a citizen mugging up the arguments against you and not those in your favour.' Isoc. 8.16, 8.20ff., 8.32f., 8.64ff., 8.75ff.

48 Speusippus, *Ep. Socrat.* 30.4-6 (early 342 B.C.), in R.Hercher, *Epistologr. Graeci* (Amsterdam 1965), 630.

49 *IG* II^2 1611.1-9, 283 triremes in 357/6; ibid. 1613.302, 349 triremes in 353/2; cf. Dem. 14.13 and 9.40.

Chapter 7. The Antigonids and the Greek states, 276-196 B.C.

Introductory note

There is no continuous ancient narrative of Greek history between the battle of Ipsus and the accession of Antigonus Doson, and in many cases the basic facts are in dispute. Hence it often happens that instead of quoting ancient evidence to support statements made in the text one can refer only to modern reconstructions. This, of course, is a fragile basis on which to build historical interpretation, and it is necessary to emphasize the provisional and hypothetical character of such interpretation. The best modern narrative, with references to both ancient sources and modern literature, is that of Will (1966). For more detailed citation of ancient evidence it is sometimes necessary to have recourse to the otherwise out-of-date accounts of Niese, *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeronea* (Gotha, 1893-1903), and Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* IV (Berlin-Leipzig, 1925-7).

1 See W.G.Forrest, 'The First Sacred War', *BCH* LXXX (1956), 33-52.

2 Badian (1966) demolished Tarn's view that the Greeks of Asia Minor were genuinely free under Alexander.

3 Diod. 18.55.2, though there is no mention of 'freedom' in the actual edict of Polyperchon quoted by Diod. 18.56. What Polyperchon was in fact doing was replacing the oligarchic regimes set up by Antipater with democracies.

4 Diod. 19.61.2. Antigonus did not say, and did not mean, that they were to be free from tribute. Cf. Simpson (1959), 403-4.

5 Welles (1934), no.13, lines 18ff.

6 Cf. Wehrli (1969), 62ff., 120.

7 Boeotia: Plut. *Demetrius* 39.4-5; on the Boeotian constitution at this time, cf. P.Roesch, *Thespies et la confédération béotienne* (Paris, 1965), 125-6. On Athens at this period, cf. G. de Sanctis, *RFIC* LXIV (1936), esp. 256ff.; E.Manni, *Demetrio Poliorcete* (Rome, 1951), 89ff.; Wehrli (1969), 186.

8 For garrisons imposed by Demetrius, see Plut. *Demetrius* 33.1, 34.5, 39.2; *Pyrrhus* 10.5. On Antigonus' policy in this respect cf. Simpson (1959), 403ff.

9 On these events see Will (1966), 82-93.

10 Polyb. 4.76.2. Θετταλοὶ γὰρ ἐδόκουν μὲν κατὰ νόμους πολιτεύειν καὶ πολὺ διαφέρειν Μακεδόνων, διέφερον δ' οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ὁμοίως ἔπασχον Μακεδόσι καὶ πᾶν ἐποίουν τὸ προσταττόμενον τοῖς βασιλικοῖς. A.H.M. Jones '*Civitates liberae et immunes* in the East', *Anatolian studies presented to W.H.Buckler* (1939), 105, is wrong to take this as an indication that Thessaly 'was technically free from Macedonian rule'.

11 For the history of Euboea in the Hellenistic period, cf. Geyer, *RE*, Supp. IV 442ff.

12 Gonatas' brother Craterus was in charge of Corinth before 277; cf. Bengtson (1944), 347. The date of the expulsion of the Macedonian garrison from the Piraeus is uncertain, and even the fact of the expulsion has been challenged: cf. Will (1966), 189, 196. Macedonian garrisons may also have remained in Achaean towns for a few years after 276. Cf. W.W.Tarn, *Antigonus Gonatas* (Oxford, 1913), 205; F.W.Walbank, *A historical commentary on Polybius* (1956-), I 231, 233.

13 The senate's decision: Livy 34.43.8; cf. Briscoe (1972), 47. Aetolian disaffection: Polyb. 18.34, 18.45.1; Livy 33.11, 33.31.1, 34.23.5ff., 35.12. Withdrawal of Roman troops: Livy 34.48.2-51.6.

14 Sources in Will (1966), 190, 192.

15 Plut. *Pyrrhus* 26.8-29; Paus. 1.13.6-8; Justin 25.4.6-10.

16 Plut. *Pyrrhus* 30.1; for Argive help to Sparta, Paus. 1.13.6.

17 For Gonatas' policy of supporting tyrants in Greek states, see

Polyb. 2.41.10, 9.26.6; Trogus, prol. 26. For literature, see Heinen (1973), 120, n.111. For Aristotimus of Elis and Aristodemus of Megalopolis, see H.Berve, *Die Tyrannis bei der Griechen* (Munich, 1967), II 713.

18 For full discussion on all issues concerned with the Chremonidean War, see Heinen (1973), 95ff. The only evidence for the outbreak of the war is the famous 'Decree of Chremonides' (*Syll.*^{3} 434-5).

19 See the literature quoted by Heinen (1973), 180, n.348.

20 Eusebius, *Chron.* (ed. Schöne), II p.237; cf. Paus. 3.6.6. See Bengtson (1944), 375-6.

21 Bengtson (1944), 376ff.; cf. J.Pouilloux, 'Antigone Gonatas et Athènes après la guerre de Chremonidès', *BCH* LXX (1946), 488-96.

22 Samos and Caunus could both be described as free states in the alliance of Ptolemy (Livy 33.18.11-12, surely following Polybius here), yet they are known to have had garrisons (Samos: Polyb. 5.35.11, 16.2.9; Caunus: Polyb. 30.31.6).

23 On Gonatas' intellectual interests, see Tarn (op.cit. n.12), chs. 1 and 8, though Tarn exaggerates in saying that Gonatas 'looked on Athens as his intellectual capital' (p.205).

24 On the rise of the Aetolian League, cf. Flacelière (1937), passim.

25 Polyb. 2.43.3; Plut. *Aratus* 5.9; Walbank (1933), 31-4; *Hist. Comm.* I 235-6.

26 Plut. *Aratus* 4.3; Walbank (1933), 32.

27 I follow, without any great degree of confidence, the chronology of Walbank (1933), 34ff.; Will (1966), 286ff. In *JHS* LVI (1936), 67, n.19 Walbank reverted to the view that the *basileus* of Plut. *Aratus* 11.2 is Ptolemy, not Antigonus, and that the revolt of Alexander followed, rather than preceded, Aratus' seizure of power at Sicyon. Aratus' attack on Corinth (Plut. *Aratus* 18.4) is seen by Walbank as an attack on Alexander as the representative of Gonatas, inspired by Ptolemy. For the alliance with Alexander, see Plut. *Aratus* 18.1; for the support from Ptolemy, Plut. *Aratus* 12ff.

28 The only direct evidence for Aetolian action against Alexander is the attack on Nicocles (Plut. *Aratus* 4.1), and that is evidence only if one both accepts my chronology (cf. n.27) and assumes that Nicocles was a creature of Alexander (cf. Will (1966), 290). But there is no trace of any quarrel between the Aetolians and Gonatas, and they fought against the Boeotians, who had allied themselves with the Achaeans (Plut. *Aratus* 16.1).

29 See Will (1966), 292-3.

30 Plut. *Aratus* 18-24; Walbank (1933), 45-7, *Hist.Comm.* I 236; Ptolemy only became an official ally of the Achaean League after the liberation of Corinth (Plut. *Aratus* 24.4).

31 Walbank (1933), 43-5; sources in Will (1966), 300.

32 Polyb. 2.44.1; Plut. *Aratus* 33.1; Justin 28.1.1-4; Walbank, *Hist.Comm.* I 237-8.

33 Polyb. 20.5.3; Feyel (1942), 83ff.; Will (1966), 316.

34 See particularly Polyb. 20.5ff. on the political situation in Boeotia; on its consequences in the Second Macedonian War see Livy 33.1-2, 27.5-29; Polyb. 18.40.1-4, 43.

35 On the reforms of Cleomenes, see B.Shimron, *CQ* n.s. XIV (1964), 232-9; *Historia* XIII (1964), 147-55; *Late Sparta* (New York, 1972), 39ff.; P.Oliva, *Sparta and her social problems* (Amsterdam-Prague, 1971), 230ff.

36 Polyb. 2.52.4. Aratus defended his action by claiming that a few years earlier Doson, the Aetolians and Cleomenes had formed an alliance against the Achaeans. This alleged alliance is not to be accepted: cf. Walbank, *Hist.Comm.* I 239. The attempt by De Laix (*CSCA* II (1969), 65-83) to defend it is unconvincing.

37 Will (1966), 328ff.

38 On the formation of the symmachy, see Polyb. 2.54.4, 4.9.4; Walbank, *Hist.Comm.* I 256.

39 On the Sellasia campaign, see Polyb. 2.65.9; Plut. *Cleomenes* 28; *Philopoemen* 6; Walbank, *Hist.Comm.* I 272ff.

40 For the Social War, see Walbank (1940), ch.2.

41 For Philip's initial good reputation, see Polyb. 4.27.10, 7.11.8.

42 I make these statements about the Illyrian Wars dogmatically. For the First War, see Polyb. 2.11-12, to be preferred to App. *Illyrica* 7-8 and Dio, fr.49. For other views, see Holleaux (1920), 102, n.3, 109-12; Walser (1954); Badian (1964); Derow (1973); Levi (1973).

43 On the Second War, see Polyb. 3.16-19, 4.16.6-19.7; Livy, per. 20; App. *Illyrica* 8; Dio, fr.53.

44 The statement in the treaty between Philip and Hannibal that the Romans were *kurioi* of the protectorate (Polyb. 7.9.13) is simply propaganda. Whether we regard the protectorate as an area bounded by a line, or, as Badian (1964), 6ff. prefers, as only a collection of separate cities and peoples, makes

no difference to the argument.

45 Polyb. 3.19.8, 5.101.7ff., 105.1; cf. Walbank (1940), 64-5.

46 Polyb. 7.9; Livy 23.33.1-34.9, 38.1-39.4, 48.3; App. *Macedonica* 1.

47 Aetolia: H.H.Schmitt, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* (Munich, 1969), III, no.536. Sparta, Elis, Messene: Polyb. 9.28.39; Livy 26.24.9. Attalus of Pergamum also supported Rome, though without a formal treaty: cf. J.Briscoe, *A Commentary on Livy books xxxi-xxxiii* (Oxford, 1973), 56. Philip's attacks on Messene: Polyb. 3.19.11, 7.11.10, 7.12.9, 7.13.6-7, 7.14.2-5, 8.8a; Livy 32.21.23; Plut. *Aratus* 49, 51.

48 For the military events of the war from 210 to 208, see Polyb. 9.41-2, 10.26, 11.5.8, 22.11.9; Livy 27.29.9-32.5, 28.5-8; Strabo 9, p.435C.

49 Livy 32.21.16, 28; the speech has clearly been worked up by Livy, but there is no reason to doubt that Polybius had a speech at this point and that the basic material is Polybian: cf. Briscoe, *Comm.* 18-19.

50 Briscoe, *Comm.* 74.

51 On Boeotia in the First Macedonian War see Feyel (1942), 170ff.

52 Polyb. 9.37.6, and further references in Briscoe, *Comm.* 133. The Greek-barbarian dichotomy could still be used as a slogan for political purposes, but intelligent Greeks had come to realize that barbarism was a matter of culture, not of language, and accepted the Romans as *sui generis*. For Eratosthenes' criticism of the distinction, see Strabo 1, p.66C; H.C.Baldry, *Entretiens Fondation Hardt* VIII (1961), 191ff.; P.M.Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (Oxford, 1972) I 530-1, and, for earlier expressions of the same view, II 761, n.87.

53 Polyb. 5.8-12; Walbank (1940), 54-5.

54 Cf. n.47.

55 Phocis: Walbank, *Hist.Comm.* I 558-9. Locris: Briscoe, *Comm.* 311.

56 Memories of Sulpicius: App. *Macedonica* 7. Plundering: Polyb. 11.5.6-8; Livy 27.31.1, 28.6.4, 28.7.4, 32.22.10; Paus. 7.17.5. Aegina: Polyb. 9.42.5-8. Cf. P.Meloni, *Il valore storico e le fonti del libro macedonico di Appiano* (Rome, 1955), 67.

57 Livy 29.12.1; the Aetolians had suffered a devastating attack by Philip (Polyb. 11.7.2; cf. Livy 36.31.11). On Roman representation of the Aetolians as treaty-breakers, cf. Briscoe, *Comm.* 52.

58 For the evidence for these events, see Briscoe, *Comm.* 36ff.

59 App. *Macedonica* 4. On the date of the Aetolian appeal, cf. Briscoe, *Comm.* 130.

60 Polyb. 31.5.6. See H.H.Schmitt, *Rom und Rhodos* (Munich, 1957), 1-49.

61 Cf. n.47.

62 Polyb. 16.27; Livy 31.14.10, 16.2, 24.4-18, 26.

63 Briscoe, *Comm.* 175.

64 Cf. n.52. Similar views: Agelaus in 217 (Polyb. 5.104.1), Thrasycrates in 207 (Polyb. 11.7.5). See J.Deininger (1971), 23ff.

Chapter 8. Laus imperii

1 This is an enlarged and revised version of the paper read to the seminar. References to modern works are necessarily sparse and often hardly reveal my debt to them.

2 Brunt (1963) on Meyer (1961); cf. also W.Schmitthenner, *Gnomon* XXXVII (1965), 152ff.; Wells (1972) - though the archaeological evidence he examines naturally cannot attest Augustus' ultimate intentions.

3 *de nat.deor.* 3.95. In *de offic.* he adopts the practical morality of the middle Stoa, but all his last philosophical works show that he could no longer accept the dogmatic basis for ethics and politics which he had taken over from the Stoa in *de leg.* book 1 with 2.15f.

4 See e.g. *de orat.* 1.219-23; 2.30, 131, 178 and 206. All these passages are put into the mouth of Antonius, whose conception of the orator's role certainly falls short of the ideal, expressed in the dialogue by Crassus, and by Cicero himself in his own person in his *Orator*, but Antonius' conception is only treated as inadequate, and the views cited are not contradicted elsewhere; cf. also *Brut.* 184-9; *pro Cluent.* 139.

5 On the relation between actual and published speeches see esp. L.Laurand, *Et. sur le style des discours de Ciceron*[2] (Paris, 1925) I 1ff.

6 *ad Att.* 2.1.3 seems to me to show that when he sent his consular speeches to Atticus, surely for publication, his aim was to perpetuate the fame of the Roman Demosthenes, not to disseminate pamphlets relevant to the political situation in 60; cf. n.8.

7 This view is asserted, and repeated against objections, in

de orat. 1.29-34, 202; 3.55-60 and 133-42, but virtually abandoned in *Orator* (despite continued insistence on the need for philosophic knowledge) and *Brutus*.

8 Contrast references to the Gracchi honorific in his *contiones* (*de leg.agr.* 2.11,31 and 81; *pro Rab. perd.* 14), hostile in speeches to the senate (*in Cat.* 1.3ff. and 29, 4.13; *de leg.agr.* 1.21). In 60 he was engaged in protecting the interests of Sullan *possessores* by amendments to Flavius' bill without objecting to the purchase of lands for distribution (*ad Att.* 1.19.4); in 63 he had shown his care for the former class in the senate (*de leg.agr.* 1.12), but railed at Rullus for protecting them before the people (*de leg.agr.* 3 passim), and he had protested against purchase of lands from willing sellers (1.14, 2.63-72). Knowing readers would have perceived the insincerity of his reproaching Rullus for speaking of the urban plebs *quasi de aliqua sentina* (ibid. 70; cf. *ad Att.* loc.cit.), and would have smiled at his pose as a true *popularis* and at his skill in representing the optimate ideals, of which in 60 he was an unashamed champion, as genuinely popular (1.23ff., 2.6-10; cf. *pro Sest.* 97ff.), and in invoking popular conceptions of *libertas* against the professedly popular tribunes, Rullus and Labienus (e.g. *de leg.agr.* 2.15-22; *pro Rab.perd.* 10-17), all in the interest of senatorial control.

9 E.g. *in Cat.* 3.26; *pro Sest.* 67; *de prov.cons.* 30, 33; *pro Balb.* 64.

10 *pro Arch.* 12-32 is the *locus classicus*. Much evidence in U. Knoche's paper, reprinted in H.Opperman (1967), 420-46. On the old Roman *virtus*, manifest in services to the state, see Earl (1961), ch.II.

11 See esp. *ad fam.* 15.4-6. Cicero retained the title of *imperator* at least till May 49 (ibid. 2.16).

12 Cf. Livy 1.16.7, 8.7.16: *disciplinam militarem, qua stetit ad hunc diem* (340 B.C.) *Romana res*; 9.17.3: *plurimum in bello pollere videntur militum copia et virtus, ingenia imperatorum, fortuna per omnia humana, maxima in res bellicas potens; ea et singula intuenti et universa sicut ab aliis regibus gentibusque, ita ab hoc quoque* (Alexander)*facile praestant invictum Romanum imperium;* 9.17.10 (discipline); *praef.* 7: *ea belli gloria est populo Romano ut cum suum conditorisque sui parentem Martem potissimum ferat, tam et hoc gentes humanae patiantur aequo animo quam imperium patiuntur.* (The idea that subjects accept an imperial power as 'deserving' to rule because of military prowess is in Thuc. 2.41.3.) Drexler (1959) cites many other texts from Livy on the concept of military glory.

13 *de rep.* 2 passim; cf. Polyb. 6.50.

14 See Roloff (1938).

15 F.Millar, *JRS* LXIII (1973), 50ff. and E.A.Judge in J.A.S.Evans, ed., *Polis and Imperium: Studies in honour of E.T.Salmon*

(Toronto, 1974), 279ff., may be right in denying that Augustus officially claimed to have 'restored the Republic' in so many words, but Vell. 2.89 (and much else) shows that such a claim would well have summarized the official view of his settlement; it is significant that Velleius, a new man himself, is so concerned to stress that *prisca illa et antiqua rei publicae forma revocata (est)*.

16 Livy 4.3ff. (whence Claudius' speech in *ILS* 212 and Tac. *Ann.* 11.24); 8.13 (*voltis exemplo maiorum augere rem Romanam victos in civitatem accipiendo? materia crescendi per summam gloriam suppeditat*); Dionys. *Ant.* 2.16ff.; 14.6; cf. Brunt (1971), 538f. Cf. Cic. *de offic.* 1.35 and p.185.

17 Jacoby, *FGH* 87 F 59. 111b (military discipline) and 112. I would ascribe Diod. 37.2-6 to Posidonius, who also deplored the decay of the old standards; cf. n.18.

18 E.g. Sall. *Cat.* 6-13; Cic. *pro Marc.* 23; *Tusc. disp.* 1.2; Hor. *Odes* 3.6 and 24, etc. Hampl (1959) cites further texts and argues that such complaints (cf. also n.17), which are just as common in classical Greece, have no basis in history and may actually betoken a heightened moral consciousness in the ages when they are made; I agree.

19 Cic. *de rep.* 2.5-11; Livy 5.54 (site of Rome); Vitruv. 6.1. 10ff.; Strabo 6.4.1 (strategic centrality of Italy). *Laudes Italiae*, a theme dear to Varro: Brunt (1971), 128ff.

20 E.g. *in Cat.* 2.29, 3.18-22 (a remarkable testimony to popular superstition); *de dom.* 143; *pro Sest.* 53; *in Vat.* 14; *pro Scaur.* 48; *pro Mil.* 83; Sall. *BJ* 14.19.

21 *de har. resp.* 18ff., with particular reference to the skill of the *haruspices* in advising on the placation of the gods. Cicero was bound, if he was to persuade senators who credited this nonsense, not to let his own scepticism appear. Cf. *de nat.deor.* 2.8 ('Stoic'); *SIG*^{3} 601; Hor. *Odes* 3.6.1ff.; *Mos. et Rom.Leg.Coll.* 6.4.8 (Diocletian); Aug. *Civ.Dei*, books 4 and 5 passim.

22 K.Latte (1960), 285f. Goar (1972) ascribes a more sincere religious belief to Cicero, but his candid analysis of the letters yields a similar result.

23 *de leg.* 2.15ff.; *de nat.deor.* 1.3ff., 77; Polyb. 6.56; cf. Posidonius (n.17). Cicero also suggests that Athenians and Romans were civilized respectively by the Eleusinian Mysteries and by Numa's rituals (*de leg.* 2.36; *de rep.* 2.26ff.). It is hard to see how Roman religion was ever thought to deter men from wrong-doing. Goar (1972) notes that Cicero only twice threatens his enemies with punishment after death (*in Cat.* 1.33; *Phil.* 14.32); see Latte (1960), 286ff., for lack of belief in an after-world, cf. esp. *pro Cluent.* 171. *de leg.* 2.25 suggests that religion makes men fear immediate punishment by the gods, but *de har. resp.* 39, *de leg.* 1.40 that they

merely afflict the wrongdoer with *furor*, to which *de leg.* 2.43ff. adds posthumous infamy.

24 *de leg.* 2.30-4, 3.27; *post red.sen.* 11, etc.; cf. Goar (1972), 48ff. Yet, as Latte (1960), 299, justly remarks, Bibulus' *obnuntiatio* had no effect even on the masses.

25 Varro, who himself accepted Stoic theology (Tert. *ad Nat.* 2.2), regarded it as superstition to fear the gods, disapproved of images and thought sacrifices futile (Arnob. 7.1), none the less followed Q. Mucius Scaevola in distinguishing three kinds of theology, philosophic and political, and approved of the last for the people, whom it was expedient to deceive; though he would not have instituted the old Roman religion in a new city, it was the duty of the priests to keep up the cults *ut potius (deos) magis colere quam despicere vulgus velit* (Aug. *Civ.Dei* 4.31; cf. 4.11.13 and 27; 6.5f.). Cf. Latte (1960), 291ff.

26 *de leg.* 2.32ff.; cf. *de div.* 2.75. On Appius Claudius see Latte (1960), 291.

27 *de div.* 2.28.70 and 148.

28 Latte (1960), ch.X; F.Schulz, *Roman legal science* (Oxford, 1946), 80ff.

29 They are collected by Ursula Heibges, *Latomus* XXVIII (1969), 833-49. I do not accept her assumption that Cicero shared, as well as adapted himself to, the vacillating beliefs of his contemporaries.

30 See W.Kroll, *Kultur der ciceronischen Zeit* (Leipzig, 1933), I ch.I, who in my view overestimates the continuing strength of the traditional religion even in educated circles.

31 Tac. *Ann.* 3.55, 16.4; Pliny, *Ep.* 1.14.4 apply *a fortiori* to this period, cf. Cic. *pro Rosc.Am.* 43-8; it is reasonable to believe that piety was as much valued as other ancient virtues.

32 This is based on analysis of the list of senators in 55 in P. Willems, *Le Sénat de la République rom.* (Paris, 1878), ch.XV, which, though antiquated, will serve for a rough estimate; I assume that *novi* preponderated among the *ignoti*. Clodius' *incestum*: *ad Att.* 1.13.3; cf. 12.3, 14.1-5, 16.1-9. I can see no evidence that Cicero or the other *principes* acted from outraged religious feeling.

33 *in Cat.* 2.11; *pro Rab.perd.* 33; *pro Sest.* 50; *de rep.* 3.41. Cf. Hor. *Epodes* 16; Livy 9.19.17.

34 Vogt (1960) assembles texts and interprets the meaning of the phrase. *ad Her.* 4.13 is the earliest extant instance in Latin. Alternatively, Cicero speaks of Rome's power over all peoples, II *Verr.* 4.81; *de leg.agr.* 2.22; *de dom.* 90; *pro Planc.* 11; *Phil.* 6.19. Cf. n.67.

35 *SEG* 1.335, cf. Cic. *ad Att.* 4.1.7 (consular law of 57 *de annona*); Polyb. 1.1.5, 1.3.10, 3.1.4, 6.50.6; for his true meaning 1.3.9, 15.9.5 with 2.14.7 and 4.2.2. A gloss in Vell. 1.6.6 shows that Aemilius Sura dated Rome's world dominion to the defeat of Antiochus III; some hold that he wrote before 171, see Swain (1940). Polybius' conception was then perhaps shared by Romans in his own lifetime.

36 Sherk (1969), no.16.

37 Badian (1958), part I passim.

38 Cimma (1976) gives the fullest recent treatment of 'client' kings. Citizenship: *PIR*^{2} A 900; H 153; I 65, 131f., 149, 175ff., 274ff., 276ff., 472, 512-17, 541, 637, 644. Armenia: *RG* 27. Lucullus had overrun Armenia; Pompey received the humble submission of Tigranes and recognized him as king, friend and ally of Rome (Cic. *Sest.* 58ff.; Plut. *Pomp.* 53, etc.). When Corbulo proposed *parta olim a Lucullo Pompeioque recipere* (Tac. *Ann.* 13.34), he designed (as the context shows) to force the Parthian nominee on the throne to recognize, like Tigranes, the suzerainty of Rome: there was no thought of annexation.

39 *BJ* 14.1; cf. Livy 42.6.8 (Antiochus IV, see n.80); 45.44.19 (Prusias I); also the Rhodian speech in 37.54.

40 In 47 Caesar required the kings and dynasts near Syria to protect that province as friends of Rome (*B.Alex.* 65.4). But most of them had territories that did not lie *between* Syria and Parthia. Ariobarzanes: Cic. *ad fam.* 15.1-4 passim; *ad Att.* 6.3.5. Tribute: Livy 45.18.7f.; Badian (1968), ch.VI.

41 Liebmann-Frankfort (1969), 7ff. and passim.

42 Veyne (1975) is no doubt right that in the third and early second centuries, with which he is concerned, 'Rome ne songe pas encore à dominer le monde, mais plûtot à être seule au monde', but 'defensive' wars fought for this purpose were bound to appear aggressive to others and to be interpreted in the light of the dominance Rome attained, which in turn created the ideal of world rule.

43 Polyb. 3.22-5 (the last renewal was in 279) for Carthage; App. *Bell.Samm.* 7.1 (Tarentum); the clause was perhaps ambiguous.

44 2.13.7 (cf. Walbank, ad loc., for varying views); 3.15, 3.20ff. and 28-30.

45 Livy 34.58; see Badian (1958), 76ff. Livy 38.38.

46 Ziegler (1964), 20ff.; Liebmann-Frankfort (1969), 171ff., 237ff., 263ff., 276ff., 296ff., 308ff. for evidence and discussion. Of course there was never any formal treaty ratified at Rome, and perhaps no more than a vague understanding; cf. Dio 37.5.

47 Plut. *Pomp.* 36; Dio 37.5-7; 40.20.1.

48 Gelzer (1963), 15ff. (first published in 1940).

49 Badian (1968), 9ff.

50 Cicero had a quaestor, four legates, a *praefectus fabrum* (*ad fam.* 3.7.4) and other equestrian prefects, of whom he sent one to do justice in Cyprus (*ad Att.* 5.21.6). Pliny had only one legate (*Ep.* 10.25); there were also an equestrian procurator with one or two freedmen assistants - Epimachus perhaps succeeded Maximus - and the prefect of the *ora Pontica* (21ff., 27ff., 83-6a). Both could call on a *cohors amicorum*, and on military officers, of whom there were far more in Cicero's province. No doubt the procurator had more clerical staff than Cicero and his quaestor.

51 A.H.M.Jones (1974), ch.VIII for a brief survey.

52 Cic. II *Verr.* 2.32; *ad Att.* 6.1.15, 6.2.4. I am not convinced by D.Kienast's rejection in *ZRE* LXXXV (1968), 330ff., of the orthodox view that grants of *libertas* did not give cities exemption from the governor's jurisdiction.

53 *ad QF* 1.1.25; cf. A.H.M.Jones (1940), 170ff.

54 *BG* 4.21, 5.25 and 54; but Commius (4.21) ultimately turned against the Romans, and the native leaders most dangerous to Rome were sometimes kings or aspirants to kingship backed by popular support (1.3ff., 7.4; cf. the case of Ambiorix, 5.27, 6.31).

55 *ad Att.* 6.2.5.

56 Badian (1968), ch.I.

57 Brunt (1971), 432ff., 449. Conscription: ch.XXII.

58 Cic. *ad fam.* 3.3.1. Cicero's army: Brunt (1971), 689.

59 See also the Cnidus inscription published in *JRS* LXIV (1974), col.III 5ff. Despite Cicero's *plurimae leges veteres*, the prohibition might have been introduced first in Saturninus' *maiestas* law, as a result of recent disasters incurred by aggressive proconsuls. But were all provincial frontiers clearly defined? And was a proconsul debarred either from striking first at an enemy force mustering outside the province, or from pursuing it after repelling an incursion? In Cicero's Cilicia the land route from the Phrygian *conventus* to Cilicia Pedias actually passed through the Cappadocian kingdom; he went outside his province three times in a year. Caesar felt no inhibition in attacking Ariovistus, etc., and there is no indication that his apparent violations of his own rule was censured even by his enemies except in one instance (cf. n.81).

60 *Iustae causae* and fetial law: Cic. *de offic.* 1.34-6 and 80: *de rep.* 2.31 (cf. 26 on Numa), 3.34ff., part of the answer to Furius Philus' speech, 8ff., which derives from a discourse of Carneades (Lactant., *div.inst.* 5.14ff.), delivered at Rome in 155; cf. Capelle (1932) and Walbank (1965), 13; it is immaterial here whether Panaetius supplied the answer (*contra*, Strasburger (1965), 45). See also Sall. *Cat.* 6.5; *or. Lepidi* 4; Drexler (1959) collects much material from Livy. For adaptation of fetial procedure in the middle republic, see Dahlheim (1968), 171ff.; but see now J.W.Rich, *Declaring war in the Roman Republic period of transmarine expansion* (Collection Latomus CXLIX) (1976), ch.III. Neither its origins, cf. Hampl (1957), nor Roman practice, when documented, can warrant Cicero's claims that it embodied a distinctively high moral standard.

61 Witness the cases of Saguntum and of the Greek cities in Asia, whose freedom Rome professed to protect against Antiochus III, while perfectly willing to abandon it in her own interests, Badian (1958), 75ff.

62 1.3.6ff., 1.6, 1.10 with 20; 1.63.9, 2.31 with 21; 3.2.6, 3.3.8ff., 6.50.6, 9.10.11, 15.10.2. For Greek views of Roman imperialism, see also 5.104, 9.37.6, 11.5; Livy (P) 31.29.6. Polybius' general judgements deserve attention although they conflict with the details of his narrative perhaps derived from Roman informants, which fit a defensive interpretation of Roman policy (Walbank (1963) with a different explanation of the apparent inconsistency). See also Walbank (1965) on his cynicism in analysing many Roman actions after 168. Perhaps his experience of contemporary Roman conduct and knowledge of the actual consequences of earlier wars made it hard for Polybius to credit that Rome's policy had ever been so defensive as the information he accepted in his narrative naturally suggested.

63 *de offic.* 1.38, 3.87. On the Hannibalic war see Lucret. 3.836ff.; Livy 22.58.3, 27.39.9, 28.19.6ff., 29.17.6, 30.32.2. Unlike some Stoics (Cic. *de fin.* 3.57), Panaetius probably allowed some value to glory, but could hardly have regarded its pursuit as condoning injustice.

64 Polyb. 36.2 and 9, on which see Hoffmann (1960); for a parallel, 32.9 and 13. There is nothing peculiarly Roman in insistence on a *iusta causa* for a war prompted by very different motives, cf. Thuc. 6.93 and 105; 7.18 (Sparta); 6.6 and 8 (Athens); Polyb. 3.6 and Arr. *Anab.* 2.14 (Macedon). For public opinion, Drexler (1959) cited Livy 3.72.2ff., 30.16.8ff., 45.18.1.

65 Drexler (1959) cited Livy 5.51ff., 31.9.5, 45.39.10 and many other texts. Cf. Thuc. 7.18 (Sparta).

66 Weippert (1972) is exhaustive and judicious on imitation of Alexander in the republic.

67 M.H.Crawford (1974), index s.v. 'globe'.

68 Jacoby, *FGH* 90 F 130.95; cf. Plut. *Caes.* 58; Weippert (1972), 171ff.; also 209ff. on Antony. Nicolaus in general views Augustus as Caesar's heir; so his conception of Caesar's aims may be relevant to his interpretation of Augustus' policy. Weippert, who admits that Augustus was at first influenced by Alexander, thinks that by 20 B.C. he had given up aspirations for world conquest (*contra* Brunt (1963), 170-6, which he had apparently not considered), but 257ff. shows persistence of the ideal with Drusus and Germanicus (esp. *P.Oxy.* 2435). Augustus' supposed criticism of Alexander for not giving priority to organizing his conquests (Plut. 207D; Sen. *Suas.* 1.8) is in character, but further conquests could be in order, following organization; in my judgement Augustus acted on that principle down to A.D. 6.

69 Illyricum, not Transalpina, was his province under the lex Vatinia. Early in 58 three of his four legions were at Aquileia (*BG* 1.10), a suitable base for an Illyrian offensive, for which such incidents as are described in 1.5.4 and 5.1.5 would have provided pretexts. As late as 56 he still desired *eas quoque nationes adire et regiones cognoscere* (3.7); the same verbs are used of his plan to invade Britain (4.20). Cf. App. *Bell.Ill.* 12. The task had to be left to his adoptive son.

70 See generally *BG* 1.1-4 (cf. Cic. *ad Att.* 1.19.2 and 20.5), 31 (cf. 6.12), 35, 36.7, 40.2.

71 Rome's *amici*: *BG* 1.33.2 and 35.4; probably too the peoples under Aeduan hegemony, cf. 43.7-9; I take it that the friendship with a former Sequanian king (1.3.4) did not mean that his people were still *amici* of Rome in 58. But the Arverni may have been: until 52 they took no known part in resistance, and retained a privileged position after their revolt (7.90.3; Pliny, *NH* 4.109).

72 1.7.4, 1.10.2, 1.12-14 and 30.

73 1.11; later Caesar told the Aedui that he had undertaken the war for their sake *magna ex parte*, 16.6.

74 1.34-6, 1.40, 1.42-5. Ariovistus' insolence: 1.33.5, 1.46.4 (paralleled by similar Roman criticisms of the Aetolians and Rhodians in Livy 33.11.8, 37.49.2, 44.14.8; cf. Dahlheim (1968), 269ff.); his duty of respect as *amicus*: 42.2ff., 43.4 (with his reply, 44.5). Dio makes Caesar answer the charge that he was bringing on the war for personal ambition by maintaining that it was Rome's tradition not only to protect subjects and allies but to seek aggrandizement (38.36-8), that she must anticipate inevitable attacks (38.40), and that Ariovistus' contumacious conduct proves his hostile intentions of which Caesar had been unaware in 59 (38.42-5). The speech is invention and often echoes imperialist speeches in Thucydides, but gives a perceptive interpretation of Roman

imperialism in general and of Caesar's conduct in 58, or rather of his apologia for it.

75 2.2. 'Gallia' is used in contradictory senses here, as in 1.1.1 and 6, and often: the Remi are outside in 2.3 and inside in 6.12. K.Christ (1974) argues that Caesar exaggerates the unity of Gaul, to justify his policy of subduing the whole land. That policy is enunciated by Cicero (*de prov. cons.* 32), not in the *Commentaries*. He had not conceived it before early 58 (n.69 and text), but in retrospect he could claim to have carried it out, and this representation of his actual achievement is implicit throughout from the first chapter of book 1.

76 2.14, 5.5-7, 7.32ff. Caesar also interfered in the internal affairs of other peoples, before they had taken up arms against him (5.3.25 and 54).

77 2.1-6. Sherwin-White (1957) notes an exact parallel in Pompey's preventive war against the Iberians (Dio 37.1).

78 3.10.2, 4.30.2 and 38.1, 5.26.1, 6.8.8, etc. Livy 8.14.4 speaks of the *crimen rebellionis*. As Timpe (1972) shows, Gallic peoples normally came under Caesar's control by *deditio*, even if they had not previously been at war with him; for earlier examples, see Dahlheim (1968), 52ff. For the consequences, cf. n.80. The *dediti* had a claim to protection (2.28.3, 32.2, etc.). Timpe argues from 2.35 that Caesar would not accept *deditio*, if he felt unable to guarantee this; cf. also 4.21.6 and 27.5. In the last cases at least it seems to me clear in the context that Caesar did accept the offers made. He is often less explicit about the settlements he made than Timpe presumes. According to Timpe no Gallic *dediti* became *foederati* or *amici*. But Caesar does not mention the *foedus* with the Helvetii (Cic. *pro Balb.* 32), and he does let out that the Treveri were *amici* (5.3.3); cf. 4.16 (Ubii).

79 4.20.1, 21.5-8, 27.1, 30.2, 5.20-2.

80 3.11; 4.6; 6.5. Once the Ubii sought his protection, he considered them subject to his orders, though *amici* (4.8 and 16, 6.9). The Treveri, who had sought his aid (1.37) and sent him cavalry (2.24), were treated as hostile in 54, because *neque ad concilia veniebant neque imperio parebant*; such obedience was part of the *officium* of *amici* (5.2-4); cf. n.74. In 173 Antiochus IV had promised to obey Roman orders *quae bono fidelique socio regi essent imperanda; se in nullo usquam cessaturum officio* (Livy 42.6.8).

81 Plut. *Caes.* 22; *Cato Minor* 51; *comp.Nic. et Crassi* 4. Suetonius presumably reflects contemporary criticisms in asserting that his campaigns were unjust and inspired by lust for glory and wealth (*Caes.* 22, 24, 47, 54), but it was surely in 54 that the senate voted to send a commission to enquire into charges of aggression (ibid. 24), if indeed it ever did; more probably this was only a hostile proposal. There is no

evidence that his earlier offensives had been challenged at Rome, and as noted by Timpe (1965), the supplications decreed in his honour, e.g. in 57 (*BG* 2.35), gave them retroactive approval.

82 *BG* 4.4-19; cf. 5.9.2, n.80.

83 *de prov.cons.* 19-36; *in Pis.* 81; *ad QF* 3.6(8).2. See Collins (1972).

84 *BG* 3.10.3; cf. 3.8.4, 4.34.5, 5.7.8, 5.27.6, 5.29.4, 5.38.2, and often in book 7 (1.5-8, 4.4, 14.10, 64.3, 76.2, 77.13-16, 89.1), 8.1.3. Similarly he makes Gauls refer to Roman acts of injustice, 5.38.2, 7.38.10. Gelzer (1963), 7 gives other examples of Roman writers putting the anti-Roman views, e.g. Sall. *ep. Mithr.*; *BJ* 81.1; Tac. *Agr.* 30. The Romans could pretend to free subjects from the rule of kings - under whom they wished to live (Livy 45.18; Strabo 12.2.11).

85 *Phil.* 6.19.

86 Yet in 46 he no longer needed to satisfy his troops' lust for vengeance, as in the war itself (7.28.4, 8.38).

87 Plut. *Caes.* 15; App. *Celt.* 2, misinterpreted by Westermann (1955), 63, though naturally unreliable. Note *BG* 7.89.5.

88 *BG* 2.14.28 and 31ff., 8.3.5, 21.2. In 8.44.1 and 3.16 note apologies for special severity; but cf. Cic.*de offic* . 3.46.

89 Cic. II *Verr.* 5.115; *de offic.* 1.33-5, 1.82, 2.18, 3.46. Numantia: see Astin (1967), 153-5 on App. *Iber.* 98.

90 Hampl (1966) adduces early atrocities to disprove the fable that the Romans became less humane to enemies in the late republic. *Deditio*: Dahlheim (1968), ch.1. Especially significant on Roman motives for clemency: Livy 42.8.5ff., 44.7.5 and 31.1; Jos. *BJ* 5.372ff. Cf. generally Livy 30.42.7: *plus paene parcendo victis quam vincendo imperium auxisse.*

91 Cicero sought to arouse prejudice against L.Piso, *cos.* 58, because his mother was Insubrian, *in Pis.* fr. 9-12 (OCT); *post red. sen.* 15.

92 *ad Att.* 14.12.1. Contrast II *Verr.* 2.2-8.

93 *pro Flacc.* 62; *ad QF* 1.1.27ff.; *de rep.* 2.34; *Tusc. disp.* 1.1-7 (but stressing Roman moral superiority).

94 *pro Flacc.* 9, 16, 57, 61; *ad QF* 1.1.16, 1.2.4; *pro Sest.* 141; *pro Lig.* 11. He found it necessary to differentiate the Sicilians (who were almost like old Romans!) from other Greeks, II *Verr.* 2.7.

95 *CAH* XI 437.

96 *de rep.* 3.37-41, whence Aug. *Civ. Dei* 19.21, cf. Capelle (1932), 93: note there *ideo iustum esse, quod talibus hominibus sit utilis servitus et pro utilitate eorum fieri, cum recte fit, id est cum improbis aufertur iniuriarum licentia, et domiti melius se habebunt, quia indomiti deterius se habuerunt.*

97 Dahlheim (1968), chs.I and II.

98 *Hist.* 4.74. Dio makes Maecenas add that taxation should be levied on all alike (52.28ff.). That was still not the case when he wrote.

99 See esp. II *Verr.* 3.207 (in 2.2-8, 5.8 he implausibly claims that the Sicilians loved their master, but treats them as exceptional); *de imp. Cn. Pomp.* 65; *ad fam.* 15.1.5.

100 *ad fam.* 15.3.2 and 4.14; *ad Att.* 5.18.2.

101 Cf. Polyb. 5.11, 10.36; Sall. *BJ* 102.6; Cic. II *Verr.* 3.14; Livy 8.13.16.

102 E.g. Sen. *Clem.* 1.3, 8.6ff., 11.4, etc., as in Polyb. 5.11.

103 Toynbee (1965), II 608ff. Particularly significant are the activities of the elder Cato in seeking to redress or punish wrongs done to subjects (*ORF*^{2} frs.58ff., 154, 173, 196-9); note also the indignation that Gaius Gracchus tried to arouse at ill-treatment of the Italians (Gell. 10.3). Even if personal or political feuds explain why some or most charges were brought, it would remain true that injustice to subjects was a suitable pretext for assailing personal adversaries.

104 Brunt (1961), part I.

105 On the duty of governors and its delicacy, Cic. *ad QF* 1.1.32-6; *ad Att.* 5.13.1. Posidonius held (with some anachronism) that equestrian control of the courts made governors too fearful to restrain Equites in the provinces (Jacoby, *FGH* 87 F 108d and 111b). There were certainly exceptions like Q.Mucius Scaevola and L.Sempronius Asellio (Diod. 37.5 and 8 from Posid.), Lucullus (Plut. *Luc.* 20) and perhaps Gabinius in Syria (Cic. *de prov. cons.* 10; *ad QF* 3.2.2); Cicero adopted Scaevola' edict on the publicans, while that of Bibulus in Syria was overtly still stricter (*ad Att.* 6.1.15, but see *ad fam.* 3.8.4),

106 From Cilicia Cicero pressed administrators of other provinces to comply with Roman moneylenders' demands (e.g. *ad fam.* 13.56 and 61) in terms perhaps not very different from the pleas on Scaptius' behalf that he resented. Despite his condemnation of Appius Claudius' conduct as governor (e.g. *ad Att.* 5.15ff. and 6.1.2), he did what he could to hinder his conviction at Rome (*ad fam.* 3.10.1; *ad Att.* 6.2.10), and showed his displeasure with hostile witnesses from Cilicia (*ad fam.* 3.11.3). Similarly in 70 L.Metellus had reversed Verres' *acta* in Sicily (II *Verr.* 2.62ff., 138-40, 3.43-6, 5.55) but obstructed his

prosecution (2.64ff., 160-4, 3.122, 152ff., 4.146-9).

107 *ad QF* 1.1 (a letter presumably intended for publication) commends *aequitas, clementia, comitas, constantia, continentia, facilitas* (for the meaning of which see *de imp. Cn. Pomp.* 41; *ad Att.* 6.2.5), *gravitas, humanitas, integritas, lenitas, mansuetudo, moderatio, severitas, temperantia.* Several of these virtues (also *fides, innocentia*) recur in Cicero's eulogy of Pompey (*de imp. Cn. Pomp.* 13,36-42) and in the claims he makes on his own behalf in 51-50 B.C. (*ad Att.* 5.9.1, 15.2, 17.2, 18.2, 20.6, etc.; *ad fam.* 15.4.1 and 14), along with *abstinentia* (for whose meaning see also *ad Att.* 5.10.2, 16.3, 21.5; *continentia, innocentia, integritas, temperantia* are more or less synonymous), *iustitia* and *modestia.* See R. Combès, *Imperator* (Paris, 1966), ch.VIII.

108 *ad Att.* 6.1.13; *ad fam.* 15.4.15.

109 *ad Att.* 5.9.1, 10.2, 13.1, 15.2, 21.5 and 7. Conceivably in pressing Scaptius' case, Atticus did not know all the facts.

110 Brunt (1961), part II.

111 *de imp. Cn. Pomp.* 4ff., 7; *de leg. agr.* 2.80ff.

112 Aurelius Victor, *Caes.* 39.31.

113 G.Barbieri, *L'Albo senatorio da Severo a Carino* (Rome, 1952), 441, found that forty-three per cent of senators whose origins were known or probable were Italian. H.-G.Pflaum, *Les Procurateurs équestres* (Paris, 1950), 193, assigned an Italian origin to twenty-six out of ninety-one third-century procurators.

Chapter 9. Greek intellectuals and the Roman aristocracy in the first century B.C.

1 This paper presents, at unseemly length, a hypothesis about one aspect of Roman imperialism in the first century B.C.; I am, *malgré tout*, grateful to Peter Garnsey and Dick Whittaker for bullying me into finishing it.

2 Testimonia and fragments in *FGH* 88.

3 Livy 9.17-9 = *FGH* 88 T 9; despite Livy's efforts, Plut. *de fort. Rom.* 326a-c implies that chance saved Rome from Alexander by reason of the latter's early death; compare Theo Stoicus (*Rhet. Gr.* ii 110, 27) for speculation on what Alexander could have achieved; the saying attributed by Gellius 17.21.33, to Alexander of Molossus that he was going to Italy to fight the Romans who were men, Alexander of Macedon was going to fight the Persians who were women, is a piece of Roman boasting cognate to that of Livy; there is little to be learnt from A.Rapaport, *Eos* XXVII (1924), 26-7, alleging

a joint source for Livy and Plut. *Pyrrhus* 19.1-2; W.R.Breitenbach, *Mus. Helv.* XXVI (1969), 146-57, 'Der Alexanderexkurs bei Livius'.

4 D.Hal. 1.4.4; E.Schwartz, *RE* IV 1886-91 (1901), discussing Quintus Curtius, identifies the *bêtes noires* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus with those of Livy and argues for the reproduction of their ideas by Pompeius Trogus, eliminating Timagenes; A.D.Momigliano, *Ath.* n.s. XII (1934), 45 = *Terzo contributo* (Rome, 1966), 499, points out that the *bêtes noires* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and of Livy cannot be the same.

5 See O.Seel, *Eine römische Weltgeschichte* (Nuremberg, 1972).

6 Lactantius, *Inst.* 7.15 and 18; Lydus, *de mens* 2.4; Justin, *Apol.* 1.20 and 44; Clement Alex. *Strom.* 6.5.43.1; see the discussions of H.Windisch, *Verhandelingen k. Akad. van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde* XXVIII, 3 (Amsterdam, 1930); F. Cumont, *Rev. Hist. Rel.* CIII (1931), 64; E.Benveniste, *Rev. Hist. Rel.* CVI (1932), 337; the oracle perhaps emerged before the achievement of a *modus vivendi* between Rome and Parthia; E.Bikerman, *REL* XXIV (1946), 148 n.10; compare *Or. Sib.* 3.350 for a prophecy of the revenge of Asia on Rome (W.W.Tarn, *JRS* XXII (1932), 137-8, conjectures Cleopatra as the vehicle, doubted by V.Nikiprowetsky, *La troisième Sibylle* (Paris, 1970), 144-6).

For Rome as a fourth empire, to be superseded by a fifth empire, in Jewish and other works of the late republic and early empire, see J.W.Swain, *CP* XXXV (1940), 15.

7 The quotation is from E.W.Gray, *JRS* XLII (1952), 123, reviewing D.Magie (1950); for Augustus see Bowersock (1965), chs.2-11; the principle is explicitly enunciated by Cic. *ad QF* 1.1.25, which discusses 'your ensuring that the cities are governed by the desires of the aristocracies'; whatever may be the truth about the state of affairs in the first half of the second century B.C., the hostility of the lower classes to Roman rule is assumed without question by Livy, see Harris (1971a), 142-3.

8 Verbal information from F.Coarelli.

9 Cic. *de fin.* 1.7; compare *Brut.* 99; for the decline of Magna Graecia in general, see *de amic.* 13.

10 Cic. *pro Arch.* 5; Archias was granted citizenship and other *praemia*, also apparently by Locri (*pro Arch.* 10); note in the latter passage that the Greeks are represented as unable to shed their (to Cicero) distasteful habit of honouring actors with their citizenship.

11 Compare the case of Emporiae, where the Spanish element in the population achieved citizenship before the Greek, Livy 34.9.1-3.

12 *Tarentum*: Cic. II *Verr.* 4.135; *de fin.* 1.7; Strabo 6.1.2 (253); for the survival of the *prohedria* in the first century A.D. see *NSc* 1896, 100 = *ILS* 6462; *NSc* 1897, 68; L.Gasperini, in *Terza*

Miscellanea greca e romana, 162ff. *Rhegium*: Strabo 6.1.2 (253). *Velia*: *ILS* 6461; F.Sartori, *Problemi di storia costituzionale italiota* (Rome, 1953), 106; Velia produced a prolific Greek-type coinage well into the first century B.C. *Neapolis*: Varro, *LL* 6.15; Cic. *pro Rab. Post.* 26-7; Dio 55.10.9; Strabo 5.4.7 (246), 6.1.2 (253); Velleius 1.4.2; Suet. *Claud.* 11; *Nero* 20 and 25; Tac. *Ann.* 15.33; Dio 60.6.2; SHA, *Hadr.* 19.1; *CIL* X 1481; F. de Martino, *PdelP* VII (1952), 333-43. *Canusium*: Hor. *Sat.* 1.10.30, with Scholia. E.Keuls, *Atti Taranto* 1975 (forthcoming), documents the survival of Italiote religious art into the Roman period and its influence on Roman funerary art.

13 *SIG* 796B = *IG* IV 1^2, 84, lines 33-4; compare the ambitions of the officer who imprisoned Paul at Jerusalem, Acts 22.25-9, also of Opramoas, *TAM* II 906, with C.S.Walton, *JRS* XIX (1929), 38, 'Oriental senators in the service of Rome', at 55.

14 Cic. *ad fam.* 13.53.2, 69.2; *pro Flacc.* 70-83; *de offic.* 3.58, if a true story, suggests that at Syracuse there was no bar to a Roman acquiring land.

15 L.Robert, *Les gladiateurs dans l'Orient grec* (Paris, 1940).

16 L.Robert, *REA* LXII (1960), 332-42.

17 P.Veyne, *Latomus* XXI (1962), 68-75.

18 Veyne (n.17), 76-9; *IG* XIV 1121 = *CIL* XIV 2218 = *ILLRP* 372, a dedication in Latin and Greek to Naso at Nemi; the reverse process is also rare, *ILLRP* 194 (Delos), 337 (Delphi), 363 (Delos), 376 (Argos), all bilingual.

19 A.L.Frothingham, *AJA* XXI (1917), 187 and 313, 'Ancient orientation unveiled: II. Etruria and Rome; III. The left as the place of honour in Roman and Christian art'; F.P.Johnson, *AJA* XXVIII (1924), 399, '*Right* and *left* in Roman art', on Roman flexibility under the empire.

20 H.Seyrig, *RA* XXIX (1929), 90, n.1 (the statue-base of *two* figures from Athens there discussed is not really germane).

21 See, provisionally, M.E.Blake, *Ancient Roman construction in Italy* (Washington, 1947), 228.

22 A.Boethius, *Roman and Greek town architecture* (Göteborg, 1948), 15: *II Int. Congr. Class. Stud. 1954* (Copenhagen, 1958), IV 92. Strabo was struck by buildings of many stories in Rome, 16.2.23 (757), and could only compare Aradus and Tyre in the east, with their restricted sites, 16.2.23 and 13 (753).

23 R.MacMullen, *Roman social relations* (New Haven, 1974), 129.

24 E.Rosenbaum, *Cyrenaican portrait sculpture* (London, 1960), 13-28.

25 Gellius 19.9.7; Strabo noticed the existence of the Atellan

farce, 5.3.6 (233); Caecilius of Caleacte compared Demosthenes and Cicero; for Virgilian influence on Greek literature see V. Reichmann, *Römische Literatur in griechischer Übersetzung*, *Phil.* supp. 34, 3 (Leipzig, 1943), 9 (also for Horatian influence) and the works cited in J.Diggle, *Euripides: Phaethon* (Cambridge, 1970), 199, n.3; for Ovidian influence on Lucian, J.Diggle, 202; for Latin influence on the fourth-century Triphiodorus (Virgil) see A.Cameron, *Claudian* (Oxford, 1970), 20, n.5; on the fifth-century Nonnus (Ovid and Claudian), Cameron, 11 and 20-1, esp. 20, n.7; Diggle, 180-200; on Christodorus (Virgil), Cameron, 20, n.4. The remark of H.D.Jocelyn, *Antichthon* I (1967), 61, that Latin poetry does not influence Greek poetry before the thirteenth century is curious.

L.Cestius Pius, of Smyrna, and Arellius Fuscus, perhaps from Asia, who worked on Latin literature are perhaps shown by their names to be of Italian origin.

26 *Milet* III, nos. 133 and 124.

27 Fr. 261 Edelstein-Kidd; the characterization in my view admirably fits Cn. Pompeius.

28 Cic. *pro Mur.* 62; Nepos, *Att.* 17.3; also Strabo 1.1.22 (13); 2, 3 and 4 (15-17). Note also the similar judgement of Diod. 34-5.33.8 (perhaps from Posidonius), G.Busolt, *Jahrb. für cl. Philologie* (1890), 331; *FGH* 87 F 112.8; F.Münzer, *RE* IV 1505, cites the *elogia* of the Scipiones as parallel material, implicitly rejected by F.Jacoby ad loc.; Diod. 37.8.2 for the duty to honour men who were *propaideumenoi*. For Cato's image as a philosopher compare Plut. *Cato Min.* 6; *Brut.* 34 with 12.

29 Dion. Hal. 15.5 (4-5). It is not surprising that Dionysius was pathetically anxious to show that the Romans were really Greeks.

30 For derogatory remarks in private letters see *ad Att.* 4.7.1, 7.18.3, 13.35.1; *ad fam.* 7.18.1, 13.78.1, 16.4.2; for the notion of the decline of Greece since classical times see *ad QF.* 1.1.16 and 27-8; *pro Flacc.* 16 and 61-2; Tac. *Hist.* 3.47; Juvenal 3.66-80; Pliny, *Ep.* 10.40.2; A.N.Sherwin-White (1967), 62-86.

31 Cic. *de prov. cons.* 10; compare Livy 36.17.5, in the speech attributed to M'. Acilius before the battle of Thermopylae, 'Syrian and Asiatic Greeks, the most worthless among the races of mankind and ones born to slavery', presumably reflecting attitudes of the first century B.C. Cic. *pro Flacc.* 9-12.

32 Cic. *pro Flacc.* 14-16; the practice documented by W.Vischer, *RhM* XXVIII (1873), 380; cf. 17 for Phrygians and Mysians in Roman assemblies.

33 Cicero was of course prepared to admit certain isolated cases where the Romans could learn from the Greeks in the field of public law, see *de leg.* 3.46 on the absence of any real system of *nomophylakia* at Rome; when Cicero discussed the institution

of the tribunate, *de re pub.* 2.57-8, he admitted that it perhaps lacked a *ratio* and remarked in its defence that a similar institution was necessary even at Sparta and on Crete; he also admitted that if the problem of debt had been dealt with as it had been by Solon and as it was later at Rome, the tribunate would not have been necessary.

34 Cic. *de orat.* 1.197; W.A.J.Watson is in my view right to argue that there was no serious Greek influence on Roman law, *Law-making in the later Roman republic* (Oxford, 1974), ch. 16. M.A. Trouard, *Cicero's attitude towards the Greeks* (Chicago, 1942), 33-42, further documents the belief of Cicero in the superiority of Rome in law and government, religion, military discipline, 52-9, in language (Cicero was here untypical).

35 Cic. *ad QF.* 1.1.27-8, closely paralleled in *pro Arch.* 12-14.

36 Cic. II *Verr.* 4.147 (Cicero in Syracuse - Cicero later represents the great orators of the preceding generation to his own, M.Antonius and L.Licinius Crassus, as affecting ignorance of things Greek); 4.4; see also 2.87; 4.29, 30, 33, 39, 94, 124, 134 (knowledge of Greek art); H.Jucker, *Vom Verhältnis der Römer* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1950), ch.IV, further documents ambiguous Roman attitudes to Greek art. At *Parad. Stoic.* 13 and 37-8 works of art are attacked basically as manifestations of luxury.

37 Cic. *Brut.* 207 (L.Aelius); *de leg.* 1.13, 2.59; *de amic.* 1 (*ius civile*); *ad fam.* 13.1.2 (Phaedrus).

38 Cic. *Brut* 306; compare *Tusc. disp.* 2.26. I regard the reference to Molo in Rome in 87 as a doublet.

39 Cic. *Brut.* 309; note *ad fam.* 13.16.4 for Apollonius, as freedman of P.Crassus, being trained by Diodotus in Cicero's house; 9.4 for a general reference to Diodotus.

40 Cic. *de offic.* 1.1; *Ep.* fr. 1; Suet. *Rhet.* 2 for the advice to Cicero not to be a pupil of the teacher of rhetoric in Latin, L.Plotius Gallus (perhaps from L.Licinius Crassus).

41 *RE* Apollonius 85.

42 Cic. *Brut.* 315, with the reading of *L*; *de fin.* 1.16 for Phaedrus and Zeno; see J.C.Davies, *CQ* n.s. XVIII (1968), 303, for the rhetorical techniques which Cicero may have learnt from Molo.

43 Suet. *DJ* 4; Plut. *Caes.* 3 (incomplete and chronologically inaccurate). Molo also taught a T.Manlius Torquatus, Cic. *Brut.* 245, and M.Favonius, *ad Att.* 2.1.9.

44 Cic. *ad fam.* 16.21.3 and 5; *ad Att.* 14.16.3, 18.4, 15.16, 27.3; *de offic.* 1.1; Plut. *Cic.* 24 (son - teachers Leonides and Herodes); Cic. *ad QF.* 3.3.4 (nephew). Note that Sallust assumed Sulla to be equally well educated in Greek and Latin, *BJ* 95.3.

45 Dio 51.15.6 with Bowersock (1965), 60-1.

46 Val. Max. 2.2.3, see Cic. *de fin.* 5.89; Roman magistrates, whether Cicero or Verres, of course continued to use interpreters for official purposes.

47 *Utra voles lingua*, *Orator* 235; *in utriusque orationis facultate*, *de offic.* 1.1; see also *utraque lingua* in Hor. *Sat.* 1.10.23; *utriusque linguae* in *Odes* 3.8.5; *hekateros* in the edict of Paullus Fabius Maximus, Sherk 65, line 30 = U.Laffi, *SCO* XVI (1967), p.20, line 30; later examples in Pliny, *NH* 12.11; Quint. *proem.* 1; 1.1.14; Stat. *Silvae* 5.3.90; Martial 10.76.6; Pliny, *Ep.* 3.1.7, 7.25.4; Gellius 17.5.3; Suet. *Gram.* 1; *Aug.* 89; *Claud.* 42; Plut. *Luc.* 1; Philostratus, *VS* 2.10.5; Dio 69.3.1; *ILS* 7761 (A.D. 229); Ammianus 15.13.1; D. 45.1.1.6; note the existence in Italy of the late republic and early empire of *omnium linguarum histriones*, Suet. *DJ* 39.1; *Aug.* 43.1; the actors of Tac. *Ann.* 14.15.1 are *pantomimi*, see E.Koestermann ad loc.

48 The main sources are Strabo 13.1.54 (608); Plut. *Sulla* 26.

49 T.P.Wiseman, *Greece and Rome* n.s. XXI (1974), 162-4, see also Cic. *Brut.* 174; *de leg.* 1.53; compare Antonius' marriage of Athena, perhaps in imitation of Antiochus IV, who *se simulabat Hierapoli Dianam ducere uxorem* (Licinianus XXVIII, p.5, lines 213 Flemisch = 9 Bonn).

50 H.W.Parke and D.E.W.Wormell, *The Delphic oracle* (Oxford, 1956), nos.593 (cf. Dion. Hal. 1.49.3), 438-41, 596.

51 Crawford (1974), no.419/2.

52 L.Licinius Crassus owned two *scyphi* by Mentor (Pliny, *NH* 33.147), Varro owned a bronze statue by him (154) and admired his work (Nonius 99, 16 M = 141 L), compare Diodorus of Lilybaeum owning *pocula* by him (Cic. II *Verr.* 4.38); *mentoreum opus* epitomized silver ware for Propertius, 1.14.2, 4.9.13, also for Juvenal and Martial, G.Lippold, *RE* XV 966-7.

For perfumes see J.Colin, 'Luxe oriental et parfums masculins dans la Rome Alexandrine (d'après Cicéron et Lucrèce)', *RBPh* XXXIII (1955), 5.

53 Sherk 22, lines 2-3; for his praetorship see also Cic. *pro Corn.* cited by Asconius 74C with comment of Asconius; for his use of *adsentio*, not *adsentior*, in senatorial debates see Varro in Gellius 2.25.9; Quint. 1.5.13.

54 H.Peter, ccccliii-ccccliv.

55 Asconius 13C; cf. 69C. There is nothing to be made of the historian L.Aelius Tubero, legate of Q.Cicero in 61 (Cic. *ad QF.* 1.1.10), to be distinguished from Q.Aelius Tubero, probably of the triumviral period, whose fragments are in H.Peter, 308-12; or of L.Scribonius Libo, whose *Annalis* (*Liber*) is used by Cicero in working out the names of the ten legates who settled Greece

in 146 (*ad Att.* 13.30.3, 32.3, perhaps also 44.3; see E.Badian, *Hommages Renard*, Coll. Lat. CI, 54-65).

56 For a critique of his oratorical style see *Brut.* 238; the absence of mention of his history is without significance, compare 95 on C.Sempronius Tuditanus and 110-16 on P.Rutilius Rufus. Macer was condemned before Cicero as praetor *de repetundis* in 66.

57 Compare *Brut.* 228 for a discussion of Sisenna as an orator (also 259) and a more favourable estimate of his historical style. I am not persuaded that Sisenna treated Sulla in his history in a way analogous to that in which Cleitarchus is supposed to have eulogized Alexander, against H.Peter, cccxliicccxliii.

58 Sent to Atticus early in 60 (*ad Att.* 1.19.10, 20.6).

59 Cic. *ad Att.* 2.1.1, published in due course, Nepos, *Att.* 18.6.

60 Cic. *ad Att.* 2.1.1 (Posidonius), 1.20.6 (others); an earlier attempt to get Archias to celebrate Cicero's consulship in verse came to nothing, *pro Arch.* 28; *ad Att.* 1.16.15.

61 See, recently, J.M.André, 'Cicéron et Lucrèce', *Mélanges Boyancé* (Rome, 1974), 21. Contrast the interest displayed at Rome in the *didascalia* of the Athenian theatre, L.Moretti, *Ath.* n.s. XXXVIII (1960), 263-81.

62 See H.Dahlmann, *RE*, Supp. VI 1174.

63 Cic. II *Verr.* 4.4 (for the term *idiotes* compare Strabo 1.2.8 (19)); compare Cicero's admiration of the way in which Greek literature was appreciated everywhere, *pro Arch.* 23.

64 M.A.Trouard (n.34), 45-51, documents the defence that Rome would in due course have reached the same level as the Greeks, but had had other things to do with her time; also the defence that Rome put such things as geometry and philosophy to practical purposes; J.Vogt, *Ciceros Glaube an Rom* (Stuttgart, 1935), 24, documents the defence that Greek culture helped to bring out Roman virtues; A.E.Wardman, *Rome's debt to Greece* (London, 1976), 150-1, documents the Roman emphasis on their sages as a defence against the lack of philosophers.

65 Cic. *pro Mur.* 58-66; Cicero admits the flattery, *de fin.* 4.74.

66 For the Roman concern with appearances see *pro Mur.* 62; and compare Lucian, *de mercede conductis* 25 for the insincerity of Roman interest in Greek culture. H.D.Jocelyn (1977), 323, concludes that Greek philosophy had little real influence in Rome.

67 See, for instance, L.Moretti, *RFIC* XCIII (1965), 283-7, for the Epicurean Philonides interceding for Laodicea with the Seleucid authorities after the murder of Cn. Octavius.

68 See the characterization of A.E.Douglas commenting on Cic. *Brut.* 239; further ritual compliments appear at *pro Sest.* 107; *pro Balb.* 15.

W.S.Anderson (1963) likewise also argues that Pompeius was a patron of the arts in the interests of prestige; I am unable to follow his argument that Pompeius with his *philoi* played a decisive role in the emergence of the *consilium principis*; this emerged from traditional Roman institutions.

69 Plut. *Pomp.* 78; App. *BC* 2.85.358 (lines of Sophocles); Plut. *Pomp.* 79; Zonaras 10.9 (speech).

70 W.S.Anderson (1963), 34.

71 Note that he advocated proscription in 49, Cic. *ad Att.* 9.11.3.

72 Anderson (1963), 28.

73 Note the detailed emulation of Alexander involved and compare the later gifts perhaps of Lucullus and certainly of Ap. Claudius Pulcher and Caesar and the intended gift of Cicero.

74 Plut. *Luc.* 1; compare *Luc.* 4 and *Sull.* 6; as an orator Lucullus is described simply as *acutus* by Cicero, *Brut.* 222, compare Plut. *Luc.* 33, a good and thoughtful speaker, and the more extended eulogy in *Luc.* 1.

75 Plut. *Luc.* 1; Lucullus claimed that the *barbara et soloeca* in the work were inserted deliberately, Cic. *ad Att.* 1.19.10, clearly not acquainted with it; I see no reason to suppose that the Greek piece on the Marsic War known to Plutarch is by Lucullus.

For the type of competition involved compare Sisenna's challenge to Hortensius to memorize the proceedings of an auction, Sen. *Contr.* 1, pref. 19; Quint. 11.2.24; also Cic. *Brutus* 301.

76 Strabo 12.3.11 (546); Plut. *Luc.* 42.1-4.

77 Cic. *pro Arch.* 21; *ad Att.* 1.16.15; see *Acad. pr.* 2.4 for celebrations in Greek and Latin of the deeds of Lucullus.

78 *Acad. pr.* 2.4.11 and 61, compare Plut. *Luc.* 42.1-4; *Luc.* 28 (treatise).

79 Cic. *ad Att.* 6.1.25, with commentary of D.R.Shackleton Bailey; Herodes is presumably also the teacher of M. Cicero junior in 44 (n.44), perhaps also the general of *IG* II 488 (so F.Münzer, *RE* VIII 920) = *IG* II-III^2 1051.

80 App. *BC* 2.88.368; Athens was the symbol of Greek civilization.

81 App. *BC* 4.65-7.278-83 (Rhodes); Bowersock (1965), 33, n.1 (Alexandria).

A city could also profit from its religious aura, note the case of Hieracome and Perperna, P.Servilius Isauricus and others, Tac. *Ann.* 3.62, Aphrodisias and Sulla, Delos in 67,

Eleusis and the two sides in 48 (App. *BC* 2.70.293; compare the initiation of Sulla).

82 Strabo 13.1.66 (614); Posidonius, fr. 253 Edelstein-Kidd.

83 My view of Posidonius is thus radically different from that of P.Treves, in *La filosofia greca e il diritto romano* (Acc. Naz. dei Lincei, Quad. 221), 27, speculating that Posidonius was led by his own rootlessness to formulate the notion of the *cosmopolis*.

Chapter 10. The beneficial ideology

1 B.Keil, *Aelii Aristeidis Smyrnaei quae supersunt omnia* II (Berlin, 1898), XXX; J.J.Reiske, *Opuscula medica ex monumentis Arabum et Ebraeorum* (Halle, 1776), 5.

2 B.Forte, *Rome and the Romans as the Greeks saw them* (Rome, 1972), 395-415, provides a broader range of evidence than Palm (1959), 60-2, but is entirely lacking in sophistication or penetration. Boulanger (1923), 341-91, is still valuable.

3 Oliver (1953) assembles a mass of comparative material; see also below, n.57.

4 Boulanger (1923), 381; B.P.Reardon, *Courants littéraires grecs* (Paris, 1971), 127-42. Still less can be derived from an emphasis on Aristeides' sincerity as asserted by H.Bengtson, 'Das Imperium Romanum im griechischer Sicht', *Gymnasium* LXXI (1964), 160-6.

5 An approach indicated by Bleicken (1966). I have been unable to see W.Gernentz, *Laudes Romae* (Diss., Rostock, 1918).

6 The Roman tradition is given by F.Christ (1938) and by L.R.Lind, 'Concept, action and character: the reasons for Rome's greatness', *TAPhA* CIII (1972), 235-84; cf. also E.M.Sanford, 'Contrasting views of the Roman empire', *AJP* LVIII (1937), 436-56.

7 E.g. *Anth. Pal.* 16.40 (Crinagoras); Dion. Hal. *Ant.* 2.9.2-3; Plut. 314C; Dio 1.20, 3.83-5; App. *BC* Pf. 1-11; Arist. 27.24-6, 21.5-7, 35.5-11.

8 A. von Stylow, *Libertas und Liberalitas* (Munich, 1972); contrast A.H.M.Jones (1974), 62-4, 81.

9 C.P.Jones (1971), 32-4.

10 J. von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa* (Berlin, 1898); A.N.Sherwin-White, *The letters of Pliny* (Oxford, 1966), 675-9.

11 Philostratus, *VS* 214 (Loeb); Arist. 50.63; C.A.Behr, *Aelius Aristeides and the Sacred Tales* (Amsterdam, 1968), 3; L.Robert, *Etudes Anatoliennes* (Paris, 1937), 207-22, produced strong

evidence for property near Hadrianoutherae, but this need not disprove Philostratus' reference to Hadriani.

12 Gal. 6.755, 14.17, 6.552, 10.561. Arabic sources (Rosenthal (1975), 35) said his grandfather was a surveyor and his great-grandfather head of the carpenters' guild. He himself may have participated in politics, 6.412, possibly in the *boule* of Pergamum: his opinions were markedly Platonic and oligarchic (cf. 10.10-11, 5.303).

13 B.Baldwin, *Studies in Lucian* (Toronto, 1973), 12-14; on peasants, Gal. 17B.49.

14 Gal. *Comm. VI in Epid. II*: *CMG* V 10.1, p.402; G.Strohmaier, 'Übersehenes zur Biographie Galens', *Philologus* CXX (1976), 117-22.

15 Bowersock (1969), 114-16.

16 Bowersock (1969), 43-88, esp. 45-7.

17 H.G.Pflaum, 'Lucien de Samosate, archistator praefecti Augusti', *MEFR* LXXI (1959), 281-4; for Plutarch, Syncellus 659; Suda s.v. Plutarchos, with C.P.Jones (1971), 34 and V.Nutton, *CQ* n.s. XXI (1971), 271.

18 Bleicken (1966), 267-9; F.Christ (1938), 103-10; A.D.Nock, *JTS* n.s. V (1954), 250: note esp., among primary sources, *Anth. Pal.* 16.61 (Crinagoras); Strabo 288; Epict. 3.13.9, 4.5.17; Plut. 317A-C, 408B; Arist. 23.54; *IGR* III 721, III 1376; *SIG* 797-8; *OGIS* 458; *AGIBM* 894; *IPriene* 105.35-6.

19 Arist. 26.76-84, 35.35-6. The attempt of C.P.Jones, 'Aelius Aristeides, Εἰς βασιλέα, *JRS* LXII (1972), 134-52, to prove the authenticity of this speech is not convincing.

20 Arist. 26.11-13, 100; cf. Irenaeus 4.46.2-3, and on the same *topos*, Menander 230 (cited throughout in the pagination of Walz).

21 Palm (1959), 114-16: cf. Athenagoras, *Leg.* 1.

22 Tertullian, *De anima* 30; a similar, if ironic, comment on African prosperity may be deduced from *Anth. Pal.* 7.626.

23 Plut. 814F; Dio 31.111; Bleicken (1966), 240-63.

24 Hence the part played by concord in the speeches of Dio and Aristeides and even in Galen, 19.46; note also Lucian, *Dem.* 64; Philostr. *VA* 1.15; Plut. 824D; M.Aurelius, quoted by Arist. 23.73; Menander 250; *IG* XII 5.906; *EG* 877b; C.P.Jones (1971), 114-15.

25 Oliver (1953), 891-2; Bleicken (1966), 243, n.40.

26 Arist. 20.15. The same words are also applied to the sack of Eleusis, 22.1.

27 Arist. 27.32, 23.11; Gal. 14.217 (cf. Rosenthal (1975), 35). The opinion of a Jewish rabbi that Gen. 1.31 'Behold it was very good' applied to the Roman empire is characterized by Schürer-Vermes-Millar (1973), 381, n.126, as a minority view among the Jews.

28 Plut. 814D. The theory of *origo* as determining a man's obligations develops from the mid-second century: see D.Nörr, 'Origo', *Tijdschr. v. Rechtsgeschiedenis* XXXI (1963), 525-600.

29 Oliver (1953), 958; note also the use of the words in *GVI* 1975.

30 F.Christ (1938), 113-14; Statius, *Silv.* 5.3.185.

31 *Anth. Pal.* 6.236, 9.285 (Philip); cf. Philo, *Leg.* 552, 556; App. pref. 8.

32 Oliver (1953), 958-80, although his choice of examples is largely irrelevant; J.Triantophyllopoulos, 'Griechisch-römische Nomokrasie vor der Constitutio Antoniniana', *Akten VI Kongr. Epigr.* (Munich, 1973), 169-91.

33 L.Mitteis, *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht* (Leipzig, 1891), remains fundamental; Sherwin-White (1973), 312, 392; Talamanca (1971); Wieling (1974); H.Wolff, *Die Constitutio Antoniniana und Papyrus Gissensis 40.1* (Diss., Cologne, 1976), 80-7, 114.

34 Bardesanes, *Liber legum*, *Patr. Syr.* 1.2, 598, 602; Greg. Thaumaturgos, *Paneg. ad Origenem* 1.7, *Patr. Graec.* 10.1052, rightly rejected by Wieling (1974), 372; *contra*, V.Arangio-Ruiz, 'L'application du droit romain en Egypte après la Constitution Antoninienne', *Bull. Inst. Eg.* XXIX (1946-7), 94-6.

35 Menander 227, cf. L.Robert, 'Les femmes théores à Ephèse', *CRAI* 1974, 176-81; on Menander's date and the problem of authenticity, see Talamanca (1971), 475-7; H.Maehler, 'Menander Rhetor and Alexander Claudius in a papyrus letter', *GRBS* XV (1974), 305-11.

36 Wieling (1974), 373, criticizes Talamanca (1971), 456, for applying *politeuometha* (M. 202) to both public and private law, but the context and Menander's other references show that Wieling's insistence on public law alone would have been rejected by Menander; cf. Talamanca (1971), 554.

37 Talamanca (1971), 482-3, 502, 557; Wieling (1974), 372-3, but his arguments are of variable worth.

38 CJ. 8.52.1; J.A.C.Thomas, 'Custom and Roman law', *Tijdschr. v. Rechtsgesch.* XXXI (1963), 43-52; E.Levy, *Gesammelte Schriften* I (Cologne, Graz, 1963), 291-3.

39 CJ. 6.23.9; contrast CJ 6.32.2 (Valerian and Gallienus), which apparently allowed it. Presumably the *privilegium speciale* was

available to (some) *civitates liberae*.

40 CJ. 10.32.36 (383): a mother's *origo* or *domicilium* was no longer to be taken into account in determining the *origo* of a son.

41 L.Mitteis, *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht* (Leipzig, 1891), 161-4; J.A.C.Thomas, *Tijdschr. v. Rechtsgesch.* XXXI (1963), 43.

42 Arist. 26.100. For a fuller exposition of the argument of this paragraph see 'Two notes on immunities', *JRS* LXI (1971), 57-60.

43 Sherwin-White (1973), 428-9.

44 Repeated by Arist. at 24.31; cf. Artemidorus 1.13; Apollonius of Tyana, *Ep.* 44; Musonius 9 (p.42, Hense).

45 F.Christ (1938), 81-3; used by Arist. 23.62 and Menander 202.

46 G.Strohmaier, 'Der Arzt in der römischen Gesellschaft: Neues aus der arabischen Galenüberlieferung?' *Acta Conventus XI Eirene* (Warsaw, 1968), 69-70; Gal. 14.62.

47 Arist. 26.100; Eusebius, *Dem. Ev.* 7.2.22; *Laud. Const.* 16.7.

48 A.H.M.Jones (1974), 102.

49 F.Millar, 'Emperors at work', *JRS* LVII (1967), 9-19.

50 Plut. 814C; in general, see C.P.Jones (1971), 110-21.

51 F.Christ (1938), 92-7.

52 Agathias, *Hist.* 2.17; cf. also G.W.Bowersock, *Augustus and the Greek world* (Oxford, 1965), 157.

53 Arist. 19; cf. Arist. 20; Philostr. *VS* 214-16.

54 W.H.Buckler, 'T. Statilius Crito, Traiani Aug. medicus', *JOÄI* XXX (1936-7), Beibl. 5-8.

55 Arist. 32.15; Gal., 14.217-18, reports that the emperors provided drugs for friends and subjects in need.

56 Dio 48.8; Philostr. *VA* 5.32; Plut. *Cato Maior* 23.3; Philo, *Leg.* 147. Dio, 2.79, implicitly compares his position as adviser to Trajan with that of Aristotle to Alexander.

57 Arist. 26.74-85; Menander 230; P.A.Brunt (1974); A.Michel, 'De Socrate à Maxime de Tyr: les problèmes sociaux de l'armée dans l'idéologie romaine', *REL* XLVII (1969), 237-51.

58 Gal. 10.632-3, possibly augmented from another (Galenic?) source in the biography of Galen by al-Mubaššir (Rosenthal (1975), 35); Roman buildings in general are also mentioned in a Jewish source,

Babylon Talmud, *Shabbat* 56b. I have also excluded the arithmetical poem of Metrodorus on the road distances between Gades and Rome (*Anth. Pal.* 14.121) and such epigrams as that of Philip on the new mole at Puteoli (*Anth. Pal.* 9.108).

59 Discussed in detail by P.M.Duval, 'Construction d'une voie romaine d'après les textes antiques', *BSAF* 1959, 176-86; cf. also F.Lämmli, *Homo faber* (Basle, 1968), 71.

60 Above, n.18.

61 Epigraphic references include: *ILS* 9469; *AE* 1926, 77; *NdS* 1888, 621; *CIL* X 6849; *ILS* 291, 5866; see also R.Paribeni, *Optimus Princeps* (Messina, 1927), 120-49; G.Radke, *RE*, Supp. XIII (1973), 1513-15, 1641-2; T.Pekary, *Untersuchungen zu den römischen Reichstrassen* (Bonn, 1968), 8-10.

62 Cf. L.Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte Roms*, ed. 10 (Leipzig, 1922), 318-20, for Roman roads reputedly surviving in use until the sixteenth century.

63 Not that the literary evidence is much better: the test of a good emperor in the Sibylline Oracles 12 and 13 is the crude one of peace or war, and consequent gifts to cities; see Sherwin-White (1973), 430-2.

64 L.Robert, 'Epigrammes relatives à des gouverneurs', *Hellenica* IV (Paris, 1948), 35-114.

65 Especially the honorary decrees for magistrates, foreign judges, doctors and athletes; only when the magnates of the east themselves become Roman officials are such magistracies regularly considered worthy of fulsome commemoration, e.g. *IPerg. Ascl.* 21; *IGR* III 173, 174; *ILS* 9471; *SEG* 17.584; *Hellenica* 11-12, 463-4; Nock (1972), 732-3.

66 E.g. *EG* 858-60; *GVI* 1107; Nock (1972), 727-30.

67 *GVI* 1156, 1099 (= *EG* 434), 818, 1112; cf. also *GVI* 1068 (Athens), I983 (Syria); *TAM* 3.127 (Solyma and Termessus).

68 Cf. *EG* 903-8, 911-14, 919; epigrams and commemorative inscriptions continue to be erected to local magistrates but, as Robert noted, *Hellenica* 4 (1948), 109, they became far rarer.

69 Firmicus Maternus 4.4.4, 3.5.21; cf. R.MacMullen, 'Social history in astrology', *AncSoc.* II (1971), 113.

70 Menander 233, deriving in part from Arist. 26.31-3, but attributing greater power and independence to the governor.

71 Although Menander, like Philostratus in his *Lives of the Sophists*, in no way implies a break with the cultural and civic traditions of the past; indeed he expects them to stretch well into the future.

72 E.Levy, 'Von römischen Precarium zur germanischen Landleihe', *ZSS* LXVI (1948), 17-25.

73 P.Brown, 'The rise and function of the holy man in late antiquity', *JRS* LXI (1971), 80-101, esp. 85-7.

74 As in the famous case of Polemo, Philostratus, *VS* 112-14, with Bowersock (1969), 48-9, and T.D.Barnes, 'In Attali gratiam', *Historia* XVIII (1969), 383-4. For Aristeides himself, see Bowersock (1969), 30-42, and my note, *JRS* LXI (1971), 52-4.

75 This situation, which can be posited of Greece, Asia Minor and possibly Syria, did not obtain in Egypt, according to A.K.Bowman, 'Some aspects of the reform of Diocletian in Egypt', *Akten XIII Intern. Papyrologenkongr.* (Munich, 1974), 43-51, where there was an attempt made to foist more administrative responsibility onto the *curiales*, probably as a result of problems and difficulties elsewhere in the empire. This may also represent a reversion to the norm and a reaction against the earlier domination of the central government and administration in that province.

Chapter 11. Rome's African empire under the Principate

1 I wish to thank C.R.Whittaker, B.D.Shaw and R.P.Saller for critical comment on an earlier draft of this paper. I am particularly grateful to C.R.Whittaker for sharing ideas as well as bibliographical references.

2 I am concerned only with the more obvious material benefits, economic, social and political. I do not, for example, discuss the possible advantage for those at the top of the social pyramid of being culturally allied with the imperial power.

3 Only one side of the argument is presented by A.Demans, 'Matériaux et réflexions pour servir à une étude du développement et du sous-développement dans les provinces de l'empire romain', in H.Temporini, ed., *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, II 3 (Berlin, 1975), 3-97.

4 C.Lepelley, 'Declin ou stabilité de l'agriculture africaine au Bas-Empire? A propos d'une Loi de l'empereur Honorius', *AntAfr* I (1976), 135ff.

5 Pliny's assertion that the senators owned half of Proconsularis (as it then was) need not be believed. For possible estates of Augustus, see *CIL* VIII 12314 (Bisica); *ILT* 213 (Sidi Habich); cf. Pliny, *NH* 18.94-5. Note the *vicus Augusti* near Vaga. Augustus may have inherited a marble quarry at Simitthus from Agrippa. See I.Shatzman, *Senatorial wealth and politics* (Brussels, 1976), 366, citing *CIL* VIII 14580-2 (*officina Agrippae*)and the use of the marble in Augustan public buildings in Rome. A (Numidian) 'royal quarry' (*officina*

regia) is also attested, see *CIL* VIII 14578-9, 14583; this probably became imperial property under the empire.

6 See D.J.Crawford (1976); Millar (1977), 133ff.; T.Kotula, 'Rozwój Terytorialny i Organizacja Latyfundiów w Rzymskiej Afryce w Okresie Wczesnego Cesarstwa', *Eos* XLVI (1952-3), 113ff.

7 Agennius Urbicus in C.Thulin, ed., *Corpus Agrimensorum Romanorum* I (1913), 45. On the source of this passage Professor O.A.W.Dilke kindly gave me this opinion: 'Agennius Urbicus is late, but at least fifty per cent of his text seems to be taken almost verbatim from an early empire writer, thought by Lachmann to be Frontinus. Whether Frontinus or not, I think he and Thulin are right in thinking so, and it may well be of Frontinus' period.' The relevant passage comes from the early writer. The evidence for private *saltus* in the late republic and early empire is summarized in Haywood (1938), 28ff., 83ff.

8 P.Leveau, 'Paysanneries antiques du pays Beni-Menacer: à propos des "ruines romaines" de la région de Cherchel (Algérie)', *BCTH* VIII (1972), 3ff., at 19.

9 Cf. Amm. Marc. 29.5.13 (a *fundus Petrensis*, built up *in modum urbis*); John Matthews, 'Mauretania in Ammianus and the Notitia', in *Aspects of the Notitia Dignitatum*, ed. R.Goodburn and P. Bartholomew, BAR Supplem. Series XV (1976), 157ff.

10 *ILAlg.* II 616; cf. 615. One of the men was C.Arrius Antoninus, cf. the advocate and consul of c. A.D. 170, *PIR*^{2} A 1088. This inscription is to be set alongside another from Cirtan territory discussed in N.Charbonnel and S.Demougin, 'Un marché en Numidie au IIIe siècle après J.-C.', *RHDFE* LIV (1976), 559ff.

11 Imperial property is indicated at *CIL* VIII 18813, Aquae Thibilitanae (Hammam Meskoutine), 9 km from Thibilis, and not far from the provincial border with Africa Proconsularis. On Cirta and its territory, see *ILAlg.* II p.40; U.Laffi, *Adtributio e contributio* (Pisa, 1966), 135ff.

12 App. *BC* 4.54; cf. L.Teutsch, *Das Städtewesen in Nordafrika in der Zeit von C.Gracchus bis zum Tode des Kaisers Augustus* (Berlin, 1962), 65ff. (Sittius); Vitruv. 8.3.24ff. (Julius): *cuius erant totius oppidi agrorum possessiones.*

13 I use 'African' in this and later sections to designate African-born individuals, whatever their ultimate family origins.

14 The first consular was a Pactumeius, one of two brothers adlected *inter praetorios* by Vespasian, consul in the 70s. See *ILAlg.* II 642-4 (Cirta). Other early consulars: P.Pactumeius Clemens, *suff.* 138, *ILAlg.* II 645; Q.Lollius Urbicus, *suff.* c. 135, *ILAlg.* II 3446, 3563, 3605, etc.; M.Cornelius Fronto, *suff.* 143; etc. In general, Fronto, *ad amicos* 2.10: *Alii quoque plurimi sunt in senatu Cirtenses clarissimi viri.*

15 The phrase giving the location of the property is corrupt (*et unum fundum invenit etiam*), but cf. Stat. *Silv.* 4.5.54-5 (Veii); *CIL* XI 3816 (near Veii).

16 Tac. *Ann.* 12.23; Dio 52.42.6-7, 50.25.6; Suet. *Cl.* 23.2.

17 A clear case is Herodes Atticus, consul (143), sophist and grand seigneur of Attica, *PIR*^{2} C 802. Athens also attracted the historian Arrian, consul (129), and in his adopted city archon (145-6) and prytanis (166-7, 169-70), *PIR*^{2} F 219. Their contemporary at Ephesos, P.Vedius Antoninus Phaedrus Sabinianus, was first of his family to attain senatorial rank but seems to have made little use of it. He is conspicuous as magistrate, envoy and benefactor of Ephesos. See e.g. *IBrit.Mus.* III 491 (= *Syll*^{3} 850); 492.

18 For African *viri clarissimi* at home in the late empire, see e.g. *CIL* VIII 1633; 24069.

19 See n.14 above.

20 This is a theme of E.J.Champlin, 'An historical study of Fronto of Cirta', D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1976, ch.1.

21 *ad M.Caes.* 1.10.5 (ed. van den Hout, pp.22-3; A.D. 143, the year of his consulship). Cf. Stat. *Silv.* 4.5.45-6: *non sermo Poenus, non habitus tibi / externa non mens; Italus, Italus.*

21 *ILAlg.* II 638. This man is probably the learned Iulius Celsinus, dubbed 'The Numidian' by his friend A.Gellius, who helped Fronto in a duel with a self-confident *grammaticus*. See A.Gell. 19.7.2, 10.1 and 11.

23 S.Gsell, C.A.Joly, *Khamissa, Mdaourouch, Announa.* III *Announa.* (Alger, 1918), 81ff.; see *PIR*^{2} A 754,757.

24 For a famous example, see *MEFR* 75 (1963), 398: C.Septimius Severus, procos. of Africa in 173-4, and his legate L.Septimius Severus, at Leptis Magna. For equestrians in employment in Africa, see Jarrett (1972), e.g. nos.7,9,14,17,23,58,59, etc.

25 This inscription was brought to my attention in this connexion by Miss Joyce Reynolds.

26 The clearest cases concern army officers. See Jarrett (1972), e.g. nos.5,8,15,37,41,42, etc. For possible examples of ex-procurators at home, see nos.47,82,89,92,100,126. Cf. Duncan-Jones (1967), 168-9.

27 See the lists compiled by Duncan-Jones (1967) and Pflaum (1968).

28 Equestrians of Cirta and environs: *ILAlg.* II 10,11,29,35,36,479 = *ILS* 6858, 481,500,528,529,560,569,617,648,649,685-6,689,690, 696,697,705,794(3),796,798(1+),799, 3610-11; *CIL* VIII 5534,18912 = *ILS* 6856. Equestrian officials from Cirta and environs: *ILAlg.* II 570; 665 = *ILS* 1437; 671 = *ILS* 5549; *CIL* VIII 5532; 18909 = *ILS* 9017; 18892; *BAC* 1917, p.336.

29 For African society as reflected by Apuleius see the admirable thesis of E.Matthews, 'The social background of the Apologia and Florida of Apuleius', B.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1968; also H.Pavis d'Escurac, 'Pour une étude sociale de l'Apologie d'Apulée', *AntAfr* VIII (1974), 89ff.

30 The wealth of the curial class is discussed by Duncan-Jones (1963).

31 Some scholars have assumed that small-scale landownership in North Africa was essentially linked with the imperial policy of assigning land to discharged soldiers. See H. d'Escurac Doisy, 'Notes sur le phénomène associatif dans le monde paysan', *AntAfr* I (1967), 59ff., following P.Romanelli, 'Brevi note sulla distribuzione della piccola e grande proprietà agricola nell'Africa Romana', *Atti del primo congresso nazionale di studi romani* (Rome, 1929), 340ff. This seems unlikely. 200-300 soldiers were demobilized each year in normal circumstances (some of whom may not have settled on the land); their life-expectancy after discharge would have been low; and land was also assigned to tribesmen (I discuss this below). It remains likely that veterans had better title to their land than tribesmen, and that they had a better chance of maintaining their position because of the tax-free status of their land.

32 See R.P.Duncan-Jones, 'Some configurations of landholding in the Roman empire', in M.I.Finley (ed.), *Studies in Roman Property* (Cambridge, 1976), 18ff.

33 Jones (1964), 636.

34 Brunt (1971), 589ff.; cf. Gascou (1972), 24ff.

35 Romanelli (1959), 207.

36 Cf. *CIL* VIII 885 = 12387: *pagus Mercurialis veteranorum Medelitanorum*; 20834 = *ILS* 6885 (Rapidum).

37 For the details see Gascou (1972). Many of Augustus' colonies also had a strategic purpose.

38 H. d'Escurac-Doisy, op.cit. n.31; Gascou (1972) (Verecunda and Lambaesis).

39 Jones (1964), 652-3, citing *IRT* 880 (A.D. 244-6); P.Trousset, *Recherches sur le limes Tripolitanus du Chott El-Djerid à la frontière tunico-libyenne* (Paris, 1974). Earlier work by Goodchild (and Ward-Perkins) may be conveniently consulted in Joyce Reynolds, ed., *Libyan studies: select papers of the late R.G.Goodchild* (London, 1976), chs.2-4.

40 *CIL* VIII 22786 a,f,k = *ILS* 9375 (A.D. 29-30). For refs. see most recently Bénabou (1976), 433, 438.

41 A.Berthier, 'Nicibes et Suburbures: nomades ou sédentaires?', *BAA* III (1968), 293ff.

42 For this view, see J.Lancel, 'Suburbures et Nicibes: une inscription de Tigisis', *Libyca* III (1955), 289ff.

43 J.Despois, *Le Hodna (Algérie)* (Paris, 1953), III.

44 The inscription was published by L.Leschi, 'Une assignation de terres en Afrique sous Septime Sévère', *Etudes d'épigraphie et d'histoire africaines* (Paris, 1957), 75ff. Bénabou (1976), 172, following Leschi, thinks the recipients were *coloni partiarii*, but does not see that they were tribesmen.

45 The economic significance of the nomads, and particularly their role as seasonal labourers, were first brought home to me by my colleague C.R.Whittaker in a paper delivered to a colloquium in Cambridge in September 1975. These matters are fully discussed in his forthcoming paper 'Land and labour in North Africa'.

46 For the tariff list from Zarai (*CIL* VIII 4508), see conveniently Haywood (1938), 80ff.

47 T.Précheur-Canonge, *La vie rurale en Afrique romaine d'après les mosaiques*, n.d., planche 1, photo 1. I owe this reference to Elaine Matthews.

48 The military confrontation with the nomads is the subject of Rachet (1970), see esp. ch.2. For regular soldiers guarding estates, see *CIL* VIII 14603 = *ILS* 2305 (late J/Cl., *saltus Philomusianus*).

49 See e.g. *ILAlg.* I 1927, with R.Syme, 'Tacfarinas, the Musulamii and Thubursicu', in P.R.Coleman-Norton, ed., *Studies in Roman economy and society in honor of A.C.Johnson* (Princeton, 1951), 113ff.; *CIL* VIII 22729 (Gigthis); Gascou (1972), 134ff. (Turris Tamelleni).

50 The laws are best known from the imperial *saltus* inscriptions. See conveniently Haywood (1938), 89ff. For a full discussion, C.Courtois *et al.*, *Tablettes Albertini* (Paris, 1952).

51 The phrase is from A.Piganiol, 'La politique agraire d'Hadrien', *Les Empereurs romains d'Espagne* (Paris, 1965), at 135. See also Bénabou (1976), 181. Both writers refer to Rostovtzeff, who was evidently the source of their views. See Rostovtzeff (1957), 367ff., 405ff.

52 See W.L.Westermann, 'Hadrian's decree on renting state domains in Egypt', *JEA* XI (1925), 165ff. There is a hint of a possible parallel to the African legislation in an unpublished inscription from Delphi involving civic land. See *BCH* 1944-5, 75 (A.D. 125).

53 L.Leschi, 'La vigne et le vin dans l'Afrique ancienne', in *Études d'épigraphie et d'histoire africaines* (Paris, 1957), 80ff.

54 J.Peyras, 'Le Fundus Aufidianus: étude d'un grand domaine romain

de la région de Mateur (Tunisie du Nord)', *AntAfr* IX (1975), 181ff. The points I have discussed here were raised in an earlier article: see Garnsey (1976).

55 *ILAfr*. 568. For A.Gabinius Quir. Datus pater see also *CIL* VIII 26467-9; *ILAfr*. 515; *ILTun*. 1511. I follow J.Carcopino, 'Fermier général ou sociétés publicaines?', *REA* XXIV (1922) 13ff., who stands by the reading of the stone (*conductoris*), rejecting the emendation (*conductori*) which turns Gabinius into a grand *conductor*.

56 See Jones (1964), 417-19, 788-9.

57 See Brunt (1976).

58 If (*exempli gratia*) the *curiales* were 25,000 out of 8 million Africans (see Duncan-Jones (1963), 170), they made up 0.3 per cent of the population.

59 J.Kolendo, 'Sur le colonat en Afrique préromaine', *Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte der alten Welt*, II (Berlin, 1965), 45ff.; Kolendo (1976), 23ff. Cf. H.Kreissig, 'Bemerkungen zur Produktionsweise in Nordafrika (vorrömische Zeit), *Afrika und Rom in der Antike*, ed. H.-J.Diesner, *et al*. (Halle, 1968), 135-42. The thesis of continuity between Roman and pre-Roman periods, advanced tentatively in the text, is argued fully by C.R. Whittaker in his forthcoming paper 'Land and labour in North Africa'.

60 Gsell (1928), I 302 n.2, 465, II 299ff., IV 47. The main texts, not all referring specifically to agricultural slaves, are Diod. 14.77, 20.69.2; Just. 21.4.6; Polyb. 15.18.1; App. *Lib*. 9,15, 24,59; Livy 21.45.7, 29.29.2; Sall. *Bell. Iug*. 44.5.

61 The evidence of the mosaics is inconclusive. Joyce Reynolds writes from Tripoli that it was not the intention of the Zliten mosaicists depicting agricultural workers to show Negroid types or black faces.

62 The evidence is presented in full by Gsell (1932), 397ff. I am not convinced by the thesis of E.M.Schtajerman, *Die Krise der Sklavenhalterordnung im Westen des römischen Reiches*, tr. W. Seyfarth (Berlin 1964), 185-204.

63 Gsell (1932), 407 n.1, suggests implausibly that they were 'des serfs tenanciers'.

64 Cf. D. 20.1.32: *'Praediorum pars sine colonis fuit, eaque actori suo colenda ... tradidit adsignatis et servis culturae necessariis.'*

65 Gsell (1932), 401-2.

66 This is implied by the frequent references in inscriptions to free *coloni*, especially on imperial estates. The *saltus* inscriptions refer once to *servi domini*, but their functions are not specified (*CIL* VIII 25902, IV ℓ.39).

67 M.Hombert, C.Préaux, *Recherches sur le recensement dans l'Egypte romain* (Leiden, 1952), 170.

68 On taxation under the Principate see Jones (1974). I have also derived considerable benefit from P.A.Brunt, 'Direct taxation under the Roman Principate', London University Special Lectures, Jan. 1972, unpublished.

69 The Roman army in Britain numbered perhaps 40-50,000 men, see S.S.Frere, *Britannia* (London, 1967), 157ff. Africa, in contrast, was garrisoned by c. 12-13,000, see Ch.-Picard (1959), 7; cf. Rachet (1970), 61.

70 Pol. 11.25.9-26.1; cf. Livy 28.25.9-10 (*exactores*, who could only have been soldiers). In any case tribute was commonly exacted as a *stipendium*, a levy of cash for the payment of soldiers, or of kind for their supplies. See now J.S.Richardson 'The Spanish mines and the development of provincial taxation', *JRS* LVI (1976), 139ff., esp. 147ff.

71 See Bénabou (1976), 448ff.

72 See R.Cagnat, 'L'annone d'Afrique', *Mém. acad. inscr. belles-lettres* XL (1916); G.Ch.-Picard, 'Néron et le blé d'Afrique', *Cah. Tun.* XIV (1956), 163ff.; G.Rickman, *Roman granaries and store buildings* (Cambridge, 1971), 307ff. at 309. H.Pavis d'Escurac, *Le préfecture de l'annone service administratif impériale d'Auguste à Constantin*, Bibl. des éc. franc. Ath. et Rome, CCXXVI (1976).

73 The tithe brought in 3 mill. *modii*, Verres was ordered to buy 3 mill. more at 3 HS per *modius*, and a further 800,000 *modii* at 3½ HS per *modius*.

74 F.Zevi, A.Tchernia, 'Amphores de Byzacène au bas empire, *AntAfr* III (1969), 173ff.; A.Carandini, 'Produzione agricola e produzione ceramica nell' Africa di età imperiale', *St. Misc.* XV (1970), 95ff.; A.Carandini, C.Panella, 'Ostia III', *St. Misc.* XXI (1973), 327ff.; 560ff.

75 For a good recent discussion, see Ramsay MacMullen, *Roman government's response to crisis A.D. 235-337* (New Haven, 1976), ch.6.

76 Hyginus (ed. Thulin, *Corpus Agrimensorum Romanorum* 1 (1913), 168-9) writes of fifths and sevenths, and Dio 38.26 of a tithe (in Bithynia). Insofar as *publicani* were present in Africa at least in the early decades of the empire, and insofar as the tax-farming system was more oppressive than the main alternatives, Africa was at a disadvantage in comparison with Spain and Gaul, which did not have *publicani*.

77 Recently, P.A.Brunt (1974), 90ff., at 105; cf. 108.

78 Brunt (1974), 99, n.46, utilizes *ILS* 9195 (= *CIL* XI 7554). But see the revised reading in *AE* 1952, 34.

79 H.M.D.Parker, *The Roman legions* (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1958), 176.

80 J.Lesquier, *L'armée romaine d'Egypte d'Auguste à Dioclétien* (Cairo, 1918), 206; G.Forni, *Il Reclutamento delle Legioni da Augusto a Diocletiano* (Milan, 1953), 219-20.

81 J.F.Gilliam, 'The veterans and the "praefectus castrorum"', *AJP* LXXVII (1956), 359ff.; J.C.Mann, 'The raising of new legions during the Principate', *Hermes* XCI (1963), 483ff.

82 Africans serving in elite corps fall into a different category. See *CIL* VI 2663 (praetorians); 3884 iii 21, v 4 (Sev.); 2384 ii 5 (Sev.) (urban cohort; there was also an urban cohort in Carthage. See *CIL* VIII 2890, 8395; *AE* 1916, 80, etc.).

83 Cf. Brunt (1974), 105: 'Auxiliary units were normally posted to regions other than those where they had been raised.'

84 An early example from Spain is Livy 24.49.7 (212 B.C.). The best-known of several cases from a later period is the *turma Salluitana* that served Pompeius Strabo (*ILS* 8888) and was constituted from several different tribes. The force of 3,000 Gallic *equites* collected by Caesar in 49 for civil war use (*Bell. Civ.* 1.39.2) was formed in a similar way. This point is discussed by D.Thomas in an unpublished paper on the army and the administration of native peoples.

85 Mauri: see R.Cagnat, *L'armée romaine d'Afrique* (Paris, 1913), 262; *RE* IV 315-16. Musulamii: *AE* 1939, 126 (Dom.); *CIL* XVI 35 (Syria, A.D. 88). Numidae: *AE* 1939, 126; *CIL* XVI 35. Gaetuli: *CIL* V 5267 = *ILS* 2721; *CIL* V 7895; 7007; *RE* I 1243; IV 286-7.

86 Rachet (1970), 161; Bénabou (1976), 124.

87 Spanish auxiliaries used by Scipiones: Livy 25.33.6. Furnished under agreements: Badian (1958), 117ff.; App. *Iber.* 44 (179 B.C.); 52 (151 B.C.); etc. In Africa an important role in recruitment was played by the *praefecti gentium*, as was recognized long ago by Cagnat (op.cit. n.85), 263ff., cf. *CIL* XI 7554 (= *ILS* 9195), with *AE* 1952, 34 [pra]ef(ecto) gentis Numidar(um), dilictat(ori) [tir]onum ex Numidia lecto[r(um)]. Other references in Brunt (1974), 106-7.

88 R.Cagnat (op.cit. n.85), 287ff.

89 J.Gascou, 'Inscriptions de Tébessa', *MEFR* LXXXI (1969), 537ff.; M.Leglay, *Les Gaulois en Afrique* (Bruxelles, 1962), at 9.

90 Th.Mommsen, *Ges. Schr.* VI 29; G.Forni (op.cit. n.80), 126-8 (in general); 212 cf. 204ff.; (Africa). For auxiliaries (not in Africa), K.Kraft, *Zur Rekrutierung von Alen und Cohorten an Rhein und Donau* (Bern, 1951), 50ff.

91 See Brunt (1974), 109ff.

92 For refs. see P.Garnsey, *Social status and legal privilege in*

the Roman empire (Oxford, 1970), 245ff.

93 See the major contributions of Broughton (1929); L.Teutsch (op. cit. n.12); and Gascou (1972). For a recent discussion with refs. see Bénabou (1976), 394-425.

94 *Publicani* may still have collected the African *stipendium* in the early decades of the Principate (see *ILS* 901), but they probably worked through the city authorities (cf. Cic. *ad Att.* 6.2.5). In any case, the cities had replaced tax-farmers altogether as tribute-collectors by the second half of the second century at the latest (see Apul. *Apol.* 101; D. 50.1.17.1, 50.4. 3.10-11, etc.). Taxes were at no stage collected by an army of centrally-controlled imperial officials. For cities and army recruitment, see the brief discussion in Brunt (1974), 114-15, and next note.

95 C.Thulin, ed., *Corpus Agrimensorum Romanorum* 1 (1913), 45.

96 The *pagus* which could conscript an influential patron was in the best position to defend its interests. The *patroni* of the *pagus* (and *civitas*) of Thugga have recently been studied, although not in this connexion, by Cl.Poinssot, 'M. Licinius Rufus: patronus pagi et civitatis Thuggensis', *BCTH* V (1969), 215ff.

97 See the fundamental study, drawing especially on Italian evidence, of Martin Frederiksen, 'Changes in the patterns of settlement', *Hellenismus in Mittelitalien, Koll. in Göttingen, Juni 1974, Abhandl. der Akad. der Wiss. in Gött.*, Phil.-Hist. Kl., Dr. Folge, XCVII (1976), 341ff.

98 See *CIL* VIII 8210 = *ILS* 6864 (2nd half, 3rd c.): *soluta contributione a Cirtensibus*. The reference is to Milev, one of the three subsidiary colonies of the Confederation. There is no reason to suppose that any of the numerous minor centres within Cirtan territory were upgraded before the fourth century, if at all.

99 The public benefactions of patrons to their client cities are better known and easier to document than the services they must have exchanged with individual members of the local aristocracy. It is not hard to imagine, for example, that individual decurions looked after the economic interests of their superiors based in Rome.

100 According to Pflaum (1970), 109-10, the Romans were displaying sensitivity, on the one hand to their Punic subjects who wanted to preserve their own constitutions, and on the other to Roman veteran colonists in the area. Gascou (1972), 226ff. correctly recognizes that a policy of municipalization was detrimental to the interests of Carthage (and notes that the award of the *ius Italicum* was compensatory), which he considers was threatening to become a 'state within a state'. In my view Severus was more alive to the advantages for the fiscus and the army of a multiplication of administrative units than to any political

threat from cities with vast territories.

101 Garnsey (1974).

102 Similarly, we should I believe accept Dio's comment on the famous Edict of Caracalla: 'nominally he was honouring them, but his real purpose was to increase his revenues' (77.9.5).

103 On nomenclature, see Bénabou (1976), 591ff., with full references.

104 E.g. for the period before Caesar, see Romanelli (1959), 109; Brunt (1971), 219.

105 See also *ILAlg.* I 2195: a man of Madauros who *domumque tenuem ad equestrem promovit gradum.*

106 See *CIL* VIII 4243 + 18502; 4196-7 (Verecunda); *ILAlg.* I 2070; 2130; 2201 (Madauros); *CIL* VIII 4594 + 18649 (Diana); cf. 4594: the same person, but not designated *vet.* in the latter inscription. Sons and descendants of veterans, especially plentiful in the veteran colonies, usually give no indication of their origins.

107 See e.g. *CIL* VIII 7080 (Cirta; ex-centurion married to a *flaminica IIII col. Cirtensium*); cf. 7958 (Cirta); 12370; *AE* 1912, 179 (Thuburbo Maius).

108 On Gigthis see Gascou (1972), 137ff.; M.G.Jarrett, 'Decurions and priests', *AJP* XCII (1971), 513ff., at 533; cf. 538.

109 See R.Syme (op.cit. n.49), 125.

110 J.Gascou, 'Inscriptions de Tébessa', *MEFR* LXXXI (1969), 556ff.

111 J.Gascou, 'Le *cognomen Gaetulus*, *Gaetulicus* en Afrique romaine', *MEFR* LXXXII (1970), 723ff.

112 See H.-G.Pflaum, 'Remarques sur l'onomastique de Cirta', *Limes Studien* XIV (Basel, 1959), 100ff.

113 For Sittius, see above n.12.

114 See Sherwin-White (1973), 241ff.; 341ff.

115 Evidence (covering the period A.D. 140-280) and bibliography in Bénabou (1976), 460. For a full discussion, see E.Frézouls, 'Les Baquates et la province romaine de Tingitane', *BAM* II (1957), 65ff.

116 W.Seston, M.Euzennat, 'Un dossier de la chancellerie romaine: la Tabula Banasitana. Etude de diplomatique', *CRAI* 1971, 468ff.

117 G.Ch.-Picard, 'Deux sénateurs romains inconnus', *Karthago* IV (1953), 121ff. at 127, citing H.-G.Pflaum, *Les Procurateurs équestres sous le Haut-Empire romain* (Paris, 1950), 184-5. But

Pflaum's lists (which now need correction and updating) produce a figure of 12.5% for the period Hadrian to the end of Commodus, and for the third century one of 27.5% (see pp.192ff.).

118 G.Ch.-Picard (op.cit. n.117), 127, citing and correcting G. Barbieri, *L'albo senatorio da Settimo Severo a Carino, 193-285* (Rome, 1952), 441. Cf. Mason Hammond, 'The composition of the senate A.D. 68-235', *JRS* XLVII (1957), 74ff., at 80: 14%, reign of Septimius Severus. For the third century I have seen conjectures of 12.5% and 14%: see, respectively, Millar (1967), 178, and C.R.Whittaker, *Herodian* (ed. Loeb), II p.187. The most optimistic assessment is that of A.R.Birley, *Septimius Severus* (London, 1971), 336ff., who conjectures that 19% of the 'most prominent' men under Severus were 'more or less certainly African', and in the case of an additional 14% 'a strong probability' points to Africa as their place of origin. The figures would be higher if the 11% whom he regards as of undiscoverable *origo* were eliminated. Clearly the whole subject requires systematic investigation. There is no reliable list of African senators. That of A.Pelletier, 'Les sénateurs d'Afrique proconsulaire', *Latomus* XXIII (1964), 511ff., is inaccurate and incomplete even for Africa Proconsularis.

119 Rachet (1970); Bénabou (1976), livre 1.

120 I pass over for reasons of space the matter of the survival of Punic or Libyo-Punic political institutions. See T.Kotula, *Les curies municipales en Afrique romaine* (Warsaw, 1968); 'Remarques sur les traditions puniques dans la constitution des villes de l'Afrique romaine', *Africana Bull.* XVII (1972), 9ff.; W.Seston, 'Des "portes" de Thugga à la constitution de Carthage', *Rev. Hist.* CCXXXVII (1967), 277ff.; Cl.Poinssot, 'Sufes maior et princeps civitatis Thuggae', *Mélanges Piganiol* (Paris, 1966), 1267ff.; B.D.Shaw, 'The undecemprimi in Roman Africa', *MusAfr* II (1973), 3ff. Nor do I discuss the survival of local cultures in Africa, especially in the countryside. See F.Millar (1968). Brunt (1976), 170ff. has an excursus on vernacular languages in the empire as a whole.

121 This theme is developed by A.N.Sherwin-White, *Racial prejudice in Imperial Rome* (Cambridge, 1967).

122 *ut homines dispersi ac rudes eoque in bello faciles quieti et otio per voluptates adsuescerent.*

123 Cf. Brunt (1976), 162.

124 P.Monceaux, *Les Africains. Etudes sur la littérature latine d'Afrique* (Paris, 1894); M.D.Brock, *Studies in Fronto and his age* (Cambridge, 1911), 161ff.; M.Leglay, 'La vie intellectuelle d'une cité africaine des confins de l'Aurès', *Hommages à L. Herrmann*, Collection Latomus XLIV (1960), 485ff.; W.Thieling, *Der Hellenismus in Kleinafrika* (Leipzig, 1911); T.Kotula, 'Utraque lingua eruditi: une page rélative à l'histoire de l'éducation dans l'Afrique romaine', *Hommages à M.Renard*, Coll. Latomus CII (1969), 386ff.; H.Pavis d'Escurac, 'Pour une étude

sociale de l'Apologie d'Apulée', *AntAfr* VIII (1974), 89ff., at 96ff.

125 M.Leglay, *Saturne Africaine: Histoire* (Paris, 1966); Bénabou (1976), 261ff.

126 Leglay (op.cit. n.125), 61ff.; 314ff., citing Tertullian, *Apol.* 9.2-3, among other texts, plus archaeological evidence.

127 Tertullian, *Apol.* 25.12ff.; Min.Felix, *Octavius* 25. Later critics of traditional justifications for Roman imperialism also happen to be African. See Lactantius, *Inst. Div.* 5.16ff.; Augustine, *de civ. dei* 19.21. The fact that Tertullian is inconsistent in the opinions he expresses on state and empire does not affect the present argument. See R.Klein, *Tertullian und das römisches Reich* (Heidelberg, 1968).

128 On this subject, Professor G.W.Clarke has written to me: 'My strong impression is that they conveniently exploit a western (general) tradition about the nature of the gods, and that a special provincial bias is probably a chance perception given the nature of the surviving evidence.'

129 On this question see the summary by R.Markus, 'Christianity and dissent in Roman North Africa: changing perspectives in recent work', in D.Baker, ed., *Schism, heresy and religious protest* (Cambridge, 1972), 21-36.

Chapter 12 Jewish attitudes to the Roman empire

The following abbreviations are used in this article:
B = Babylonian Talmud, J = Palestinian (Jerusalem) Talmud.

1 I Macc. 8.23-30 (Josephus, *Ant.* 12.414-19); 12.1-4 (Jos. *Ant.* 13.163); 14.25; Jos. *Ant.* 13.559-66.

2 Ps. Sol. 8.9-22; cf. 2.3, 13-15. In 17.5-8, 22 it is the Hasmonean rulers who are blamed.

3 Ps. Sol. 17.23-6; cf. Orac. Sib. 3.46-53.

4 Orac. Sib. 3.356ff., etc. On the background to this work and its dating see V.Nikiprowetzky, *La troisième Sibylle* (Paris, 1970).

5 *Ant.* 17.299-314. Cf. *Ant.* 14.41, a similar argument before Pompey in 63 B.C.

6 Philo, *Leg.* 157, 317; cf. Jos. *BJ* 2.197. The expense was probably borne by the emperor, notwithstanding Jos. *C.Ap.* 2.77. A similar sacrifice instituted by the Persians (Ezra 6.10) was still being performed during the Hasmonean War (I Macc. 7.33). The Roman sacrifice, however, was discontinued in the summer of 66 (Jos. *BJ* 2.409); Josephus calls this act *tou pros Romaious polemou katabole*.

7 Hananiah the *segan* of the Priests, Mishnah Aboth 3.2, B Abodah Zarah 4^a. The date is probably the last years of the temple. The parallel text in Aboth de Rabbi Nathan B 31 (end) inserts what may be a fragment of such a prayer: 'may it reign over us for all time'. Cf. Philo, *In Flaccum* 49; 1 Timothy 2.2.

8 A possible exception is *Megillath Ta'anith, 'The Scroll of Fasts'* (ed. H.Lichtenstein, *HUCA* VIII-IX (1931/2), 257-351), a document celebrating nationalist victories. It was never received into the canon of rabbinic literature.

9 Mark 12.17. Cf. I.Abrahams, '"Give unto Caesar"', in *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, First Series (Cambridge, 1917), 62-5.

10 Mishnah Aboth 3.5. *Hakkanah* may mean 'the zealot'. Cf. Hananiah the *segan* of the Priests, Aboth de Rabbi Nathan A 20.

11 See above, n.6.

12 See Song of Songs Zuta 2.10; cf. Allon (1961), 74-5.

13 See T.Rajak, *CQ* XXIII (1973), 351-2.

14 Aboth de Rabbi Nathan A 4, B 6. See J.Neusner, *The development of a legend* (Leiden, 1970), 113ff.

15 On the relationship between the various versions see J.Neusner, op.cit. 228-34.

16 Taught by Yohanan bar Nappaha, B Gittin 56^b, Lamentations Rabba 1.5.31.

17 See the collection of (mainly Babylonian amoraic) sayings, B Shabbath 119^b-120^a. Cf. Tosefta Menahoth 13.22; J Yoma 38^c; B Yoma 9^b; Pesahim 118^b.

18 I Baruch 1.15-17. See the account of reactions to the crisis of A.D. 70 in M.Simon, *Verus Israel* (Paris, 1948), 19-28.

19 I Baruch 1.11-12 (NEB). For Nebuchadnezzar, Belshazzar, Babylon, read Vespasian, Titus, Rome. The writers of this period commonly applied the names of the Babylonian captivity to their recent conquerors. For the prayer see above, n.7.

20 See E.M.Smallwood, 'Palestine c. A.D. 115-18', *Historia* XI (1962), 500-10.

21 For the literature, ancient and modern, see Schürer-Vermes-Millar (1973), 529 (and p.533 for the rabbinic evidence).

22 The various theories are set out in V.Tcherikover *et al.*, *Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum* I (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 90, n.84.

23 Trajan died at Selinus in Cilicia.

24 See Schürer-Vermes-Millar (1973), 543. 'Star' is an allusion to Numbers 24.17.

25 B Sanhedrin 98[a-b]. For the sentiment cf. Judah I, B Yoma 10[a].

26 Haninah ben Abbahu, J Ta'anith 64[a]. The reading *Romi* for *Dumah* is ascribed to a text of Rabbi Meir. Similarly in Pesikta de Rab Kahana 68[a], Isaiah 34.7 is read as 'Romans shall come down with them'. Eleazar ben Pedat in the late third century is the author of several such interpretations, e.g. Genesis Rabba 10.7 (cf. Leviticus Rabba 22.4; Ecclesiastes Rabba 5.8.5; B Berakhoth 62[b]; J Shabbath 8[c]); 61.7 (cf. Exodus Rabba 9.13; Pesikta Rabbati 17.8).

27 Yohanan, Genesis Rabba 76.6, Leviticus Rabba 13.5, B Abodah Zarah 2[b] (= Shebuoth 6[b]). Other examples: Genesis Rabba 44.17; Exodus Rabba 51.7; Leviticus Rabba 13; Song of Songs Rabba 6.10.1; Midrash Psalms 18.11.

28 E.g. Pesikta Rabbati 14.15, 17.8; Midrash Psalms 15.1.

29 E.g. Genesis Rabba 63.9 (quoted above), 70.8; Leviticus Rabba 13.5.

30 Leviticus Rabba 29.2 (= Pesikta de Rab Kahana 151[b]). This elaboration derives from a homily of the second-century rabbi Meir, cf. ibid. and Midrash Psalms 78.6. Other homilies of Samuel bar Nahman on the same theme: Genesis Rabba 73.7 (= 75.5); Deuteronomy Rabba 1.20 (cf. Abbahu, Genesis Rabba 78.14).

31 Midrash Psalms 10.6, 17.12. Cf. Esther Rabba 3.5, where Esau is the father of the twins.

32 Levi, J 'Abodah Zarah 39[c]; cf. B Shabbath 56[b]; Sanhedrin 21[b]; Song of Songs Rabba 1.6.4.

33 B Megillah 6[a]. The authority is a Babylonian, Ulla, but the legend is likely to have a Palestinian origin.

34 Exodus Rabba 1.31, B Sanhedrin 98[a]. Cf. Vermes (1975), 223-4.

35 Rabbinic references to Roman institutions are collected in S. Krauss, *Paras veromi battalmud ubammidrashim* (Tel-Aviv, 1948); cf. S.Lieberman, 'Roman legal institutions in early Rabbinics and in the Acta Martyrum', *JQR* XXXV (1944), 1-55.

36 Genesis Rabba 63.6, Midrash Psalms 14.3.

37 E.g. Genesis Rabba 63.13.

38 Hiyya bar Abba, Genesis Rabba 63.10; cf. B Gittin 57[b]. Yohanan rebuts this charge, B Shabbath 149[b]. See also Orac.Sib. 5.387.

39 Pesikta Rabbati 12.4-5; Genesis Rabba 63.8 (Abba bar Kahana), 75.1.

40 Simeon ben Lakish, Genesis Rabba 2.4 = Pesikta Rabbati 33.6.

41 Levi, Ecclesiastes Rabba 1.7.9. Cf. Hama bar Haninah, Genesis Rabba 66.7; Abba bar Kahana, Leviticus Rabba 15.9; Yohanan, B Pesahim 118^{b}. See S.Lieberman, *JQR* XXXVI (1945), 344-70.

42 Ecclesiastes Rabba 1.7.9; Esther Rabba 1.17; cf. B Pesahim 119^{a}.

43 Simon, Genesis Rabba 65.1, Leviticus Rabba 13.5, Midrash Psalms 80.6. Cf. Isaac, Genesis Rabba 63.8.

44 Judah ben Simon, Genesis Rabba 49.9. Cf. Yose, Exodus Rabba 18.5.

45 Genesis Rabba 37.2, 63.10. See S.Lieberman, *JQR* XXXV (1944), 24-5.

46 This subject is discussed more fully by Glatzer (1962, 1975).

47 See above, p.268.

48 Above, p.271.

49 Deuteronomy Rabba 1.20; cf. Genesis Rabba 78.14 (Abbahu). For the messianic use of this verse see above, n.24.

50 See W.Bacher, *Die Agada der palästinensischen Amoräer* (Strassburg, 1892-9), I 252ff. on Yohanan's attitude to Rome.

51 Genesis Rabba 63.6, 76.6; Leviticus Rabba 13.5; B Pesahim 118^{b}; 'Abodah Zarah 2^{b} (= Shebuoth 6^{b}).

52 B Baba Metzi'a 84^{a}: he was apparently a *leistes*.

53 E.g. B Sanhedrin 98^{b}; Genesis Rabba 63.6; Leviticus Rabba 13.5.

54 B Yoma 9^{b}; cf. Song of Songs Rabba 8.9.3.

55 Song of Songs Rabba 2.7.1. See Allon (1961), 77; Baer (1961), 114; Glatzer (1975), 15.

56 Tanhuma (ed. Buber), *Debarim* suppl. 3.

57 Genesis Rabba 63.6, 10; cf. 63.14, 64.2.

58 Genesis Rabba 75.1; Leviticus Rabba 7.6.

59 Though not entirely. Messianic risings recur spasmodically in the Byzantine empire. See A.Sharf, *Byzantine Jewry* (London, 1971), esp. Appendix I, a tenth-century apocalyptic 'Vision of Daniel'.

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Journal titles have been abbreviated according to the initials used by *Année philologique* or in a fashion which is self-explanatory. Other abbreviations refer to ancient authors or to standard collections of inscriptions, legal texts, etc., which it is hoped will be familiar to most readers.

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